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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the reorganisation in exile of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa during the 1960s. The 1960s are 
generally regarded as a period of quiescence in the historiography of the South African 
liberation struggle. This study partially challenges such a view. It argues that although the 
1960s witnessed the progressive silencing of all forms of opposition by the apartheid 
government in South Africa, this was also a difficult time of experimentation and change, 
during which the exiled liberation movements had to adjust to the dramatically altered 
conditions of struggle emerging in the post-Sharpeville context.
The thesis traces the roots and early history of the international networks of 
solidarity between South Africa and Britain from the time of the 1945 Pan African 
Congress to the founding of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1960. It proceeds to 
examine the first attempts by the South African liberation movements to set up an external 
presence through the South African United Front, the causes of its demise and its legacy in 
terms of future unity. The establishment of the external mission of the ANC, its activities, 
and its relationship with host African countries vis-a-vis that of the PAC are analysed in 
detail. The research then focuses on problems of representation emerging from the gradual 
take-over of the ANC external mission as the sole representative of the whole of the 
Congress Alliance as a result of the Rivonia raid and trial. It is suggested that the internal 
debate between the ANC and its allies, most notably the South African Communist Party, 
signal a transition from the multi-racial approach of the 1950s to the creation of a unitary, 
non-racial liberation front. Issues of strategy and tactics arising from the decision to embark 
on a path of armed struggle in the early part of the decade are also analysed, including the 
state of .affairs within the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the complex 
relationship between military and political structures. Finally, the parallel development of 
the PAC in exile is reviewed, and some of its distinctive features are compared and 
contrasted to those of the ANC.
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INTRODUCTION 
1960: A year of destiny?
In 1960, seventeen African countries won their independence from colonial rule. This was
the year in which more African countries became independent than any other year, and
1960 went down in history as the ‘Year of Africa’ or ‘Africa Year.’ At the end of his tour
of the African continent in February, the Conservative British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan famously warned the South African parliament of a “wind of change” sweeping
all over Africa. As the process of decolonisation gained speed on the rest of the continent,
the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the two
most prominent African nationalist organisations in South Africa, increasingly associated
their predicament with the struggles of fellow Africans against colonialism. Even in South
Africa, the most industrialised country on the continent, the prospect of liberation from
white minority rule did not seem far off. In his address to the December 1959 Annual
Conference of the ANC, its President Chief Albert Lutuli exhorted:
Africa is very much astir. She is fast freeing herself from the shackles of 
colonialism. The year 1960 could be described as a Year of Destiny for many areas 
in Africa. [...]
WHAT ABOUT THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA? THE OPPRESSED COULD 
MAKE THE YEAR 1960 A YEAR OF DESTINY IN SOUTH AFRICA.1
1 Chief Albert Lutuli, “The Liberation Struggle is on in Earnest,” Presidential Address to the 47th Annual 
Conference o f  the African National Congress, Durban, 12 December 1959, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/lutuli/lutuli59.html. Original emphasis.
The PAC similarly identified itself with “the progressive forces of African nationalism” 
elsewhere in Africa, where, as stated in its Manifesto (adopted in April 1959), “[t]he 
liquidation of the forces of oppression is a process that not even nuclear power can halt.”
Originally called the South African Native National Congress, the ANC was bom in 
1912 to bring together Africans across what was then the Union of South Africa into a 
single organisation which transcended regional and ‘tribal’ differences by promoting a 
spirit of African nationalism. Initially drawing most of its support from the African middle 
classes, in its first three decades of existence the ANC focused its activities on getting a 
hearing for African grievances by using peaceful means such as petitions, deputations, 
appearances before government bodies, pamphleteering, and civil disobedience. In the mid- 
1940s, the socio-economic developments unleashed by the Second World War -  most 
importantly African urbanisation, employment in the secondary sector and trade union 
organisation -  helped bring about a double process of revival and radicalisation of the 
ANC, under the powerful influence of its Youth League. By turning to non-violent tactics 
of direct action, the ANC grew in the years that followed into a truly mass organisation 
which was now determined to achieve full citizenship rights for black South Africans 
throughout the country as laid out in its 1949 Programme of Action.
The accession to power of the National Party under a programme of apartheid in 
1948 helped unite the opposition movement. In 1947, the leadership of the ANC and of the 
South African Indian Congress (SAIC) signed the Declaration of Joint Cooperation, better 
known as the Dadoo-Naicker-Xuma or ‘Three Doctors’ Pact, which ushered in a new era of
2 Manifesto o f  the Africanist Movement, document 39b in Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, Challenge and 
Violence, 1953-1964, in Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History o f  African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Vol. 3 (Stanford, 1977), 518-519.
inter-racial collaboration. The alliance was first consolidated during the 1952 Defiance 
Campaign against Unjust Laws, which was organised jointly by the ANC and the SAIC.
In the early 1950s, the Coloured People Congress (CPC) and the (white) Congress 
of Democrats (COD) were formed to mobilise their respective communities in opposition 
against the government and in support of the ANC. Together with the ANC, the SAIC and 
the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), they came to constitute a broad 
union of forces that came to be known as the Congress Alliance. The alliance grew out of 
the principle that the ANC, as President Lutuli explained, was “prepared to cooperate fully 
on the basis of equality with any National or political party or organisation, provided they
' j
share common objectives and common methods of achieving our aims.”
On 26 June 1955 the Congress Alliance adopted its manifesto, the Freedom Charter, 
at the historic Congress of the People in Kliptown. The Charter outlined the vision of an 
equal society which would be governed according to principles of economic and social 
justice. Despite being often quoted as evidence of the ANC’s non-racialism, the Freedom 
Charter actually reflected a multi-, rather than non-racial conception of the South Africa as 
a plural nation made of four nations or, to use the terminology of the Charter, “national 
groups:”4 African, Indian, Coloured and white.5 The same multi-racial understanding also
3 Presidential Address by Chief A.J. Lutuli, ANC Annual Conference, 18-20 December 1953, document 3a in 
Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 122.
4 See “Freedom Charter,” adopted by the Congress o f  the people, Kliptown, 26 June 1955, document 11 in 
Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 205-208.
5 These divisions mirrored the official categories used by the South African government. The latter did not 
view all Africans as constituting a single nation, but further subdivided the African population into a variety 
o f  smaller, ethnically defined nations. This classification system underpinned much o f  apartheid legislation, 
as well as the Bantustan project. Although this study does not subscribe to the divisions imposed by the 
apartheid state, it does nevertheless use the terms “African,” “Indian,” “Coloured,” and “white” as this was 
the terminology used by the liberation movements at the time. When the term “black” is used, it is used in the
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informed the tactical union of the four, racially separate Congresses in the Congress 
Alliance. The debate around the so called ‘national question’ (i.e. what constitutes the 
nation), with the attendant ambiguity between non- and multi-racialism, is one of the 
subjects of this thesis.
The PAC was formed on 6 April 1959 after internal dissention within the ANC led 
to the breakaway of a group known as the Africanists, who had been growing more and 
more disgruntled with the policies of the ANC. Three main reasons for the Africanists’ 
disagreement can be identified. First, the Africanists had been opposed to the calling off of 
the 1952 Defiance Campaign by the senior ANC leadership in January 1953. Second, there 
was the issue of cooperation with Indians in the SAIC, and white liberals and communists 
in the COD. According to the Africanists, the ANC had come to be unduly influenced by 
non-Africans in the Congress Alliance, whom they accused of dictating policy to the ANC. 
Third, the Africanists claimed that the ANC had abandoned the 1949 Programme of Action 
and substituted it with the Freedom Charter.
Despite the general mood of optimism which seemed to infuse the start of the 
decade, the year 1960 turned out to be an anti-climax for the South African liberation 
struggle. The date nevertheless remains a watershed in South Africa’s history. On 21 March 
1960, peaceful anti-pass demonstrations organised by the PAC ended in the brutal police 
massacres of Sharpeville and Langa. The ANC and the PAC, which were consequently 
both declared illegal organisations, resolved to move underground and to embark on a path 
of armed struggle to meet the South African government’s increasing violence and 
repression. In the next few years, new draconian legislation was introduced which in effect 
turned South Africa into a police state. The decade which followed, on the surface a period
same sense as the post-Soweto generation intended it to refer to African, Coloured, and Indian sections o f  the 
populations collectively.
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of apparent tranquillity, saw the effective crushing of almost all forms o f internal political 
opposition by the apartheid machinery.
The year 1960 is also crucial in the history of the South African liberation 
movements as it coincides with the establishment of permanent outside machineries by the 
ANC and the PAC. The history of the liberation movements’ external work between 1960 
and 1969 is the principal subject of this thesis. The period in question, which has 
traditionally been regarded as one of relative political quiescence in the history of the South 
African liberation struggle, has received scant attention from historians of South Africa. In 
a way, the total suppression of the resistance movement in South Africa in the 1960s is also 
mirrored in the literature. Most histories of the liberation struggle either end with the 
banning of the liberation movements in 1960 and the subsequent turn to armed struggle, or 
they almost literally ‘jump’ from the early 1960s to the Durban strikes of 1973. The 
narrative usually picks up again in the mid-late 1970s, when the exiled ANC and, albeit to a 
less extent, the PAC gradually linked up with the resurgent resistance movement in South 
Africa and were thus able to capitalise on internal developments which occurred somewhat 
independently from them. This in turn enabled the two organisations to reappear as 
significant forces on the South African political scene in the 1980s. But what happened to 
the liberation movements in the years leading up to these events is rarely questioned, 
despite the fact that both the ANC and the PAC had in the process become quite different 
from the organisations they had been up until 1960. Moreover, their continued physical 
existence in exile has tended to be taken simply as a given fact.
Until the late 1960s, the few existing surveys of the history o f black political 
organisations were those written by some of the intellectuals of the various opposition 
movements as a result of their own political involvement. One of their purposes was to 
redress the general indifference of the dominant settler and liberal traditions in South
14
African historiography to contemporary black politics as a subject matter.6 A pioneering 
work in this respect was Eddie Roux’s Time Longer than Rope, originally published in 
1948.7 This was followed by Jack and Ray Simons’s Class and Colour in South Africa 
which appeared in 1969 -  the same year as the first volume of Wilson and Thompson’s 
Oxford History o f  South Africa.8 Although not strictly academic because of their underlying 
political aim -  the Simons’ preferred to call their book “an exercise in political sociology 
on a time scale,” rather than a history9 -  these early Marxist works have too often been 
ignored by the next generation of radical historians.10 Some of the questions introduced by 
these authors -  for instance with regards to the nature of race and class exploitation and the 
relationship between national and class struggle in South Africa -  are still relevant half a 
century later. However, the historical period under scrutiny in this study was too recent to 
be written about by this group of scholar-activists.
From the early 1970s, the recurrence of popular protests in South Africa itself was 
matched by a corresponding interest in social and popular history by a new generation of 
radical-revisionist and Marxist-inspired historians. In the preface to 1977 edition of the 
third volume of the epic documentary collection, From Protest to Challenge, which charted
6 Edward Roux, Time Longer than Rope: A History o f  the Black Man's Struggle fo r  Freedom in South Africa 
(London, 1948), 7.
7 Another important book was John Burger (pseudonym o f  Leo Marquand), The Black M an ’s Burden 
(London, 1943). For a non-Marxist interpretation see Jordan Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid 
(London, 1963).
8 Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), The Oxford History o f  South Africa, Vol.l, South Africa to 
1870, and Vol. 2, 1870-1966 (Oxford, 1969-1971). Leo Kuper’s chapter in volume two (426-476) was the 
only contribution to the collection devoted to the history o f African nationalism in South Africa. In the South 
African edition, even this was omitted from publication.
9 H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Harmondsworth, 1969), 9.
10 Bernhard Makhosezwe Magubane, “Whose memory -  whose history? The illusion o f  liberal and radical 
debates,” in Hans Erik Stolten (ed.), History Making and Present D ay Politics: The Meaning o f  Collective 
Memory in South Africa (Uppsala, 2007), 270.
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the history of black resistance in South Africa in the period 1882-1964 through a 
combination of archival material and analytical essays, American scholars Karis and Carter 
expressed the hope that their project would be “a stepping-stone for new generations of 
historians.”11 However, in the preface to the fifth volume in the series, which appeared in 
1997 and covers the history of the liberation struggle from its nadir in 1964 to its 
resurgence in 1979, readers are told that “these expectations are as pertinent [today] as they 
were almost two decades ago.”12 With a small number of exceptions, such as Tom Lodge’s
IT •influential survey of black resistance Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, it has in
fact been one of the failings of the revisionist school that only a a few comprehensive
syntheses of South Africa’s history have been attempted,14 despite the proliferation of
numerous, in-depth case studies.15 Although black political organisations have been
regarded in principle as key agents of political change and as important mobilisers of social
identity by revisionist historians, their concern with social history and history ‘from below’
-  rather than ‘institutional’ history -  has resulted on the whole in a localised focus of
enquiry. Bernhard Magubane has boldly argued this point in a recent critique of the liberal
and revisionist traditions in South Africa’s historiography:
When one reads the contributions of the Neo-Marxist historians, the infrequency of 
discussions of the national liberation movement and its struggles strikes one very
11 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 3, xv.
12 Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History o f  African 
Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, Vol. 5, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979 (Pretoria, 1997), xxii.
13 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London, 1983).
14 Some examples include: Nigel Worden, The Making o f Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and 
Apartheid, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 2000); Robert Ross, A Concise History o f  South Africa (Cambridge, 1999); 
William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, rev. ed. (Oxford, 2001).
15 Hans Erik Stolten, “History in the new South Africa: An introduction,” in Stolten (ed.), History Making, 
18-19.
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forcefully. The banning of the ANC and the PAC seems to have suggested that the 
national aspirations of Africans were no longer realistic.16
Moreover, the 1960s have tended to be viewed by radical historians as a rather 
inconsequential phase when compared to the militancy of the 1970s and 1980s -  or to the 
mass public campaigns of the 1950s. This has meant that for a long time Tom Lodge’s 
chapter on “Revolutionary exile politics, 1960-1975”17 provided the only overview of the 
period stretching from the banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1960 to the Soweto uprising 
of 1976.
A number of popular and official histories of the ANC have been written over the
1 ftyears by some of its members, friendly supporters and onlookers. The first, obvious 
problem with this body of literature is their open partisanship. Secondly, they have done 
little to correct the academic neglect of the 1960s and turn it into a period deserving closer 
investigation. And thirdly, they were written at a time when the political climate in South 
Africa was too highly charged for them to be able to escape the heavy ideological burdens 
imposed by the struggle. On the academic front, Peter Walshe’s account of the ANC during 
its legal era ends in 1952.19 Saul Dubow’s brief survey of the ANC is the only book to have 
been written by an academic which covers the entire history of the organisation from its
16 Magubane, “Whose memory -  whose history?,” 273.
17 Lodge, Black Politics, 295-320.
18 See Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle fo r  a Birthright (Harmondsworth, 1966); Francis Meli, South 
Africa Belongs to Us: A History o f the ANC  (Harare, 1988); Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History o f  the 
African National Congress (London, 1989); Dale T. McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A 
Critical Political Biography (London, 1997).
19 Peter Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism in South Africa: the African National Congress, 1912-1952 
(London, 1970).
17
birth to its election to power in 1994.20 However, this book too pays limited attention to the 
1960s.
The secondary literature on the history of the PAC is remarkably limited. This can 
in part be explained in terms of the organisation’s own political decline. Gail Gerhart has 
traced the ideological origins of the Africanist movement in her Black Power in South 
Africa21 The activities of the PAC/Poqo underground in the early 1960s have been 
documented in detail by Lodge,22 Karis and Gerhart,23 and more recently by Brown 
Bavusile Maaba and Sello Mathabatha.24 Both Lodge and Karis and Gerhart have provided 
general overviews of the history of the PAC in exile,25 which is also the subject of a 
doctoral thesis by Kwandiwe Kondlo26 and of an article by Thami ka Plaatjie.27 No 
institutional histories of the PAC have been written thus far. The same goes for
20 Saul Dubow, The African National Congress (Johannesburg, 2000).
21 Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution o f  an Ideology (Berkeley, 1979).
22 See Tom Lodge, “The Paarl insurrection: A South African uprising,” African Studies Review , 25 (1982), 
95-116; and “The Poqo insurrection,” in Tom Lodge (ed.), Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies 
(Johannesburg, 1986).
23 See Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 669-671.
24 Brown Bavusile Maaba, “The PAC’s war against the state, 1960-1963,” and Sello Mathabatha, “The PAC 
and POQO in Pretoria, 1958-1964,” both in South African Democracy Education Trust (hereafter SADET) 
(eds.), The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 1, 1960-1970 (Cape Town, 2004), 257-297, 299-318. 
See also Thami ka Plaatjie, “The PAC’s internal underground activities, 1960-1980,” in SADET (eds.), The 
Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2, 1970-1980 (Pretoria, 2006), 669-701.
25 Lodge, Black Politics, 305-317; “The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990,” in Ian Liebenberg, Fiona 
Lortan, Bobby Nel, B., and Gert van der Westhuizen (eds.), The Long March: The Story o f  the Struggle fo r  
Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria, 1994), 104-124; and Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 46-50.
26 Kwandiwe Merriman Kondlo, “In the twilight o f  the Azanian Revolution: the exile history o f  the Pan 
Africanist Congress o f Azania (South Africa): 1960-1990,” D. Litt. Et Phil Thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, October 2003, http://etd.rau.ac.za/theses/available/etd-08182004-115716/.
27 Thami ka Plaatjie, “The PAC in Exile,” in SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 2, 703-746.
28 Bernard Leeman wrote a partisan account o f  the PAC and Basutoland Congress Party. Lesotho and the 
Struggle fo r  Azania: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania: The Origins and History o f  the 
Basutoland Congress Party and the Pan Africanist Congress (London, 1985).
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autobiographies and political biographies of PAC leaders and activists. The PAC’s most 
important leader, Robert Sobukwe, has been the subject of just two political biographies.29 
C.J. Driver is the author of a biography of Patrick Duncan, which in part also covers the 
history of the PAC as Duncan became one of its members in the early 1960s.30 Philip 
Kgosana and Mxolisi Mgxahe’s personal memoirs appear to be the only existing 
autobiographies of PAC activists.31 By contrast, ANC and communist leaders and activists 
have been both the authors and the subjects of a wide array of autobiographies, memoirs 
and political biographies, especially after 1994. Among the most notable examples of 
personal accounts are Nelson Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom, Ahmed Kathrada’s 
Memoirs, Joe Slovo’s unfinished autobiography, Ben Turok’s Nothing but the Truth, and 
Rusty Bernstein’s Memory Against Forgetting}2 Anthony Sampson’s authorised biography 
of Mandela,33 and the life stories of Walter and Albertina Sisulu and Oliver Tambo are 
among the most important political biographies written by others.34
Only in recent years have scholars started to bridge some of the gaps in the literature 
and to fully appreciate the complexity of the 1960s as a decade worthy of attention in its 
own right. On one hand, this change in the historiography has been made possible by new
29 See Bejamin Pogrund, How Can Man Die Better: Sobukwe and Apartheid  (London, 1990); Elias L. 
Ntloedibe, Here Is a Tree: Political Biography o f  Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (Mogoditshane, 1995).
30 C.J. Driver, Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African (London, 1980).
31 Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg, 1988); Mxolisi Mgxahe, Are You 
with Us?: The Story o f  a PAC Activist (Houghton, 2006).
32 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography o f  Nelson Mandela (London, 1995); A.M. 
Kathrada, Memoirs (Cape Town, 2004); Joe Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography (Randburg, 1995); 
Ben Turok, Nothing but the Truth: Behind the ANC's Struggle Politics (Johannesburg, 2003); Rusty 
Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting: Memoirs from  a Life in South African Politics 1938-1964 (Sandton, 
1999).
33 Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography (London, 1999).
34 Elinor Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Claremont, 2002); Luli Callinicos, Oliver 
Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Cape Town, 2005).
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documentary sources and oral history projects that have become available in South African 
archives since 1994. On the other hand, South Africa’s transition to democracy has enabled 
historians, as well as many of the participants in the anti-apartheid struggle, to write and 
speak about the past more openly than before. As the bans on individuals and organisations 
were gradually lifted after 1990, so were many of the inhibitions which the demands of the 
struggle and the commitment to oppose apartheid exacted. The challenge today lies, as 
historian Shula Marks has argued, “in transforming South African history from being a 
morality play -  whether in its settler version as a narrative of the confrontation between 
civilisation and savagery (or modernity and irrationality) or in its humanitarian version of
i f
villains and victims.”
The publication of the first volume of The Road to Democracy in South Africa in 
2004 has marked a very important step in this direction. The chapters in the volume provide 
fresh insights into the years 1960-1970 by focusing on particular organisations, their 
activities, the evolution of their strategies and tactics, as well as specific events and other 
salient aspects which shaped the decade. Their overall aim is to challenge “the notion that 
the 1960s was a decade of political quiescence.” However, it is perhaps a shortcoming of 
the book that the composite chapters, which individually stand on their own, do not form a 
continuous narrative, as it is common with collections of this nature.
Building on this new body of scholarship, this thesis also challenges the 
characterisation of the 1960s as the ‘decade of quietude’ or, as the period has also been
35 Shula Marks, “Rewriting South African history: or the hunt for Hintsa’s head,” in Simon McGrath, Charles 
Jedrej, Kenneth King, and Jack Thompson (eds.), Rethinking African History (Edinburgh, 1997), 105.
36 SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, xv.
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referred to, ‘the lull.’37 It argues that although the 1960s witnessed the progressive silencing 
of all forms of internal opposition by the apartheid machinery, this was also a critical time 
of experimentation and change, in which the exiled liberation movements had to adjust to 
the dramatically altered conditions of struggle emerging in the post-Sharpeville context. 
Within a few years from their banning and the momentous decision to take up arms, both 
the ANC and the PAC virtually ceased to function in South Africa, where a large portion of 
their leadership languished in prison, and were effectively transformed into exiled 
movements. Forced to operate under conditions of illegality after long years of mass-based 
public campaigns and extra-parliamentary activity, cut off from their internal support base, 
separated from South Africa by a physical barrier of countries which were either allies of 
the apartheid state or too economically dependent on it to be able to oppose its policies, the 
liberation movements faced enormous challenges ahead of them. An in-depth analysis of 
what happened to the ANC and the PAC during their first decade of exile is important to 
reaching a greater understanding not just of the 1960s, but also of the years that followed. 
In fact, one could argue that it was on the basis of the achievements, as well as of the 
difficulties, setbacks, disagreements and doubts that appeared at this time, that the 
liberation movements ultimately emerged victorious in 1990.
In particular, it is remarkable that the ANC and its allies managed not only to stay 
together but were actually able to create a degree of unity, purpose and thrust which in turn 
allowed the ANC to pull through one of the bleakest periods in its history. The PAC in 
exile, on the other hand, was affected by a number of internal problems which in part 
overshadowed the message of the political tendency that the organisation represented when
37 Nigel Worden has dubbed the period after Sharpeville “decade o f  quietude,” although with an important 
question mark. The Making o f Modern South Africa, 128. For “the lull” see Julie Frederikse, The Unbreakable 
Thread: Non-racialism in South Africa (London, 1990), 92-103.
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it was founded in 1959. Despite these difficulties, which became visible from a very early 
stage, the PAC never disappeared from the political scene. The PAC’s continued survival, 
however troubled, can in part be attributed to its very Africanist ideology and the powerful 
appeal it was able to generate both within South Africa and at a Pan-African level.
Periodisation and outline
The primary concern of this thesis is with the reorganisation of the ANC and its allies, most 
notably the South African Communist Party (SACP), in exile from the time of the 
Sharpeville massacre to the Morogoro Consultative Conference of 1969. The history of 
PAC in exile during the same period is the second important topic of this study. An analysis 
of the PAC not only provides an interesting point of comparison with the ANC, but is also 
necessary because the ANC’s development after 1960 was in some measure determined by 
the PAC. Although the focus will be almost exclusively on these organisations, this is not 
to imply that they were the only organisations committed to ending apartheid in South 
Africa. The ANC and the PAC were, however, the only South African nationalist 
organisations which managed to regroup externally in a way that was both significant (in 
terms of the numbers of people involved) and enduring. This can in part be explained by 
the ‘liberation movement’ status they were both accorded by the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), unlike smaller groups such as the Non-European Unity Movement, and the 
material support they were able to benefit from as a result.
Although none of the chapters in the thesis is dedicated exclusively to the history of 
the SACP, the Party’s relationship with the ANC and its overall influence on the liberation 
struggle are an important aspect of this study. The SACP was established in 1953 following 
the disbandment of the original Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) as a result of the
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Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. Until the public announcement of the Party’s 
existence in July 1960, the SACP was not only a clandestine but also a secret organisation. 
Moreover, no official methods of contact governed the relations between the Party and the 
ANC, which functioned in a completely separate manner. However, individual communists 
generally occupied prominent positions either in the ANC or one or the other of the 
constituent organisations in the Congress Alliance. In this way, the Party was still able to 
bear its mark on the movement as a whole without, however, counterposing itself to it. The 
determination of SACP members to play a part in the Congress Movement stemmed from 
the Party’s resolve to build a strong ANC which would spearhead a national democratic 
revolution, not a socialist one. The origins of this policy and its implications are analysed in 
the thesis.
The role of the SACP in South Africa’s liberation struggle and the influence it has 
had on the ANC have been the subject of much historical debate -  a debate which 
originated within the liberation movement itself. Some scholars, such as Ellis and Sechaba, 
have argued that the aim of the SACP was essentially that of taking over the leadership of 
the ANC, which they claim was achieved at Morogoro in 1969.38 Eddy Maloka’s more 
recent study of the SACP in exile and Vladimir Shubin’s work on the ANC and the Soviet 
Union, however, have painted a rather more complex picture of ANC-SACP relations.39 In 
the period under scrutiny in this study, these relations were certainly not as straightforward 
as they may appear from the perspective of the present. Without a doubt the banning of the 
ANC in 1960 and the subsequent decision to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) by a section 
of its leadership in conjunction with the SACP to carry out sabotage operations brought the
38 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African 
Communist Party in Exile (London, 1992).
39 Eddy Maloka, The South African Communist Party in Exile, 1963-1990 (Pretoria, 2002); Vladimir G. 
Shubin, The ANC: A View from  Moscow  (Cape Town, 1999).
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ANC and the Party considerably closer. Nevertheless, the two organisations still continued 
to operate independently of one another. By 1965, the task of leading both the ANC and 
MK came to fall entirely onto the shoulders of the external mission of the ANC, with its 
headquarters in Tanzania. As a result, the SACP, the majority of whose members in exile 
were based in London, in effect lost all control over MK’s direction, as well as organised 
contact with its own members in MK. This lack of contact also affected relations between 
non-African members of the Central Committee of the SACP in London and those 
representing the ANC external mission in African countries. It was not until the late 1960s 
that the SACP managed to establish a good degree of cohesion among its leaders scattered 
in exile and was thus in the position to be able to formulate policy once again.
One aspect of the debate about the SACP on which commentators generally agree is 
that the Communist Party played a unique role -  for good or for worse -  in South Africa’s 
liberation. This is certainly true if one looks at other African countries, where no equivalent 
of the SACP can be found. Something which is perhaps less acknowledged is that the 
SACP’s decision to support the formation of a broad alliance of forces in the fight against 
apartheid is not as exceptional if compared to the policies of other communist parties 
outside of Africa. South Africa was not the only context in which a local communist party 
consciously adopted policies which would prevent the development of extremism and 
worked with other political groupings to defeat the immediate common enemy.40 This 
thesis argues that the SACP, like the communist parties of other countries, acted as a 
dynamic and unifying force within the liberation movement during the period in question,
40 For example, the role played by the Italian Communist Party in the war o f  resistance against Nazi-fascist 
occupation in 1943-1945 and its aftermath bears striking similarities with the SACP’s development o f  an 
alliance with the ANC, its controlled approach to the armed struggle, and the prominent part SACP leaders 
played in South Africa’s transition to democracy. For a brief history o f  the Italian Communist Party see 
Palmiro Togliatti, II Partito Comunista Italiano (Roma, 1961).
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by the end of which it had become an integral part of the alliance, yet with its own 
independent ideology, programme and role.
The five chapters which make up this thesis are ordered chronologically, so that 
each chapter covers a fairly discrete number of years. Every chapter is also organised 
around a central defining theme, which means that in some cases the narrative may go back 
in time to place that particular theme in historical context. The periodisation which informs 
the separation of the chapters is based on the identification of five stages. The first period, 
1945-1960 (Chapter One), coincides with the liberation movements’ early diplomatic 
activity and the founding stages of the international solidarity movement, one of the 
liberation movements’ key pillars of support throughout their long years of exile. At this 
time, the liberation movements were still legal in South Africa, from where operations were 
conducted in their entirety. The next stage, 1960-1962 (Chapter Two), covers the life-span 
of the South African United Front, the first external structure set up jointly by the ANC and 
the PAC in the aftermath of their banning. The third stage, 1962-1965 (Chapter Three), saw 
the establishment of a number of key operational centres or missions by the ANC and the 
PAC outside South Africa and their transformation into exile movements. Stage four, 1965- 
1967 (Chapter Four), witnessed the emergence of a series of problems leading to intense 
internal debate within both exile movements. The last phase, 1967-1969 (Chapter Five), 
was marked by the ANC’s military undertakings in Rhodesia and the act of intervention to 
stop the ensuing crisis by the ANC leadership at Morogoro in 1969.
March 1960 marks the formal beginning of the liberation movements’ external work
and the setting up of international offices by both the ANC and the PAC. However, this
thesis maintains that since the end of the Second World War, the ANC had become
increasingly aware of the importance of foreign support for the internal resistance
movement. After the war, contact was established with various international organisations,
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individuals and even states, mainly through the broader Pan-African and anti-colonial 
movement, which had its centre in Britain. Hence, Chapter One traces the roots and early 
history of the international networks of solidarity between South Africa and Britain from 
the time of the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress up to the formation of the British 
Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in 1960. The chapter argues that the AAM was bom as a 
by-product of the Congress Movement in South Africa thanks to the commitment to the 
liberation struggle of a small group of highly politically conscious South Africans who had 
been arriving in Britain since the late 1940s. Moreover, the timing of its formation, which 
coincides with the liberation movements’ move into exile, was especially important 
because throughout all of the 1960s, when ANC membership was still restricted to black 
South Africans, the AAM provided the kind of public platform that the Congress Alliance 
had been in the 1950s. Prior to the Morogoro Conference, it was largely through the AAM 
that white, Indian and Coloured exiles could offer their services in support of the national 
liberation movement.
Chapter Two proceeds to examine the first attempts by the South African liberation 
movements to establish an external presence through the South African United Front, 
which lasted from 1960 to the beginning of 1962. Given that the Front was created at a time 
of political divisions and bitter rivalry between the ANC and the PAC inside South Africa, 
the chapter investigates the reasons behind its formation and eventual demise, as well as its 
legacy for future ANC-PAC relations. The history of the SAUF is also worth analysing 
because it brings into focus the views of independent African states, Ghana in particular, 
about South Africa’s liberation. What emerges is that the ANC’s multi-racial approach to 
politics was largely viewed as problematic on the rest of the continent. As a result, the ANC 
decided to re-orient its external image in order to gain full recognition by African states.
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The establishment of the external mission of the ANC, its activities, and its 
relationship with African host countries, especially Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, vis-a-vis 
the PAC are analysed in Chapter Three, which covers the years 1962-1965. The 
formulation of the policy of the “African image” by the ANC following the demise of the 
SAUF is given special attention. The impact of specific events in South Africa, notably the 
Rivonia raid and trial, and their implications for the exiled movement and its development 
are also examined. The second half of this chapter provides a detailed account of the 
activities of the PA C , in Basutoland in the same period. The aim is to highlight the 
PAC/Poqo movement’s potentialities and their shattering, which was in part self-inflicted 
and in part achieved by the collusion of the British colonial authorities in Basutoland with 
South Africa in uprooting the PAC from this country.
Chapter Four analyses problems of external representation stemming from the
gradual take-over by the ANC external mission of the leadership of the whole of the
movement after Rivonia. The first indication of these problems was a dispute between the
ANC external mission and some representatives of the Coloured People Congress in exile,
which only finished with the latter’s defection to the PAC in 1966. The breakaway,
however, did not bring a permanent solution to the problems of external representation, as
the continued debates between the various parts of the former Congress Alliance now in
exile demonstrate. The position of the SACP on this issue is also discussed. The Chapter
goes on to suggest that the debates which occurred in this period are evidence of a gradual
transition from the multi-racial approach of the 1950s to the creation of a non-racial, united
front. Far from being linear, this transition involved a fundamental transformation of the
relations between the ANC and its non-African allies and was further complicated by the
policy of the “African image.” Lastly, the chapter looks at the PAC’s attempt at solving its
internal problems during the Moshi Conference of 1967. Although the meeting did not
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succeed in putting an end to the PAC’s in-fighting, the Moshi Conference seems to indicate 
a process of ideological transformation on the part of the PAC in exile.
The Morogoro Conference of 1969 can be viewed as the equivalent of the PAC’s 
effort at internal reform at Moshi by the ANC. The Conference, which is dealt with in 
Chapter Five, took place at a time of extreme crisis in the ANC. An investigation into the 
roots of the crisis reveals serious problems of discontent within the ANC’s army, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe. From 1966 the growing unrest in ANC military camps erupted in a 
series of desertions, rebellions or small mutinies and the scathing criticism of the ANC 
leadership by MK members such as Chris Hani. These incidents point to a widening gap 
between the political and military wings of the ANC which by 1969 had come to threaten 
the organisation’s very existence. Therefore the Chapter scrutinises military matters and 
issues of strategy and tactics arising from the decision to embark on a path of armed 
struggle in the early part of the decade. It argues that the ANC had failed to sufficiently 
adjust its strategy and tactics to the changing context. By 1969 this had led to deadlock 
which the ANC was able to overcome through the Morogoro Conference. Lastly, the 
impact of the Conference in the restructuring of the relations between the ANC and its non- 
African supporters is assessed, with special reference to ANC-SACP relations.
Among the resolutions adopted by the ANC at Morogoro was the historic decision
to open up its membership to all South African exiles regardless of race. Although today
the ANC is a non-racial party which anyone is free to join, until 1969, ANC membership,
including that of its external mission, had been exclusively African. The opening of
membership in 1969 was an event of huge proportions in the history of the ANC and the
development of its policy of non-racialism, which is one of the most important themes
running throughout the thesis. On the one hand, non-racialism had a long tradition in South
Africa -  evidence of which can be found for instance in the history of the trade union and
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socialist movements. Julie Frederikse has gone as far as to argue that non-racialism has run 
like an ‘unbreakable thread’ throughout the history of the liberation struggle.41 On the other 
hand, the difficult process of forging non-racial unity is perhaps more problematic than 
what Frederikse has suggested. In a society deeply divided along lines of colour, unity and 
united action between different groups were neither inevitable nor natural developments. 
More specifically, as Nhlanhla Ndebele has also suggested, this study seeks to demonstrate 
that it was the new conditions of exile which called for a rethinking of the ANC’s 
membership policy at Morogoro in 1969 42
Methodology and sources
The methodology that has been applied to the writing of this thesis is archival research. The 
principal documentary sources that have been used are the written records of the liberation 
movements, both published and unpublished. Published documents include various 
documentary collections (such as Karis and Carters’ From Protest to Challenge) and the 
ANC’s official website, which has a substantial section dedicated to the organisation’s 
historical documents.43 The bulk of the ANC external mission papers are held at the official 
ANC archive, the University of Fort Hare’s Liberation Archives. As well as the ANC 
Morogoro papers and part of the organisation’s London papers, the Oliver Tambo 
Collection, which is part of the same archive, has been consulted. The Mayibuye Centre at 
the University of the Western Cape holds the other half of the ANC London mission 
documents. It is also the repository of the personal papers of many prominent anti-apartheid
41 See Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread.
42 Nhlanhla Ndebele, “The African National Congress and the policy o f  non-racialism: a study o f  the 
membership issue,” Politikon, 29 (2002), 133-146.
43 See http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/.
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activists. In particular, the papers of Yusuf Dadoo, Brian Bunting and Reg September have 
been important sources of information. The Mayibuye Centre also boasts a large Sound and 
Oral History collection, including the full transcripts of Hilda Bernstein’s interviews on the 
experience of exile, which have been especially helpful in the writing of the first chapter. 
Lastly, the Karis and Gerhart collection at the Historical Papers of the University of the 
Witwatersrand has also supplied valuable material.
The National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre, based in Fort Hare, is the official 
custodian of the archival records of the PAC. However, very little material dating to the 
1960s has survived other than the early documents which are published in the third volume 
of From Protest to Challenge. However, some documents concerning the PAC can be 
found in some of the above mentioned ANC collections. Moreover, the British National 
Archives in London have supplied interesting and detailed information about the activities 
of the PAC in Basutoland during the years when its headquarters were based in Maseru. 
But the overall paucity of PAC archival documents -  as opposed to ANC primary sources 
for the same period -  has determined that main focus of this study would have to be on the 
ANC in exile, while the PAC can only be dealt with in secondary measure.
Although the documents of the SACP were originally deposited at the Mayibuye 
Archives shortly after 1994, the Party then recalled these so that they could be processed 
and classified but has not returned them since. Despite this major obstacle, many individual 
collections, especially those that belonged to members of the Party, hold material which has 
helped to bring light into the history of the SACP during this period. Other than the 
collections that have already been mentioned so far, the Simons’ papers, which are part of 
Manuscripts and Archives at the University of Cape Town, have been especially important. 
As with the PAC, however, the sketchy nature of SACP documentation can only produce a 
partial picture of the history of the Communist Party in the 1960s.
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Rhodes House Library in Oxford has been consulted to research the papers of the 
British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which is discussed in chapter one. The Movement for 
Colonial Freedom archival collection at SOAS Library has also been examined.
In order to make up for some of the shortcomings of these primary sources, a 
number of individuals who had been active participants in the events discussed in this 
thesis have been interviewed. Oral history, however, presents its own set of problems. The 
first one is that interviewees have been asked to look back into a past which is quite remote. 
Second, some of the interviewees have been reluctant to discuss certain topics and have 
tended to gloss over some of the problems put before them because of their sensitive nature. 
Despite this, oral interviews have nevertheless provided precious insiders’ viewpoints, 
helping to personalise the arguments and debates which arose during the period under 
scrutiny.
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CHAPTER ONE
Externa] support for the South African liberation struggle, c. 1945-1960
In March 1960, a handful of black leaders of the opposition secretly left South Africa in 
order to rally international support for the struggle against apartheid. Within the span of a 
few years they had been joined by a considerable number of their friends and colleagues 
and had come to form a sizeable community of South African political exiles clustered in 
various centres throughout Africa, Europe and North America. Wholesale repression by the 
apartheid regime in South Africa during this period meant that it was from these centres 
that the South African liberation movements would have to continue to direct their struggle 
from now on. Despite a period of relative disorientation and uncertainty which lasted 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the ANC was able not only to survive, but also to re- 
emerge as a powerful force in South African politics by the early 1980s. Over the next three 
decades after its banishment in 1960, the external structures of the ANC expanded on a 
scale which is unprecedented in the history of any other exiled liberation movement. By the 
time the ANC and its allies were able to return ‘home’ in the early 1990s, they had 
developed a bureaucratic machinery of huge proportions which included diplomatic 
missions, publicity and information centres, military camps and educational and other 
vocational facilities. In the late 1980s, an estimated ten to fifteen thousand people (most of 
whom were members of Umkhonto we Sizwe) were represented by the ANC outside South 
Africa, and spread throughout as many as twenty-five countries.1
1 Tom Lodge, “Rebellion: the turning o f  the tide,” in Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson (eds.), All Here and Now: 
Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (London, 1992), 173-174.
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How was this impressive development possible? Prior to 1960, neither the ANC nor 
its newly-formed rival, the PAC, had established external offices, nor were they officially 
represented abroad on a permanent basis. However, this is not to say that no international 
links and contacts were in place prior to this date. By the time of the Sharpeville massacre 
of March 1960, the internationalisation (or extemalisation) of the anti-apartheid struggle 
had been well under way for over a decade as part of the wider pan-African and anti­
colonial movement, particularly in Britain. This process was the result of a growing 
international awareness on the part of the liberation movements in South Africa on the one 
hand, coupled with the commitment to the freedom struggle of a small group of South 
Africans who had been emigrating to Britain since the late 1940s on the other. So when the 
ANC and the PAC began to set up an external presence after March 1960, they did not 
move into a vacuum but were able to link up with a growing transnational anti-apartheid 
network whose foundations had started to be laid down from the mid-late 1940s. The 
development of these international connections from the 1945 Manchester Pan-African 
Congress to the formation of the British AAM in 1960 are examined in this chapter.
This chapter will take the view, as Christabel Gurney has suggested, that the AAM 
“began almost as an offshoot of the South African Congress movement.”2 Although the 
ANC was not directly involved in establishing an anti-apartheid movement in Britain, both 
the origins and future direction of the AAM were directly shaped by Congress-related 
events in South Africa. Moreover, it was largely through the initiative and dedication of 
South African Congress supporters in London that a boycott of South African goods was 
started in Britain in June 1959, culminating in the birth of the AAM less than a year later.
2 Christabel Gurney, “In the heart o f  the beast: the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1959-1994,” in SADET 
(eds.), International Solidarity, Vol. 1 (forthcoming in 2008), 2.
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The ANC, Britain and the United Nations
Since its birth in 1912 the ANC had looked to the outside world for support for the
grievances and concerns of black South Africans. The obvious immediate focus of attention
of the leaders of the ANC was Britain, as it had also been for their predecessors. Britain
occupied a unique position in relation to South Africa, being the former colonial power and
major investor in the country’s economy. Moreover, it was the British parliament that had
sanctioned the Act of Union under which the Union of South Africa was created in 1910 as
a self-governing white Dominion within the British Commonwealth -  but from whose
parliament non-whites would be permanently excluded. Hopes that Britain would lend a
sympathetic ear to the grievances of black South Africans dated back to the nineteenth
century and stemmed from the inherent belief of the Western-educated, Christianised
leadership of the ANC in the standards of British practice and justice. Ultimately, these
hopes rested, as Peter Walshe has argued, “on an idealised version of a multi-racial empire
governed by non-racial principles, on Britain’s nineteenth-century position as ultimately
responsible for Native affairs, and on a constitutional judgement that was but recently out
of date.”3 This idealised notion of a benevolent British empire produced a tension with
enduring influence on following generations of African leaders and which has been
summed up by Mandela in his autobiography:
I confess to being something of an Anglophile. When I thought of Western 
democracy and freedom, I thought of the British parliamentary system. In so many 
ways, the very model o f the gentleman for me was an Englishman. Despite Britain 
being the home of parliamentary democracy, it was that democracy that had helped 
to inflict a pernicious system of iniquity on my people. While I abhorred the notion 
of British imperialism, I never rejected the trappings of British style and manners.4
3 Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 20.
4 Mandela, Long Walk, 360.
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By the end of the Second World War, the South African nationalist movement had become 
disillusioned with the tactics of sending deputations to present appeals and polite petitions 
to the South African and British parliaments and the King. A younger, bolder generation of 
African leaders entered the political arena in the wartime period and their militancy helped 
to resuscitate the ANC from the moribund state it had reached in the mid-late 1930s. In 
1944 they founded the ANC Youth League, whose Manifesto completely rejected the old 
philosophy of trusteeship in favour of one of “African self-determination,” which translated 
into the clear demand for “full and free citizenship.”5 The Youth League criticised its 
mother body for being an “organisation of the privileged few.” These “privileged few” had 
become “out of actual touch with the needs of the rank and file and of our people” and were 
“merely reacting negatively to given conditions, able neither to assert the national will nor 
to resist it openly.” Freedom from white domination could only be achieved, the Youth 
League argued, through mass action under the banner of African nationalism. Despite the 
criticism, the Youth League saw it as its challenge “to build Congress from within” by 
acting as its “brain-trust and power-station.”6 At its Annual Conference in December 1949 
the ANC adopted a Programme of Action, which the Youth League had drafted. The 
Programme declared the right of black people to self-determination and laid out plans for 
strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience and non-cooperation.7 Increasingly, under the influence 
of the Youth League, the organisation became internationalist in outlook, as its focus now
5 “Congress Youth League Manifesto,” issued by the Provisional Committee o f the Congress Youth League, 
March 1944, document 48 in Thomas Karis, Hope and Challenge, 1935-1952, in Karis and Carter (eds.), 
From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 2 (Stanford, 1973), 300-308.
6 Ibid., 308.
7 See “Programme o f  Action,” statement o f  policy adopted at the ANC Annual Conference, 17 December 
1949, document 60 in Karis, Hope and Challenge, 337-339.
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expanded to the African continent. In their 1944 Manifesto the founders of the Youth
League listed among their creeds that:
We believe in the unity of all Africans from the Mediterranean Sea in the North to 
the Indian and Atlantic oceans in the South - and that Africans must speak with one 
voice.8
On the one hand, it can be argued that the emergence of the Youth League and the 
radicalism it generated are indigenous products of the South African environment.9 Yet, on 
the other hand, both the radicalisation of African politics and the ANC’s growing 
internationalism during the Second World War and its aftermath are not phenomena 
exceptional to South Africa and they also need to be understood within the broader trend of 
the intensification of anti-colonial struggles during the same period. The Second World 
War and the signing of the Atlantic Charter (which enunciated the right of all peoples to 
self-determination) by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941 placed the colonial powers, Britain 
in particular, under pressure as to what the future of their colonial territories would be once 
the war ended. The Atlantic Charter, which was endorsed by South Africa’s Prime Minister 
Jan Smuts, inspired the ANC to draw up its own charter, Africans’ Claims in South Africa, 
which was unanimously adopted at its Annual Conference in December 1943. The ANC 
hoped, Mandela later explained, “that the government and ordinary South Africans would 
see that the principles they were fighting for in Europe were the same ones we were 
advocating at home.”10 This document was divided into two parts, “The Atlantic Charter 
from the standpoint of Africans within the Union of South Africa,” and a “Bill of rights.” In 
the latter, the ANC demanded full citizenship rights, equal share in the material resources
8 “Congress Youth League Manifesto,” issued by the Provisional Committee o f  the Congress Youth League, 
March 1944, document 48 in Karis, Hope and Challenge, 308.
9 See Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 335-339.
10 Mandela, Long Walk, 110.
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of the country, equal opportunities in all spheres of employment, and full participation in 
and access to educational, economic, and medical facilities.11 On the question of the 
franchise, the call was made for “the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right 
to vote and be elected to parliament, provincial councils and other representative 
institutions.”12 Although the call for full citizenship rights had variously been made in the 
past and the principle of one man one vote had been implicitly suggested in the wording of 
some of its statements, the ANC now seemed to take a more radical position on the 
franchise issue than it had until now.13 Africans’ Claims is also evidence of a “more self- 
conscious and assertive Pan-African thinking” which had been latent in the ANC, and 
which the war helped bring into greater focus. As Walshe has pointed, out “through having 
to interpret the Atlantic Charter, Congress therefore received a boost to its own 
expectations and simultaneously had its attention directed to the process of political 
emancipation throughout the entire African continent.”14
Hopes that the British government would support the demands of black South 
Africans had largely waned by the time the war ended. The UN emerged in the aftermath of 
the war as the arbiter of a new, international world order, and its importance was 
immediately recognised by Congress. In 1946 ANC President Dr A.B. Xuma personally 
delivered a petition to the UN, which he visited alongside a delegation from the SAIC15 and 
Indian government representatives (who were lobbying the UN on the Pegging and Asiatic
11 See Africans’ Claims in South Africa, including “The Atlantic Charter from the standpoint o f  Africans 
within the Union o f  South Africa” and “Bill o f rights,” adopted by the ANC Annual Conference, 16 
December 1943, document 29b in Karis, Hope and Challenge, 209-223.
12 Ibid, 217.
13 Karis, Hope and Challenge, 89.
14 Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 334.
15 The two SAIC delegates were H.A. Naidoo and Sorabjee Rustomjee. Senator Hymie Basner also travelled 
with them.
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Acts), to protest against the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. Xuma 
wanted to link the incorporation of South West Africa to the issue of South Africa’s 
domestic Native policy, which, he argued, could not merely be considered as an internal 
matter because it left Africans with “no means of effective influence over Parliament 
through normal democratic channels.”16 The UN’s rejection of Pretoria’s request for
1 7incorporation of South West Africa and its condemnation of anti-Indian legislation did 
little to shift the future course of South Africa’s politics. However, “[i]n the years that 
followed, Congress continued to draw on the United Nations as a source of moral support 
and to use it as a platform for protesting against apartheid.”18
Despite the shift of focus to the UN, Britain nevertheless continued to hold a special 
relationship with South Africa as a result of its deeply-rooted historic and economic links 
and its imperial responsibility. Moreover, from the 1930s Britain had become a centre of 
growing pan-African and anti-colonial activity, which found expression in the formation of 
a number of organisations such as the West African Students’ Union (founded in 1925), the 
League of Coloured Peoples (1931), the International African Service Bureau (1937), and 
the Pan-African Federation (1944). United by a common anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
spirit, by the belief that the right to self-determination must be extended to colonial 
territories after the war and by their experience of British racism, these various groups 
increasingly came together during the 1940s. A series of initiatives were organised in
16 Quoted in Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism , 330. See also Dr. A.B. Xuma, President-General, 
ANC: Cable to the Chairman, General Assembly, opposing South Africa’s proposal for incorporation o f  
South West Africa, January 1946, http://www.anc.org.za/un/letters/index.html#xuma.
17 See A/RES/44 (I), 8 December 1946,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf7Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/44ffl&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION. 
and A/RES/65 (I), 14 December 1946,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf7Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/65(I')&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION.
18 Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 331.
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Britain to articulate the concerns and the demands of colonial peoples with the view of 
influencing the discussions on colonial issues at the UN, enlisting the support of the 
international trade union movement, as well as of exerting pressure on the British 
government and influencing British public opinion.19
In February and June of 1945, London respectively hosted the World Trade Union 
Conference and the All Colonial Peoples’ Conference. A “Charter of Labour for the 
Colonies” was discussed at the World Trade Union Conference which raised, amongst 
other issues, the problem of trade union representation for African workers specifically in 
South Africa and Rhodesia.20 A South African writer-joumalist, Peter Abrahams, was 
among the speakers at the All Colonial Peoples’ Conference, where he said that in South 
Africa “only a revolution can ever liberate the Africans from slavery under which they now 
exist.”21 That South Africa was represented within this growing Pan-African and anti­
colonial movement in Britain at this time was largely the result of the voluntary, individual 
effort of this one man, who acted as its international ambassador in this period. Abrahams 
had first become politicised in South Africa, before leaving the country in 1939 in order to
99fulfil his ambition to be a writer. After working as a seaman for two years, he arrived in 
England in 1941, where he soon became active in Pan-African circles through the 
International African Service Bureau. In Britain he also worked as a regular correspondent 
for the Daily Worker and later The Observer, before resettling in Jamaica in 1955.
19 See Hakim Adi, “Pan-Africanism in Britain: background to the 1945 Manchester Congress,” in Hakim Adi, 
Marika Sherwood, and George Padmore (eds.), The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited  
(London, 1995), 11-32.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Quoted in ibid., 18.
22 See Peter Abrahams, Tell Freedom  (London, 1954) for a moving account o f  Abrahams’ political journey 
and early life in South Africa.
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The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress
In October 1945 the fifth Pan-African Congress was held in Manchester, marking the 
culmination of a period of intensified anti-colonial activity in the UK. The initial impetus 
for the Manchester Congress came from George Padmore and the Pan-African Federation, 
with the support of W.E.B. Du Bois, ‘the father of Pan-Africanism.’ The West African 
Students’ Union, the League of Coloured Peoples, as well as several individuals and 
organisations from the USA, the Caribbean, and Africa were involved in its preparation. 
Twenty-six of the ninety delegates to the Manchester Congress came from Africa. Among 
them were Hastings Banda, Kwame Nkrumah, Obafemi Awolowo and Jomo Kenyatta, who 
all became the leaders of their respective countries at independence.
Peter Abrahams, who had been appointed Publicity Secretary to the Conference, 
had written to D.D.T. Jabavu (President of the All African Convention) in South Africa 
inviting him to attend and asking him to forward the request to the ANC as well as to the 
Non-European Unity Front. All the South Africans failed to participate as they could not 
obtain passports from the South African government. The ANC was in the end represented 
at the Congress by Peter Abrahams himself and Makumalo (Mark) Hlubi,24 “but their 
appointment had been a belated and haphazard one.”25 Still, it was fortunate that Abrahams 
and Hlubi happened to be in London at the time, or the ANC would have not been 
represented at the Congress at all. As well as acting as the Publicity Secretary, Abrahams 
collaborated with Padmore in the publication of a commemorative pamphlet on the 
Congress.
23 See Adi, Sherwood, and Padmore (eds.), The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress.
24 Hlubi had arrived in Britain to study medicine on a scholarship around the mid-1930s, but instead became 
involved in show business and acting. He had begun his acting career at the Bantu Men’s Social Centre, 
which is where that Hlubi and Abrahams had first met.
25 Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 338.
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The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress has been viewed as a landmark event 
in accelerating the end of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, marking the beginning of a 
new, militant phase in the fight against colonialism. However, for the purpose of this study, 
the focus will be on its relevance in regards to the South African freedom struggle 
specifically. The right of all people, including those living under colonial rule, to govern 
themselves was affirmed by the Congress, which also called for complete social, economic 
and political emancipation of the colonies. The strike and the boycott were pinned down as 
the two “invincible” weapons through which colonial peoples could win the battle against 
imperialism.26 In particular, the call for boycott turned out to be of crucial significance for 
the South African resistance movement, for in the late 1950s the boycott weapon was 
extended beyond the country’s borders to become one of the most effective weapons to 
isolate South Africa internationally.
A session of the Manchester Congress chaired by W.E.B. Du Bois was dedicated to 
discussing “Oppression in South Africa,” and was addressed by both Hlubi and Abrahams. 
Hlubi spoke of South Africa’s policy of segregation and in particular its implications on the 
labour front. Abrahams, on the other hand, drew attention to the Pass Laws and African 
education. In the resolutions passed by the Congress, several demands were made in 
relation to South Africa, on top of the list being the universal suffrage. The Congress 
pledged its support for the non-European people of South Africa and their struggle, which 
was viewed “as an integral part of the common struggle for national liberation throughout 
Africa.” Alarm over South Africa’s expansionist regional policies was also voiced in a 
resolution which rejected any plans of incorporation of the neighbouring Protectorates and
26 See George Padmore (ed.), Colonial and... coloured unity, a programme o f  action: history o f  the Pan- 
African Congress, reprinted in Adi, Sherwood, and Padmore (eds.), The 1945 Manchester Pan-African 
Congress, 51-124.
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demanded that the British Labour government honour the initial promise of Protection 
under which it had come to rule these territories.27 Finally, a draft resolution on South West 
Africa was adopted and later submitted to the UN, rejecting South Africa’s claims to rule 
this territory and demanding the abolition of its League of Nations mandate.
The resolutions adopted by the Pan-African Congress in relation to Southern Africa 
are significant for a number of reasons. First, the demand of one man one vote was clearly 
stated. Then, South Africa’s policy towards South West Africa on one hand and the 
Protectorates on the other were identified as two critical areas of concern over which 
international action should be mobilised through the UN. Finally, the struggle in South 
Africa was declared as inseparable from the liberation of Africa as a whole and firmly 
placed within the context of anti-colonial struggles. Yet, Walshe has argued, whereas the 
Pan-African Congress played an important role in terms of the development o f Pan-African 
thinking in middle Africa, “it would be easy to exaggerate its impact” on black South 
African politics.29 In fact, neither Abrahams nor Hlubi had the necessary political 
credentials to make them properly representative of the ANC, of which they were not, 
formally speaking, members. Moreover, they both remained in the UK, which meant that 
the ideas and vision which were promoted at the Congress were not directly brought back 
into South Africa. Perhaps most significantly, the South African counterpart of the 
generation of African leaders who was present at the Congress and who would come of age 
in the 1950s to lead the anti-colonial struggle in their countries of origins, was rather insular 
in comparison. Whereas the likes of Nkrumah and Kenyatta shared a similar experience of 
British colonialism and came together in the UK where they all spent time studying,
27 Ibid., 105-106.
28 Ibid., 111-112.
29 Walshe, The Rise o f  African Nationalism, 337-338.
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Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Govan Mbeki, who were politicised in the 1940s and emerged 
as the leaders of the South African nationalist movement the following decade, were shaped 
by very different (and very South Africa) experiences.
First, they were all educated in South Africa, where, up to the late 1940s, the 
African elite could still enjoy the benefits of non-racial missionary institutions such as 
Lovedale, Healdtown and Fort Hare, the ‘alma mater ’ of African nationalists. Furthermore, 
before the Bantu Education Act was introduced in 1953, small numbers of Africans could 
still enter the ‘liberal’ English-speaking universities. In the mid-late 1940s, the University 
of Witwatersrand brought nascent African leaders such as Mandela into close contact with 
white radicals and Indians (many of whom were also members of the Communist Party). 
The inter-racial friendships which developed among this groups of Wits graduates played 
an important role in the softening of Africanist sentiments within the ANC and in the 
development of a South African brand of African nationalism with no equivalent elsewhere 
in Africa. In Mandela’s case, which can be used as an illustration of the feelings of most of 
the ANC leaders of his generation, Lodge has suggested that: “Increasingly, the narrow 
solidarities of the more doctrinaire Youth League ideologues were emotionally at odds with 
his own personal experience, however intellectually appealing he may have found them 
initially.”30
Even so, the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress was significant in that it 
marked the beginning of a new era of active campaigning for colonial freedom in Britain 
which challenged the previous moderate, legalistic and gradualist attitude towards 
decolonisation adopted by Western governments and liberal human rights groups.31 The
30 Tom Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford, 2006), 48.
31 George W. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation o f South 
Africa (Westport, 1977), 31-32.
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Congress was attended by representatives of the British Independent Labour Party and 
Common Wealth Party. The Lancashire and Cheshire District Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB), Pat Devine, sent a fraternal message in which it pledged to 
campaign for the extension of the principle of self-determination to the colonies and for the 
introduction of immediate reforms by the British government.32 In 1948, Nkrumah, 
Kenyatta, and Padmore were among the participants in the Congress of Peoples Against 
Imperialism, whose Chairman was Andrew Fenner Brockway of the Independent Labour 
Party. Significantly, it was within this growing anti-colonial movement that anti-apartheid 
began to make itself heard in the UK.
Early campaigning against apartheid in the UK
As decolonisation helped to throw into greater prominence the plight of the black 
population of South Africa, anti-apartheid activism started to grow in Britain after the 
Second World War. In the 1950s, a diverse range of new organisations and personalities 
leaning to the left of British politics entered the political scene of anti-colonialist and anti­
apartheid discourse in the UK. They included Fenner Brockway’s Movement for Colonial 
Freedom (MCF), Michael Scott’s Africa Bureau and Canon John Collins’s Christian
' i  ^
Action. Trevor Huddleston, Michael Scott and John Collins, who collectively gained a 
reputation as ‘the turbulent priests,’34 all played a prominent role within this network and 
articulated Christian critiques of apartheid long before the Christian Churches would take a
32 Adi, Sherwood, and Padmore (eds.), The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, 115-116.
33 The origins o f  both Christian Action and the Africa Bureau can be traced back to the Anti-Slavery Society 
o f  1906, which in turn had grown out o f  nineteenth-century anti-slavery groups. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, 
33.
34 See Rob Skinner, “Turbulent priests or movement intellectuals? Christian voices and international 
opposition to apartheid in the 1950s,” http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/aam/turbulent.html.
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stand on the issue. Scott and Huddleston35 both had a first hand experience of South Africa, 
and during their time in the country they had formed close contacts with the ANC and the 
Congress Movement. On their return to the UK, they became outspoken critics of apartheid 
and champions of black people’s rights. In 1956, the publication of Huddleston’s personal 
account of life in Sophiatown, Naught fo r  Your Comfort, “carried its message of the 
humanity of black South Africans into the homes of church people throughout Britain” at a 
time when the British public knew very little about apartheid and South Africa.37 Several 
Labour Party constituencies, Labour MPs, trade union groups, and the CPGB were also 
involved in the campaigning. These organisations and individuals were the first to act on a 
transnational level through international structures like the UN. Their primary concern was 
with Africa as a whole, and with the independence of African states. As for South Africa, 
their expectations were that apartheid had to be dismantled and that majority rule had to be 
established soon.38
As early as 1946 Michael Scott testified before the UN in New York on behalf of 
the Herero people of South West Africa regarding South Africa’s incorporation of this 
mandate territory. In March 1952, after having been prohibited from returning to South 
Africa, Scott established the Africa Bureau in London, “to help people in Africa opposing 
unfair discrimination and inequality of opportunity and to foster cooperation between 
races,” and “to oppose racial tyrannies in Africa [...] to promote the achievement of non-
35 In 1981 Huddleston became President o f  the AAM. He also became IDAF’s Chairman after Collins’s death 
in 1982.
36 Trevor Huddleston, Naught fo r  your Comfort (London, 1956). Michael Scott also published an 
autobiographical account covering his years in South Africa and Namibia. A Time to Speak (London, 1958).
37 Gurney, “In the heart o f  the beast,” 4.
38 Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, 34-35.
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discriminatory majority rule in Africa.”39 The Africa Bureau Committee included members 
of the Labour and Liberal Parties, while the Conservative Lord Hemingford was its 
Chairman. Jane Symonds, an Englishwoman, and Mary Benson, a South Africa emigre, 
assisted Scott in the office.40 Scott and the Africa Bureau were close to David Astor, editor 
of the London Observer, known at the time as “the black man’s friend.”41 South African 
Labour Party leader and journalist Colin Legum, who left South Africa in opposition to the 
National Party’s electoral victory in 1948,42 became The Observer's first Africa 
correspondent. In the 1950s, the Bureau aided the people of Nyasaland, Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia in their opposition to the creation of the Central African Federation by 
the British government, and took up the case of Tshekedi and Seretse Khama who had been 
exiled from Bechuanaland by the British authorities. Other campaigns included protests 
against the imposition of the 1953 Bantu Education Act and the Sophiatown removals, as 
well as publicity on conditions in the Rand’s shantytowns and in prison farms. Finally, in 
early 1956, Scott and Trevor Huddleston started a protest against apartheid in sport43 and 
the arts at a meeting in the House of Lords.44
Christian Action was another organisation working on Africa during this period. 
Following the arrests of the Defiance Campaign in 1952, on Huddleston’s request from 
South Africa, Canon Collins set up the British Defence and Aid Fund as an offshoot of
39 Africa Bureau Constitution, quoted in Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, 35.
40 In 1957 Mary Benson became the secretary o f the Treason Trial Defence Fund in Johannesburg. She 
permanently moved to England in 1966 after she was banned in South Africa. See Mary Benson, A Far Cry: 
the making o f  a South African (Pretoria, 1996).
41 Sampson, Mandela, 128.
42 See Mark Israel, South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom  (Houndmills, 1999), 26.
43 For a brief overview o f  the beginnings o f  the campaign against apartheid in sport see Abdul Minty, 
“International boycott o f apartheid sport,” United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 
16/71, April 1971. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/aam/abdul-2.html#(l) .
44 Benson, A Far Cry, 88.
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Christian Action to provide aid to “the prosecuted victims of unjust legislation and 
oppressive and arbitrary procedures, and relief to their families and dependants [...] until 
the blacks in South Africa are politically, socially and economically free men and 
women.”45 During the Treason Trial of 1956-61, the British Defence and Aid Fund changed 
its name into the Defence and Aid Fund; in 1961 it became the International Defence and 
Aid Fund (IDAF). Until its banning under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1964, 
IDAF held offices in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. After 1964 it continued its 
work until 1991 through an international office based in London, and national committees 
in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, the US, 
Denmark, Switzerland and Australia. Under the effective direction of Canon Collins, IDAF 
“injected tens of millions of pounds into the struggle against apartheid.” This money was 
directed at the defence of “almost every political trial of importance to come before South 
African courts” and the dependants of political prisoners.46
MCF was formed in 1954 under the chairmanship of Fenner Brockway “in order to 
coordinate the activities of British organisations concerned with anti-imperialism and 
colonialism.”47 It incorporated the League Against Imperialism, the Central Africa 
Committee, the Kenya Committee and the Seretse Khama Defence Committee. Its early 
work concentrated on informing and pressurising British MPs to raise colonial issues in
45 Canon J. Collins, “The Work o f  IDAF,” Address to the 62nd meeting o f  the United Nations Special 
Committee on Apartheid, New York, June 1965, in Canon John Collins, Southern Africa: Freedom and 
Peace. Addresses to the United Nations, 1965-1979, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/solidaritv/collinsp.html#l.
46 Denis Herbstein, White Lies: Canon John Collins and the Secret War Against Apartheid (Oxford, 2004), 1. 
For an account o f  the work o f Canon Collins and IDAF see also Diana Collins, Partners in Protest: Life with 
Canon Collins (London, 1992).
47 School o f  Oriental and African Studies, Archives and Manuscripts, Movement for Colonial Freedom 
(hereafter MCF), Catalogue.
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both Houses. A Committee on Southern Africa and the Protectorates was established in 
1954, and a Committee Against Racialism in Sport was created in 1956, thus introducing 
anti-apartheid and anti-racist campaign work alongside anti-colonialism. Sponsors of the 
Movement included Lord Archibald, Barbara Castle MP, Canon Collins, Trevor 
Huddleston, and Gerald Gardiner QC. In 1958, Barbara Castle went to South Africa to 
report on the Treason Trial for the Sunday Pictorial.48 In 1962 Castle became the first 
AAM Honorary President.49 Brockway, MCF’s Vice-Chairman John Stonehouse MP, and 
its General Secretary John Eber were among the early supporters of the first British boycott 
o f South African goods. The support of these British political figures, who stood out 
against the majority of public opinion at a time when “large sections of the British public 
were still believing that colonialism was a good thing and Africa was backward,” played a 
very important role in swinging that opinion in the opposite direction.50
One of the earliest supporters of the South African freedom cause that existed in 
London at the time was the India League, which had been set up by the Indian National 
Congress and had campaigned for India’s independence. South African Indians in London 
converged onto the India League and used it as a base from which they could take 
initiatives on the South African question, “especially given the importance that India was 
attributing to the South African question in the UN at the time.”51 In 1948 the India League 
published a pamphlet, which had been jointly written by Dr Yusuf Dadoo (President of the 
Trasvaal Indian Congress) and Cassim Jadwat for circulation at the UN General Assembly
48 Christabel Gurney, “ ‘A great cause’: The origins o f the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 
1960,” Journal o f Southern African Studies, 26 (2000), 130.
49 Castle resigned in 1964 after the Labour Party’s electoral victory as she was appointed Minister o f  Overseas 
Development in the new government. David Steele replaced her as AAM Honorary President.
50 University o f  the Western Cape (hereafter UWC), Mayibuye Archives, “Hilda Bernstein Interviews on the 
Experience o f  Exile” (hereafter HBI), Abdul Minty, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts Vol. 8.
51 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Vella Pillay, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts, Vol. 13.
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in Paris in November that year.52 Jadwat was a representative of the SAIC and the Passive 
Resistance Council who had arrived in Britain as early as 1945, after he had been “seen off 
at Cape Town docks by Yusuf Dadoo who urged him to get international support for the 
anti-apartheid struggle.” In 1949 Jadwat and the India League organised a meeting at
C 'i
Friends House in London that was addressed by Dadoo and Paul Robeson.
Early South African political exile54
From the late 1940s a more substantial number of South Africans started to travel abroad, 
and to the UK in particular. This development was in part a consequence of the 
enforcement of apartheid legislation from the late 1940s. For some, the move was a 
permanent one. Others, like Brian Bunting, Bram Fischer, Harold Wolpe and Lionel 
Forman, intermittently visited or resided in London during the 1950s because of their 
connections with the international communist world and socialist youth and students’ 
organisations. Many of the South Africans who arrived in Britain during this period came 
as students and eventually failed to return as a result of a combination of personal and 
political circumstances as well as of changes in South Africa itself. Vella and Patsy Pillay 
arrived in 1949 so that Vella could enrol for a Masters degree at the London School of 
Economics. The Pillays also had personal reasons for leaving as they had got married in 
South Africa before the Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act came into effect
52 See “South Africa -  on the road to fascism,” November 1948, 
http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/historv/iadwatda.html#N 1 .
53 Gurney, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 132.
54 For a comprehensive study o f  South African political exile in the UK see Israel, South African Political 
Exile. For a collection o f  oral testimonies on the experience o f  exile see Hilda Bernstein, The Rift: The Exile 
Experience o f  South Africans (London, 1994).
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which would have made it very difficult for them to continue to live together.55 Vella Pillay 
became one of the most important contact persons for South Africans arriving in London 
thereafter. Rosalynde ‘Ros’ Ainslie de Lanerolle similarly left in 1954 in order to further 
her studies in English literature and live in England for some time. She later got married to 
a man from Sri Lanka, which, as for the Pillays, made their return to South Africa 
impossible. Ainslie was a graduate of the University of Cape Town, which she had attended 
alongside Ronald Segal, and was recruited as the contact person in London for the South 
African radical quarterly Africa South, which Segal edited.56 For much of the 1950s Ethel 
de Keyser was also in London, where she came to continue study English literature and 
theatre.57
Towards the end of the decade the initial trickle of South African students arriving 
in the UK turned into a stream as educational opportunities in South Africa became even 
more severely restricted. This was as a result of the establishment of the newly segregated 
universities after the enactment of the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. Mac 
Maharaj came in 1957, Abdul Minty in October 195858 and Kader Asmal in 1959.59 Steve 
Naidoo, Tony and Hassim Sedaat, Mana Chetty, Freddy Reddy and Joan Nair also arrived
55 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Vella Pillay, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts Vol. 13.
56 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
57 The Guardian, 20 July 2004.
58 Abdul Minty arrived in the UK in 1958 to finish his O-levels and A-levels. In South Africa he had attended 
a non-racial school run by the Congress Movement with Aziz and Essop Pahap in the Indian township o f  
Lenasia (Johannesburg). Here they were taught by the likes o f  Duma Nokwe, Molly Fischer and Alfred 
Hutchinson, which had a profound influence on them at a very early age. See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, 
HBI, Abdul Minty, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts Vol. 8.
59 Kader Asmal left South Africa in 1959 to study Law at the London School o f  Economics (apartheid 
legislation prohibited him from studying this subject in South Africa). He stayed in the UK until 1963 and 
then moved to Ireland with his wife Louise where they founded the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1964. 
Interview with Kader Asmal, Cape Town, 26 January 2005.
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around this time. However, as Christabel Gurney has observed, “a consequence of 
apartheid was that only whites, and some South African Indians, could afford the ‘luxury’ 
o f going into exile.”60 This meant that very few Africans were able to go overseas. Among 
the few Africans to leave in this period was Mzwandile Piliso, who came to Britain in 1950 
to study pharmacy. Raymond ‘Mazisi’ Kunene, the Zulu poet, came in 1959 on a Christian 
Action scholarship.61 The year 1959 also marked the important arrival of Tennyson 
Makiwane, former Treason Trialist and leader of the Youth League (as well as, 
incidentally, Piliso’s cousin). All of the South African emigres just mentioned played an 
instrumental role in the launch of the first British boycott of South African goods in 1959, 
its transformation into the AAM in 1960 and continued to play an active part in the 
organisation throughout the rest of its existence. Ainslie, for example, was the Boycott 
Committee’s Secretary and went on to become the AAM’s first Honorary Secretary. After a 
couple of years she was replaced by Abdul Minty, who remained Honorary Secretary until 
the AAM was dissolved in 1994. Vella Pillay became AAM Honorary Treasurer. Finally de 
Keyser filled the most senior full-time position in the AAM, that of executive secretary, 
from 1967 to 1975.
Most of these young South Africans were already politicised when they moved to 
the UK as they had been involved in student politics back in South Africa, where they had 
been close to the SAIC,62 the Young Communist League, the CPSA and, after 1953, the 
underground SACP. As well as students, there was also a number of important South
60 Gurney, “In the heart o f  the beast,” 5.
61 Bernstein, The Rift, 354.
62 Like the ANC, the SAIC had undergone a process o f  radicalisation as a new leadership was voted in in the 
mid-1940s. In 1945 Dr Yusuf Dadoo and Dr Monty Naicker were elected President o f  the Transvaal and 
Natal Indian Congresses respectively. The change o f  guard in the SAIC leadership spurred the passive 
resistance campaign o f  1946-1947.
African trade union and Communist Party leaders who came to Britain after their 
banishment under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. They included Solly Sachs 
and James Phillip (respectively the General Secretary and National Chairman of the 
Garment Workers’ Union), and Guy Routh of the Industrial Council for the Clothing 
Industry. For a period of time, Sachs worked for Canon Collin’s Defence Fund as 
Secretary.63 H.A. Naidoo, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSA from 1945 to 
1950, and his wife Pauline Podbrey, a fellow CPSA member, left with permission from the 
Party after they had both been ‘named’ under the Suppression of Communism Act. Being a 
mixed couple, family concerns also influenced the Naidoos’ decision to leave. Before 
leaving, Moses Kotane, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSA, told them that 
there was “an important job to be done overseas.”64 Lastly, Simon and Cynthia Zukas,65 
and Max and Saura Joffe, who had been members of the CPSA, also joined the network of 
South African political activists in Britain in the early 1950s.
63 See Herbstein, White Lies, 62.
64 Quoted in Israel, South African Political Exile, 28.
65 Simon Zukas was a Lithuanian-born trade unionist and communist who grew up in Northern Rhodesia. In 
the late 1940s he studied Engineering and Politics at the University o f  Cape Town (UCT) where he became 
involved in the activities o f  National Union o f  South African Students (NUSAS) and worked closely with the 
Communist Party. He then returned to Northern Rhodesia, from where he was deported to the UK in 
December 1952 because o f  his trade union and anti-Central Federation activities. In London he joined the 
growing network o f  South African exiles (many o f  whom he knew from his Cape Town days) and continued 
to campaign against the Central African Federation and for Zambia’s independence. As well as being a 
member o f  SASA, he served on MCF’s South and Central Africa Committee. He broke o ff his ties with the 
SACP after the crushing o f  the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956. Zukas’s wife Cynthia was 
from South Africa. She had also been a student at UCT where she was introduced to politics through the left- 
wing discussion group the Modern Youth Society. She met Simon Zukas in London (where she had moved to 
do post-graduate studies) through the South African social network and they got married here. Like her 
husband, Cynthia Zukas also devoted herself to anti-apartheid- work in London through the South African 
Students’ Association, the Boycott Movement, and the AAM -  whose Finchley local Committee she became 
Secretary of. After independence in 1964, the Zukas returned to Zambia where they continued to support the 
ANC. See Simon Zukas, Into Exile and Back (Lusaka, 2002).
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International links through the SACP
Until the early 1960s, most of the SACP’s (and, through the SACP, the ANC’s) external 
contacts were channelled through the CPGB.66 Therefore, one of the most immediate points 
of contact for South Africans communists in the UK was naturally with the CPGB. David 
Kitson,67 for example, was a member of the Hornsey branch of the CPGB, whereas the 
Pillays were active in its Finchley branch. The British Communist Party arranged for H.A. 
Naidoo, six months after he had arrived from South Africa in 1951, to go to Hungary to 
work on the English language broadcast at Radio Budapest.68 The CPGB also had an 
International Committee which was divided into a number of “sub-committees covering 
every area of Britain’s former empire, including committees for Africa and South Africa, to 
which, where possible, it recruited members from the territories concerned, including South 
Africa.” Vella Pillay served on both these committees, whereas Mac Maharaj was a 
member of the Africa Committee.69
66 Shubin, ANC, 13.
67 David Kitson left South Africa in 1947. He became involved in trade union work in Britain through the 
draughtsmen’s union, AESD. This became the first British union to sell its shares in South African companies 
in protest against apartheid in 1958. Gurney, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 131. In 1955 David Kitson met Norma 
Cranko in London as Norma was on her way to Poland to attend the Warsaw Youth Festival hosted by the 
World Federation o f  Democratic Youth as a delegate o f  the COD. They subsequently got married in London. 
In 1959 they returned to South Africa where David Kitson joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and became a member 
o f  the second National High Command after Rivonia. He was captured and sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment in December 1964. Norma returned to London two years later and devoted her energies to 
AAM work, especially around the release o f  political prisoners. See Norma Kitson, Where Sixpence Lives 
(London, 1986).
68 H.A. Naidoo’s experience in Hungary was bitterly disillusioning and after his return to London in 1955 he 
took little part in political activities. “Obituary: H.A. Naidoo,” Sechaba, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1971.
69 Gurney, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 131-132.
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After the secret re-formation of the SACP in South Africa in 1953, a SACP cell 
soon became operative in London. Ruth First helped to set this up during a visit to London 
in 1954. Three representatives were initially recruited: Vella Pillay, Simon Zukas, and a 
third, unidentified member (whose initials are CF), who was a fellow at Cambridge 
University.70 The group slowly expanded and came to include Mac Maharaj, Kader Asmal 
and, immediately after March 1960, Dr Yusuf Dadoo, Barry Feinberg71 and Julius Baker. 
This group of seven or eight people met once or twice a week, initially at the Pillay’s home, 
in order to hold political discussions and gather and organise the mailing of Marxist 
literature to South Africa72 The SACP cell in London was responsible for keeping in close 
touch with the rest of the party in South Africa by correspondence through safe addresses. 
Press cuttings on international affairs were also sent to South Africa on a regular basis, and 
confidential documents would sometimes be received from South Africa for passing to 
international organisations.73 After March 1960, London grew considerably in importance 
as a centre of activity for the exiled SACP. The Party’s executive body, the Central 
Committee, and the editorial of its journal, the African Communist, were both forced to 
move their headquarters to London in the early 1960s. By 1966, London was the only 
centre -  both in South Africa and internationally -  where an organised Party formation was 
still operative.74
70 Zukas, Into Exile, 102-104. Zukas soon broke o ff his links with the SACP because o f  his criticism o f the 
Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956.
71 Feinberg, who had also been a member o f  the COD in South Africa, later worked for IDAF.
72 Israel, South African Political Exile, 171.
73 Zukas, Into Exile, 101-102.
74 See Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 15.
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South African activists in London also fell in with MCF through its Southern 
African Committee.75 Simon Zukas and Dr Leon Szur (another South African) were among 
its members. They also gravitated around 2 Amen Court, the home of Canon Collins, who,
Hf\in the words of Kunene, represented “the pivot, the stone against which we leaned.” 
Finally, as many of them enrolled at British universities, they became part of the growing 
student movement in this country. So, this group of highly politically-motivated South 
Africans in the UK was functioning on the left of British politics, monitoring events were 
going on in South Africa and taking them up via the CPGB, MCF, and students’ politics, 
and through them they were in turn able to feed-in into the British labour movement and the 
Labour Party.77
Contact with home was facilitated by frequent visits to the UK by fellow South 
Africans interspersed throughout the 1950s. The international connections of radical white 
and Indian students at Wits78 proved to be of great importance “in securing invitations and 
travel arrangements that enabled a succession of ANC personalities to visit Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union”79 during this period. Moreover, South African communists (and non­
communists) travelling to international conferences (mostly in socialist countries) typically 
stopped-over in London, where they would stay and consult with the South African 
Congress supporters living there. The British Communist Party often helped with the 
practicalities of these trips -  from raising money for airfares, to arranging for travel
75 See MCF Com 8.
76 Quoted in Bernstein, The Rift, 355.
77 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
78 For example, in 1951-1952 Ahmed Kathrada was in Hungary working for the Budapest-based World 
Federation o f  Democratic Youth. Lionel Forman, another Wits student, lived in Prague in 1951-1953 where 
he represented NUSAS at the headquarters o f  the International Union o f  Students.
79 Lodge, Mandela, 48.
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documents (many in fact had to leave without passports, which were difficult to obtain 
from the South African government).80
In 1951 SACP leader Bram Fischer attended the World Peace Council Conference 
in Vienna and returned to South Africa via London. Walter Sisulu and Duma Nokwe, at the 
time Secretaries of the ANC and the ANC Youth League respectively, made an important
Q 1
trip to a number of ‘iron curtain’ countries in 1953. First, however, they travelled to 
London, where they were put up by David Kitson and met other South Africans resident in 
London, including the Pillays. They were also introduced to CPGB leaders Palme Dutt 
(who was the chairman of the Party’s International Committee) and Idris Cox (chair of the 
Africa Committee).82 From Britain Nokwe led a contingent of twenty-five South Africans 
to Bucharest to attend a Youth and Student Festival and a conference of the International 
Union of Students in Warsaw. After Poland, Sisulu and Nokwe went to the Soviet Union 
and China, where Sisulu raised the question of Chinese support for a possible armed 
struggle.83 Before embarking on their return trip home, Sisulu and Nokwe spent another 
few days in London. During this second stay Sisulu addressed a meeting at Holbom Hall
80 Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 132.
81 Ahmed Kathrada was responsible for practical arrangements for Nokwe and Sisulu’s trip. See Sisulu, 
Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 110.
82 Sisulu talked to Palme Dutt and Idris Cox about the possible convening o f  a Pan-African Congress in 
Africa (he had previously written to organisations and governments in Africa on behalf o f  the ANC and had 
received positive responses from Ethiopia, Liberia, Lybia and Egypt as well as nationalist movements). The 
two CPGB leaders were less than enthusiastic about the proposal. But Sisulu argued that the CPGB did not 
focus enough on colonial affairs and that it needed to pay serious attention to Pan-Africanism. Sisulu, Walter 
and Albertina Sisulu, 108, 110. This may have been due to the fact that it was not until around the mid-1950s 
that the CPGB resolved an ideological debate around the relationship between the struggle against capitalism 
in the metropolis and anti-imperialist struggles in the periphery o f  empire and came to the conclusion that the 
latter “need not wait on the establishment o f  socialism in the imperial centre.” Thereafter the CPGB’s policy 
towards colonial countries became one o f  “unambiguous support for independence [ ...]  and majority rule in 
South Africa.” Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 131.
83 See Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 110-112.
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alongside Solly Sachs, where “he [Sisulu] emphasised that the English had an obligation to 
the people of South Africa because of the colonial relationship and the manner in which 
South Africa had been handed over to the white man.”84 Through Fenner Brockway, Sisulu 
also spoke to a group of British MPs about the situation in South Africa. Lastly, Sisulu 
consulted with a number of Pan-African movement and African nationalist leaders in 
London.85 When Elizabeth Mafekeng (the South African Food and Canning Workers 
Union’s trade unionist) visited China in 1954, she stayed with the Zukas’s in London 
before returning to South Africa.86 In 1955 Moses Kotane (the SACP General Secretary) 
and Maulvi Cachalia (an executive member of the SAIC) arrived in London en route to the 
Bandung Conference. They were introduced to Krishna Menon and Pandit Nehru at the 
office of the Indian High Commission in London where, as they had left South Africa 
without a passport, they were given Indian travel documents. Max Joffe was their host 
during their brief stay in London, during which Kotane and Cachalia held talks with Fenner 
Brockway and Canon Collins and “canvassed as many representative groups as possible, 
including the parliamentary group of the Labour Party.”87
It is fair to assume that all the meetings and activities undertaken by South African 
opposition leaders who visited London in the 1950s were facilitated by the group of fellow 
South Africans now living there through the mobilisation of the social and political 
networks they had begun to form. Moreover, these international trips can be viewed as 
evidence of the South African liberation movements’ increasingly internationalist outlook
84 Ibid., 112.
85 Ibid., 113.
86 SACP leader Ray Alexander Simons and union’s General Secretary, helped organise Mafekeng’s trip from 
South Africa as she was in regular contact with the SACP cell in London. See Zukas, Into Exile, 102.
87 Brian Bunting, Moses Kotane, South African Revolutionary: A Political Biography, 3rd ed. (Cape Town, 
1998), 212.
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which has been mentioned earlier. Finally, they are further indication of a growing 
awareness, which had started to manifest itself after 1945, of the importance of 
international support for the struggle at home, and of the need to cultivate contacts with the 
outside world.
SASA, SAFA and the CAO
Sometime in the early 1950s, South African students in London organised themselves into 
the South African Students’ Association (SASA). This group of progressive students felt it 
was important that while in the UK88 they should keep together “with a sense of purpose of 
some kind.”89 According to the oral testimony of one of its principal founders, Vella Pillay, 
SASA essentially started as a social networking organisation in the attempt to mobilise the 
“growing number of South Africans [that] was coming to study at British universities.” 
Gathering at the Pillays’ home in East Finchley, they “formed a powerful group that met 
regularly in order to find what initiatives could be taken and in which direction, and how 
the support for the solidarity movement supported the South African freedom cause.”90 
With the help of the India League, where Patsy Pillay worked as secretary to the H igh. 
Commissioner, SASA organised some of the early demonstrations in Hyde Park and around 
South Africa House, which became the main focus of anti-apartheid protests in later years.
Around the mid-1950s, SASA set up a London New Age Committee in order to 
raise funds for the South African left-wing weekly newspaper.91 The paper had originally
88 Many o f  them still considered their stay in the UK as temporary at this moment in time.
89 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
90 Vella Pillay, Witness Seminar on the AAM origins, Institute o f  Commonwealth Studies, London, 12 
November 1998.
91 See Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 132-133.
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been called Guardian but had been banned in 1952 under the Suppression of Communism 
Act. It then reappeared under a series of new names: Clarion, People’s World, and finally 
Advance, until this was banned too in 1954. Thereafter it became New Age. The London 
New Age Committee was periodically revived at times of crisis, for example in 1957, after 
New Age offices were raided by the police and the documents seized were used as evidence 
in the Treason Trial.92 In 1962, the New Age Committee in London was mobilised for the 
last time, before the paper was banned forever. The 1962 General Laws Amendment Act 
made it compulsory for any newspaper starting publication to deposit to the Minister of 
Justice (John B. Vorster) the sum of R 20,000, which would be forfeited to the state in the 
event of its banning (this was essentially to prevent banned publications from reappearing 
under a changed name). As soon as the bill was introduced in parliament, Brian Bunting, 
editor of New Age, wrote to Vella Pillay and Yusuf Dadoo in London asking that “the 
maximum protest should be roused” and that the Minister “be deluged with protests” 
against his proposal to ban the paper.93 A New Age Campaign was speedily launched in 
London. This took the form of letters of appeal and deputations (to British newspapers, 
television channels, the National Union of Journalists, the International Organisation of 
Journalists and British political parties and trade unions), the holding of several press 
conferences, a Declaration on the banning of New Age signed by Barbara Castle and other 
MPs, academics, newspaper editors and writers, and an appeal for funds for New Age 
personnel who had been affected by the banning.94
92 The newspaper was accused no. 157 in the trial. Charges against New Age were withdrawn as the 
prosecution failed to have it convicted o f  offences arising from the contents o f  the paper.
93 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH05, Brian Bunting, Cape Town, letter to Yusuf Dadoo, London, 23 May 
2007.
94 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH05, Untitled document, London New Age Committee [n.d.].
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When the Congress of the People took place in South Africa in 1955, SASA started 
“campaigning around British support for the Freedom Charter.”95 This is how SASA 
gradually took on a more political character. The transition resulted in SASA’s 
transformation into the South African Freedom Association (SAFA) in the spring of 1958, 
following calls for support from home, where the Congress Movement feared that the South 
African government would soon crack down on the opposition, who was planning stay-at- 
homes in protest against the all-white elections in April.96 As well as students, SAFA 
received those South Africans from the political movement (such as trade union and 
opposition politicians) resident in London so “that the campaign could be developed on a 
very much wider basis in support of the Congress of the People and of the Freedom 
Charter.”97 Solly Sachs was SAFA’s initial secretary and was succeeded by Mac Maharaj.98 
SAFA was to offer “maximum support to the men and women within South Africa who are 
fighting for liberty and tolerance under very difficult circumstances;”99 as well as to 
provide the British public with information about South Africa.100
SAFA moved away from its original India League base to the Committee of African 
Organisations (CAO) -  a coordinating body of African students in London probably 
established around the end of 1958.101 Frene Ginwala, who was then completing a degree in
95 Vella Pillay, Witness Seminar on the AAM origins, Institute o f  Commonwealth Studies, London, 12 
November 1998.
96 Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 133
97 Vella Pillay, Witness Seminar on the AAM origins, Institute o f Commonwealth Studies, London, 12 
November 1998.
98 Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 133.
99 The Sunday Times, London, 22 June 1958, quoted in Israel, South African Political Exile, 161.
100 Africa Digest, 6, July-August 1958, quoted in ibid.
101 The CAO’s constituent bodies were: the Ugandan National Congress, the Basutoland African Congress, 
the West African Students’ Union, the Nigerian Union o f  Great Britain and Ireland, Kenya’s Students’ 
Association, the Uganda Association, Tanganyika Students’ Association, SAFA, the East and Central Africa
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Law at the London School of Economics, was a CAO unofficial member. After Ginwala
left the country, Ros Ainslie and Steve Naidoo continued to attend CAO meetings on behalf
of SAFA.102 The CAO provided a platform bringing together Anglophone African student
organisations based in Britain and a number of liberation movements which had
representatives in London at the climax of the campaign for African independence. The
newly independent Ghanaian government had funded the setting up of Africa Unity House
at 3 Collingham Gardens, London SW5. It was intended to house all the different African
organisations in London under one roof, and the CAO had an office here. Among the
CAO’s aims and objectives were:
To work with, and promote the aims of the All-African People’s Conference, as 
well as the Independent African States and to spread among Africans the spirit of 
Pan-Africanism; to work with all constituent organisations and to ensure the fullest 
possible cooperation and solidarity on issues affecting the continent of Africa, or a 
particular country; [...] to keep the conscience of the world alive to the problems 
affecting Africa; [... and] to assist the struggle of our people for freedom, liberty, 
equality and national independence.103
SAFA’s affiliation to the CAO was explained by Vella Pillay in these terms: “as we were 
approaching the 1960s the whole question of African independence had become a major 
international question. And above all a major question for this country, being the pre­
colonial power.”104 In other words, South African activists in London understood their 
campaigning in support of the freedom struggle in South Africa as part and parcel of the
Study Circle, the African League, the African Forum, Sierra Leone Students’ Union, Ghana Students’ Union. 
Alao Aka Bashorum was the CAO’s first Chairman and was succeeded by Femi Okunnu, Dennis Phombeah 
was the General Secretary. See University o f  Oxford, Bodleian Library o f  Commonwealth and African 
Studies at Rhodes House, Archive o f  the Anti-Apartheid Movement (hereafter MSS AAM), MSS AAM 90a, 
CAO Constitution.
102 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
103 MSS AAM 90a, CAO Constitution.
104 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Vella Pillay, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts Vol. 13.
wider movement for liberation from colonial rule in Britain. According to Ros Ainslie, their
determination to play a part in the British political scene came out of an inner conflict, a
sense of loss arising in turn from their decision to leave South Africa: “Their energies come
out of the conflict between what you’ve left and where you are. [...] The conflict produces
the energy. It’s all an attempt to resolve your problem of being in exile.”105 These articulate
South Africans thus came to Britain with a feeling of responsibility for the movement they
had left behind and saw their political activism in their host country as a direct extension of
their commitment to the struggle in South Africa. As Kader Asmal has explained:
All of us were acting either as members of the underground Communist Party or the 
African National Congress. Consciously doing this as part of the extemalisation of 
the struggle. Not as... simply as a human thing. [...] All of us were doing this, 
entirely as combatants, [...] consciously. It’s rather unusual.106
The CAO and its affiliate SAFA were the initiators of the first British boycott of South 
African goods in June 1959, which will be analysed next.
The ANC’s call for a boycott
In South Africa, the coming to power of the National Party in 1948 and the implementation 
of the new doctrine of apartheid had triggered a decade of mass protests, stay-at-homes and 
passive resistance under the leadership of the Congress Movement. As the government 
responded with increasingly retaliatory measures against the opposition by placing bans on 
its leaders and outlawing all forms of political protest, by the late 1950s the ANC was
105 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
106 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Kader Asmal, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts Vol. 1.
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increasingly focusing on the boycott as “one of the few forms of protest left to Africans that
did not involve breaking the law.”107
The first official call for an economic boycott, however, had been made not by the
ANC but by the first All-African People’s Conference, held in Accra in December 1958.
The Conference, which devoted special attention to the situation in South Africa, called on
African states to withdraw their migrant labour force from South African industry and to
break off diplomatic relations with African states that practiced racial discrimination. Most
importantly, it had resolved to commence an international campaign to boycott South
African goods. A permanent Secretariat was set up whose task was:
[To] urge any African independent states which conduct trade with South Africa to 
impose economic sanctions against the latter country as a protest against racial 
discrimination which the European minority are practising to the humiliation of the 
non-European majority. Such economic sanctions should include the boycott of 
South African goods.1 8
Boycotts had a long tradition within South African resistance history. In 1907 South 
African Indians in the Transvaal staged one of the first boycott campaigns when they 
refused to register under the pass laws introduced by General Smuts. In the 1950s a number 
of organised as well as spontaneous boycotts had been staged with some success, thus 
providing “an example of African success in winning satisfaction on an economic 
grievance.”109 Most noteworthy were the Evaton bus boycott of 1955-1956, and the 
Alexandra bus boycott of 1957.110 Although “economic grievances rather than political
107 Lodge, Black Politics, 181.
108 Resolution on Racialism and Discriminatory laws and Practices, All-African People’s Conference, 5-13 
December 1958, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/bovcotts/first allafrican conf.html.
109 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 276.
110 See Lodge, Black Politics, 153-187.
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aims” were at the heart of the bus boycotts, ANC leaders came to recognise their potential 
“as an opportunity for politicisation.”111
In the wake of the resolutions adopted by the All-African People’s Conference and 
of the recent bus boycotts in South Africa, the ANC proclaimed at its Annual Conference of 
December 1958 (which started as the All-African People’s Conference in Ghana had just 
ended): “The economic boycott is going to be one of the major political weapons in the 
country.”112 A National Anti-Pass Planning Council and an Economic Boycott Committee 
were appointed to handle the task of organising an economic boycott campaign. This, the 
ANC “hoped would be reinforced by an international boycott of South African goods.”113 
At the end of May 1959 the ANC held a Mass National Conference in Johannesburg, to 
which the Anti-Pass Council submitted its report. In particular, the report read: “By 
withdrawing our purchasing power from certain institutions we can, as Chief Lutuli said, 
‘punch them in the stomach’.”114 At the end of the Conference, ANC leader Robert Resha 
called for a boycott of potatoes against the farm labour system and the brutal treatment of 
African farm workers. A wider boycott of goods produced by Nationalist-controlled 
institutions was also to begin on 26 June 1959, known as South Africa Freedom Day, which 
was to be observed as a day of ‘self-denial.’115 The desirability of an international 
economic boycott had been implicit in some of the ANC’s statements. The Economic 
Boycott Committee for instance had made the point that: “The economic boycott has 
unlimited potentialities. When our local purchasing power is combined with that of
1,1 Ibid., 275.
112 Report o f  the National Executive Committee o f  the ANC, submitted to the Annual Conference, 13-14 
December 1958, document 31 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 445.
113 Ibid., 292.
114 Quoted in ibid., 292.
115 See Report o f  the national Executive Committee o f  the ANC, submitted to the Annual Conference, 12-13 
December 1959, document 33 in ibid., 472.
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sympathetic organisations overseas we wield a devastating weapon.”116 Thus far, however, 
the organisation had fallen short of making a direct call for an international boycott.
“Boycott Slave-drivers Goods” 117
The ANC’s call for the boycott of Nationalist-controlled products in South Africa was 
immediately taken up in Britain by SAFA through the CAO. Although it is unclear who 
exactly came up with the idea of launching a boycott campaign in the UK, a CAO Boycott 
Sub-Committee was established to run this part of the organisation’s work. Ros Ainslie and 
Steve Naidoo both served on this CAO Sub-Committee as SAFA representatives. Femi 
Okunnu, President of the Nigerian Union of Great Britain and Ireland, was its Chairman. 
Claudia Jones of the West Indian Gazette was also part of the initiative. MCF joined the
| | o
campaign in June by sending two of its representatives, Joan Hymans and Simon Zukas. 
The group quickly set out to organise a British boycott of South African products, including 
consumer goods industries and tobacco companies supporting the apartheid regime. The 
campaign targets were the oppressive pass-laws system, African farm ‘slave’ labour, and 
trade union recognition for African workers.119
Under the auspices of the CAO and in collaboration with MCF, the Boycott Sub-
1 90Committee announced its programme at a press conference at 200 Gower Street, London, 
on Wednesday 24 June 1959. This was followed by a twenty-four-hour vigil outside South
1,6 Ibid.
117 MSS AAM 90a, “Boycott slave-drivers goods” leaflet produced by the CAO, 200 Gower Street, London 
NW1.
118 MSS AAM 90b, Brief report on the activities o f  the CAO from the latter part o f  1958 to the beginning o f  
1960.
119 MSS AAM 90a, “Boycott o f  South African Goods” briefing, [June? 1959].
120 This was the address o f  the surgery o f  Dr David Pitt, a West Indian doctor linked to the CAO, where the 
Boycott Sub-Committee had a small office.
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Africa House starting at 6 pm on the same day. On June 26, a meeting was held at Holborn 
Hall to launch the boycott of South African goods in Britain. The speakers at the meeting, 
attended by over five-hundred people, were Michael Scott, Vella Pillay, Mr Chiume of the 
banned Nyasaland African National Congress, and Julius Nyerere -  who was in London 
for constitutional talks after the recent electoral victory of the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU). According to Ainslie, it was thanks to the CAO that the Boycott Sub- 
Committee was able to bring Nyerere to take part in the event.121 Tennyson Makiwane of 
the ANC also addressed the meeting. After being acquitted in late 1958 from the Treason 
Trial, in early 1959 Makiwane illegally left South Africa to attend the Afro-Asian Peoples’ 
Solidarity Conference in Cairo and other international conferences on behalf of the ANC. 
In the spring of 1959 he came to London and soon became deeply involved in the boycott 
campaign. Trevor Huddleston, who (together with Canon Collins, Michael Scott, Fenner 
Brockway MP, John Stonehouse MP, and Prof. Max Gluckham) sponsored the boycott, and
whose name initially featured among the list of speakers, did not actually take part in the
122meeting.
During the days preceding the launch, a few articles publicising the start of the 
campaign (both in South Africa and in the UK) were published in the Daily Worker. Steve 
Naidoo wrote that “any expression of sympathy by the British people for the struggle of the 
African Congress may go some way towards forcing the South African authorities to bring 
a halt to their policies.”123 On 27 June, the newspaper reported that according to an ANC
121 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
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122 MSS AAM 90a, Letter from Trevor Huddleston to Bashorum, 2 July 1959.
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spokesman the response to the boycott call the previous day had been “very good 
indeed.”124 Other than this, the event went largely unnoticed by the rest of the British press.
In South Africa, Herby Pillay told in the Transvaal Indian Congress’ Bulletin of 
how Nyerere had spoken about the economic boycott as the “turning point in the struggle in 
South Africa,”125 while Scott had appealed to the British public to support the boycott, 
which he described as “the testing point for the white people.”126 Leaflets asking not to buy 
South African canned fruit, jams, fish, meat, potatoes and cigarettes, were distributed 
throughout June and the following months. The leaflet, echoing the words o f the recent 
report of the ANC’s Anti-Pass Council, read: “the internal boycott in South Africa coupled 
with external support from sympathetic people overseas are devastating weapons against 
South Africa’s racialism.”127
Some positive responses came from various organisations, especially from the left, 
including several trade unions, the Political Committee of the London Co-operative 
Society, the overseas branch of People’s National Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, the 
West Indian Organisation, the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, and some Labour Party and 
Communist Party constituencies.128 The Isle of Thanet Labour Party, for instance, passed a 
resolution calling “upon its members and all lovers of freedom and justice to boycott in
124 Ibid., 27 June 1959.
125 “ ...June 26th in London,” Transvaal Indian Congress' Bulletin, Johannesburg, July, 1959. Christabel 
Gumey supplied a copy o f  this article.
126 Ibid.
127 MSS AAM 90a, “Boycott slave-drivers goods” leaflet produced by the CAO, 200 Gower Street, London 
NW1. See also “Report o f  the National Executive Committee o f  the ANC, submitted to the Annual 
Conference, December 12-13 1959,” document 33 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 472.
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whatever way all produce of South Africa”129 which was endorsed by a few other Labour 
Party constituencies. In London, pickets were held in Finchley, St Pancras, Hampstead and 
Brixton in July and August in conjunction with the local contacts established, while more 
efforts were being made to widen support for the boycott.
By the beginning of August, however, the Boycott Sub-Committee had come to the 
conclusion that “after initial impact, CAO had not been able to mobilise enough forces to 
broaden and intensify the campaign sufficiently.” Despite the support of a few individual 
Labour Party constituencies, the Labour and Liberal Parties had been wary of backing the 
boycott, leaving it as a matter of individual choice. This was partly due to the fact that the 
British Labour Party was closer to the (white) South African Labour Party than to the 
Congress Movement. Moreover, colonial policy did not feature high on the Labour Party’s 
agenda for the October 1959 elections.130 The TUC, on the other hand, seemed to be more 
concerned with promoting unity among already registered trade unions, which 
automatically excluded black South African workers.131 Finally, mobilising Conservative 
support for the boycott had proved to be an even more daunting task.
In order to remedy the situation, the need to work more closely with local Labour 
Party, Co-op and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) groups, and to establish 
contacts with the United Nations Associations (UNA), the National Union of Students 
(NUS), and the British Council of Churches was thus put forward. Most importantly, the 
Sub-Committee pledged to endeavour itself to mobilise as broad a support as possible and 
to gain more eminent sponsors.132 This tactic was consistent with the inclusive approach
129 MSS AAM 90a, Letter from the Isle o f  Thanet Labour Party concerning a resolution passed on 8 June
1959.
130 Gumey, “ ‘A Great Cause’,” 136.
131 Ibid., 130.
132 MSS AAM 90a, Minutes o f  the South African Boycott Sub-Committee meeting, 3 August 1959.
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and of the ANC and its Indian, white and Coloured allies in the Congress Alliance in South 
Africa. The question of whether communists should be approached or solicited as sponsors 
was also raised at this stage. It was decided that “all support should be welcomed and none 
excluded, and that the campaign should be seen as a ‘liberal’ (small T )  issue and not in 
terms of party politics at all.”133 Again, the Boycott Sub-Committee’s approach can be 
viewed as a reflection of the relationship of cooperation between the liberation movement 
and communists in South Africa itself. This emerges clearly from the minutes of an AAM 
meeting in June the following year. During an argument about whether the CPGB should 
be approached to send representatives or not, Raymond Kunene pointed out that not to do 
so would be contrary to the ANC’s policy of alignment with all political parties, including 
the Communist Party.134
The Boycott Movement
In September 1959, the CAO Boycott Sub-Committee was reconstituted as an independent 
Committee. This time the Committee, chaired by Dennis Phombeah from the CAO, 
incorporated a larger number of South Africans who were determined that this time the 
boycott should succeed. Ros Ainslie was appointed Secretary and Vella Pillay Treasurer. 
Tennyson Makiwane and Patrick van Rensburg,135 an executive member of the South 
African Liberal Party, became Associate Directors. Other South Africans on the new
133 Ibid.
134 See MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the AAM meeting o f  1 June 1960.
135 Van Rensburg was appointed Director from the end o f  November 1959, when Christian Action joined the 
campaign. See below.
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committee were Abdul Minty, Steve Naidoo, Ruth Ballin, Mana Chetty, Kader Asmal, and 
Raymond Kunene.136
Pat van Rensburg had worked in the Congo as a member of the South African 
Foreign Service. In 1957 he had resigned from his post in protest against the South African 
government’s policies. After arriving in Britain sometime in 1959, he started to work with 
Canon Collins, helping to raise money for the Defence and Aid Fund. He had previously 
met Tennyson Makiwane in South Africa through Robert Resha, another ANC leader. As 
they met again in London, Makiwane invited him to join the Committee and, after seeking
1 ^7approval from the Liberal Party National Chairman, Peter Brown, van Rensburg agreed.
Makiwane and van Rensburg’s presence on the reconstituted Committee proved to 
be of crucial importance. A known ANC leader, Makiwane was the first African South 
African with political credentials to arrive in Britain. As such, Makiwane could respond 
convincingly to the argument that the boycott would hurt the people it was designed to 
help. He had the political authority to speak of the boycott as being what Africans 
themselves wanted, no matter if they would have to suffer temporary sacrifice as part of the 
battle to win the greater goal of freedom. Van Rensburg, on the other hand, represented a 
key link with the Liberal Party in South Africa, to which he reported regularly.138 As a 
white Liberal and moderate, he gave the campaign some measure of respectability and was 
thus able to mobilise broader support from across the field of British politics. Speaking of 
him, Ainslie remembered that: “The [British] press were quite delighted with this Afrikaner
136 MSS AAM 90b, Brief report on the activities o f the CAO from the latter part o f  1958 to the beginning o f  
1960.
137 Patrick van Rensburg, Guilty Land  (London, 1962), 44.
138 See MSS AAM 91.
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who was coming to say that it was his culpa. Guilty man and guilty land and all that 
stuff.”139
In early November 1959 the members of the new Committee decided to set up a 
working committee in preparation of a month of intensified boycott the following March, to 
coincide with major anti-pass demonstrations organised by the ANC and the PAC in South 
Africa. Soon afterwards, Christian Action approached the Committee, now calling itself the 
Boycott Movement, offering help in the form of money and secretarial facilities to run 
“what promised to become a tremendous campaign.”140 After internal discussions 
concerning the Movement’s determination to maintain its independence, an agreement with 
Christian Action was reached and the offer was accepted. An initial grant of £500 to 
finance the campaign for the next four months (three months of organising and one month 
of boycott) and a paid secretary were provided on some conditions. First, two Christian 
Action nominees would have to be on the Committee, the first being David Ennals, 
Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party. Secondly, Pat van Rensburg 
should be appointed Director as a link with Christian Action. Third, Christian Action’s part 
in the campaign should be acknowledged by some kind of formula along the lines of “the 
Boycott Movement in association with Christian Action.” Finally, the present Movement 
would continue to run the boycott provided they did not take a stand contradicting that of 
Christian Action.141 At this point, Martin Ennals of the National Council for Civil Liberties 
joined the Movement as Organising Secretary, while Keith Lye of the Africa Bureau 
became Deputy Director. These new arrangements for the campaign, the minutes of the 
Boycott Movement reported, “linked satisfactorily South African and English
139 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
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140 MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the Boycott Movement Committee meeting, 25 November 1959.
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organisers.”142 Ros Ainslie, though, later remembered that “we [the South African initiators 
of the boycott] were all very cross about that. Didn’t like David [Ennals] foisted on us and 
we certainly didn’t like being told we should only have a three month boycott.”143 
However, the Boycott Committee, which until now had been relying on the voluntary effort 
of its members, desperately lacked funding, which meant that they had little choice but to 
accept whatever came along.
Until now, the initiative for starting a boycott of South African goods in Britain had 
rested entirely on the small group of South African exiles in London with the help of their 
British supporters. The ANC had in fact not made any direct calls for an international 
boycott, although it did acknowledge that “the international response was beyond all 
expectations.”144 In order to enhance the boycott’s veracity, on Anthony Sampson’s (former 
editor of Drum Magazine in Johannesburg, now working for the London Observer) 
suggestion,145 van Rensburg wrote to the ANC President Chief Albert Lutuli requesting “a 
statement calling freshly and clearly for the boycott.”146 The appeal came in early January 
1960, signed jointly by Chief Lutuli, G.M. Naicker (President of the SAIC) and Peter 
Brown (National Chairman of the Liberal Party). Directed “particularly to the people of 
Great Britain, by whose Parliament the original Act of Union was approved,” it asked them 
“to strike a blow for freedom and justice” by adhering to the consumer boycott.147
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British support for the Boycott Month
Meanwhile, by the end of 1959 the political climate in Britain had changed considerably. 
The Conservatives’ repeated electoral victories and the Labour Party’s alienating ‘right 
wing’ policies had helped create a situation in which there was a creeping disaffection with 
party politics, especially among young people. This had fostered the development of a 
substantial extra-parliamentary movement, the most important part of which was the CND, 
and many of the British people involved in it were very much the same as those in the 
boycott campaign.148 Also, a great deal of racism had been growing in the country as a 
result of West Indian immigration to Britain. This growing racism worried quite a few 
people on the left and was yet another factor in helping make the boycott a reality.149 So, it 
was a fortunate coincidence that the boycott of South Africa came into British politics at 
this particular moment in time, as the Boycott Movement was somehow able to tap into 
these political feelings.
After its third consecutive defeat in the October elections, the Labour Party “was 
split from top to bottom.”150 Needing an issue around which to unite people, Labour Party 
General Secretary Morgan Phillips thought that this should be something that would appeal 
morally to the country. He therefore suggested “that consideration be given to making 1960 
an ‘Africa Year’.”151 The designation of 1960 as ‘Africa Year’ was significant in two 
respects. First, it meant that Africa now received quite a lot of attention from the British 
media, thus arousing public interest in the anti-colonial struggles. Secondly, it made the
148 Christabel Gumey, Witness Seminar on the AAM origins, Institute o f  Commonwealth Studies, London, 12 
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Labour Party Executive think again about supporting the boycott. This time, “the Party
stumbled into supporting the boycott as a ready-made campaign that fitted into its ‘Africa
Year’.”152 However, Labour support for the boycott remained cautious. As the leader of the
Labour Party Hugh Gaitskell carefully explained while speaking at a Boycott rally in a
packed Trafalgar Square in February 1960, the boycott was essentially a moral gesture. Its
aim was not “to bring the South African Government to its knees but to encourage the
1white nationalists to adopt a new and better frame of mind towards the Africans.” The 
Labour Party’s decision to back the boycott was readily followed by a TUC General 
Council resolution on 23 December 1959 which appealed to its members and the public 
generally “to express by a consumers’ boycott of South African goods their personal 
revulsion against the racial policies being pursued by the Government of South Africa in 
the political, social, and industrial fields.”154 The resolution endorsed the consumer boycott, 
but fell short of calling for an industrial boycott, which the Movement was asking the trade 
unions to consider.
The Labour Party’s decision to join the boycott gave the campaign a major lurch 
forward. Official Labour support meant that individual Labour constituencies and councils 
would now have to pay serious attention to the boycott.155 This, in turn, aroused fears that 
the boycott would become a party political issue, as local boycott committees mushroomed 
throughout the country. By February 1960, thirty-five committees had already been 
established while twenty-five more were reported to be in the process of being formed.156
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The boycott organisers were concerned this may put local boycott committees in danger of 
becoming dominated by the Labour Party, which would be contrary to the their idea that the 
boycott should be perceived as “a movement, not individuals or organisations,” or what can 
be described as the Movement’s ‘collective principle.’ For this reason, the Movement’s 
National Committee worked hard to ensure that committees should be as broad as possible 
and not one party.157
The CPGB, although not featuring on the list of the Boycott Month sponsors 
because of the Labour Party’s prescription policy, was involved in the campaign in other 
unofficial ways. The London Committee of the Boycott Movement for instance, had John 
Mahon (Secretary of the London District Communist Party), and Kay Beauchamp after 
him, on it.158 The Party’s newspaper, the Daily Worker provided wide coverage of the 
boycott’s progress, as well as giving the boycott its total support. For the whole duration of 
the Boycott Month in March 1960, the Daily Worker changed its sub-heading from “the 
only daily paper owned by its readers” into “Boycott South African goods.”159
The British Liberal Party, initially fearing “too close an association,”160 did not join 
the campaign until mid-November 1959. It then issued a resolution condemning the South 
African government for its actions against Ronald Segal (who had recently been served 
with banning orders) and calling on the UK and other Commonwealth countries to 
subscribe to the boycott.161 Individual Liberal Party members and the Women’s Liberal 
Federation also decided to back the campaign. In December 1959, Jeremy Thorpe MP (who
157 MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the Boycott Movement Committee meeting, 6 January 1960.
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later became the AAM Vice-President) and Manuela Sykes accepted to become sponsors of 
the Boycott Month. Other Liberals supporting a complete boycott were Lt Colonel Patrick
1 f\0Lort-Philips, Desmond Banks and Anthony Brooke.
The Conservative Party felt that they too had to formally condemn apartheid. As the 
British Government struggled to redefine its relationship with its ex-colonies to ensure that 
they would remain in the Commonwealth and join the Western camp in the Cold War, 
Macmillan was becoming increasingly concerned about “the political costs of British links 
with the apartheid government.”163 Soon after his election he therefore planned a tour of 
Africa, which would terminate in Cape Town. Yet, despite Macmillan’s so called ‘attack’ 
on South Africa’s apartheid policies in his “wind of change” speech to the South African 
Parliament on 3 February I960,164 the British Prime Minister also took the opportunity to 
“deprecate attempts which are being made in Britain today to organise a consumer boycott 
of South African goods.”165
Efforts to gain at least some degree o f Conservative support for the boycott were 
largely unsuccessful, with the only exception of Lord Altrincham,166 whose name appeared 
in the list of the sponsors from September 1959, and who said the Prime Minister had made 
a mistake in disparaging the boycott.167 The attempt was made to establish contacts with the 
‘progressive’ Bow Group, but without success. Christopher Chataway MP was also 
approached. Although he expressed his sympathy to the cause which inspired the boycott, 
he declined to become a sponsor since he doubted of the use of boycott as a political
162 MSS AAM 91, Newspaper cutting.
163 Sampson, Mandela, 127.
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weapon.168 In a letter to Lord Altrincham, van Rensburg was thus forced to conclude that 
the Movement had “made miserably little progress amongst Conservatives.”169 By January 
1960 hopes for Tory support had given way to a hopefulness that at least the Conservative 
Party would not publicly oppose the boycott and consider leaving individual members free 
to join the campaign.170
Considerable interest in the boycott came this time from the NUS and many 
Universities’ and students’ societies. British university students had been protesting against 
South Africa’s racial policies since 1947, when the Royal Family visited the country. In the 
late 1950s, British academics voiced their opposition to the Extension of University of 
Education Bill through a petition circulated by MCF. Scottish students also protested 
vigorously against the introduction of apartheid legislation in education as a result of the 
strong relationship that existed between missionary orders in Scotland and African 
educational institutions in South Africa.171 The Students’ Unions of the London School of 
Economics, of the University College of North Wales, Leeds, Edinburgh, and Oxford’s 
JACARI (Joint Action Committee Against Racial Intolerance), and Cambridge’s JAGUAR 
(Joint Action Group for Understanding Among Races) all passed resolutions in support of
179the boycott. As many of the South Africans involved in organising the boycott had either
recently graduated or were still enrolled at British universities, they probably played an 
intermediary role in drawing British university students into the campaign.
As well as MCF, Christian Action, and the Africa Bureau, all of which had already 
put their weight behind the June 1959 boycott, other organisations now pledged their
168 MSS AAM 91, Letter from Chris Chataway MP to Patrick van Rensburg, December 1959.
169 MSS AAM 91, Letter from Patrick van Rensburg to Lord Altrincham, 18 December 1959.
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support for the Boycott Month. These were the newly formed Socialist Youth Movement, 
the New Left Review, as well as the Women’s Co-operative Guild and the British, Asian 
and Overseas Socialist Fellowships -  already among the supporters of the June 1959 
boycott. Finally, the London Co-operative Society passed a resolution urging
1 71Commonwealth states to cease handling South African goods.
The Boycott Month
On 17 January 1960, the Boycott Movement organised a National Conference at Deniston 
House in London. It was preceded by a press conference on the 12 January, which was 
attended by thirty-two press representatives, and where it was stressed that the campaign 
was part of a continued activity with one month of intensified action. The National 
Conference attracted 250 people from 158 organisations. Chaired by Huddleston and 
Phombeah of the CAO, it was addressed by some prominent speakers and sponsors, 
including Lord Altrincham, Manuela Sykes, Harry Knight (General Secretary of the 
supervisory and scientific workers’ union ASSET), Anthony Wedgwood Benn and Oginga 
Odinga of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo. As well as the forthcoming Boycott 
Month, the Conference discussed the future tasks of the Movement, which it was felt 
should continue its work after March.174
The Boycott Month was officially launched at a march culminating in a mass rally, 
chaired by Huddleston, in Trafalgar Square on 28 February 1960. Up to fifteen thousand 
people took part in the event, at which Hugh Gaitskell, Lord Altrincham, Jeremy Thorpe 
MP, Tennyson Makiwane and members of the trade union and co-operative movements
173 Boycott News, No. 1, January 1960.
174 See MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f the Boycott Movement Committee meeting, 13 and 19 February 1960, 
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spoke. A renewed statement from Chief Lutuli was read out. It welcomed “most heartedly 
the action of overseas people in launching the boycott of South African goods [...as] a 
demonstration of solidarity of freedom loving peoples throughout the world to fight 
oppression wherever oppression is found.”175 In the following weeks the campaign was 
continued through poster parades, pickets and the distribution of a newsletter, Boycott 
News, and other publicity material.176 On 27 March another march starting from Marble 
Arch and ending again in a mass rally in Trafalgar Square was planned to mark the end of 
the month of boycott.
Sharpeville and future implications
On 16 March 1960, five days before the Sharpeville shootings of 21 March, a meeting of 
the Boycott Movement Committee passed a resolution on future policy. It was agreed that 
“there should be a committee called the Anti-Apartheid Coordinating Committee 
(incorporating the Boycott Movement) to co-ordinate activities of all organisations 
opposing apartheid and in particular those of the committees formed throughout the country
• 177during the Boycott Month. Other campaigns would also be organised from time to time.” 
Setting up a permanent anti-apartheid body in the UK was something that the South African 
core of the boycott organisers had always envisaged. Financial constraints and the 
challenge of creating longer-term support had proved to be the biggest impediment to this. 
According to Vella Pillay, Sharpeville was a turning point in generating sympathy and
175 MSS AAM 92a, Interview and statement by Chief Albert Lutuli, January 1960.
176 Three types o f  publicity leaflets were printed for over one million copies, ten thousand posters were 
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177 MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the Boycott Movement Committee meeting o f  16 March 1960.
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galvanising support, as “a large number of people began to associate themselves with the 
Boycott Movement.”178 Moreover, although the Boycott Movement was already making 
plans for extending its activities beyond the boycott by becoming a permanent organisation 
at the time Sharpeville happened, Sharpeville made this transformation imperative. On the 
other hand, it was crucial that an organisation with a certain structure had already been 
established when Sharpeville took place so that the issue could be immediately picked up. 
While, for instance, the Defiance Campaign had come and gone without making much dent 
on international attitudes towards South Africa,179 thanks to the work done by the Boycott 
Movement, South Africa was now very much on the agenda of British politics and had 
become a news item -  thus ensuring that Sharpeville would not go unnoticed.
Sharpeville made newspapers’ headlines worldwide. In the days that followed, 
hundreds of people gathered in Trafalgar Square in protest against the police massacre: 
“wearing black and white anti-apartheid badges, some with black armbands, the 
demonstrators silently marched up and down or stood in groups reading and displaying 
Boycott News.”x%0 On 23 March, some one hundred students from the London School of 
Economics joined the steady stream of protestors picketing outside South Africa House to 
deliver a letter addressed to the South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd which 
suggested that he should stay at home as he would not be welcome in Britain (where he was 
due to arrive shortly for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference). Furthermore, a 
special prayer service to be held in St Martin’s in the Field on 1 April, and a recall 
conference on 30 April were planned.181
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During a meeting on 23 March, having agreed that “an international Anti-Apartheid 
campaign should be initiated at once,” the Anti-Apartheid Committee (the word 
‘Coordinating’ now dropped from the name) outlined a programme for international action 
through the UN and the Commonwealth and its first demands for government action. 
Lobbying the British government was to take place around three issues. First, “the British 
Government should protest at the use of weapons and no more should be supplied” to South 
Africa. Second, “the Government should make a grant of funds for the dependents of the 
victims.” And third, it “should express its disapproval of South Africa at the UN.”182 These 
requests, to which the imposition of economic sanctions was soon added,183 were to remain 
key areas of AAM activity in the years ahead.
Sharpeville gave a new urgency to the need to organise future action. This, 
however, soon turned out to be no easy task, due to “certain jealousies [...] and a little strife 
amongst various organisations which have become very keen on the boycott.”184 Some 
frictions had already surfaced towards the end of the previous year, when Christian Action 
had offered the Boycott Movement to help run and finance the campaign. In the spring of 
1960, these tensions started to re-emerge, as the Anti-Apartheid Committee, having 
changed its name again into the Anti-Apartheid Movement from the end of April, and
considering itself to be “the most useful group organising rank and file [anti-apartheid]
• • 1activity throughout the country,” concentrated on continuing its work. Canon Collins and
Christian Action, on the other hand, felt that the AAM could not carry out this coordinating 
function and insisted that a separate committee be formed to plan future action. Although 
he was impressed by the work done by the Boycott Movement, which he had helped
182 MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the Boycott Movement Committee meeting o f  23 March 1960.
183 Economic sanctions are also discussed in Chapter Two.
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finance, Collins was at the same time “slightly alarmed by the thought that he might have 
helped create a monster.”186 A Coordinating Committee, with representatives from 
Christian Action, MCF, the Africa Bureau and the AAM and convened by David Astor first 
and then Lord Altrincham, was established at the end of May 1960. A few meetings were 
called and continued to be held sporadically until the end of the year. Although every 
organisation represented on the Committee agreed in principle on the idea of establishing a 
permanent coordinating body, no agreement was ever reached in practice. This was because 
there was an underlying expectation that the AAM, as the more recent organisation, would 
submit its sovereignty to the Coordinating Committee and accepted it as a higher policy-
1 87making body, which the AAM categorically refused to do.
In the meantime, the South African founders of the AAM were adamant that the 
Movement should “remain free to implement [its] programme in whatever way we think 
fit.”188 In the summer of 1960 the Movement reorganised itself into a National Committee 
and a separate Executive Committee. The National Committee was to be the policy-making 
body of the Movement, “composed of individuals and organisations active in the fight 
against Apartheid.”189 The Executive Committee, on the other hand, was going to be 
responsible for carrying out the day-to-day work of the Movement, coordinating the 
activities of the organisations represented on both Committees and implementing policy. It 
would be composed of members of the National Committee, including one representative 
from each of these organisations: CAO, Christian Action, MCF and the Africa Bureau, as 
well as the officers of the Movement as appointed by the National Committee, and two
186 Herbstein, White Lies, 41.
187 See MSS AAM 90b, Notes on Anti-Apartheid “Coordinating Committee” by Lord Altrincham, 9 
September 1960.
188 MSS AAM 90b, Minutes o f  the Anti-Apartheid Movement meeting o f  13 May 1960.
189 MSS AAM 90b, Draft for discussion at the AAM meeting o f  29 June 1960.
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individual members of the National Committee.190 These basic organisational arrangements 
continued to structure the AAM for the next thirty-five years of its existence. With the 
launching of the Penny Pledge Campaign in September 1960, the AAM had made clear its 
decision “to go it alone.”191
South African exiles and the AAM in the 1960s
After Sharpeville, Britain became again the destination of another small group of political 
exiles who were driven out because of the changed political situation in South Africa. 
Whereas during the 1950s it had still been possible for an extra-parliamentary opposition to 
operate in the country, the banning of the ANC and the PAC immediately after Sharpeville 
marked the beginning of a gradual transfer of the arena of the struggle from inside to 
outside South Africa’s borders. The Rivonia raid and trial of 1963-1964 marked the 
completion of this relocation process -  as well as the arrival yet another, and this time 
rather sizeable, wave of political exiles.
For reasons which will be analysed in Chapter Three, London became home to the 
vast majority of non-African exiles, who steadily swelled the ranks of the AAM. In October 
1962, Joan Hymans complained at a meeting of the AAM National Committee that the
1Q9Executive Committee had a larger number of South African than British members. 
Despite Hymans’ remonstration, by 1965, an even larger number of South Africans was 
working in the AAM -  either as members of its National and Executive Committees, or as
190 Ibid.
191 MSS AAM 90b, Notes on Anti-Apartheid “Coordinating Committee” by Lord Altrincham, 9 September
1960.
192 MSS AAM 43, Minutes o f  the National Committee o f  the AAM, Friends House, 8 October 1962.
83
one of the movement’s officers, or in some other capacity.193 This South African 
predominance in the early history of the AAM can in part be explained by the fact that 
ANC membership was at the time still confined to Africans. As a result, white, Indian and 
Coloured activists arriving in exile found themselves excluded from the external structures 
which the ANC established after 1960. Instead, the AAM gave them the political home 
which the external mission of ANC could not. The AAM came to function as a public 
platform of the kind that the Congress Alliance had been in South Africa in the 1950s, and 
through which non-African exiles could now throw in their resources and energies in 
support of the national liberation movement. It is therefore no accident that although the 
AAM portrayed itself to be non-partisan, in effect it was always closer to the ANC than it 
ever was to the PAC. Moreover, many of the AAM’s defining features -  notably its broad 
appeal -  had their roots in the Congress Movement back in South Africa. It is also 
interesting that some of the AAM’s internal debates and dynamics (which first emerged in 
this period and were to persist throughout its existence), as with regards to the position of 
Indians and communists in both movements, mirrored in many ways the debates that had 
recently taken place within the Congress Alliance. The AAM was in fact the target of a 
criticism similar to the one waged to the ANC by its critics and opponents: that it was run 
by Indians and communists.194
193 By 1965, South African exiles in the UK who were working in the AAM in one capacity or another (other 
than the ones that have already been mentioned) included (in no particular order): Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Hilda 
Bernstein, Harold and Anne-Marie Wolpe, Leon Levy, Jack and Rica Hodgson, Brian and Sonya Bunting, 
Margaret Legum, Mannie Brown, Ronald Segal, Bishop Ambrose Reeves, Mary Benson, Sonya Clements, 
Freda Levson, Wolfie Kodesh and Phyllis Altman. See MSS AAM 45, Proposed membership for 1965.
194 University o f  Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, file 99, 
Mazizi Kunene, ANC office, 3 Collingham Gardens, London, letter to ANC Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cairo, 22 
November 1964.
84
The penetration of the AAM by South African exiles (most of whom had been 
associated with the Congress Alliance in South Africa) in the early 1960s, convinced 
successive British governments -  whether under Labour or Tory administration -  that the 
AAM was, just like the ANC, “under Communist control.”195 The communist stigma was 
also applied by British government officials to individuals and organisations associated 
with the AAM. Ronald Segal, who in April 1964 convened an International Conference for 
Economic Sanctions against South Africa,196 was written off by the British Foreign Office 
as a “communist sympathiser.”197 In late 1954, the Foreign Office also labelled Abdul 
Minty and Mazizi Kunene as communists. IDAF, on the other hand, was perceived by the 
British government as “a respectable and liberal organisation” which, however, did
1 Qfi“include communists who of course seek to use it for their own political purposes.” This 
characterisation of IDAF influenced the 1964-elected Labour government’s decision not to 
make a financial contribution to the fund in late 1964199 -  a decision which remained 
unchanged ever since.200
The presence of communists in the AAM was also a source of controversy within 
the movement itself. In April 1964 Barbara Castle nearly resigned as Honorary President 
over an argument involving Vella Pillay, then AAM Vice-Chairman, and fellow executive
195 PRO: FO 371/17767, Guidelines to Her Majesty's representatives on the Conference o f  Economic 
Sanctions, 8 April 1964.
196 See Ronald Segal (ed.), Sanctions Against South Africa (Harmondsworth, 1964).
197 PRO: FO 371/17767, Telegram from J. Wilson, Foreign Office, to the UK mission to the UN, New York, 
18 March 1964.
198 PRO: FO 371/177072, Notes o f a conversation between J. Wilson, Foreign Office, with the Lord 
Chancellor, 18-21 December 1964.
199Ibid.
200 See Arianna Lissoni, “The Anti-apartheid movement, Britain and South Africa: anti-apartheid protest vs 
realpolitik. A history o f  the AAM and its influence on the British government’s policy towards South Africa 
in 1964,” MSc dissertation, LSE, 15 September 2000,
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/aam/dissertation.htm.
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member Ros Ainslie. Following the publication of an article in the Sunday Telegraph 
which stated that both Pillay and Ainslie were members of the Communist Party, Castle 
wrote to the newspaper denying the allegation. She then demanded that the Pillay and 
Ainslie do the same, something which they initially refused to do.201 It was only after 
Castle threatened that she “wanted to consider her position in regard to AAM” that Pillay 
and Ainslie sent a letter, having agreed that “it was most important to maintain the unity of 
the AAM.”202 Ironically, Pillay and Ainslie’s overarching commitment to unity derived 
from the very SACP membership they were being accused of.
Conclusion
Britain, in its unique position as the former colonial power and the major investing country 
in South Africa, had been one of the main targets of Black South Africans’ diplomatic 
efforts since the Act of Union in 1910. In the aftermath of World War Two, and following 
election of the Nationalist Party in 1948, most of the hopes for support for the predicament 
of black South Africans shifted to the UN and later to the newly independent African states. 
Despite this, Britain continued to hold a special relationship with South Africa because of 
its economic and historic links. From the 1950s, British support did eventually start to 
come, not from the government though, but from anti-colonial and church groups, the 
Communist Party, and sections of the Labour and Liberal Parties.203 Moreover, since the 
1940s, a growing number of South Africans had been arriving in London, where they began 
to set up social and political networks of solidarity with the liberation movement in South 
Africa. These networks were also crucially interlinked with the growing movement for
201 MSS AAM 66, Minutes o f  the Executive Committee, 27 April 1964.
202 MSS AAM 66, Executive Committee emergency meeting minutes, 2 May 1964.
203 James Barber, The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa (London, 1983), 2.
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African self-determination in Britain. As Ros Ainslie has pointed out: “it’s important to 
stress the African base of this thing and people [...] too often forget it.”204
In June 1959, a limited campaign for the boycott of South African goods was 
launched in Britain. Within less than year, as the emergency situation in South Africa 
intensified, the boycott campaign had grown into a Movement in its own right going under 
the name of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. From the onset, the AAM, which “operated 
[...] as an instrument of solidarity with the people of South Africa”, was characterised by 
an “umbilical cord relationship with the [liberation] struggle”. For the next thirty years 
the AAM campaigned for a sports, cultural, academic, consumer, arms and economic 
boycott of South Africa to help bring apartheid to an end. The AAM was formed to 
coordinate all the anti-apartheid work in the UK and to keep South Africa’s apartheid 
policy to the forefront of British politics. Its formation was not an easy process: it required 
the selfless dedication of a small group of committed individuals, a remarkable mobilising 
effort, and the overcoming of inter as well as personal and intra-organisational disputes and 
jealousies.
For a brief but significant period of time, the Boycott Movement was able to attract 
a wide and diverse range of support -  from the British Communist, Liberal and Labour 
Parties, to the trade unions, individual MPs, the NUS, several Churches, and other 
organisations. This diverse range of people and organisations managed to work together on 
the basis of what they had to offer, despite their political differences. Although there had
204 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, HBI, Ros Ainslie de Lanerolle, interview with Hilda Bernstein, Transcripts 
Vol. 1.
205 Abdul S. Minty, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement? What kind o f  history?,” The Anti-Apartheid Movement: 
A 40-year Perspective, Report o f the Symposium Organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives 
Committee to Mark the 40th Anniversary o f  the Establishment o f  the Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa 
House, London, 25-26 June 1999, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/aam/svmposium.html.
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been an early recognition on the part of its founders that the movement needed to put down 
roots in British society if it was to become a successful venture, this only started to be 
accomplished from the mid-1970s.206 In the 1960s, the numerical superiority of South 
African exiles on AAM structures meant that it was them who in effect ran the 
organisation, which functioned almost as a surrogate of the former Congress Alliance.
The arrival of the Sharpeville and Rivonia generations of exiles in the UK played a 
central role in providing the emergent AAM with leadership and political direction. Direct 
contact with the liberation movements was made incredibly easier by the fact that after 
1960 they established a formal presence in London, as the next chapter will show. At the 
same time, when the first group of South African leaders arrived in the UK immediately 
after Sharpeville, they were relatively unknown outside of South Africa. These exiles were 
welcomed and integrated into the anti-apartheid network that had been growing in London 
and, thanks to it, they were immediately given public status and recognition.
206 In 1975 Mike Terry (former NUS Secretary) took over the position o f AAM Executive Secretary from 
Ethel de Keyser. According to Gurney, “His patient diplomacy and ability to work with organisations across 
the political spectrum were invaluable to the AAM as it expanded in the 1980s.” Gurney, “In the heart o f  the 
beast,” footnote 228, 48.
CHAPTER TWO
The South African United Front, June 1960-March 1962
On 21 March 1960 South African police shot on a peaceful crowd of PAC supporters who 
had gathered outside the police stations of the African locations of Sharpeville (south of 
Johannesburg) and Langa (Cape Town) to protest against the pass laws. Sixty-nine people 
were killed and hundreds wounded, including women and children. The shootings plunged 
the country into chaos, to the extent that “[t]he events of March 1960 came closest to 
representing a crisis for the South African state.”1 In the African townships, the much hated 
passbooks were being burned, while workers went on strike in response to Chief Lutuli’s 
call for a National Day of Mourning on 28 March. Two days later, a young PAC leader, 
Philip Kgosana, led a 30,000-strong crowd from Langa into Cape Town’s city centre, 
“terrifying the white population, who feared that the dreaded ‘Revolution’ was finally upon 
them.”2
Wide international media coverage of the Sharpeville shootings caused the outrage 
of world public opinion. For the first time, the UN Security Council took a stand against 
South Africa by passing a resolution which deplored the South African government’s 
actions as responsible for the recent loss of lives and which requested “the Secretary- 
General, in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to make such 
arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and to report to the Security Council whenever necessary and appropriate.”3 Nine
1 Lodge, Black Politics, 210.
2 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 255.
3 S/RES/134 (1960), 1 April 1960, http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs 1 a.html# 14.
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countries, including the United States, voted in favour of the resolution, while Britain and 
France abstained.
South Africa faced a temporary economic crisis, as “[t]hese events provoked a flight
of foreign capital” which in turn made share prices on the Johannesburgh Stock Exchange
plummet. Business groups called on the government to introduce reforms to settle African
grievances and quell the wave of domestic and international protest.4
After a brief suspension of the pass laws, the apartheid state moved swiftly to
prevent further unrest and restore public order. On 30 March a State of Emergency was
imposed and thousands of people, including most of the leaders of the opposition, were
rounded up by the police and detained. On 8 April the Unlawful Organisations Bill was
passed, and the following day ANC and the PAC were both banned. Despite an
assassination attempt on Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd on 9 April, by the end of the
month the government had ruthlessly regained control of the country. Rather than being the
revolution that many people had been hoping for, Sharpeville turned out to be “the
revolution that wasn’t.”5 However, as Tom Lodge has argued:
The significance of the Sharpeville crisis was not that it was an occasion when 
revolutionary political and social conditions were present and consequently 
squandered. Instead it represented a turning point in the history of African 
nationalism, when protest finally hardened into resistance, and when African 
politicians were forced to begin of thinking in terms of a revolutionary strategy.6
March 1960 marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the South African 
liberation struggle in a number of ways. The ANC and PAC, after being declared illegal 
organisations, had to go underground and find alternative forms of struggle to meet the
4 Dan O ’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics o f  the National Party 1948-1994 
(Randburg, 1996), 101.
5 Sampson, Mandela, 133.
6 Lodge, Black Politics, 225.
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state’s increasing violence and repression. In December 1961, on the initiative of some 
SACP and ANC leaders, Umkhonto we Sizwe announced its existence as “an independent 
body, formed by Africans” and including “in its ranks South Africans of all races,” which 
would “carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods.”7 As Umkhonto 
decided that the time was not yet ripe for guerrilla activity, selective sabotage was chosen 
as the first step towards armed revolution. The PAC produced its own insurrectionist 
offshoot, Poqo, which was committed to revolutionary change in South Africa by way of a 
general uprising.
The year 1960 also marks the formal beginnings of the liberation movements’ 
external work. This chapter will deal with the first attempt at setting up a joint external 
machinery through the SAUF. Its aim was to seek “the sympathy and support of the 
peoples and governments of the world” for the struggle against apartheid, as well as “to 
bring international economic and political pressure on the South African Government, and
Q
in general to secure its expulsion from the world comity of nations.”
The Front came into existence just over a year after the Africanists’ decision to form 
a separate organisation in April 1959. From the onset, the PAC had established itself as a 
rival of the ANC -  and this rivalry had continued to shape relations between the two parties 
up until Sharpeville. The PAC’s last minute announcement that its anti-pass demonstration 
would take place on 21 March, for example, was interpreted by the ANC as a deliberate 
attempt to sabotage its own anti-pass campaign, which was scheduled to start only ten days 
later. Mandela called the PAC’s announcement “a blatant case of opportunism” which was
7 Leaflet issued by the command o f Umkhonto we Sizwe, 16 December, 1961, document 66 in Karis and 
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 716.
8 Yusuf Dadoo, “Why the United Front Failed,” New Age, 29 March 1962.
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“motivated more by a desire to eclipse the ANC than to defeat the enemy.”9 Still, the 
decision to form a United Front abroad was taken and it is thus important to ask why.
The history of the SAUF has generally tended to be overlooked, probably because 
ANC-PAC relations became so bitter and because, from about 1962, political separation 
appeared irrevocable. In other words, there has been a tendency to dismiss the Front, its 
workings, and its significance because of the underlying assumption that the organisation 
was in any case doomed to fail. Although it can still be argued that the PAC’s decision to 
undertake a separate political path as a result of fundamental ideological differences 
between the Africanists and the Charterists in the ANC was indeed one of the root factors 
in the collapse of the Front, its history is still worth analysing for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the creation of a united front so soon after the ANC-PAC split is revealing 
about the capacity of Africans to pool their resources at times of extreme crisis. Secondly, it 
has something to say about the liberation movements’ international standing and their needs 
as they attempted to set up structures outside South Africa for the first time. Thirdly, the 
history of the SAUF is indicative of how the liberation movements’ exile politics were 
inextricably tied to and shaped by what was happening inside the country. Then, the SAUF 
represents a first, uncertain stage in the gradual building of an external base by the 
liberation movements, which in turn was a process very much driven by South African 
events. Finally, the birth of the SAUF is directly linked to a call on the South African 
leadership in exile by Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah. This raises questions as to what 
the independent African states’ vision for the liberation of Africa as a whole was, how 
much this proved to be applicable to the South African situation, and what kind of 
relationship the ANC was able to establish with African states vis-a-vis the PAC.
9 Mandela, Long Walk, 280.
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The M aking of the SAUF, April-June 1960
During its last conference as a legal organisation in South Africa in December 1959, the
ANC Executive had made provisions for its newly elected Deputy President Oliver
Reginald Tambo to leave the country to represent the organisation abroad and rally
international support for the anti-apartheid struggle in the event of the ANC being banned:
When that occurred, the NEC [National Executive Committee] anticipated, there 
would be widespread arrests, and the ANC would need an ambassador to carry 
abroad the message of its vision and solicit support for the movement.10
The Sharpeville massacre and the intense succession of events which followed it 
“dramatically accelerated the plan for an external mission” and now made it “imperative 
that Tambo leave [South Africa] immediately, before he was picked up.”11 On 29 March 
1960, Tambo drove into the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland with friend Ronald Segal, 
the banned editor of Africa South}2 After a failed attempt to proceed to Tanganyika via 
Southern Rhodesia, Tambo and Segal drove back to Francistown, where Dr Yusuf Dadoo 
had now arrived and was, like them, eager to find a way out of the Protectorate, as all 
refugees were in danger of extradition or abduction by the South African police. Dr Dadoo 
had gone into hiding with SACP General Secretary Moses Kotane and Michael Harmel, 
another SACP leader, when the State of Emergency had been declared and left South 
Africa on 9 April. The decision that Dadoo should leave the country had been taken by the 
SACP in consultation with the SAIC so that he could “assist with the organisation of
13solidarity work and consolidate the external apparatus of the [Communist] Party.”
10 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 253.
11 Ibid, 254.
12 For a story o f  their escape see Ronald Segal, Into Exile (London, 1963).
13 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 262. For a brief political biography o f  Yusuf Dadoo see Essop Pahad, “Yusuf 
Dadoo, A Proud History o f  Struggle,” http://www.sacp.org.za/biographies/dadoo.html
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Although at this stage the ANC and the SACP, which was secretly functioning
underground and would soon announce its existence, were still operating independently
“and there was no intention at that stage to work together on an escape route [...] Dadoo
was, nevertheless, included in the travel plans.”14
Through Frene Ginwala, whom the ANC had put in charge of helping people come
out of South Africa, the group found their way to Dar es Salaam via the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland on a small chartered plane. According to Mac Maharaj, it was the
small SACP cell active in London which raised the money for the airfare.15 Tanganyika,
whose independence was imminent, was seen as a fairly safe staging post for people fleeing
South Africa. In Dar es Salaam Tambo met PAC leaders Nana Mahomo and Peter ’Molotsi,
who had left South Africa on 20 March, and the idea of working together in representing
the interests of the South African people abroad was casually mentioned during the
encounter. Neither the ANC nor the PAC leaders knew where they would settle. Thus,
working together simply meant the possibility of cooperation of some kind.16 According to
Tambo’s biographer Luli Callinicos, while in Tanganyika, Tambo asked Ginwala to
arrange for travelling documents for the PAC men as well. This might have been more than
a “thoughtful consideration” on Tambo’s part:
In the first place, it went without saying in African black circles that political 
differences should never interfere with personal relationships. In any case, the three 
men, far from home and united in the common oppression of both their 
organisations, were very pleased to see each other. In addition, Tambo may have 
also hoped to renew the opportunity to begin a process of reconciliation with the 
young PAC members. After all, the split had occurred just two years earlier; here
14 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 261.
15 Ibid., note 14, 642.
16 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Oliver Tambo, “Notes and 
Observations on ‘United Front and Afterwards’ by Judy Coburn.” This document contains fairly detailed 
information about the SAUF and was written by Tambo in response to a paper written by Judy Cobum. 
Neither the paper nor its author have been identified.
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was a chance to persuade them, eventually, to work within the mother body of the 
ANC.17
Tambo was not alone in thinking that unity with the Africanist dissidents was still possible. 
Mandela also thought that “once the heated polemics had cooled, the essential commonality 
of the struggle would bring us together.”18 Perhaps this hope was rooted in the simplistic 
characterisation of the PAC by ANC leaders like Mandela as “immature,” and in the 
dismissal of the PAC’s ideology as the “undeveloped and callous” “views of one’s 
youth.” 19 Both Mandela and Tambo, however, were soon to find out that they had seriously 
underestimated the appeal potential of the PAC’s Africanism.
In the 1950s ’Molotsi had worked as a reporter for The World and in 1955 founded 
the Africanist. ’Molotsi left South Africa with Nana Mahomo on the eve of the March anti­
pass demonstrations to represent the PAC internationally when the campaign took place. 
’Molotsi was the PAC Officer for Pan-African Matters, while Mahomo was Secretary for 
Culture and had been in charge of PAC activities in the Western Cape.20 On 20 March, 
’Molotsi, Mahomo, P.K. Leballo (PAC General Secretary) and Robert Sobukwe (PAC 
President) had met at Ellen Molapo’s21 house in Johannesburg and made preparations for 
’Molotsi and Mahomo to escape.22 According to ’Molotsi, Sobukwe decided that ’Molotsi, 
being the Officer for Pan African Matters, “was the most qualified person” to act as PAC
17 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 262.
18 Mandela, Long Walk, 269.
19 Ibid., 268.
20 University o f  the Witwatersrand, William Cullen Library, Historical Papers (hereafter CULLEN HSTPAP), 
A2422, Peter ’Molotsi interview with Gail M. Gerhart, August 25, 27, 1969, New York.
21 Ellen Molapo was a prominent PAC and Garment Workers Union member in Newclare, Johannesburg. See 
Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, note 139, 372.
22 CULLEN HSTPAP, A2422, Ellen Molapo interview with Gail M. Gerhart, 3 January 1970, Leribe, 
Lesotho.
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international representative and help put the PAC in touch with other movements and 
governments. Moreover, the PAC leadership had been discussing the idea that there should 
be representation abroad, especially because they saw “Makiwane of the ANC who was 
gaining all the sympathy abroad.” 23 Thus, part of the reason why ’Molotsi and Mahomo 
were sent out of South Africa was that the ANC was perceived to be ahead of the PAC in 
building international contacts.
Once all the South Africans had been issued with travel documents by the Indian 
Consulate24 in Kenya so that they could continue their journeys, Tambo left on his own for 
Tunisia, where he had been invited to speak at a World Assembly of Youth (WAY)
9 <Conference by its Swedish Secretary General, David Wirmark. On his way to Tunis from 
Nairobi, Tambo received a cable from the Ghanaian government inviting him to Ghana “for
9 f \the purpose of discussing the South African situation.” On his arrival in Accra he joined 
up again with Segal, Dadoo, ’Molotsi and Mahomo, who had all been cabled while in Dar 
es Salaam. Tennyson Makiwane was also in Accra to attend a meeting of the All-African 
People’s Conference Steering Committee, of which he was member, and was thus included 
in the Ghanaian invitation. Since he did not officially represent any organisation, Ronald 
Segal did not take part in the discussions 27 It turned out that the purpose of the invitation 
was to put before the group the idea of forming a united front, of establishing the 
headquarters of such front in Accra, and of issuing a public statement announcing the
23 CULLEN HSTPAP, A2422, Peter ’Molotsi interview with Gail M. Gerhart.
24 These were probably obtained through Yusuf Dadoo, who was “certainly an asset to anyone seeking the 
patronage o f  the Indian government.” Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 261.
25 Tor Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol. 1, Formation o f  a popular opinion, 
1950-1970 (Uppsala, 1999), 101-102.
26 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
27 Interview with Ronald Segal, Walton-on-Thames, 14 November 2003.
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decision.28 The formation of a govemment-in-exile was suggested at first, and Ghana
29offered to raise a loan for this purpose. But the South Africans turned down the offer.
The rift between the ANC and the PAC troubled Nkrumah, who argued “that there 
was no room for opposition groups among patriots. A union of the two liberation 
movements, he maintained, was both necessary to achieve success at home and appropriate 
for Pan-Africanism in the region.”30 Nkrumah’s emphatic concern might help explain why, 
according to Tambo, “the principle of forming a united front on some basis was readily 
agreed to,”31 in spite of the recent history of enmity between the ANC and the PAC. The 
question of where to establish the Front’s headquarters was postponed until the 
forthcoming meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in May, which 
Nkrumah would also be attending, so that the disposition of other African states towards 
supporting the South African liberation struggle could be assessed first. The exiled South 
African leaders were in fact anxious to secure support for economic sanctions from 
independent African states. They also hoped that African countries would help raise the 
issue of South Africa at the UN. Moreover, the South Africans may have been wary of 
establishing too close a relationship with Ghana too soon, which might irretrievably limit 
their freedom of action in future. In particular, it was felt that too close an association with 
Ghana could prejudice their chances of establishing friendly relations with Western 
countries, especially Britain and the United States, and thus of getting all the support 
possible they needed.32 Moreover, it is likely that the South African leaders did not want to
28 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
29 Interview with Ronald Segal, Walton-on-Thames, 14 November 2003.
30 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 264.
31 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
32 Ibid.
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officially commit to anything without the approval of their respective organisations at 
home.
Preliminary talks about unity were resumed in London in May 1960. Nkrumah’s 
offer to provide facilities for running an office in Ghana was accepted, whereas the decision 
o f where to establish headquarters was kept open.33 At this stage, another PAC leader, 
Vusumzi L. Make,34 was brought into the discussions. It was also decided to include the 
South West Africa National Union (SWANU, formed in 1959 out of the South West Africa 
progressive Association). Jariretundu Kozonguizi, SWANU’s President, was already in 
London for the purpose of representing his organisation internationally, and had become 
involved in the activities of the Boycott Movement. In London, the group of leaders agreed 
in principle “to work together, to campaign together, and to act together in making 
approaches to individuals, organisations and governments on the issues of apartheid and 
South West Africa.”35
The inclusion of the Namibian movements into the SAUF (in January 1961 
membership was extended to the South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO) 
seemed a logical step. On 10 December 1959 the South African police had opened fire on 
demonstrators in Windhoek and killed eleven people. UN reactions to this atrocity 
“foreshadowed those that were to follow the Sharpeville shootings some three months 
later,”36 and very much put the South West African question on the international agenda. 
Another way in which the Windhoek massacre anticipated what happened in South Africa
33 Ibid.
34 Make had been a member o f  the ANC Youth League and Treason Trial defendant. Arrested in 1957 and 
banished to the northern Transvaal after his release, he fled South Africa in 1958 and later became a PAC 
representative abroad. See Gail M. Gerhart and Thomas Karis, Political Profiles, 1882-1964, Vol. 4 o f Karis 
and Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, 68.
35 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
36 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 295.
98
as a result o f Sharpeville is that it forced the African nationalist leadership into exile and 
into an armed struggle shortly afterwards. As Tambo explained to the UN General 
Assembly in October 1960 (which Sam Njuoma of SWAPO, Mburumba Kerina and 
Kozonguizi also addressed): “Namibians and South Africans fought the same struggle. 
Living on the two sides of the border, they suffered under the same government which was 
enforcing the same policies.”37 However, the contribution of the Namibian liberation 
movements to the SAUF was marginal, and the activities of the SAUF ultimately centred 
on South Africa. Partly, this was because SWANU’s affiliation depended to a great extent 
on Kozonguizi’s personal relations with the ANC -  of which he had been member. More 
crucially, Namibian involvement in the SAUF was soon overshadowed by the conflict 
between SWANU and SWAPO, which escalated around this time.38
From London the group set out on a tour of African states “for the purpose of 
explaining the situation in South Africa and South West Africa, soliciting their support and 
discussing the establishment of offices.” First they went to Cairo, where they were able to 
enlist Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser’s support, and from there to Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia 
and Guinea. Tambo remained behind in Cairo “battling for a visa to enter the United States 
to undertake a speaking tour arranged by the American Committee on Africa.”39 Because of 
the delay in granting the visa, Tambo eventually had to postpone the American tour and 
rejoined the rest of the South African exiles in Addis Ababa to attend the Second 
Conference of Independent African States. Talks of institutional cooperation between the 
various South African organisations were finalised during the Conference, which 
Mburumba Kerina, whom the Herero Chiefs’ Council had sent as a petitioner to the UN on
37 Ronald Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics o f  Decolonization, 1945-1990 (London, 
1994), 32.
38 Ibid., 33.
39 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
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South West Africa, was also attending as adviser to the Liberian delegation.40 Kerina was 
one of the nationalist leaders involved in the reconstitution of the Ovamboland People’s 
Organisation into SWAPO in April 1960. According to Tambo’s notes, in Addis Ababa 
Kerina was allowed to participate in the discussions in an individual capacity because of his 
involvement in the South West African question at the UN.41
The formation of the SAUF was officially announced at the Conference of 
Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa between 15 and 24 June 1960. A 
memorandum briefly outlining the current situation in South Africa and appealing for the 
economic and political isolation of South Africa, as well as for funds, was submitted to the 
Conference by a “South African Delegation” consisting of representatives of the four 
organisations -  ANC, PAC, SAIC, and SWANU. The Conference welcomed the formation 
of the United Front and adopted measures which included a call to isolate South Africa 
diplomatically and economically, and the decision to assist “the victims of racial 
discrimination and furnish them with all the means necessary to attain their political 
objectives of liberty and democracy.”42
SAUF membership, organisation and structure
In the light of their missions to the various African states, the South African leaders, having 
returned to London after the Addis Ababa Conference, held further talks regarding the basis 
of the Front, its guiding principles, and policy matters. “These discussions resulted in a
40 In November 1960 Liberia and Ethiopia took the issue o f  South Africa’s occupation o f  Namibia to the 
International Court o f  Jurists by charging South Africa o f  failure to meet its UN mandate obligations.
41 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
42 Resolution adopted by the Second Conference o f  Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 24 June 1960, 
http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs la.html#14
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formal document which cited the overthrow of white domination as the long term object” of 
the Front, “and the mobilisation of international support as the immediate objective.”43 
Membership of the Front was to consist of representatives of all the organisations which 
had taken part in the setting up of the Front -  which so far included the ANC, PAC, SAIC, 
and SWANU. SWAPO, represented by Kerina, joined the union in January 1961. 
Theoretically, it was agreed that each organisation in the Front should have equal status and 
that the same principle should apply to individual representatives, none of whom exercised 
overall leadership functions. Although Tambo represented the most senior organisation in 
the group (as well as being the second most senior individual, the first being Dadoo), he 
“was careful not to impose the leadership of the ANC on the other organisations,” which, as 
he was well aware, could create frictions.44
No organisation with white membership was part of the Front. This was, according 
to Tambo, simply because “there were no white groups to be included.” Around January 
1961, however, Patrick van Rensburg applied to be admitted to the SAUF as a member of 
the Liberal Party, but was turned down. Tambo explained this decision in terms of the lack 
of official mandate from the Liberal Party of van Rensburg’s application. During a 
conference of all SAUF representatives in January 1961, the matter of how to handle 
applications by other South African political organisations was settled by the decision to 
deal with them individually if and when they were made. In his notes on the SAUF, Tambo 
categorically rejected the suggestion that the exclusion of whites from the Front was a 
concession to the PAC for having already agreed to include one non-African organisation, 
the SAIC. Rather, from Tambo’s point of view, the presence of whites in the SAUF was
43 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
44 Ibid.
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“never even an issue.”45 For Tambo and the ANC the participation of whites in principle 
may not have presented any ideological problem. For years the ANC had worked in close 
contact with the white COD. Although the PAC also cooperated, on a less public front, 
with the whites in the non-racial Liberal Party,46 the same cannot be argued with certainty 
about the PAC. The ANC’s cooperation with whites and Indians, which was interpreted by 
the Africanists as a form of collaboration with the oppressor,47 had in fact been one of the 
very reasons for the PAC’s breakaway. In any case, the absence of whites in the SAUF may 
have had less to do with ideological considerations on the part o f the ANC or the PAC and 
more to do with the fact that the formation of the SAUF had been, after all, an African 
initiative, encouraged by Nkrumah and other African leaders.
The Front set out its immediate aims as follows. Internationally, it would lobby the 
UN for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa and the transfer of the 
trusteeship mandate of South West Africa to the UN “as a first step towards the granting of 
complete independence to the territory.”48 Secondly, a campaign against oil and oil 
products was planned to stop their supply to South Africa by industrial action. Third, the 
SAUF would secure “maximum and concerted action by all independent African states to 
refuse shipping, air landing facilities and air space to all South African aeroplanes.” Finally, 
it appealed to the people of all countries to continue and intensify the boycott of South
45 Ibid.
46 See Chapter Three.
47 See “Future o f  the Africanist Movement.” Questions and answers by R.M. Sobukwe, in The Africanist, 
document 38 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 507.
48 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Press Statement, South African United Front, London, 6 September 
1960.
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African goods, as “a very effective and useful weapon in exerting economic pressure on 
South Africa.”49
To start with, offices would be opened in Cairo, Accra and London. Makiwane and 
‘Molotsi were assigned to Accra, Make and Mzwandile Piliso50 to Cairo, and Mahomo, 
Dadoo and Kozonguizi to London. Tambo, also provisionally based in London, had “a 
roving mission between offices to facilitate coordination.” Finally, Kerina was appointed as 
contact person for the Front in New York, the base of the UN headquarters.51 Another 
office was opened in Dar es Salaam in February 1961, with James Hadebe for the ANC and 
Gaur Rabede for the PAC.52 Representation in the various offices was uneven: SWANU 
and the SAIC were not represented anywhere else but London, and the ANC was 
unrepresented in Cairo -  Tambo argued that Piliso did not officially belong to any
53organisation at the time he was brought into the Front, and only later joined the ANC. 
Although this set up does not seem to have caused any serious difficulties in principle, it 
might have later turned into a contributing factor to the Front’s downfall.
In order to keep every SAUF office up to date on all decisions and activities, 
duplicate copies of all communications from one office to the other were sent to each of the 
other offices, which in turn could add comments and observations as they deemed 
necessary. This seemed to be fairly effective, as decisions could be speedily reached on 
matters that did not require the holding of a conference. Each office was also responsible 
for sending regular periodic reports on its work and sphere of activity. In Tambo’s view, 
this communication system was most important in keeping the Front together as well as in
49 Ibid.
50 Piliso had just qualified as a pharmacist in London (see Chapter One) and offered his services to the SAUF.
51 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
52 New Age, 28 December 1961.
53 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
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helping maintain its coherence: “Numerous decisions were taken on a variety of matters 
through the machinery of inter-office reports, and many knotty issues were similarly 
resolved.”54
In an article appearing in New Age and Spearhead after the breakdown of the
SAUF, Yusuf Dadoo wrote:
United fronts in general demand a high degree of discipline and integrity from their 
participants. They call for absolute honesty and frankness, for a regular discussion 
of outstanding problems and difficulties and above all for unity in action. They 
forbid public attacks of one partner by another. They prohibit conspiracies and 
underhand schemes to undermine one or other partners in the front.55
Given the frailty of ANC-PAC relations prior to the setting up of the Front, this kind of
discipline applied to the SAUF all the more. During the Addis Ababa consultations,
members of the Front had expressly agreed among themselves that they “would not indulge
in attacking, misrepresenting, or otherwise undermining a member organisation of the
Front.”56
However, on accepting his appointment to the Cairo office in August 1960, Piliso 
expressed his concern that there was not “maximum HONESTY” among the Front’s 
members. Placing “individual organisations above the will of the people and their well 
being” would, Piliso warned, “retard the movement for many decades.” In order to prevent 
this from happening, he suggested introducing the swearing of an oath that members would 
not divulge details of the Front’s missions unless granted specific permission. In a final 
plea that the Front would “be built by confidence in each other,” Piliso put the following 
alternative before his colleagues: “we must choose whether our first love and devotion is in
54 Ibid.
55 Yusuf Dadoo, “Why the United Front Failed,” New Age, 29 March 1962. The same article also appeared 
under the title “Disunited Front” in Spearhead, April 1962.
56 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
104
the FRONT or outside.”57 Piliso’s remarks point to a fundamental problem in the union: 
from the very start, loyalty to individual organisations did in fact override their 
commitment to the Front, which, in turn, helped to foster divisions and suspiciousness 
amongst its members.
The SAUF in London
The formation of a United Front comprising all the various Southern African organisations 
turned out to be a useful move on tactical grounds. The existence of the Front helped in a 
number of ways: in the holding of joint press conferences (one joint conference could be 
made, instead of having to hold four separate ones); in the political lobbying of British 
MPs, the Commonwealth Office, and the UN; and, in more practical terms, in applying for 
political refugee status, or the in sharing of office premises and bills. In London, the SAUF 
was given an office at 31a John Adam Street, at the India League. Dr Dadoo’s presence in 
the Front was instrumental in obtaining facilities at the India League, whose founder,
CQ
Krishna Menon, was a personal friend of Dadoo’s.
In Britain, the Front proved to be especially useful in the handling of relations 
between solidarity organisations and the South African liberation movements as it enabled 
groups such as the A AM and the Defence and Aid Fund to stand outside the divisions 
between the liberation movements and at the same time to offer their broad support for the 
anti-apartheid struggle.59 On their arrival in the UK, members of the SAUF were able to 
establish immediate contact with British organisations campaigning against apartheid
57 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Mzwandile Piliso, Letter to the offices o f  the SAUF, 11 August 1960. 
Original emphasis.
58 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 266.
59 Personal communication with Dorothy Robinson, 17 November 2003.
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through the group of South Africans already active in this country. Moreover, for a short 
while, Makiwane was both a member of the SAUF and Director of the Boycott Movement, 
then in the process of transforming itself into the AAM. On 20 April 1960, Yusuf Dadoo, 
who had just arrived in London,60 was the guest at the first official AAM meeting where he 
“expressed appreciation, on behalf of the people of South Africa, for the work done by the 
Boycott Movement, and said it had been a tremendous inspiration and hoped the Anti- 
Apartheid Committee would continue.” Dadoo also emphasised the importance of outside 
pressure on South Africa and suggested a series of possible actions to be taken. One was to 
approach trade unions in Britain as well as African states and ask them not to handle oil for 
South Africa. Then, to lobby the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference. And third, to solicit the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa 
at the UN.61
Through the help of British organisations, the AAM in particular, the SAUF was 
able to engage itself in a series of British campaigns and events from an early start. A press 
conference was organised by the AAM to publicise Tambo and Segal’s arrival in London in 
early May. In September 1960, Mahomo, Tambo and Dadoo attended the TUC Annual 
Conference, where they urged the TUC to bring their pressure on the British government to 
support measures for economic sanctions against South Africa and also called on the 
British workers to demonstrate their support for the anti-apartheid struggle by taking “some 
suitable form of industrial action.”62 The AAM also arranged a two-weeks tour during
60 Dadoo travelled to the UK from Ghana separately from the others who remained in Ghana and only arrived 
in London some weeks later. See MSS AAM 2, AAM minutes, 20 April 1960, 30 April 1960, and 4 May 
1960.
61 MSS AAM 2, AAM committee minutes, 20 April 1960.
62 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Press Statement, South African United Front, London, 6 September 
1960.
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which Mahomo, Tambo and Dadoo addressed a series of meetings aimed at educating the 
British public on the issue of apartheid in various UK centres starting from 9 September. 
These included Newcastle, Sheffield, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham, 
Bristol and Norwich. MCF, the Africa Bureau and AAM local groups and committees 
throughout the country were mobilised to help run the meetings. A Central Hall Mass 
Rally Against Apartheid held under the auspices of the Africa Bureau, AAM, Christian 
Action, CAO, and MCF took place on 23 September to mark the end of the tour.64
Towards the end of 1960 the SAUF London office was also involved in publicity 
work to revive public interest in the South African question. Sharpeville and its tragic 
aftermath had been widely covered by the British and international media, which in turn 
had been an important factor in provoking world-wide protests. But media interest in South 
Africa now appeared to have waned. In particular, the SAUF felt that scant attention was 
being given by the British press to the situation in Pondoland -  not least because of the 
“complete blackout on news to the outside world” by the South African government. In 
November 1960 a press conference was held at Denison House where the SAUF issued a 
statement denouncing the South African government’s Bantustan policy and the unrest in 
Pondoland.65 The success of the conference, however, was limited because of poor 
attendance and the preference of the press “for something more sensational.”66
63 MSS AAM 43, Minutes o f the National Committee, 17 August 1960.
64 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Press Statement, South African United Front, London, 6 
September 1960, and MSS AAM 2, National Committee minutes, 7 September 1960.
65 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, SAUF Press Statement, London, 18 November 1960. For a history o f  
rural struggles in the early 1960s see Govan Mbeki, South Africa: The P easants’ Revolt (London, 1964), and 
Sukude Matoti and Lungisile Ntsebeza, “Rural resistance in Mpondoland and Thembuland, 1960-1963,” in 
SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, 177-208.
66 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, London reporting to the offices o f  the South African United Front 
Accra/Cairo/New York, 21 November 1960.
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Relations with British organisations
In July 1960, representation was offered to two members of the SAUF on the Anti-
67Apartheid Coordinating Committee after the matter had been discussed internally. 
However, as noted in Chapter One, by October 1960 the Coordinating Committee had 
virtually ceased to exist except in name. After Makiwane left London as a result of his 
appointment to the SAUF’s Accra office in August, the front continued to hold a seat on the 
AAM Executive Committee.68
Relations between the SAUF and the AAM were formalised at a meeting between 
Nana Mahomo and five members of the AAM Executive Committee on 4 November 1960. 
First, the question of possible misunderstandings arising out of simultaneous international 
boycott campaigns by different organisations was dealt with. At the meeting Mahomo 
insisted that the SAUF, as representative of the movements in South Africa, must be 
regarded as ultimately in charge of the international boycott campaign, which the AAM had 
initiated and now continued to organise and sponsor. The AAM undertook to make clear in 
all future correspondence that the campaign was being conducted by the SAUF. At the 
same time it would continue to encourage initiatives at all levels and to send information to 
organisations overseas. The meeting also agreed on “the desirability of fullest cooperation 
between Anti-Apartheid and the Front.”69 To this purpose, the SAUF was granted a 
permanent seat in an observer or adviser capacity on both the AAM’s National and 
Executive Committees so as to allow maximum consultation between the two organisations
67 MSS AAM 42, Anti-Apartheid Co-ordinating Committee minutes, 29 July 1960. From the AAM records it 
is unclear which SAUF member occupied this seat, which may have rotated between Dadoo, Mahomo and 
Tambo.
68 MSS AAM 43, National Committee minutes, 3 August 1960.
69 MSS AAM 93b, Letter from the AAM to the SAUF in London, 21 November 1960.
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without, on the other hand, the SAUF having to be publicly associated with AAM
decisions. Finally, the relationship between the two bodies was summed up as follows:
AAM had originally been formed in order to gain British support for the policies of 
the liberation movement in South Africa, and in particular for the international 
boycott. As the UF represented this movement, and as AAM had never regarded 
itself as an organisation with a policy separate from the policies of those struggling 
in South Africa, its broad policy (e.g. to work for an international boycott or not) 
would naturally bound up with the stand taken by the UF. However, it would not 
necessarily be committed by a tactical decision by UF (e.g. to call publicly for 
industrial sanctions).70
This framework remained at the basis of the relations between the AAM and the South 
African liberation movements even after the dissolution of the SAUF. It proved to be 
especially important in allowing the AAM to continue to offer its broad support for the 
anti-apartheid struggle without having to openly advocate armed action (which could have 
alienated many of its British supporters) after the liberation movements’ strategic turn in 
late 1961. Underpinning the relationship between the AAM and the liberation movements 
was the understanding that the AAM’s “campaign to end British support for apartheid was
• 71part of a wider struggle with the people of Southern Africa as the main protagonists.” 
Therefore, it was for the people of South Africa, of whom the liberation movements were 
the direct representatives, to decide on the strategies and tactics which they deemed as best 
to achieve their own liberation.
The South African Republic and the Commonwealth
From early 1961, most of the SAUF’s and its international allies’ efforts were taken up by 
the question of South Africa’s continued Commonwealth membership. On 5 October 1960,
70 Ibid.
71 Gumey, “In the heart o f the beast,” 29.
109
in a whites-only referendum, 52 percent of South African voters favoured the establishment
of a Republic. Prior to the referendum, Verwoerd had announced that a South African
Republic would apply for continued Commonwealth membership at the next
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in March the next year.
In October 1960, Oliver Tambo and Vusumzi Make delivered a statement calling
for economic sanctions at the UN. The statement also drew attention to the fact that in the:
[Referendum held to decide the basic structure of the country [...] the millions of 
Africans and other non-white people of that country did not have a say because the 
indigenous majority of South Africa are not voters. The significance of this 
referendum is that the ‘electorate’ of South Africa has not only endorsed the brutal 
policies of the South African Government but has also given the rulers of South 
Africa a fresh mandate to carry on their campaign directed at making Africans 
‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ in the land of their birth.72
On 20 January 1961, in conclusion to a conference between its various offices, the SAUF 
held a press conference on the question of South Africa’s admission to the Commonwealth 
after becoming a Republic. The press statement declared that the SAUF was “categorically 
opposed to the admission of South Africa to the Commonwealth,” which would be “not 
only an embarrassment to the non-white members whose skin pigment is held in contempt 
by South Africa, but also an insult to human dignity.” South Africa’s continued 
membership would undermine the Commonwealth’s “reputation as an organisation that 
will not tolerate racial discrimination.” The SAUF also expressed the hope that South 
Africa’s exclusion from the Commonwealth would finally dispel the idea that the 
Commonwealth had “some restraining influence on South Africa,” which was the position 
adopted by the Conservative British government on the issue. The statement concluded 
with a reverberation of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s famous words to the South
72 Statement on behalf o f the South African United Front, New York, October 1960, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1960s/pr600000.html.
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African Parliament of February 1960: “In these days of the ‘winds of change’ it is 
appropriate that the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference should
'7 1
adjust itself accordingly.”
In the early months of 1961, SAUF delegations travelled to Asian (Ceylon, India,
Pakistan and Malaysia) and African (Nigeria and Ghana) Commonwealth countries to ask
them to take steps to exclude South Africa from the Commonwealth. Letters were also sent
to all Commonwealth Prime Ministers with the same purpose. Julius Nyerere, soon to be
the Prime Minister of independent Tanganyika, supported the SAUF’s call by announcing
that should South Africa continue to be a member of the Commonwealth, he would
withdraw his country from this organisation.74
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of March 1961 became the focus
of much anti-apartheid campaigning in the UK. The AAM organised a silent seventy-two-
hour vigil in Trafalgar Square, with six ‘eminent’ persons spending one hour each at the
vigil. The demonstrators, who were not allowed to any banners or slogans, adopted the idea
of wearing black sashes. Sixty-seven of them bore the word “Sharpeville” on them and two
of them “Langa,” in commemoration of the victims of the police shootings in South Africa
the previous year.75 After three days of strong opposition by Afro-Asian countries and
Canada during the Conference, on 15 March Verwoerd was forced to withdraw South
Africa’s application. The Republic, he announced, would now be free:
[FJrom the pressure of Afro-Asian nations who were busy invading the 
Commonwealth. We are not prepared to allow these countries to dictate what our
73 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, SAUF Statement on South Africa and the Commonwealth, London, 
20 January 1961.
74 Contact, 23 March 1961.
75 Personal communication with Dorothy Robinson, 17 November 2003.
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future should be ... Therefore, we go now forward alone. We are standing on our 
own feet.76
The SAUF hailed the outcome of the Prime Ministers’ Conference. From London, Yusuf 
Dadoo delivered a message to the South African people welcoming South Africa’s forced 
withdrawal as “a historic step forward in the struggle against apartheid,” opening up “vast 
possibilities [...] to make further inroads into the bastion of racialism and white 
supremacy”77 by challenging the very foundations of Verwoerd’s Republic, to be 
inaugurated in May. In South Africa, the liberal newsletter Contact reported that “a great 
part of the credit for the victory must go to the United Front.”78 Such victory, Lionel 
‘Rusty’ Bernstein concurred in Fighting Talk, had been made possible by the SAUF, which 
had acted as a “spectre” throughout the Premiers’ Conference. “It was with this spectre that 
Verwoerd fought for the allegiance of Commonwealth premiers,”79 who clearly chose to 
stand with the United Front against Verwoerd. Finally, Chief Lutuli spoke in favour of the 
expulsion and commended the SAUF for the success of its work.80
The reaction of white South Africa to the news, on the other hand, was one of 
“hysteria, irrationality and flight from reality.”81 A cheerful mob of fifty-thousand 
Nationalist South Africans assembled from all over the country to applaud Verwoerd’s 
“triumph” as he stepped off the plane. A German correspondent at the time of Verwoerd’s 
return wrote: “There is a stink of Nuremburg about South Africa.”82
76 Quoted in O ’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 106.
77 Yusuf Dadoo, Message from London to the South African people, March 1961, 
http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/historv/dadoo-a.html#5d.
78 Contact, 23 March 1961.
79 Fighting Talk, April 1961.
80 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 360.
81 Fighting Talk, April 1961.
82 Ibid.
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The United Nations and economic sanctions
As the previous chapter has shown, the termination of South Africa’s mandate over South 
West Africa, the possibility of incorporation of the High Commission Territories, and the 
treatment of Indians living in the Union provided the three key issues around which UN 
intervention in South Africa was sought in the aftermath of the Second World War. By 
drawing the attention of the UN to these questions, ANC leaders hoped to raise the problem 
of Native policy inside the Union at the UN. In 1949, ANC policy towards the UN was 
made clear in its Annual Conference resolutions. The ANC countered Pretoria’s claim that 
race relations in South Africa were a matter of domestic jurisdiction and stated “that 
U.N.O. has a right to intervene in this matter, which, unless dealt with in accordance with 
the principles of the U.N.O. Charter, will ultimately lead to armed conflict between the 
races.”83 UN recognition that South Africa’s domestic policies were a matter of 
international concern came in the wake of the Defiance Campaign. In December 1952 the 
General Assembly resolved to establish a UN Commission on the Racial Situation in South 
Africa.84 Although the ANC welcomed this UN decision, it soon found itself in total 
disagreement with some of the Commission’s findings, which suggested that apartheid
85policy was being implemented with some degree of “gradualism and flexibility.” In 1959, 
the ANC submitted a memorandum to the UN on the “Question of race conflict in South 
Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the government of the Union of South 
Africa.” This document, however, still confined itself to denouncing apartheid as a
83 Minutes o f  the Annual Conference o f  the ANC, 15-19 December 1949, document 47 in Karis, Hope and 
Challenge, 295.
84 A/RES/616 (VII), 5 December 1952,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/079/59/IMG/NR007959.Ddf7QDenElement.
85 See Report o f  the National Executive Committee, ANC Annual Conference, 16-19 December 1954, and 
Address by Professor ZK Matthews, ANC Annual Conference, 17-18 December 1955, documents 7b and 13b 
in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 216.
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violation of the UN Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights, and to urging the UN 
to call on the South African government to reconsider its policies.86
The imposition of the State of Emergency in South Africa at the end of March 1960 
led an emergency committee of the ANC to issue a statement which, as well as submitting a 
set of “urgent proposals” to the government, for the first time explicitly called “upon the 
United Nations to quarantine the racialist Verwoerd Government by imposing full 
economic sanctions against the Union of South Africa.”87 From this moment onwards and 
over the next three decades, campaigning for economic sanctions against South Africa 
became one of the key areas of international anti-apartheid activity, both for the ANC and 
its foreign supporters. The question of sanctions was immediately picked up by the SAUF 
abroad. During the October 1960 General Assembly session in New York, the SAUF made 
the first direct call for economic sanctions at the UN. Tambo and Make delivered a 
statement on behalf of the Front “to alert the world of the dangers of the policy o f the 
Government of the Union of South Africa and to appeal for speedy international
oo
intervention at the United Nations level” in the form of economic sanctions.
The SAUF scored an important diplomatic victory at the UN one month after South 
Africa’s exclusion from the Commonwealth when, on 15 April 1961, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the policy of apartheid as “reprehensible and 
repugnant to human dignity,” and calling on all states “to consider taking such separate and 
collective action” as was open to them “to bring about the abandonment of these
86 Memorandum submitted by the ANC to the General Assembly o f  the United Nations, 1959, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/un/ancmem.html.
87 A statement by the Emergency Committee o f  the African National Congress, 1 April 1960, document 51 in 
Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 572.
88 Statement on behalf o f  the South African United Front, New York, October 1960, 
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policies.”89 This was the first time the UK voted in favour of a resolution against South 
Africa; only Portugal voted against.
The passing of this resolution at the UN was the result of the concerted effort of the 
SAUF and its African and Asian allies, and India in particular. India had been the initiator 
of the debate over South Africa’s racial policies at the UN in 1946, when a complaint was 
lodged against the treatment of people of Indian origins in the Union. Since then, the Indian 
government relentlessly sought to achieve international condemnation of apartheid at the 
UN. India was the main sponsor of the 1961 General Assembly resolution, which had been 
drafted by the Asian states as a ‘safety net’ in case another resolution, sponsored by the 
African states, and calling for specific measures including economic sanctions, failed to be 
approved (which it did).
Tambo and Make went to New York to represent the SAUF while the General 
Assembly would be discussing apartheid. A memorandum signed by the SAUF was 
circulated to all delegations on the eve of the General Assembly voting, asking them to 
support -  or at least not to oppose - the African resolution. Special attention was devoted by 
the SAUF to the Latin American states, in the attempt to win them over to the side of the 
Afro-Asian group.90 Finally, the SAUF urged the Indian delegate to the UN to ensure Asian 
support for the African resolution to a degree consistent with Afro-Asian unity.91 Although 
India voted in favour of both resolutions, support for the African draft remained insufficient 
and the resolution was eventually withdrawn by its sponsors.
89 A/RES/1598 (XV), 15 April 1961,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/198/13/IMG/NR019813.Ddf7QpenElement.
90 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, File C 4.46, Letter from the SAUF to Dr Luis 
Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative to the UN, Mission o f  Mexico, new York, 12 April 1961.
91 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, File C 4.46, Letter from the SAUF to Mr C. S. 
Jha, Permanent Representative to the UN, Mission o f  India, New York, 12 April 1961.
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In 1962, the General Assembly passed another resolution which this time requested 
member states to take specific measures against South Africa, including breaking off 
diplomatic relations, closing their ports and airports to South Africa, imposing a trade 
boycott, and an arms embargo. Moreover, it set up a Special Committee “to keep the racial 
policies of the Government of South Africa under review,” and to report to both the 
General Assembly and the Security Council.92 Over the next decades, the Special 
Committee against Apartheid, which began its work in April 1963, worked in close 
collaboration with the South African liberation movements (as well as individuals and 
solidarity organisations such as the AAM campaigning against apartheid) to promote 
effective action against South Africa at the UN.93
The April 1961 UN resolution was to be the last achievement of the SAUF. In fact, 
events in South Africa during the next month were to give a severe blow to the tentative 
union between the ANC and the PAC abroad. Tambo later explained in his notes on the 
history of the SAUF that no attempt had been made to impose the United Front on the 
organisations in South Africa - nor was there ever any intention to do so. But the Front did 
ultimately suffer from the fact that its establishment was not a projection of a set-up which 
was obtained in South Africa and was not the deliberate creation of the organisations inside 
the country.94 The events surrounding the May 1961 stay-at-home clearly prove this point.
92 A/RES/1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTIQN/GEN/NR0/192/69/IMG/NR019269.pdf7QpenElement.
93 See Special Committee against Apartheid, selected statements and other press releases, 1963-1983, 
compiled and edited by E.S. Reddy, http://www.anc.org.za/un/sp-com-l.html. Enuga Reddy was the Principal 
Secretary o f  the Special Committee from its inception and later became Director o f  the UN Centre against 
Apartheid.
94 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
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From the December 1960 Consultative Convention to the May 1961 stay-at-home
When the State of Emergency which had been imposed in South Africa after Sharpeville 
was lifted at the end of August 1960, and the opposition leaders released from prison, they 
were somewhat surprised to learn about the creation of the SAUF. Walter Sisulu, for 
instance, was not comfortable with such idea, as he could not see how there could be unity 
abroad when there was no unity at home.95
Some attempts at African unity, however, were made when in December invitations 
to a consultative conference of African leaders were sent out by a group of individuals 
(among whom Chief Lutuli) formerly associated with the banned ANC.96 The Conference 
took place in Johannesburg on 16 and 17 December 1960 and was attended by some thirty- 
six Africans, including members of both the ANC and PAC. Despite some criticism over 
the manner in which it was organised, the Conference agreed on “the urgent need for 
African Unity” and resolved to organise an All-In African Conference whose purpose
07would be to call for a National Convention representing all the people of South Africa. A 
Continuation Committee with representatives from a broad political spectrum was 
appointed for the organisation of the All-In Conference. Cables were also sent to the UN 
Secretary-General, Dag Hammerskjold, urging him to meet African leaders during his 
forthcoming visit in January, and to Oliver Tambo expressing appreciation of the work of 
the United Front.98
95 Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 179.
96 For more details on the South African events described in the following paragraphs see also Karis and 
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 353-364.
97 Resolutions, Adopted by the Consultative Conference o f  African leaders, and Cables, Sent by the 
Conference to the United Nations and Oliver Tambo, December 16-17, 1960, document 54 in Karis and 
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 626-629.
98 Ibid.
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In London, the SAUF backed up the Conference’s endeavours by sending a further 
cable to the UN Secretary-General on the subject of consulting with the non-white 
leadership in South Africa." As the date of the All-In Conference, which was to take place 
in Pietermaritzburg on 25-26 March 1961, approached, Yusuf Dadoo encouraged the South 
African people to “redouble their efforts and work with renewed energy in opposing every 
facet of Dr. Verwoerd’s Government,”100 and to back up with mass action the All-African 
Conference for its speedy and successful realisation.
However, the PAC soon pulled out of the Continuation Committee on the grounds 
that the All-In Conference “had shifted its aim from African unification to preparations for 
a multiracial convention”101 when “Africans alone,” the PAC argued, could “solve the 
problems besetting South Africa.”102 By the time the Conference took place “unity had 
already been shattered and the conference was predominantly an ANC affair.”103 The 
reasons for the breakdown of unity are complex and, as Gail and Gerhart have argued, the 
question “remains as to whether or not antagonism and suspicion were not already too 
strong in 1961 to be overcome.”104 The PAC and Liberal Party members on the 
Continuation Committee accused the ANC of trying to dominate under the fa9 ade of unity, 
and resorted to the old rhetoric of white communist control of the ANC. Paradoxically,
99 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, SAUF Press Release: Cable Sent to Dag Hammerskjold, Secretary 
General o f the United Nations on His Visit to South Africa, signed by Nana Mahomo and Yusuf Dadoo, 
London, 3 January 1961.
100 Yusuf Dadoo, Message from London to the South African people, March 1961, 
http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/historv/dadoo-a.html#5d
101 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 356.
102 New Age, 9 March 1961.
103 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 355.
'04 Ibid., 357.
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their withdrawal from the Continuation Committee had the effect of leaving the ANC with 
communist support only, thus strengthening their collaboration even further.105
The ANC went ahead with the Conference, which was attended by 1,400 delegates. 
The ANC, however, clearly dominated in the end. The Conference’s main resolution was 
the issuing of an ultimatum, to be met by May 31, the day South Africa was to become a 
Republic, demanding a multi-racial National Convention of elected representatives of all 
the people to draw up a new non-racial constitution for South Africa. Should the ultimatum 
not be met, country-wide demonstrations would be staged. A National Action Council 
(NAC), with Mandela as Secretary, was created for the purpose of organising the anti- 
Republican demonstrations. Mandela, whose ban had recently expired and who had not 
appeared on a public platform since 1952, addressed the conference and called on Africans 
not to cooperate if the government failed to meet the demand of a national convention. 
Mandela also renewed the appeal for unity and promised “militant campaigns” with the aid 
of “external pressures that would be generated by the SAUF abroad.”106
In mid-May the NAC announced that the anti-Republican demonstrations would 
take the form of a three-day stay-at-home on 29, 30, 31 May; the NAC flyers read: “No one 
who loves freedom should go to work on those three days.”107 The PAC leadership, 
however, stood opposed to the strike, which they thought was an irresponsible 
“misdirection” of the African people, side-stepping the “true” goal of “Freedom and 
Independence Now!” as set by Sobukwe.108 Not only was the PAC against the strike, but
105 Sampson, Mandela, 141.
106 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 358.
107 “Stay at Home,” Flyer issued by the National Action Council, document 60 in Karis and Gerhart, 
Challenge and Violence, 639.
108 “Clarion Call to African Nationalists.” Article in Mafube (The Dawn o f  Freedom), N o .l, Issued by 
“African Nationalists,” May 1961, document 62 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 640-1.
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also it became involved in actively sabotaging it. In the weekend before May 29, the PAC
issued flyers calling on people to go to work and not to support the Congress Alliance with
their move to a National Convention.109
The attitude adopted by the PAC on the stay-at-home was not going to be easily
forgotten by the ANC. By calling on people to go to work, the ANC argued, the PAC had
taken the side of the South African government. In his review of the stay-at-home, written
from underground, Mandela argued:
Differences between rival political organisations in the liberation camp on tactical 
questions is one thing and may be permissible. But for a political body, which 
purports to be part of the liberation struggle, to pursue a line which objectively 
supports Government that suppresses Africans is treacherous and unforgivable.110
Meanwhile in London, the SAUF, including its PAC members, had continued to publicise
the idea of a National Convention, and to expose the South African government’s military
showdown in preparation to crush the opposition by force in a series of press releases
throughout May.111 In view of the anti-republican demonstrations planned in South Africa,
the London branch of the SAUF also called on the British public:
[T]o observe May 31 as a day of solidarity by holding meetings and rallies and 
expressing support for the campaign of mass demonstration and national strikes of 
the South African people, by intensifying the boycott of South African goods and by 
demanding that the United Kingdom government stops immediately supplies of
arms and tanks to South Africa, and that it refrains from entering bi-lateral
11 *2agreements with the South African Government.
109 “Poqo. Poqo. Poqo.” Flyer issued by the PAC, document 61 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 
639-640.
110 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH07, Boxfile 3.2.2, Nelson Mandela, “National Action Council: A Review  
o f  the Stay-At-Home Demonstration May 29th, 30th, 31st, 1961.”
111 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, ANC London Papers, Boxfile 1, Press release, issued by the South African 
United Front, London, 5 May 1961.
112 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Press Handout for Conference at St Bride Foundation Institute, 
London, 11 May 1961, issued by the SAUF.
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From Dar es Salaam Hadebe and Radebe of the ANC and PAC respectively were the
signatories of a message to the movement in South Africa which said:
The SAUF congratulates the Continuation Committee of the people’s conference 
held at Pietermaritzburg for organising demonstrations on the eve of the South 
African Republic which threatens to further oppress and persecute the people.113
Dissolution
After May-June 1961, documentary evidence of SAUF activity amounts to little if nothing. 
In June 1961, a SAUF delegation sought an interview with the British Defence Minister, 
Mr Harold Watkinson, in connection with a visit by the South African Minister of Defence, 
Mr J J . Fouche -  to no avail. In the end, a letter was personally delivered by the delegation 
to the Ministry of Defence.114 The latest surviving piece of documentary evidence relating 
to the SAUF is a press statement issued in protest against Anderson Ganyile’s kidnapping 
by the South African police in Basutoland.115 The freezing of joint action was most likely 
due to the sharp discrepancy between the position adopted by the PAC in South Africa and 
abroad during the May stay-at-home. A further reason might have been that by mid-1961 
both liberation movements had embarked on their separate armed paths, and the focus of 
the leaders in exile had in part turned to trying to gain financial and military support for 
their respective military wings.
Members of the SAUF increasingly worked as representatives of their individual 
organisations, rather than on behalf of the Front, which continued to exist only nominally.
1,3 Quoted in Mandela, “National Action Council: A Review o f  the Stay-At-Home Demonstration May 29th, 
30th, 31st, 1961.”
114 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, News release, issued by the SAUF, London, 27 June 1961.
115 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Press statement on the case o f Anderson Ganyile, issued by the 
SAUF, London, 18 January 1962.
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In October 1961, the COD received a report from Yusuf Dadoo which stated that the SAUF 
was “no longer in existence except in name,” and that “the ANC representatives abroad 
were establishing their own offices in various centres.”116 Unity abroad had been made 
impossible, Dadoo conveyed, by “the constant undermining carried on by PAC over a long 
period,” and by “the differences between the organisations in South Africa.”117 Around this 
time the PAC had also opened a separate office in London, which had annoyed other Front 
members who “had scrupulously refrained from presenting any of their initiatives as 
exclusively their own.”118
The ANC, however, was worried about the popularity the PAC enjoyed among 
African states, and Nkrumah’s Ghana especially, and this might be the reason why the 
SAUF continued to exist for as long as it did. Because of the PAC’s withdrawal from the 
All-in Conference of March 1961 and its sabotage of the May stay-at-home, the SAUF 
convened a meeting in London around September/October to review the situation “and the 
members agreed to communicate with their respective organisations at home.” According 
to Callinicos, Mzwai Piliso in Cairo received a communique from home “stating that the 
United Front had served its purpose.” In view of the approaching Pan-African Movement 
for East and Central Africa Conference (PAFMECA) of February 1961, Tambo thought it 
would not be wise to make the news of the Front’s dissolution public and instead decided 
“to wait and see how things would develop” as he “was inclined not to tackle the PAC 
publicly,” given the “fair amount of prejudice against the ANC.”119
116 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH229 Boxfile 1.2.2, Decisions taken at a meeting o f the Secretariat o f  the 
NEC o f  the COD held on 24 October 1961.
1,7 Ibid.
118 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 285.
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The formal dissolution of the SAUF was first announced by the Dar es Salaam 
office and reported in South Africa in New Age on 1 February 1962. The break up was 
explained as the result of internal dissension within the PAC at the time of the anti­
republican demonstrations in May, culminating with the expulsion of Philip Kgosana and 
Laurence Mgweba120 from the ranks of the PAC abroad. The expulsion of Kgosana’s 
‘rebel’ group was the first of what became an almost endless series of internal conflicts 
which troubled the PAC throughout its exile period. Kgosana had been arrested on 30 
March 1960. He was released on bail in November and at the end of the following month 
he crossed the border into Swaziland and eventually reached Tanganyika in March 1961, 
where he joined Mgweba and a small group of PAC members (totalling about fifteen 
people) who had also escaped from South Africa in January. In his autobiography Kgosana 
claimed that his departure had been sanctioned by Sobukwe, who had issued directives that 
ten thousand youths be sent abroad for military training in preparation of the next stage of 
the struggle.121 A crisis soon developed between the new PAC arrivals and Mahomo and 
’Molotsi, who accused the former of taking unilateral action for leaving South Africa. 
Kgosana and Mgweba, on the other hand, demanded clarifications from Mahomo and 
’Molotsi through a consultative conference, as it appeared to them “that the external PAC 
had joined hands with the Congress Alliance” in the SAUF, which, they believed, was 
dominated by the ANC.122 The crisis reached a collision when on 22 January 1962 Kgosana 
and Mgweba were expelled from the PAC on the grounds that they had defied the 
leadership by order of ’Molotsi, who announced the decision at a press conference in
120 Both Kgosana and Mgweba had played a prominent role in the March 1960 anti-pass demonstrations in 
Cape Town.
121 Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 57.
122 Ibid., 72.
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Accra. Copies of the expulsion order were also distributed at PAFMECSA the following
1 73month to dissuade African leaders from assisting the ‘rebels.’
The London office of the SAUF only resolved to officially dissolve on 13 March 
1962.124 The reasons for this delay are likely to be related to the ANC’s anxiety over 
African support, and its desire to dispel perceptions of disunity in black South Africa at the 
Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern and Central Africa (PAFMECA, hereafter 
renamed PAFMECSA to include Southern Africa) Conference of February 1962. Internal 
divisions within the PAC itself finally sealed the fate of the SAUF. Kgosana and Mgweba’s 
expulsion had led to a split of the PAC into two factions, each claiming to speak in the 
name of the organisation.125 This had created doubts abroad as to the authority and political 
substance of the PAC, which the ANC did not want to be associated with. Furthermore, the 
PAC group opposed to Kgosana, and composed of Mahomo, ‘Molotsi and Raboroko had 
staged various attacks on the ANC via the Ghanaian radio programme the Voice o f  Africa 
and its monthly magazine.
Multi-racialism versus African nationalism
By the late 1950s, the ANC’s collaboration with its non-African allies in the Congress 
Alliance, and the white COD in particular, had given rise to allegations that the ANC 
“danced to the tune of the Communists”127 by the Africanist group within the ANC. George 
Padmore’s influential Pan-Africanism or Communism?, which included a section on
123 Ibid., 74.
124 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, ANC London Papers, Boxfile 1, Press Statement by the SAUF, Signed by O. 
Tambo, N. Mahomo, Y. Dadoo, and J. Kozonguizi, London, 15 March 1962.
125 New Age, 29 March 1962.
126 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
127 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 244.
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“Communism and Bantu Nationalism” in South Africa had been published in 1956, 
contributing to spread anti-communist feelings in Pan-African circles. South African 
communists were accused by Padmore of “spending their time and energies debating the 
various ideological brands of communism” instead of uniting before the common enemy. 
According to Padmore, in South Africa, communism was “simply helping to maintain 
disunity among the non-Europeans by creating the impression among the oppressed people 
that salvation will come from outside their own ranks.”
The ANC increasingly appeared out of step with developments on the rest of the 
continent. In December 1958, Ezekiel ‘Zeke’ Mphahlele, writer and academic, attended the 
All African Peoples’ Conference in Accra to submit a memorandum on behalf of the ANC. 
At the Conference, the ANC had difficulties in reconciliating its ideology of non-racialism 
and its policy of multi-racial cooperation based on the Freedom Charter with ideas such as 
the “African Personality” or “Pan-African Socialism” contained in the Conference’s “Call 
to Independence.” The ANC’s memorandum to the Conference presented by Mphahlele 
reviewed the ANC’s history and its vision of a ‘“ a democratic South Africa’ embracing all, 
regardless of colour or race who pay undivided allegiance to South Africa and mother 
Africa.” Although the ANC’s philosophy of struggle implied “a recognition of the concept 
of African Nationalism,” because of the unique economic, social, and political history and 
racial set-up in South Africa, the ANC had been “progressively developing the concept of 
an all embracing ‘Africanism’.” Therefore, the ANC argued, in Africa, the “liberatory 
organisations and movements which hold diverse political and social theories and
128 George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle fo r  Africa (London, 1956), 362- 
363.
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principles,” although united in the common anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle,
190should not be forced “to adopt a common ideology and philosophy.”
The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chief Lutuli in 1961 seemed to give
weight to the notion that the ANC was not ‘African’ enough and that it was controlled by
whites. Despite the great symbolic significance and the international prominence the Prize
gave the ANC,130 Mandela was worried that the award “created the impression that he
[Lutuli] had been bought by the whites,” and that he was a “white stooge.”131 Lutuli’s
autobiography Let My People Go, published in 1962, had been dictated to Mary-Louise
Hooper,132 a white woman from the American Committee on Africa,133 and praised by
white liberals such as Alan Paton. By contrast, as Mandela recorded in his travel diaries:
The PAC has started off with tremendous advantages ideologically and has skilfully 
exploited opposition to whites and partnership. Sharpeville boosted them up and the 
stand of their leaders during the trial, and the imprisonment of Sobukwe, fostered 
the belief that they were more militant than the ANC.134
Furthermore, the very nature of the criticism by the ANC about the PAC, Mandela learnt,
had the opposite effect of making the Africanists “some sort of heroes,” as “[i]t does not
1
discredit any politician in Africa to be called a racialist or anti-white.”
The PAC, on the other hand, had recognised the appeal of Pan-Africanism. The 
PAC contested the idea of South Africa’s exceptionalism, and argued instead “that South
129 Notes for Delegates to the All African People’s Conference to be held in Accra, Ghana, December 1958, 
Issued by the ANC, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/bovcotts/accra58.html.
130 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 279.
131 Quoted in Sampson, Mandela, 165.
132 For a short biography o f  Mary-Louise Hooper see http://www.afficanactivist.msu.edu/directorv.php.
133 For a study o f  the American Committee on Africa and anti-apartheid activism in the USA see Donald R. 
Culverson, Contesting apartheid: US activism, 1960-1987 (Boulder, 1999).
134 Quoted in Martin Meredith, Nelson Mandela: A Biography (London, 1997), 213.
135 Quoted in Sampson, Mandela, 165.
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Africa is an integral part of the indivisible whole that is Afrika.” The Africanists also 
rejected multi-racialism as, in the words of Sobukwe, “a pandering of European bigotry and 
arrogance” and “a method of safeguarding white interests.” Instead, the PAC aimed at a 
“government of the Africans by the Africans, for the Africans,” which would not guarantee 
minority rights.136 The PAC’s programme of action for freedom in 1963 shared the goal set 
by the 1958 All African People’s Conference and its vision of a continental government 
and of a union of African states, based on an “Africanistic Socialist democratic order” 
which in turn would favour the development of the “African personality.” In South 
Africa Pan-Africanism had thus come to be equated with the PAC -  whose flag, a map of 
Africa with a star where Ghana is, and emanating rays casting light onto the rest of the 
continent, is indicative of the inspiration the PAC drew from Ghana, “the Mecca of Pan 
Africanism.” 138 In April 1959, Nkrumah had cabled a congratulatory message to the PAC
1 TOInaugural Conference.
Mandela was taken aback on discovering how much support the PAC had gained 
abroad when he toured Africa in early 1962 to assess, inter alia, the disposition in the 
whole of Africa to the struggle at home which had taken on a new form.140 Another purpose 
of Mandela’s trip at this particular moment in time may have been, as Lodge has suggested 
in his biography of Mandela, “to establish a fuller understanding with the ANC external 
mission.”141 The PAC was seen to share Ghana’s Pan-African approach and African leaders
136 Robert M. Sobukwe, Opening Address, Inaugural Conference o f  the PAC, April 4-6, 1959, document 39a 
in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 516.
137 See the Manifesto o f  the Africanist Movement, document 39b in in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and 
Violence, 517-524.
138 Peter ’Molotsi, quoted in Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 264.
139 Karis and Carter, Challenge and Violence, 314.
140 Sampson, Mandela, 164.
141 Lodge, Mandela, 96.
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were not accustomed to the ANC’s approach on race and distrusted its relationship with 
Indians and white radicals, particularly communists. Throughout his trip, Mandela had a 
hard time in trying to explain and justify the ANC’s non-racialism. This was a difficulty 
which Tambo had already encountered and immediately briefed Mandela on. Tambo had 
come to the conclusion that “the ANC had to appear more independent, taking certain 
actions unilaterally without the involvement of other members of the [Congress] Alliance,” 
and Mandela agreed with him.142
In Tanzania, Mandela’s first stop, Nyerere even suggested that the armed struggle 
be postponed until Sobukwe was released from prison.143 But Mandela and Tambo’s 
possibly most frustrating visit was to Ghana, where they tried to see President Nkrumah, 
but instead got “lectured” by Foreign Minister Ako Ajei that “the ANC was a tribalist 
organisation,” and were told that they could not see the President. On top of this, Mandela 
was left to pay for his hotel costs.144
When Mandela arrived in London he and Tambo told Yusuf Dadoo and Vella 
Pillay “that the ANC must show itself as an independent force to be represented only by 
Africans at international conferences,” they had a fall out. “Dadoo protested that Mandela 
was changing ANC policy,” but the latter “insisted that it was a change of image only. The 
ANC had to appear genuinely African: it had got Tost in a nebulous organisation 
representing everybody’.”145 As the crisis in the SAUF developed and the ANC prepared to
142 Mandela, Long Walk, 361.
143 Ibid.
144 Sampson, Mandela, 167.
145 Ibid., 169.
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establish offices of its own in various centres, it appears that the SAIC was also now 
considering opening an office in East Africa.146
Around mid- July 1962, after he had just commenced a military training course in 
Ethiopia which should have lasted six months, Mandela was urgently recalled home by a 
telegram from Walter Sisulu. In his autobiography Mandela has attributed the decision to 
the needs of the internal armed struggle, which he claimed was escalating.147 According to 
Lodge, it is more likely that Sisulu was concerned that Mandela’s long absence would 
demoralise the rank and file of MK.148 But a third, less acknowledged, reason for 
Mandela’s hasty departure from Ethiopia could be that the leadership at home had become 
alarmed by rumours that while abroad Mandela had become an Africanist and had joined 
the PAC.149 The nature of the discussions between Mandela and various leaders in South 
Africa which took place immediately upon his return seems to corroborate this.
During a secret meeting at Rivonia to report on his trip, Mandela proposed to the 
ANC Working Committee150 that the Congress Alliance be reshaped so that the ANC 
would appear to be more ‘African.’ In his autobiography Mandela says that because of the 
seriousness of his proposition, the Committee urged him to consult Chief Lutuli and the rest 
of the leadership. Mandela, however, fails to comment on the specific reactions of his 
colleagues -  and this may be a tactful omission on his part.151 Everyone in the Working 
Committee (except for Govan Mbeki, who was concerned about Mandela’s safety) agreed
146 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH229, Boxfile 1.2.2. Decisions taken at a meeting o f  the Secretariat o f the 
NEC o f  the COD held on 24 October 1961.
147 Mandela, Long Walk, 363.
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149 See Mandela, Long Walk, 412, and Pogrund, Sobukwe, 176.
150 Present at this meeting were Walter Sisulu, Moses Kotane, Govan Mbeki, Dan Tloome, J.B. Marks and 
Duma Nokwe. See Mandela, Long Walk, 369.
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that Mandela should immediately set off for Durban. Here Mandela saw Monty Naicker 
and Ismail Meer of the Indian Congress, who met his proposal with a resistance similar to 
the one Mandela and Tambo had encountered in Dadoo in London. His next meeting was 
with Chief Lutuli in Groutville, who told Mandela that “he did not like the idea of foreign 
politicians dictating policy to the ANC.” Mandela countered this by saying that his plan 
“was simply to effect cosmetic changes in order to make the ANC more intelligible -  and 
more palatable -  to our allies.”152 The Chief did not give Mandela a final pronouncement, 
and the issue remained unsolved as Mandela was arrested a few days later.
Nevertheless, Mandela’s beliefs and proposed change of ‘image’ had profound 
implications. Mandela’s own defiant performance at his first trial -  from the decision that 
no application for bail should be made, to his choice o f the Xhosa kaross instead of a suit to 
publicly enhance the symbolism that he was a black man entering a white man’s court,153 to 
his decision to conduct his own defence, to his suggestion that it should be the state, not 
him, that should be put on trial, to his indication that he did not feel morally bound to obey 
the laws made by a white parliament in which he had no representation -  was a close 
reminder of Sobukwe’s own approach to the court in 1960, and can be viewed as an 
integral part of the promotion of a new ANC image (as well as of Mandela) during this 
period. Although they may have not affected so much the movement as a whole at home, 
which was in any case banned and thus unable to engage in any kind of public display, 
Mandela’s proposals had significant repercussions on the ANC external mission, which 
carried the flag of the ANC abroad. They resulted in a policy which came to be internally 
known as the “African image.” The “African image” became a major issue of debate within 
the movement in exile, as it will emerge in the next two chapters.
152 Ibid., 370-371.
153 Ibid., 385.
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Future unity
Still, the dissolution of the SAUF did not theoretically mean that future cooperation 
between the ANC and the PAC would be ruled out. After the decision to disband the Front 
had been announced, Tambo was quoted in New Age saying that the ANC abroad continued 
to support the principles of unity, joint action, and cooperation.154 In practice, however, it 
was not until 1991 that the ANC and the PAC would work together again through the short­
lived Patriotic Front.155 Tambo’s statement in support of unity might have therefore been 
one of convenience rather than principle, in the attempt to please African leaders such as 
Nkrumah and Nasser who had insisted on the creation of a united front in the first place.
The idea that the ANC and the PAC should unite in a common front was one that 
outlived the period of the SAUF. For the rest of the decade and beyond, pressure for the 
formation of a united front continued to be exerted by African leaders through the OAU, 
established by the African Summit Conference of Addis Ababa in May 1963. The OAU’s 
Committee of Nine, or African Liberation Committee, a sub-committee in charge of 
channelling financial, military and logistical aid to liberation organisations, laid it down as 
a condition for recognition and support that different liberation parties in each given 
African country must come together in a common liberation front to direct political
154 New Age, 22 March 1962.
155 The Patriotic Front was launched in 1991 as a loose alliance o f  anti-apartheid organisations which included 
the ANC, the PAC, and 92 others, to work on a mutually acceptable programme for the negotiated transfer o f  
power. The Patriotic Front’s Conference held in Durban o f  25-27 October 1991 agreed on the need to hold an 
All-Party Congress, which was then named the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), to set 
out the principles for a new constitution. However, on December 21 1991, the day o f  CODESA’s first 
meeting, the PAC walked out o f  the meeting making allegations o f  collusion between the ANC and the South 
African government. See PAC Allegations, issued by the Department o f  Information and Publicity, PO Box 
61884, Marshalltown 2307, 27 November 1991, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1991/prl 127.html. and 
PAC Statement and Walkout, issued by the Department o f Information and Publicity, PO Box 61884, 
Marshalltown 2307, 1 December, 1991. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/!991/prl201 .html.
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activities. For the ANC this demand for unity presented a threefold dilemma. It was 
problematic in terms of first agreeing on objectives and, second, on methods to achieve 
them. But third, and most importantly, it posed a problem in terms of what would become 
of the multi-racial alliance between Africans, Coloureds, Indians and whites established in 
the 1950s through the Congress Alliance and consolidated with the creation in 1961 of MK, 
whose membership was non-racial from its inception. The ANC made clear in publicity and 
information material issued in the early 1960s that it was not prepared to forfeit a solid 
alliance based on years of political cooperation in order to come together with the PAC.156 
The fact that the ANC’s collaboration with Indians and whites had been one of the principal 
grounds on which the PAC had broken away from the ANC in the first place in turn made it 
very unlikely that the PAC was ever going to accept working with the ANC and its allies.
Repeated statements by the OAU that the unity of the ANC and the PAC was a 
cardinal factor in the struggle of the people of South Africa throughout all of the 1960s and 
early 1970s were in vain. When, in December 1964, Z.B. Molete, PAC Secretary for 
Publicity, announced that the PAC and the ANC were holding talks with Mr Diallo Telli, 
the first Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), also participating, 
Oliver Tambo firmly rejected the existence of such talks as an attempt on the part of the 
PAC “to deceive and mislead for purely selfish ends.”157 In 1967, PAC representatives in 
Lusaka made contact with their ANC’s counterparts with the purpose of holding 
exploratory talks between the two organisations. These contacts, however, failed to reach
156 African National Congress o f  South Africa, Issued by the ANC South Africa, PO Box 2239, Dar es 
Salaam, 7. November 1963.
157 Denial o f talks between the ANC and the PAC, Press statement by Oliver Tambo, December 1964, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1960s/pr641200.html.
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higher leadership levels.158 Moreover, although it was the PAC which had initially sought 
to establish contact, this was not a spontaneous PAC initiative but the direct result of a call 
by the OAU, on whose continued assistance the PAC now depended almost entirely.159
The most serious call for a united front came in 1972, when the OAU Liberation 
Committee “expressed the view that there was a lull in the armed struggle in South Africa, 
and that this was due to the unwillingness on the part of the ANC and the PAC to form a 
united front,” after the PAC brought the issue before its Nineteenth Session.160 A study 
group was appointed by the Liberation Committee to examine the situation in South Africa 
and assist the ANC and the PAC reach an agreement on the formation of a united front. The 
ANC took the matter very seriously. Internal discussions were held on to how to respond to 
the OAU in order to ensure that the nature o f the Liberation Committee’s proposals about 
the South African liberation struggle would only be advisory in nature. The ANC was 
deeply irritated by the actions of the Liberation Committee, whose interference in the South 
African liberation movements’ policies were perceived as a threat to its independence as an 
organisation. During an internal meeting to discuss how to respond to the OAU Liberation 
Committee’s resolution calling for a united front with the PAC, Mark Shope complained of 
the “fixed attitudes” of African states, who assumed “the role of experts who have ready­
made solutions” for the South African struggle.161 The ANC questioned the fact that the
158 UCT, Manuscripts and Archives, Simons Collection (hereafter BC 1081), P 10.2, P.K. Leballo, Dar es 
Salaam, to O.R. Tambo, Morogoro, Letter dated 19 January 1971.
159 See Opening Address by George Magombe, in Pan Africanist Congress o f  Azania (S.A.), Report o f  the 
National Executive Committee Meeting, Moshi, Tanzania, 19 to 22 September 1967, Issued by the 
Department o f  Publicity and Information, PO Box 2257, Lusaka, Republic o f  Zambia. See also Chapter Four.
16° u c t ,  Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P I5.1, Statement on the Question o f  a United Front by O.R. 
Tambo Acting President o f  the ANC (S.A.) to the 20th Session o f  the OAU Liberation Committee [1972].
161 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 77, File C4.39, Notes o f Meeting to Discuss OAU 
Liberation Committee Resolution Calling for a United Front with PAC [n.d.].
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matter of a united front between the PAC and the ANC should be the subject of statements 
made to the Twentieth Session of the OAU Liberation Committee and argued that it was for 
the liberation movements themselves to “search for and find what would in effect be the 
answer to the overall problem.”162 The outcome of these discussions was a lengthy 
document submitted to the Twentieth Session of the Liberation Committee in which the 
ANC aimed at clarifying its stand on the question of unity once and for all.
ANC-PAC relations on Robben Island
The inability of the ANC and the PAC to achieve unity in the remainder of their exile 
histories was mirrored by the debates taking place between the two organisations on 
Robben Island, which was in many ways a microcosm of the world outside.164 During his 
initial stay at Pretoria Central in 1962, Mandela had been eager to talk to other political 
prisoners, who were predominantly from the PAC and among whom was Sobukwe, 
because, he wrote in his autobiography, he “thought that in prison we might forge a unity 
that we could not on the outside.”165 Although relations between Mandela and Sobukwe 
seem to have been cordial enough, the two leaders disagreed over the most basic questions, 
as for example with regards to fighting for the improvement of prison conditions. From the 
moment of his arrival at Pretoria Central Mandela complained about issues such as prison 
clothing and food. Mandela and other ANC leaders viewed such prison struggles as an 
extension of the struggle outside. Sobukwe and the PAC, on the other hand, were against
162 UCT, Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P15.1, Statement on the Question o f  a United Front by O.R. 
Tambo Acting President o f the ANC (S.A.) to the 20th Session o f  the OAU Liberation Committee [1972].
163 See UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, File C4.46, African National Congress 
(South Africa), The Call for Unity and a United Front, Mogadishu, 15 October 1973.
164 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 32.
165 Mandela, Long Walk, 398.
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any form of engagement with the prison authorities which, in their view, would imply a 
recognition of government’s right to incarcerate them in the first place.166
After political prisoners were moved to Robben Island, Mandela continued to 
make it his mission to “seek accommodation with our rivals in the struggle.” In Long Walk 
to Freedom he explained that he “saw Robben Island as an opportunity to patch up the long 
and often bitter differences between the ANC and the PAC.” If unity could be established 
between the two organisations on the island, Mandela thought, “that could set a precedence 
for uniting them in the liberation struggle as a whole.” During Mandela’s first stay on the 
island in 1963, the PAC greatly outnumbered the ANC but, after the Rivonia trial, the 
PAC-ANC ratio of prisoners started to invert. This seemed to disturb PAC prisoners, who 
saw the arrival of the Rivonia group and those who followed “as an encroachment on their 
territory.”167 At various stages in the 1960s, Mandela held talks on the question of unity 
with Zeph Mothopeng, Selby Ngendane and Clarence Makwetu of the PAC. Yet, despite 
many “fruitful discussions,” nothing came of them. The PAC continued to view any sort of 
negotiations with the prison authorities as a betrayal. At the same time, this did not stop 
them “from taking advantage of the benefits that resulted from negotiations.” Moreover, 
Mandela complained that PAC prisoners often boycotted meetings which had no overt 
party affiliation. Finally, in prison the PAC men remained “unashamedly anti-communist 
and anti-Indian.”168 As on the outside, these political differences ultimately proved to be 
too fundamental for the ANC and the PAC leaders in prison to bridge.
The ANC’s internal machinery on Robben Island, known as the High Organ, is 
something which the PAC and other organisations on the island, the Non-European Unity
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 523.
168 Ibid., 523-524.
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Movement in particular, also appeared to resent. In the early years, the High Organ would 
often act on behalf of all other political prisoners. At the insistence of Neville Alexander of 
the Unity Movement a new body, which later became known as “Ulundi,” was eventually 
created. This committee had representatives from all organisations. Even so, the ANC was 
perceived by others to attempt to dominate on the committee, and finding a common 
approach to problems continued to be a difficult task.169
Conclusion
Was the breakdown of the SAUF inevitable? The view that the dissolution of the SAUF 
was the predetermined result of a priori ideological and political differences between the 
ANC and the PAC does not do justice to the history of the Front. Rather, it can be argued 
that its gradual dissolution after May 1961 grew out of a complex process of action and 
reaction which involved the assumptions, perceptions, and policies of the ANC and the 
PAC in South Africa and abroad, as well as the force of particular events.
The alliance that had brought together the ANC, PAC, SAIC, SWANU, and 
SWAPO overseas was essentially one of convenience. For this reason, the SAUF was 
always an improbable union. However, during the post-Sharpeville crisis, mistrust and 
other issues of contention between the PAC and the ANC were buried under the urgent 
need of both organisations to gather international support for the struggle at home. In this 
respect, as Tambo noted, the SAUF had “a most serviceable life.”170 It did mobilise world 
opinion and succeeded in drawing governments into active participation in the application 
of various pressures on South Africa, as the results achieved at the Commonwealth and the
169 Ibid., 525-526.
170 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, file C4.46, Tambo, “Notes and Observations.”
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UN demonstrate. The Front also represented “a convenient machinery for African states 
and other organisations to work with,”171 as instead of having to choose from a number of 
South African organisations they could work with one United Front. Finally, at the time the 
SAUF was formed, there was a general lull in mass activity in South Africa as a result of 
the post-Sharpeville State of Emergency, in which thousands were arrested. The SAUF 
played an important role in catalysing the activities of South Africans abroad during this 
period and in keeping South Africa on the international agenda.
The brief moment of unity within the movement in South Africa established during 
the Consultative Conference of December 1960 helped strengthen the SAUF.172 However, 
the inconsistency between the PAC’s attitude towards the anti-Republican demonstrations 
of May 1961 in South Africa and abroad clearly pointed to the fact that the SAUF could not 
properly exist in isolation from the organisations at home.173 The success of unity abroad 
ultimately depended on the situation in South Africa, which suggested not only an absence 
of unity, but active opposition to it on the part of the PAC during the May stay-at-home. 
Failure to cultivate mutual confidence among the SAUF members, and conduct which 
induced mutual suspicion further exacerbated ANC-PAC relations and eventually resulted 
in the breaking up of the Front.
The failure of African unity in the early 1960s, both in South Africa and abroad, 
ultimately resulted in the further consolidation of the alliance between the ANC and the 
SACP, which had announced its underground existence in July 1960 during the Sharpeville 
State of Emergency. The formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the second part of 1961 was 
a decisive step in this respect. The PAC, on the other hand, thanks to its successful
171 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
172 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 351.
173 New Age, 22 March 1962.
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identification of interests with the African continent, continued to be the favoured 
organisation of African leaders, especially within the OAU. Riven by internal disputes 
throughout its history of exile, the PAC’s survival became increasingly dependent on the 
OAU’s support and sponsorship.
Despite repeated calls by the OAU and its African Liberation Committee, no unity 
between the ANC and the PAC was achieved again during the remainder of their exile 
histories. The experience of the SAUF must have influenced future considerations about 
unity on both sides, but, above all, from the ANC’s point of view, was the fact that 
factionalism and internal squabbles had, by the late 1960s, turned the PAC into a “spent 
force”174 which no longer constituted a serious threat to the ANC’s international standing.
174 UFH, Liberation Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 77, File C4.39, Notes o f  Meeting to Discuss OAU 
Liberation Committee Resolution Calling for a United Front with PAC [n.d.].
138
CHAPTER THREE
The ANC and the PAC in exile, c. 1962-1965
The events of March 1960 had thrown the Nationalist government in “its then gravest ever 
crisis.”1 The crisis, however, proved to be only temporary. In November 1960, grand 
apartheid’s architect Hendrik Verwoerd urged fellow National Party members that they 
would have to stand like “walls of granite” on every facet of apartheid policy. Political 
stability was firmly and quickly re-imposed through the centralisation of power -  both 
within the National Party and government -  in Verwoerd’s hands, and through the 
introduction of drastic measures, such as the 1962 General Law Amendment Act, under the 
new Minister of Justice John Vorster. In October 1961 the Nationalists were re-elected into 
power with an overwhelming 63.7 percent majority. The torture and murder of political 
detainees became the order of the day. Military expenditure was significantly increased, 
while heavy censorship was imposed on all surviving overt opposition. Dan O’Meara has
# >y
suggested that this was “perhaps the bleakest period in South Africa’s dismal history.” By 
the late 1960s, the South African economy was booming, white standards of living reached 
record heights, and the National Party seemed to be firm in power more than ever before. 
At least on the surface, apartheid had entered its “golden age.”
While the internal forces of opposition were inexorably suppressed in the years 
between 1960 and 1964, the embryonic exiled movement abroad grew exponentially. This 
chapter will trace the reorganisation of the ANC and the PAC in exile from the breakdown
1 O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 100.
2 Ibid., 110.
3 Ibid., 116.
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of the SAUF in early 1962 to 1965. During this period, after having set up their separate 
external offices or missions, both Congresses had to re-orient their policies to the needs 
arising from the changed conditions of struggle in South Africa, notably the beginning of 
the armed struggle. The ANC and the PAC had to devise new international structures and 
gather support for the struggle at home in diplomatic, financial and now military terms. 
Moreover, they soon found themselves in the position of having to once again readjust their 
function as a result of the hammering received by the underground movement in South 
Africa in 1963-1964, a time when the full power of apartheid repression was starting to be 
felt.
As the locus of the struggle shifted from South Africa to the international arena, the 
South African liberation movements underwent radical transformation. For the ANC, this 
complex process did not entail the simple transposition of the relations that had existed 
between the organisation and its partners in the Congress Alliance in South Africa. In the 
early 1960s, competition over international support with the PAC, especially -  and 
crucially -  among African states, led the ANC to adopt the decision that its external form 
and structure should be shaped around a principle known as the “African image.” What this 
policy implied, and the development of relations with Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia by the 
ANC are analysed in the first half of this chapter.
The PAC started off at a relative disadvantage against the ANC in terms of
international diplomacy. Being a relative newcomer on the international arena, the PAC
could not rely on and benefit from the international links and relations which the ANC had
been cultivating in the years prior to its banning. At the same time, the PAC was
ideologically more attuned with African sentiments elsewhere on the continent, which
meant that it was initially less preoccupied than what the ANC was with having to ‘prove’
its African credentials. However, the PAC still had to deal with its own set of problems in
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the aftermath of Sharpeville, which saw the arrest and sentencing to prison of the majority 
of its leadership. In 1962, the first external headquarters of the PAC were established in 
Basutoland, which meant that for some time the PAC had the potential to mount a more 
effective challenge in South Africa itself thanks to the proximity of the external leadership 
to the underground Poqo movement. The failure to do so can be ascribed primarily to the 
political inexperience and lack of discipline of the PAC leadership, internal strife, and the 
absence of a carefully planned out programme or strategy. These problems, which had 
clearly emerged by 1965, would continue to plague the organisation throughout the rest of 
its time in exile.
The politics of multi-racialism in the 1950s
During the 1950s African resistance politics had gradually started to shift from a narrow 
ideology of African nationalism based on ideas o f “self-determination” and “national 
freedom” as expressed in the 1949 Programme of Action,4 to a “gentler,” all-inclusive type 
of nationalism which took into account the multi-racial nature of the country and pointed 
towards unity with other minority groups and united action.5 The 1952 Defiance Campaign 
and Chief Lutuli’s election as ANC President in December 1952 played a significant role in 
bringing about this transition, at the heart of which was “a new awareness of South Africa 
as a multi-racial or multi-ethnic society.”6
In November 1952, the ANC and the SAIC had made a call on white liberals “to 
form an organisation which whites could join, and which would coordinate its activities
4 See “Programme o f  Action,” statement o f  policy adopted at the ANC Annual Conference, 17 December 
1949, document 60 in Karis, Hope and Challenge, 337-339.
5 Lodge, Black Politics, 68.
6 Saul Dubow, “Thoughts on South Africa: some preliminary ideas,” in Stolten (eds.), History Making, 67.
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with those of the Congresses.”7 A similar call was made on the Coloured leadership so that
they would do the same for the Coloured community. The decision to form the COD and
the Coloured People’s Organisation (renamed Coloured People’s Congress at the 1955
Congress of the People) to mobilise the support of the Coloured population and of
progressive whites was thus an opportunistic one. Despite the fact that many would have
preferred to join a unitary organisation open to all races, the ANC and its allies agreed on
the need to have organisations with racially separate identities. There were practical reasons
for such decision. First, geographical separation of the different racial (or ‘national’, as they
were called by the liberation movement) groups into locations, ghettoes, and homelands
posed serious problems of organisation. Second, different problems affected different
groups at different times, thus demanding different approaches. As Reginald ‘Reg’
September, one o f the principal founders and General Secretary of the CPC, has explained:
We couldn’t take the question of limit between the different social groups for 
granted, it is something that you had to work for. You couldn’t for example take it 
for granted that the CPC would call a meeting against the imposition of pass laws in 
South Africa and expect the African community to participate in it. It didn’t work 
that way, it couldn’t work that way, because it wasn’t an issue for the Coloured 
people. If you called a meeting on the Group Areas Act, you couldn’t expect 
Africans to attend such a meeting [...] because it was an issue for them a long while 
ago. And Group Areas Act was very recent for us, at that time.8
The choice of a multi-racial alliance was influenced ideologically by the CPSA’s “two- 
stage” or “Native Republic” theory, which was in turn based on Stalin’s ideas on 
nationality.9 Formed in 1921, in its first few years of existence the CPSA concentrated on
7 Lodge, Black Politics, 69.
8 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
9 According to Stalin’s definition, a nation is “a historically constituted, stable community o f  people, formed 
on the basis o f a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a 
common culture.” Joseph V. Stalin, “Marxism and the national question,” in Prosveshcheniye, Nos. 3-5, 
March-May 1913, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm.
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organising the white workers. In the aftermath of the white miners’ strike of 1922, which 
the CPS A had supported, a shift in focus started to take place. At the 1924 Conference, the 
CPSA resolved to redirect its attention towards African workers and to build African trade 
unions. In 1928, South Africa featured for the first time on the agenda for debate at the 
Comintern. The situation in South Africa was discussed at the Comintern on the basis of a 
draft resolution by its Executive Committee, which suggested that the CPSA should work 
for the establishment of “an Independent Native Republic -  with full guarantees for 
minority groups -  as a stage towards a workers’ and peasants government” in South 
Africa.10 The “Independent Native Republic” slogan was summed up in a document called 
“The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies” which was adopted by the 1928 Comintern 
despite remonstrations by the CPSA delegation (consisting, of S.P. and Rebecca Bunting 
and Eddie Roux) who insisted on the pre-eminence of class, not national struggle in South 
Africa. (This debate on the relationship between the class and the national struggle, and in 
turn on the relations between the Party and the national liberation movements, is a problem 
that the Communist Party has been “almost obsessed with”11 from the time of its formation 
up to the present day.) The 1928 Comintern document called upon the CPSA to 
“determinedly and consistently put forward the creation of an independent native republic, 
with simultaneous guarantees for the rights of the white minority, and struggle in deeds for 
its realisation.” The “Independent Native Republic” or “two-stage” thesis was endorsed by 
the CPSA, despite a great deal of opposition, at its 1929 Conference.12
The CPSA disbanded in 1950 when it had become clear that its banning under the 
Suppression of Communism Act was imminent. In 1953 it re-emerged underground under a
10 Quoted in A. Lerumo (pseudonym o f  Michael Harmel), Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party o f  
South Africa (London, 1971), 64.
11 Karis, Hope and Challenge, 107.
12 Lerumo, Fifty Fighting Years, 64-65.
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new name, the SACP. David Everatt has argued that the transformation of the CPSA into 
the SACP was not merely an unproblematic continuation, and that “the birth of the SACP 
occasioned a prolonged and intense debate on the relationship between class struggle and 
African nationalism.”13 Whereas the Cape Town-dominated CPSA had been wary of what 
was seen as essentially ‘bourgeois’ African nationalism, the Transvaal-dominated SACP 
was closer to the centre of African nationalism and the ANC (which had been undergoing a 
twin process of radicalisation -  under the influence of the ANC Youth League -  and of 
growing unity with other forces opposed to apartheid). Because of their different regional 
experiences, the Transvaal Party members “pressed for a closer relationship with the 
Congress movement and greater support for national struggle.”14 This shift of the Party’s 
headquarters from Cape Town to the Transvaal played a crucial role in influencing the 
formulation of the SACP’s theory of “colonialism of a special type” or “internal 
colonialism,” which became the “ideological glue” holding the alliance between the SACP 
and the ANC together over the next forty years.15 According to this theory, the situation in 
South Africa was that of a unique type of colonialism, where an independent “oppressing 
White nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side 
by side with them.”16 Through this notion, the SACP aimed at resolving the chronic class- 
colour debate. The “colonialism of a special type” and “two-stage” theories became 
enunciated in The Road to South African Freedom, the programme that was adopted by the 
Party’s Fifth Congress held underground in Johannesburg in 1962. In this document, the
13 David Everatt, “Alliance politics o f  a special type: the roots o f  the ANC/SACP alliance, 1950-1954,” 
Journal o f Southern African Studies, 18 (1991), 20.
14 Ibid., 23.
15 Ibid., 19.
16 SACP, The Road to South African Freedom: The Programme o f  the South African Communist Party 
(London, 1964), 27.
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SACP put forward as its immediate proposals the establishment of a “national democratic 
state” (not a socialist state) whose main content would be the national liberation of the 
African people within the framework of the Freedom Charter.17 The SACP’s 1962 
programme, not only “has remained the backbone of communist theory in South Africa 
ever since,”18 but also had long-lasting implications in shaping the strategy and tactics of 
the liberation movement as a whole.
The multi-racial alliance between the ANC, SAIC, CPC, COD, and SACTU 
found ideological expression in the Freedom Charter, adopted on 26 June 1955 at the 
Congress of the People. The Charter, which stated that “South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, black and white” and that “[a]ll national groups shall be protected by law against 
insults to their race and national pride,”19 essentially sanctioned the multi-national, multi­
racial approach of the Congress Movement, which the SACP also endorsed.
It was precisely with the multi-racialism of the Freedom Charter that the 
Africanists in the ANC strongly disagreed with. To them, the policy of multi-racialism 
amounted to the forfeiting by the ANC of “the Africans’ inalienable right to full 
‘ownership’ of South Africa.” Rejecting the premises of multi-racialism as implying “a 
recognition of some distinctive difference between members of the human species,” they 
argued that there was only “one race: the human race.”21 The Africanists thus “proclaimed 
themselves ‘nonracialists’ (who recognised people as individuals, not as members of racial
17 See SACP, The Road to South African Freedom.
18 Simon Adams, Comrade Minister: The South African Communist Party and the Transition from  Apartheid  
to Democracy (Huntington, 2001), 43.
19 “Freedom Charter,” adopted by the Congress o f  the People, 26 June 1955, document 11 in Karis and 
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 205-8. Emphasis added.
20 Robert Sobukwe, quoted in Azania News, London, 1966.
21 See “Manifesto o f  the Africanist Movement,” document 39b, in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 
517-524.
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99groups)” and “professed to accept individuals of all colors [s j c ] as future citizens.” 
Finally, they “resented the formal equivalence of African and non-African groupings” in
23the Congress Alliance, in which the ANC enjoyed the status of ‘first among equals.’ The 
incorporation of the concept of multi-racialism into African politics in the 1950s had thus 
been fundamental to the Africanists’ discontent and their subsequent decision to form the 
PAC in 1959.
Setting up the ANC external mission: the “African image”
When Tambo left South Africa in late March 1960, the initial intention had been to 
establish an ANC external machinery of some kind. This project, however, had been 
overshadowed by a series of events which led instead to the formation of the SAUF. In fact, 
at the time the decision to send Tambo out was taken, there had been “no anticipation of the 
PAC [arising] as a factor outside or for that matter inside the country.”24 The Sharpeville 
killings had ensured the PAC “overnight recognition” despite the relatively poor popular 
response to its anti-pass call on a national scale. As Karis and Gerhart have argued, “if 
police had not shot into the crowd of demonstrators that gathered at Sharpeville location 
outside Vereeniging on March 21, 1960, the day might have marked just one more abortive 
campaign in the history of African protest.”25 Following Sharpeville, the problems which 
the PAC’? newly gained notoriety presented were temporarily overcome through the setting 
up of the SAUF. Flowever, as the crisis in the SAUF developed, the question o f external
22 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 65.
23 Dubow, “Thoughts on South Africa,” 67.
24 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
25 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 332.
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representation emerged again. In South Africa, the ANC and member organisations of the 
Congress Alliance “engaged in a very thorough discussion as to what was required to 
replace the SAUF.”26
ANC concerns over projecting a genuinely “African image” played a major role 
in the formal reorganisation of the Congress Movement abroad following the dissolution of 
the SAUF, just as they had influenced its formation. The “image” problem had been 
revived by Mandela’s extensive reports of his discussions with leading African statesmen 
during his tour o f the continent in the first half of 1962. On Mandela’s return to South 
Africa, “the phrase ‘the image’ which the ANC presents to the outside world became a 
nucleus of wide ranging discussions.”27
Prior to March 1960, the Congress Alliance had functioned through the Joint 
Congress Executives, the formal head of the alliance, and through the National Action 
Council, or Secretariat, a consultative, non-policy making body with delegates from each of 
the four sponsoring bodies. Members of the Secretariat included Walter Sisulu and, Duma 
Nokwe for the ANC, Yusuf Dadoo for the SAIC, George Peake for the CPC, and Piet 
Beyleveld for the COD (he was replaced by Ben Turok around 195 8).28 After the banning 
of the ANC in 1960, the possibility of reproducing outside the country the same Congress 
Alliance machinery that existed inside the country (in which certain sections were now 
legal and others illegal)29 was rejected, as was the idea that each organisation in the
26 UFH, Liberation Archive, Oliver Tambo Papers: Box 81, File B.2.3.1, Political report o f  the NEC to the 
Consultative Conference o f the ANC, Morogoro, April 1969.
27 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
28 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 82.
29 Unlike the ANC, the CPC, SAIC, and SACTU were still legal organisations, although this description could 
only be academic in terms o f organisational possibilities and political activity. The white COD was banned on
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Alliance should set up its own external mission, which would result in a counterproductive 
dispersion of energies and resources. Instead, it was agreed that the external mission should 
reflect the fundamental fact that the essence of the struggle at home was the liberation of 
the African people, which would in turn introduce democratic rights for all.30 As a result of 
the discussions taking place within the Alliance, it was unanimously decided that an 
external mission of the ANC should be set up “to serve as representative not only o f the 
ANC but the whole progressive movement in South Africa.”31 This meant “the
9^establishment, especially in African capitals, of ANC missions led by ANC personnel.” 
Although it was felt that the image that the movement should project outside the country 
was that of an essentially ‘African’ struggle, “it was also understood that all members of the 
Alliance would be integrated in the external mission whenever possible.”33 In view of the 
fact that central to the external mission work would be “obtaining the assistance and 
alliance of the African states,” this type of machinery was thought to be the most suitable 
one for facilitating the achievement of the movement’s aims, without having “to win 
converts in the African states to our concept of non-racial unity.”34 Finally, some of the
14 September 1962, and the organisation decided to formally dissolve when it became obvious that o f  all its 
active members where either banned, in prison, or abroad.
30 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
31 UFH, Liberation Archive, Oliver Tambo Papers: Box 81, File B.2.3.1, Political report o f  the NEC to the 
Consultative Conference o f the ANC, Morogoro, April 1969.
32 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
33 UFH, Liberation Archive, Oliver Tambo Papers: Box 81, File B.2.3.1, Political report o f  the NEC to the 
Consultative Conference o f  the ANC, Morogoro, April 1969.
34 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
148
organisational weaknesses inherent in the structure of the Congress Alliance would avoid
being reproduced in external work.35 According to Reg September:
None of us [i.e. the other organisations in the Congress Alliance] had the kind of 
mass support that the ANC had. None of us had the sort of foundations that the 
ANC had. None of us could expect the kind of support in Africa that the ANC could 
get. The understanding thus was that we would be all working together under the 
aegis of the ANC, who would lead the movement.36
Despite being the subject of “comprehensive and at times acrimonious” debate,37 these 
decisions “were then taken by the leadership at home of the entire Congress Alliance in 
1962,”38 and confirmed at the Lobatse Consultative Conference of October 1962, the first 
ANC Conference since 1959. Although the ANC was now a banned organisation, the 
majority of the fifty or more delegates39 came from South Africa and met with their 
comrades now living in exile. It was during this conference that the ANC officially 
endorsed the decision to organise and prepare for armed struggle.40 Up this point, the ANC 
National Executive had not officially embraced the turn to violence, although it granted that 
individual “members who undertook such activity would not be subject to disciplinary 
action.”41 Any public identification between the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe had been
35 As for instance with regards to the formal equivalence o f  the constituent bodies in the Alliance, which did 
not accurately reflect their individual memberships. The difference between the ANC and the other 
organisations was also big in terms o f  experience, the ANC being the oldest organisation in the Alliance.
36 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
37 See for instance Dadoo’s disagreement with Mandela discussed in the previous chapter.
38 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
39 Among the delegates to the Lobatse Conference, chaired by Govan Mbeki, were Oliver Tambo, Yusuf 
Dadoo, Moses Kotane, Alfred Kgokong, Walter Sisulu and Moses Mabhida.
40 UFH, Liberation Archive, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 81, File B.2.3.1, Political report o f  the NEC to the 
Consultative Conference o f  the ANC, Morogoro, April 1969.
41 Nelson Mandela, Statement during the Rivonia trial, 20 April 1964, document 75 in Karis and Gerhart, 
Challenge and Violence, 777-778.
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carefully avoided for security reasons.42 This ambiguity, however, had at the same time 
created a “widespread confusion among ANC members as to what the organisation’s 
official policy was,” as well as “a security hiatus that allowed a level of infiltration that 
subsequently destroyed the domestic arm of MK.”43 One of the purposes of the Lobatse 
Conference, thus, was to clear such confusion.
The Conference emphasised the growing importance of the external mission, which 
was assigned the role of arranging for military training and support, and of carrying out 
international diplomatic and solidarity work. It also confirmed Oliver Tambo’s mandate 
from the ANC executive to confront such problems.44 At this stage, however, a relatively 
strong leadership was still active inside South Africa which could issue directives for the 
external mission to carry out. Even after Mandela’s arrest in August 1962, the ANC and 
MK continued to function underground under the guidance of leaders such as Raymond 
Mhlaba (who succeeded Mandela as MK’s Commander-in-Chief), Walter Sisulu, Joe 
Slovo, and Govan Mbeki.
The decisions concerning the external organisational apparatus of the Congress 
Alliance were also approved by the SACP at its Sixth National Conference of November 
1962, which acknowledged the changing character of the Congress Alliance since the 
banning of the ANC in April 1960. The SACP was concerned that “continued stress in
42 The first explicit link between the ANC with MK was made by Robert Resha in a public speech in London 
in late 1962. According to Rusty Bernstein, Resha had already made the same speech during a visit by an 
ANC delegation to one o f  the African countries. It remains unclear whether the claim had been authorised or 
not, but the ANC chose not repudiate it either. See Slovo, The Unfinished Autobiography, 151; Bernstein, 
Memory Against Forgetting, 238; and Sifiso M. Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile, 1960-1970,” in SADET (eds.), 
The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, 435.
43 Bernard Magubane, Philip Bonner, Jabulani Sithole, Peter Delius, Janet Cherry, Pat Gibbs and Thozama 
April, “The turn to armed struggle,” in SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, 135.
44 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 275.
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public work on the ‘Alliance’ would give the impression that the ‘Congress Movement’
now consisting only of the South African Indian Congress, South African Congress of
Trade Unions and South African Coloured People’s Congress -  had inherited the leadership
of the national liberation movement.” According to the SACP, a “distorted presentation of
our image abroad” had created a situation in which:
It is the alliance which has been seen abroad, increasingly as the Congress 
movement, and not the real national organisations, vastly unequal in size and in 
importance which make it up. The effect has been, in propaganda abroad, to eclipse 
the leading role and nature of the ANC; and to mute the leading aim which is the 
liberation of the African majority.45
The SACP identified the projection of such “false” image as the main reason for the 
alienation of “some people,” “especially in Africa.” In keeping to the notion o f South 
Africa’s exceptionalism, the SACP observed that in the rest of the continent “there have 
been no significant elements in the White and Asian minority communities 
uncompromisingly joining the Africans’ freedom struggle.” Because of this, the “multi­
racial democratic alliance in the struggle for national freedom is not understood or 
supported” by African leaders, whose “undifferentiated hostility towards Whites and 
Asians leads them to suspect or despise the policy of the national liberation movement in 
this country.” The image projected abroad thus needed correction though a change in 
organisational set-up, in order to make it clear that “the leader of this movement is and has 
always been the African National Congress.” This would not imply, as Mandela had 
concluded too, any change in the “essence” of the alliance, that is the “consultation and 
unity between the various congresses” at all times.46
45 “A Landmark in South Africa’s History: The Sixth National Conference o f  the South African Communist 
Party,” International Bulletin, no. 4, December 1962, in Allison Drew (ed.), South A frica’s Radical Tradition: 
A Documentary History, Vol. 2, 1943-1964 (Cape Town, 1997), 358-364.
46 Ibid.
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Rivonia and implications
Conditions in South Africa, however, were soon to alter dramatically. The police raid on
Liliesfarm, Rivonia, on 11 July 1963, which led to the capture of virtually the whole of
MK’s National High Command (NHC), severely crippled both the military and political
underground movement. Although the ANC was trying to minimise the seriousness of the
arrests by claiming that it would only “lead to a redoubling of efforts to bring down the
Verwoerd regime of repression, plunder and tyranny,”47 Rivonia was a major setback for
the ANC. Anthony Sampson reported at the time:
The ANC is certainly not dead [...] But the individual African leadership which has 
been prominent for the past ten years is now effectively incapacitated inside the 
Republic.48
Soon after the Rivonia arrests, a second NHC was established.49 In the period between July 
1963 and September of the following year, the new High Command “had reactivated MK 
structures and mobilised 600 people in the Transvaal alone.”50 However, the capture and 
trial of the second NHC, in what became known as the Tittle Rivonia trial,’ “were the final 
blows for the internal political and military structures,” which left the task of maintaining 
internal structures largely to the remaining SACP leaders, notably Bram Fischer.51 The 
smashing of the virtually the whole of the underground movement at the Rivonia and Tittle 
Rivonia’ trials in effect transformed the ANC into an organisation in exile. The external 
mission now found itself in the position of having to assume responsibility for the fate of
47 South African Freedom News, Dar es Salaam: African National Congress o f  South Africa, 12 July 1963.
48 The Observer, London, 1 March 1964.
49 The second NHC included Wilton Mkwayi (Commander-in-Chief), Mac Maharaj, David Kitson, Laloo 
Chiba, and John Edward Matthews.
50 Gregory Houston, “The post-Rivonia ANC/SACP underground,” in SADET (eds.), The Road to 
Democracy, Vol. 1, 602.
51 Ibid., 618.
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the entire movement, including “organising for internal work, which had never been its job 
when established.”52
The Rivonia raid and the umpteenth sweep of arrests which followed it gave way to 
the second significant wave of political exile after Sharpeville, which further transformed 
the initial conditions under which the ANC had been given mandate to represent the 
Congress Alliance internationally. In keeping to the idea of the “African image” and in 
trying to dispel the perception amongst African leaders that the ANC was an organisation 
controlled by white and Indian communists, ANC members going into exile, including 
prominent SACP members such as Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks, tended to establish 
themselves in those African capitals which hosted ANC offices. On the other hand, the UK, 
and London in particular, became the place of refuge for the majority of the white, 
Coloured and Indian exiles. This pattern of political exile created a somewhat anomalous 
situation in London, where a substantial community of South Africans formerly associated 
with the Congress Alliance established itself, but was left in “organisational limbo” as a 
result of the decision that only the ANC should open offices abroad.
The choice of the UK for many South African exiles was in part determined by the 
practical need of earning a living,54 and partly by the fact that whites, Coloureds and 
Indians -  especially if communist -  did not appear to be very welcome in African states. 
Many well-known non-African communists, as for example Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Slovo, Ruth 
First and Michael Harmel, “had been declared prohibited immigrants in Tanzania and had 
consequently been obliged to operate from Europe.”55 Until the 1970s, the only notable
52 UFH, Liberation Archive, Oliver Tambo Papers: Box 81, File B.2.3.1, Political report o f  the NEC to the 
Consultative Conference o f the ANC, Morogoro, April 1969.
53 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 36.
54 Interview with Brian Bunting, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 22 November 2004.
55 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 326.
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exceptions were Jack Simons and Ray Alexander, who half-settled in Lusaka in 1965,56 and
Ben and Mary Turok. The Turoks, however, encountered problems as they tried to settle in
Africa when they left South Africa in 1966. After illegally crossing the border into
Botswana, Ben Turok was fetched from Lusaka by Tennyson Makiwane. The Zambian
immigration office, however, only granted him a 48-hour permit, after which Turok went to
Kenya where he was joined by his wife and children. The Turoks then tried to remain in
Kenya but despite letters of credentials from the ANC to Joseph Murumbi (Kenya’s vice-
President) and Tom Mboya (Minister o f Labour) and their determination to stay, the Turoks
still failed to obtain a visa and work permit.57 Ben Turok recalls that in their dealings with
the Kenyan authorities: “everyone was polite but adamant that there was no place for us in
Kenya and that we should leave for Britain.”58 In October 1966 Ben Turok and his family
finally managed to settle in Dar es Salaam, where he got a job in the surveying division of
the Tanzanian government.59 This is how Turok came to understand the prohibitions
against white comrades from South Africa:
Already in the days of Kwame Nkrumah the PAC had persuaded Africa’s leaders 
that the ANC multiracialism was a mechanism for domination by white 
communists. [...] In Africa, where there was no equivalent group to South Africa’s 
white progressives, this explanation was accepted. And so throughout the continent, 
white South African meant communist, and they wanted none of it.60
56 Initially, the Simons’ spent half o f  their time in Lusaka and half in Manchester, where Jack got a fellowship 
at the University o f  Manchester in 1965.
57 Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first President, had been a leading Pan-African in the years o f  the struggle against 
British colonial rule (in 1945 he had attended, like Nkrumah and other future African statesmen, the 
Manchester Pan-African Conference). After Kenya became independent in December 1963, however, 
Kenyatta adopted a rather conservative foreign policy. Although Kenya formally condemned apartheid South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesia’s UDI, it did not provide any direct support to liberation movements and was 
perceived to be as “well to the right o f  the more militant attitudes adopted by Zambia and Tanzania.” Guy 
Arnold, Kenyatta and the Politics o f  Kenya (London, 1974), 171.
58 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 191.
59 In January 1969 even the Turoks joined the majority o f  the white exile community in the UK.
60 Ben Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 199.
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There might have been further reasons for such hostility. First, as the newly independent 
African states inherited a colonial bureaucratic and military system, immigration officials in 
countries such as Zambia and Kenya tended to be friendly with the British, their former 
colonial power, especially in the first few years after independence.61 Second, the resistance 
of African states to having white South African leaders of the opposition settling 
permanently within their countries’ borders may have been the reflection of a certain 
insecurity on their part, as the high visibility of their presence could invite retaliation by 
apartheid South Africa.
By February 1965, ANC offices had been established in London, Algiers, Cairo, 
Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, where the organisation’s provisional headquarters were located. 
These were in fact and practice ANC offices led by ANC personnel responsible to the ANC 
National Executive. (The only exception to this model in the 1960s was the ANC Asian 
mission in New Delhi, which was officially opened on 14 November 1967 and was run by 
Alfred Nzo as chief representative alongside Maulvi Cachalia of the Indian Congress.) 
Members of other organisations in the Alliance also participated in the work of these 
offices although “not at policy-making or decision-making level, [...] irrespective of the 
political status of the non-ANC person involved.”62 In almost three years of existence, the 
ANC external mission could proudly boast that a tremendous amount of work had been
61 Like the Turoks, the Simons’ also found the immigration officers in Zambia to be un-cooperative. This may 
have been because although Zambia “was favourably disposed towards the ANC, [ ...]  it had inherited from 
the British colonial authority a civil service that included supporters and even agents o f  the South African 
government.” Shubin, ANC, 66. See also Ray Alexander Simons, All My Life and All M y Strength, edited by 
Raymond Suttner (Johannesburg, 2004), 303.
62 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH07, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
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carried out, “in particular in relation to the new phase of the struggle,” with numerous 
freedom fighters being sent for military training to a number of countries, including 
socialist countries. The external mission also served all sections of the Alliance by 
providing facilities for travelling, documents, and training. Most importantly, close 
working contacts had been established with African states, especially Tanzania, thanks to 
the effective projection of the “African image.” This representation was thought to have 
been so successful that “the PAC attempt to portray itself as the only African organisation 
in South Africa has hopelessly failed and in fact politically and ideologically the PAC has 
suffered complete rout in Africa.”64 Why the ANC felt it could make such a claim at this 
stage will emerge from the analysis of PAC activities in the period 1962-1965 later in this 
chapter. In order to understand the significance of the internal debate over the “African 
image” the state of ANC relations with other African states, especially Ghana, Tanzania 
and Zambia, during this period will be examined first.
The assistance of independent African states, especially the so-called front line 
states,65 to the South African liberation movements was without doubt vital to the latter’s 
endurance throughout the long exile period. It is also indisputable that for their active 
support, which took the form of material, financial, military, and moral aid, all the front line 
states paid a heavy price.66 However, the relationship between the liberation movements 
and African governments was by no means straightforward or free o f trouble. Although 
countries like Zambia and Tanzania later gave their full support, when the ANC and the
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 The front line states were, as one after the other attained full independence, Tanzania (1961), Zambia 
(1964), Angola (1975), Mozambique (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980).
66 See for example Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War 
(Harare, 1986), and William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots o f  War in Angola and 
Mozambique (Johannesburg, 1994).
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PAC first moved into exile there was a widespread perception that the ANC “was not
5 5 6 Vgenuine, that we’re a communist front, and therefore we are after a Soviet agenda.” 
Moreover, as it has already been suggested, from an ideological point of view, African 
states came from a different ideological background from that of the ANC. They also each 
had their own set of ideas as to what they thought was the ‘correct’ political path which the 
south African liberation movements should follow. Thus, the next three sections will try to 
convey some of the complexities in the early relations between the South African liberation 
movements and the governments of Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, which in the 1960s 
represented the three most committed African countries to South Africa’s liberation.
Relations with Ghana
The first sub-Saharan country to win independence from colonial rule in 1957, Nkrumah’s 
Ghana had set the rest of the continent on a pace of rolling independence which soon left as 
colonies in Africa only the Spanish and Portuguese territories, French Somaliland, and the 
white minority regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Ghana had assumed “the 
status of a prototype -  a road which all African territories must travel, a vanguard of the 
‘African revolution’.”68 Nkrumah’s continental impact and influence cannot be overstated. 
Until his overthrow from power in 1966 and even beyond, Nkrumah acted as the leading 
advocate of African liberation and Pan-African unity, which he saw as the ultimate goal of 
Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah had proclaimed that Ghana’s independence would be
67 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Cape Town, 14 February 2005.
68 Opoku Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations 
(London, 1992), 28.
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“meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African Continent,”69 and 
he therefore took it on as his duty to “commit all the resources and energies of Ghana 
towards achieving Africa’s independence and unity.”70 This he did through a foreign policy 
of ‘diplomatic offensive,’ non-alignment, and through a series of initiatives aimed at 
promoting African unity, which can be viewed as the forerunners to the formation of the 
OAU in 1963.71
Under the rule of Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples’ Party, Ghana understood the
situation in South Africa within this framework of African unity. In order for the new
independent African states to avoid being drawn into neo-colonial structures, apartheid
South Africa had to be confronted or else, as Nkrumah noted:
If the African nations were united, those who practise neo-colonialism (and support 
apartheid) would adjust themselves to the new balance of forces in exactly the same 
way as the capitalist world has in the past adjusted itself to any other change in the 
balance o f power.72
In the years immediately before independence, Ghana’s South African policy had been one 
of “cautious dialogue.” This was due to the fact “that before independence, Ghana was 
ruled by a diarchy in which Britain controlled foreign policy and, therefore, defined 
Ghana’s attitude toward South Africa.” Furthermore, “Ghana remained tied indirectly to 
South Africa through the operation of British firms.”73 This approach was reflected in the 
first All-African People’s Conference in 1958, which expressed the preference for non­
69 Kwame Nkrumah’s midnight pronouncement at Ghana’s independence celebrations on March 6, 1957, in 
Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms o f  Kwame Nkrumah (London, 1980), 77.
70 Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa, 30.
71 See S.E. Quarm, Diplomatic Offensive: An Overview o f  Ghana’s Diplomacy Under Dr Kwame Nkrumah, 
(Accra, 1997).
72 Quoted in E.K. Dumor, Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa: An African Response to Apartheid, Accra: 
Ghana Universities Press, 1991, 68.
73 Dumor, Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa, 71.
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violent methods of struggle, although it also condoned the use of violence where no
alternatives were available.74
By 1960, however, the formation of a more radical African -  including South
African — policy had begun, triggered, in part, by “the non-chalant attitude toward the
South African issue”75 adopted by the French-speaking West African countries which had
been drawn into the French Union by De Gaulle. On the question of violence/non-violence,
the weight had now shifted towards the acceptance of violence. The Positive Action
Conference o f April 1960 (organised by Nkrumah to discuss the next steps after the French
nuclear explosions in the Sahara), sanctioned the move away from non-violence.
Sharpeville was also included on the Conference agenda. As Nkrumah wrote in this respect:
South Africa is probably the biggest impediment to the liberation and unity of the 
African continent and it is a question we must face realistically. For some time now, 
we have tried a line of policy, namely that if only one was patient and negotiated 
and tried to understand the problems of South Africa, then the situation would 
gradually begin to improve and little by little, racial oppression would disappear. 
However [...] our experience has proved this policy to be false.76
Why then, given Nkrumah’s commitment to the liberation of South Africa, had the ANC 
not been able to establish itself in Ghana as late as mid-1965? Following the short-lived 
experience of the SAUF, during which Tennyson Makiwane had worked on behalf of the 
SAUF in the Accra office, the ANC had in fact been left unrepresented in Ghana and West 
Africa at large. This was due to Ghana’s open preference for the PAC over the ANC. The 
ANC, on the other hand had been unwilling to open facilities elsewhere in West Africa. In 
September 1961, contacts had been made with the Nigerian government for the ANC to set
74 See Notes for Delegates to the All African People’s Conference to be held in Accra, Ghana, December 
1958, Issued by the ANC, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/bovcotts/accra58.html.
75 Dumor, Ghana, OA U and Southern Africa , 72.
76 Quoted in Ibid., 72.
159
up an office in the country with Robert Resha as representative.77 The office, however was 
never opened. Clearly, such was Ghana’s international prestige that “it would not have been 
in the best interest of the struggle in South Africa to have had the ANC operating from 
some small insignificant comer in West Africa.”78 The organisation’s international 
standing, especially in Africa, would have been weakened had it “appeared ostensibly that 
Congress was unaccepted by a country which was virtually the leading state on the African 
continent.”79
Regional dynamics in West Africa may also have influenced the decision by the 
ANC not to set up offices in a West African country other than Ghana. In fact, Ghana and 
Nigeria were part of two opposing blocs within the region, the former being a member of 
the Casablanca Group, and the latter being part of the Monrovia Group. The Casablanca 
Group, led by Ghana and composed of Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, and the 
government in exile of the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale, was committed to the 
total liberation of Africa and to continental unity through the creation of a United States of 
Africa. At a conference in Casablanca in 1961, following the experience of the Congo 
crisis, Nkrumah had proposed the establishment of a military African High Command to 
ensure a common defence strategy to safeguard independent African states against neo­
colonial aggression and to “provide military assistance for nationalist fighters in dependent 
territories.”80 The Monrovia Group, on the other hand, was opposed to Nkrumah’s idea of 
an African High Command, which, according to the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar
77 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 37 file 133, Confidential Supplementary 
Memorandum by Robert Resha, 19 September 1961.
78 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, file 1, Joe Matlou, Notes on the West African 
Mission, Morogoro, May 1966.
79 Ibid.
80 Dumor, Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa, 158-9.
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Tafawa Balewa, would only lead to an escalation of the arms race and “draw Africa in the 
East-West imbroglio.”81 This group, consisting of Nigeria Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia, and the French Brazzaville States was more concerned “with 
issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs 
and hence the preservation o f the old colonial boundaries,”82 than unity.
Arrangements to open an ANC office in Accra were finally made with the Bureau
a*
of African Affairs (a Ghanaian government body) and its Executive Secretary Ofori Baah 
following a visit by a Bureau’s delegation to East Africa in 1965. In a letter to Tambo, 
Baah admitted that the relationship between the ANC and the Bureau had been weak in the 
past, and proposed that both parties put the past behind them and work at repairing 
relations. He also told Tambo that the ANC would “now have a new lease of life in
OA
Ghana.” Tambo, on the other hand, reassured Baah that the Bureau could “count on the 
full cooperation of the ANC.”85
The Bureau of African Affairs had been conceived by Nkrumah to support the 
struggles in Africa’s unliberated territories. It was responsible for identifying the key 
leaders of the liberation movements and for bringing them to Ghana to undergo 
‘ideological’ and military training. George Padmore, who was one of Nkrumah’s closest 
advisors, headed the Bureau, which, together with Flagstaff House (consisting of Nkrumah
81 Quoted in Ibid., 159.
82 Ibid., 163.
83 Baah had temporarly replaced A.K. Barden as Director o f  the Bureau. See Sifiso M. Ndlovu, “The ANC 
and the world”, in SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, 555.
84 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, O. Baah, Accra, to O.R. Tambo, Dar es 
Salaam, 8 July 1965.
85 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, O.R. Tambo, Dar es Salaam, to O. Baah, 
Accra, 3 August 1965.
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and his advisors) was responsible for shaping Ghana’s African policy, including Southern 
African policy.86
The first ANC office in Ghana was thus only opened towards the end of August
1965 with Joe Matlou as chief representative, despite the fact that the ANC had for many
years wanted to establish an office there in preference to other West African states:
It had to be so, because the Ghana of Kwame Nkrumah was a revolutionary state 
which held a central position in the onward march of the African revolution. Her 
powerful approach to the problems of African liberation, national independence, 
African Nationalism and Unity gave her comparative supremacy and noted pre­
eminence in the eyes of Africa, over many African states. Naturally, the ANC took 
cognizance of this fact, so did many other freedom fighters-organisations.87
Matlou reported that, from the time of his arrival in Accra, “it was easy to detect a spirit of 
resistance to the ANC with some officials.” Thus, the ANC urgently needed to make itself 
“freely acceptable” through a “systematic plan of work,” consisting of a “scheme for 
publicity and propaganda.”88 The plan was mapped out to start in Ghana but ultimately to 
cover the whole of West Africa.89 James Hadebe, the ANC chief representative in Dar es 
Salaam, concurred with Matlou on the burning need to finally put the ANC on the map by 
“paint[ing] bold the ANC letters in West Africa.”90 In September 1965, Matlou, however, 
informed headquarters that the Ghanaian government had not yet been able to find suitable 
office facilities for the ANC and that the Bureau of African Affairs was experiencing
86 The Africa Bureau also ran a radio station, Radio Ghana (which broadcasted to the whole o f  Africa in 
several languages), and published a monthly magazine, The Voice o f  Africa, which had in the past carried out 
attacks on the ANC, and which had a PAC member on its editorial board. See Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 
432.
87 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Notes on the West African 
Mission, Morogoro, May 1966.
88 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Supplementary Report [n.d.].
89 Ibid.
90 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, James Hadebe, Dar es Salaam, to Joe 
Matlou, Accra, 26 August 1965.
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difficulties in making arrangements to invite additional ANC representatives. Matlou was at 
this time still operating from his private flat in Accra.91
Although the PAC representatives in Ghana appeared to Matlou to be “very much 
worried about our presence here in what they have always considered to be their 
stronghold,”92 feelings of hostility towards the ANC “became intensified after the [October 
1965] OAU Summit Conference”.93 As the ANC representatives missed the meeting of 
Foreign Ministers, “not much was really achieved”94 in terms of improving the ANC’s 
position in Ghana and West Africa at large during the OAU Conference. So, although some 
progress was discernible, “a solid layer of resistance towards the ANC”95 persisted. Only in 
early January 1966 was Matlou granted a meeting with President Nkrumah, on which all 
that Matlou could comment was that he had a “brief but most inspiring”96 interview.
On 24 February 1966 a CIA-sponsored coup by the Ghanaian army and police 
deposed Nkrumah and his ministers and the country’s constitution was suspended. The 
1966 coup d ’etat had the effect of bringing the work of the ANC (as well as of all other 
liberation movements) in Ghana to a halt. In the first couple of months after Nkrumah’s 
overthrow, a period of uncertainty followed in regard to the status of African liberation 
movements in Ghana. The new National Liberation Council (NCL) military government
91 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Accra, to James Hadebe, Dar 
es Salaam, 28 September 1965.
92 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Accra, to O.R. Tambo, 
Morogoro, 3 November 1965.
93 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Supplementary Report [n.d]. 
The October 1965 OAU conference decided to cancel OAU aid to the Zimbabwean liberation movements on 
disunity grounds.
94 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Accra, to O.R. Tambo, 
Morogoro, 3 November 1965.
95 Ibid.
96 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Supplementary Report [n.d.].
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adopted “a rather retreatist philosophy and bankrupt internationalism in relation to Pan- 
Africanism.”97 The Bureau of African Affairs was wound up and the NLC junta initially 
informed all freedom fighters that they had to leave the country. The government 
subsequently reversed this position but the question of financial support to the liberation 
movements based in Ghana remained uncertain. Matlou raised this matter in a letter to the 
NLC secretariat dated 12 April 1966.98 Financial support notwithstanding, the ANC 
ultimately decided that the Ghana office would be closed down,99 and Matlou was recalled 
to headquarters in Morogoro. After travelling around West Africa with the view of finding 
an alternative base, Matlou had a meeting with NLC Chairman General Ankrah in which he 
informed him of his executive’s decision.100 This was to be the end of the ANC’s West 
African endeavour.
In London, Africa Unity House, whose facilities both the ANC and the PAC had 
kept using as an office base after the collapse of the SAUF, was also closed down sometime 
in 1966 as a result o f the coup and the ANC relocated to Rathbone Street.
97 Dumor, Ghana, OA U and Southern Africa, 98-99.
98 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Report to Headquarters, 21 
April 1966.
99 Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966 was interpreted by many African states as a serious setback in the ‘African 
revolution,’ and more specifically in the liberation o f  Southern Africa by the leaders o f  the Frontline states. 
Kenneth Kaunda o f  Zambia and Nyerere o f  Tanzania, for example, never granted the NLC diplomatic 
recognition. Guinea, Mali, and Uganda (as well as the Soviet Union and China) also broke o ff diplomatic 
relations with the NLC military regime.
100 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, File 1, Joe Matlou, Accra, to Duma Nokwe, 
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Relations with Tanzania
In May 1963 the OAU was established by thirty-two African states in Addis Ababa. Its 
formation reflected the tensions between the new African leaders about the kind of unity 
they wanted. In the end, it was the gradualist approach of the Monrovia Group which 
prevailed at the conference, and the OAU Charter “[f]ar from a political union [...] rather 
laid emphasis on principles that would preserve individualism.”101 Although the OAU did 
not adopt Nkrumah’s proposed scheme of an African High Command, it did in its stead 
establish an African Liberation Committee, whose function was to support and advise 
liberation movements. PAFMECSA had been previously responsible for carrying out such 
role, “[b]ut, as distinct from PAFMECSA, of which the liberation movements were 
themselves members, they had to face the Liberation Committee Officials as supplicants 
rather than equals.”102 The Liberation Committee had its operating base in Dar es Salaam 
and was presided over by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona. Thus, Tanzania, 
having achieved independence in December 1961, quickly “became one of the most 
important focuses of exile activity and the Tanzanian government the most important 
supporter of the South African organisations.”103
Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere shared with Nkrumah the vision of a united 
Africa under one continental government. The two leaders, however, differed 
fundamentally on how to achieve such goal. Whereas Nkrumah called for immediate 
continental unification, Nyerere envisaged a regional or ‘step-by-step’ process, which 
would allow African countries to come together at their own pace. This difference in 
approach had fostered a rivalry between Nkrumah and Nyerere for continental pre-
101 Quarm, Diplomatic Offensive, 47.
102 Shubin, ANC, 61.
103 Lodge, Black Politics, 298.
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eminence as symbols of African radicalism.104 Furthermore, Nyerere advocated a kind of 
socialism which, unlike Nkurmah’s class-based, scientific socialism, was non-racialist, 
non-Marxist, and based on traditional concepts of self-reliance and cooperation.
The difference between Nkrumah’s radicalism and Nyerere’s gradualism and the 
rivalry between the two leaders may help to understand why the ANC was from the start 
able to establish friendly and productive contacts with Tanzania but found it hard to be 
accepted by Ghana. Because of Nkrumah’s radicalism and essential Pan-Africanism, Ghana 
tended to be suspicious of whoever did not totally support its same primary policies. As 
seen in the previous chapter, the PAC shared a lot of affinities with Nkrumah’s Pan-African 
vision. On the other hand, the ANC’s multi-racial approach appeared out of synch with 
such vision.
The Tanzania mission of the ANC was established in 1963. After a brief period in 
which London had been the main base for the ANC in exile, Oliver Tambo decided to 
move the organisation’s headquarters to Tanzania, “which had offered land for training 
camps and an office for the ANC in Dar es Salaam.” The move was prompted by the 
demands of armed struggle, which, after the arrest of the bulk of MK’s leadership at 
Rivonia in July 1963, would now have to be directed and coordinated from outside, under a 
reconstituted High Command.105 Furthermore, Tanzania represented, at this point, the 
southernmost base from which military operations could be carried out. James Hadebe, who 
had previously represented the ANC in the Dar es Salaam office of the SAUF, was 
appointed chief representative. Moses Kotane, who Tambo had “expressly requested [...] 
be sent out to assist him and the Mission in Exile” because of his “broad-ranging views and
104 See Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa.
105 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 293.
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international experience,”106 J.B. Marks, Robert Resha, Duma Nokwe, Mendi Msimang, 
Ruth Mompati and Thomas Nkobi were among those who helped establish the Tanzania 
mission. Despite a slow and difficult start in the early years due to a lack of resources, the 
ANC opened a further office in Morogoro, in the southeast of the country, and a base in 
Mbeya (which was responsible for helping with the clearing of incoming consignments 
such as food, medicines, clothing, house material, motor vehicles, and military stuff). A 
number of military camps for the training of freedom fighters, the first being at Kongwa,107 
were also gradually set up. Generous donations of land by the Tanzania government in later 
years allowed the ANC to begin projects such as SOMAFCO (The Solomon Mahlangu 
Freedom College, named after the executed MK fighter and started in 1979) and the ANC 
Development Centre (begun in 1982) at Mazimbu and Dakawa respectively.108
Although the ANC was able to establish a constructive relationship with Tanzania 
over the years, this does not mean that it was hassle-free. Aziz Pahad has aptly described 
the ambivalent relationship between the ANC and Tanzania -  and the front line states more 
generally -  as one of “love and hate.”109 In early 1965, for instance, the ANC was forced to 
move its headquarters from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro as a result o f the Tanzanian 
government’s decision in November 1964 that only four members of each liberation 
movement would be allowed to maintain an office in the capital. Shubin has argued that the 
ANC external mission suffered from the transfer of headquarters to Morogoro, “a 
provincial town in Tanzania far from any international activity.”110 Again, in 1967, during
106 Ibid., 308.
107 See Chapter Five.
108 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Tanzania Mission Finding Aid.
109 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Cape Town, 14 February 2005.
110 Shubin, ANC, 70.
167
the period of the Arusha declaration, which made Ujamaa (i.e. Nyerere’s brand of
socialism) the official ideology and policy of Tanzania, Ben Turok noticed that:
[Conflicting signs came from Nyerere and the government. On the one hand we 
were given to understand that a revolution had been unleashed which would change 
the whole character of Tanzanian society. On the other hand, there was caution and 
moderation. This was also true about how the way Tanzania treated the liberation 
movements. On the one hand the ANC, PAC, Swapo, Zapu, Frelimo, MPLA and so 
on had offices in Dar es Salaam and enjoyed the protection of the Tanzanian 
government. At the same time the government was obviously anxious about the 
presence of so many revolutionaries and militants and often very critical of them. 
Sometimes we were referred to as ‘revolutionaries’ and at others as ‘Wakimbizi’ 
(refugees, or more literally, runaways) and subjected to derogatory comments in the 
official press and even by Tanu leaders.111
As an example of this, Turok has told how, at a student symposium on the liberation 
movements which the ANC had been invited to address, the ANC eventually withdrew 
from the meeting because of an attack in The Daily Nation (Tanzania’s national newspaper) 
“which portrayed the [liberation] movements as cowardly and content to enjoy the fruits of 
exile.”" 2
Relations with Zambia
After independence in October 1964, under President Kenneth Kaunda Zambia was another 
country which became deeply committed to the liberation of southern Africa through the 
active support of the liberation movements. Anglin and Shaw have argued that Zambia’s 
foreign policy was shaped by three ideological principles or values: Humanism, Pan- 
Africanism and positive non-alignment. Humanism advocated the establishment of a social 
order based on racial equality and respect. It was developed by Kaunda in direct response to 
the racism and racial inequality and conflict both domestically (as a result of Zambia’s own
111 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 202.
112 Ibid., 203.
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colonial experience) and in the region. Like Nkrumah and Nyerere, Kaunda was also a 
strong believer in continental cooperation, thus his insistence on the unity of the liberation 
movements in individual countries. This belief in African unity also meant that Zambia’s 
foreign policy was influenced by the OAU and its decisions. Finally, non-alignment was 
seen as central to Zambia’s economic disengagement from South Africa and Rhodesia and
• 1 1 Tits development within the framework of an alternative economic order.
The ANC, PAC, SWAPO, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Movimento Popular da Libertafao de 
Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Liberta?ao de Angola (FNLA), the Uniao 
Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the Frente de Libertafao de 
Mo9 ambique (FRELIMO), and the Comite Revolucionario de Mo9 ambique (COREMO) all 
established a presence -  some only provisionally and others long term -  in the country. 
Recognised liberation movements were granted administrative facilities at the African 
Liberation Centre, located on the outskirts of Lusaka and established in 1965.114 Sharing 
borders with Angola, South African occupied Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and 
Mozambique, Zambia was strategically positioned to offer a base for the liberation 
movements’ military operations. Ronnie Kasrils summed up the country’s strategic 
significance when in a letter to his wife Eleanor in 1978 he wrote that Zambia “is smack in 
the front line struggle against Rhodesia and Pretoria [...]. Geo-politically this country is 
placed at the strategic crossroads of the battle to liberate southern Africa, and Kaunda is 
four-square behind us.”115 Although Kaunda expressed a preference for a peaceful solution
113 Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zam bia’s Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and 
Dependence (Boulder, 1979).
114 Ibid., 241.
115 Ronnie Kasrils, ‘Armed and Dangerous, ’ My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid  (London, 1993), 
181-182.
169
to Southern Africa’s problems, he came to recognise that violence was not only inevitable 
but necessary because of the offensive waged by the white regimes to the South.116 
However, because of its geography, its economic dependence on the South and its support 
for the liberation movements, Zambia was especially exposed to attacks and reprisals by 
white-ruled Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Zambia therefore granted freedom 
fighters transit rights through the country but forbid, at least until 1974, the establishment 
of military training centres (such as the ones set up in Tanzania) because of the internal and 
external security risks involved. Thus, apart from the designated liberation movements’ 
officials, military personnel had no rights of residence and their permit to stay in the 
country was usually limited to a few days.117
Although both the ANC and the PAC were represented in Zambia in the beginning, 
Zambia completely severed relations with the latter. In August 1968 the PAC was banned 
in the country and forty-five of its members were deported to Tanzania for breaching 
regulations by which nationalist organisations had to abide, internecine strife, and their
n o
alleged involvement in a plot to assassinate Zambian ministers and to overthrow Kaunda.
In September 1967, the PAC’s internal squabbles and perceived inefficiency had prompted 
the Liberation Committee of the OAU to temporarily suspend all aid.119 It was only thanks 
to the intervention and support of the Tanzanian government that this was resumed and that 
the PAC was saved from the verge of collapse.
Ideologically, it could be argued that Kaunda’s Humanism may have been closer to 
the ANC’s ideology than to the PAC’s. Acting on the principle of non-racialism, Zambia’s 
ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), had accepted whites as
116 See Kenneth David Kaunda, On Violence, edited by Colin M. Morris (London, 1980).
117 Anglin and Shaw, Zam bia’s Foreign Policy, 243-244
118 Ibid., 254. See also Lodge, Black Politics, 312.
119 The OAU also withdrew assistance to SWANU and Holden Roberto’s FNLA.
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members since the days of the fight for independence.120 Still, in the early exile period, the 
South African question ranked rather low in comparison to the Portuguese territories and, 
most importantly for Zambia, the Rhodesian regime. It was only after Mozambique, 
Angola, and Zimbabwe won their independence that South Africa (and Namibia) became 
the centre stage of the liberation struggle and that the ANC emerged as the main liberation 
movement in Zambia. Until then, finding a solution in Rhodesia remained Zambia’s top 
priority. Rhodesia in fact “was the country with which Zambia had had the closest 
associations in the past” and “initially appeared to be the most promising country for early 
independence.”121 This is further exemplified by the fact that Tanzania remained the base of 
the ANC’s headquarters until 1977. Only then was the ANC able to move its operational 
centre closer to South Africa by transferring its provisional headquarters to Lusaka.
Zambia’s uneasy geo-political position helps to account for the negotiations she 
entered with the white settler regimes at various stages. In April 1969, Zambia, Tanzania 
and twelve other states in East and Central Africa adopted (without prior consultation or 
knowledge of the liberation movements) the Lusaka Manifesto, which was later endorsed 
by both the OAU and the UN General Assembly. The Manifesto referred to South Africa as 
“an independent Sovereign state and a member of the United Nations” whose “internal 
affairs” were, from a legal point of view, “a matter exclusively for the people of South 
Africa,” and expressed preference for dialogue and peaceful change in southern Africa. The 
document also contained the ambiguous phrase that “even if international law is to exclude 
the active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that 
the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a
120 Simon Zukas and Thomas Fox-Pitt were both UNIP members. See Zukas, Into Exile.
121 Anglin and Shaw, Zam bia’s Foreign Policy, 16.
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government which rejects the manhood of most humanity.”122 The moderate and 
conciliatory tone of the Lusaka Manifesto created for some time a climate of uncertainty in 
the continued support of the front line states and, more generally, of African states for the 
liberation movements in Southern Africa. Furthermore, “the failure to consult the ANC or 
the PAC was a humiliating exposure of their diplomatic weakness,” as well as of their 
dependence on the goodwill of African states, which meant that although the Manifesto was 
seen as a setback to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, the ANC and the other 
liberation movements could not afford to publicly criticise it.123
The Lusaka Manifesto led to a cooling of relations between the ANC on one hand, 
and Zambia and Tanzania on the other. These two states had come under great South 
African pressure, and were starting to feel increasingly isolated in the region. According to 
Shubin, during this period, “ANC activities in African countries were faltering. After the 
failure in Zimbabwe,124 Umkhonto lost its capacity to operate from Zambian territory. 
Some of the Tanzanian leadership looked with suspicion at the presence of non-Africans 
and communists in the ANC.”125 In July 1969 the ANC was given a fourteen days notice by 
the Tanzanian authorities to vacate its military camp at Kongwa on the grounds that the 
continued presence of MK cadres had become a security risk. As a result, the ANC had to 
evacuate most of its army to the USSR before it was able to obtain permission for returning 
MK fighters to Tanzania.126
122 The Lusaka Manifesto, reproduced in Pro Veritate, 13 (1975), 14-16.
123 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 35.
124 This is described in Chapter Five.
125 Shubin, ANC, 97.
126 Ibid., 99.
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The PAC/Poqo underground and moves to crush unity, c. 1960-1962
The imprisonment of Sobukwe alongside the bulk of the PAC’s leadership in March 1960 
had placed the Africanist movement “in a virtual state of suspense.”127 In December 1959, 
the national leaders of the PAC had largely underestimated the organisation’s strength 
when they decided to launch an ambitious anti-pass campaign the following year. This 
became evident once the PAC and the ANC were outlawed in April 1960. If the ANC had 
been caught unprepared for the government’s crackdown after Sharpeville, the PAC has 
been viewed as being even more ill-equipped for illegality.128 Firstly, it should be noted that 
the banning came after barely one year of existence, and the party lacked the experience 
and organisational skills that the ANC had been able to build during almost five decades of 
existence. The teaching background of many PAC leaders has also been invoked as a factor 
in trying to explain some of the PAC’s organisational shortcomings.129 Secondly, the 
slogan of “No bail, no defence, no fine!” adopted by the PAC during the March 1960 anti­
pass (or, as the PAC called it, Positive Action) campaign resulted in many of its leaders 
being served relatively long prison sentences. They included the PAC President Robert 
Mangaliso Sobukwe, sentenced to three years imprisonment on a charge of incitement, 
General Secretary Potlako Kitchener Leballo, sentenced to two years, most of the national 
executive committee members, as well as a large number of national, provincial and 
regional organisers. The slogan responded to the PAC’s belief that the leadership should 
lead the masses by heroic example and its criticism of the ANC leadership for having “too 
often been ready to choose safety over danger,” as when they prematurely called off the
127 Pogrund, Sobukwe, 183.
128 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 341.
129 As state employees, teachers were prohibited from taking part in organised politics. See Lodge, “The Pan- 
Africanist Congress,” 106.
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Defiance Campaign.130 The leaders of the PAC however had not only underestimated the 
severity of these prison sentences, and but also they had taken “only the most desultory
131precautions to install a chain of command which could function in their absence.” The 
unfolding of events in the days immediately after Sharpeville initially encouraged the PAC 
leaders in prison to think that they were “creating history.”132 But as the regime struck back 
with all its might, the leaders of the PAC came to a more sombre assessment of the 
situation and even began to question whether they had adopted the correct tactic.133 Thirdly, 
the PAC tended to rely on “inspirational leadership and appropriate slogans” rather than on 
political strategy.134 This had left an aura of uncertainty as to what the future of the positive 
action campaign would be.135 On 21 March 1960, PAC leaders were to show the way by 
turning themselves in for arrest at police stations throughout the country. Then the African 
masses, coiled like a spring and ready to unleash their revolutionary potential, would 
simply follow their example. By making the system unworkable, the campaign would lead 
to the abolition of the pass laws, and this would be a stepping stone on the way to 
independence. In his last instructions to PAC branches on the eve of the anti-pass 
demonstrations Sobukwe had spoken of the struggle ahead as being an “unfolding one, one 
campaign leading on to another in a NEVER-ENDING STREAM -  until independence is 
won.”136 However, other than this general notion that the campaign would trigger off a 
snowballing revolutionary process which would lead to freedom by 1963, the PAC had no
130 Gerhart, Black Power, 230.
131 Lodge, “The Pan-Africanist Congress,” 108.
132 Pogrund, Sobukwe, 154.
133 Ibid., 169.
134 Ibid., 106-7.
135 Gerhart, Black Power, 234.
136 R.M. Sobukwe, “To All Regions and Branches o f  PAC,” document 50 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge 
and Violence, 570. Original emphasis.
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clear political programme of how this would be achieved. When it was outlawed in April 
1960 the PAC was thus left without much direction or leadership for its reconstitution, both 
underground and in exile.
Despite this lack of preparation, the PAC was nevertheless able to inspire “the
1 ^7largest active clandestine organisation of the 1960s,” Poqo (meaning “pure” or “alone” in 
Xhosa). Poqo’s insurrectionism has been analysed in detail by Tom Lodge. A few general 
points about Poqo will be summarised here. Following Sharpeville, underground political 
mobilisation occurred especially in those regions where the PAC had enjoyed substantial 
support, i.e. the area known as the Vaal triangle, Pretoria, the Cape Peninsula and the 
Boland region. In particular, Langa (Cape Town) and Paarl emerged as the most dynamic 
centres o f activity, and it was here is that PAC supporters first identified themselves as 
Poqo.138 The impetus for the initiatives which took place in the western Cape in this period 
came from ‘below,’ was largely autonomous and localised in nature, and, at least in the 
beginning, had no connection with neither the remnants of the PAC leadership in South 
Africa or those who had started to regroup in exile.139 In the Transvaal, on the other hand, 
the movement “was motivated less by local causes and social tensions and more by the 
strategic conception of those members of the PAC’s national executive who remained at 
liberty or who had been released from prison.”140
In terms of political theory, Poqo had “no public statement of aims or ideology other 
than a reputation of a generalized support for Sobukwe and the PAC and an ‘all-out’
137 Lodge, Black Politics, 241.
138 For the usage o f  the word Poqo see Lodge, “The Poqo insurrection,” 179-180, and Plaatjie, “The PAC’s 
internal underground activities,” 678.
139 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 341.
140 Lodge, “The Poqo insurrection,” 183.
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determination to smash white rule.”141 Poqo’s message had millenarian undertones and its 
rhetoric was often crudely anti-white. As Lodge has argued, the PAC’s Africanist ideology 
as it had been articulated in the 1959 Manifesto (for example its Pan-African outlook, its 
views on communism, and its stance on racial minorities) did not feature in Poqo’s 
message. With most of the party’s intellectuals now locked up in jail, the original ideology 
of the PAC had become stripped of its theoretical refinements. Africanism was reduced “to 
a set of catchphrases, those which resonated most strongly with the experience and 
preoccupations of men who had been forced off the land, whose families were subjected to 
all sorts of official harassment, whose children lived on the margins of starvation, and who 
experienced every relationship with authority in terms of conflict, whether at the work 
place, in the compound, or in the reserve.”142 A one-man government-appointed 
commission of enquiry into Poqo, the Snyman Commission, argued in 1963 that the 
ideological tenets of the PAC were fully comprehended only by the upper echelons of the 
PAC/Poqo leadership.143 For the majority of Poqo militants, “a generation [...] to whom 
action proceeded political theory and operation superseded strategy,” the movement’s 
appeal laid in the immediacy of its aims and results, rather than in long-term planning based 
on a clearly understood political philosophy.144
In the period between 1961 and 1963, the resentment and grievances of Poqo 
militants found expression in a series of outbreaks of violence which included the murder 
of suspected informers, policemen, and of those individuals perceived to be state 
collaborators (for example, those headmen and chiefs who were assisting the state in the
141 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 669.
142 Lodge, “The Pan-Africanist Congress,” 112.
143 Muriel Horrell, Action, Reaction and Counter-Reaction: A B rief Review o f  Non-white Political Movements 
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implementation of Bantu Authorities). In late 1962, Kaiser Matanzima was the target of 
several (failed) assassination attempts because of his application to become Paramount 
Chief of Thembuland.145 Furthermore, from the beginning, Poqo was involved in the killing 
of whites and in its messages it often conveyed the idea that it was preparing for a war 
against whites. According to Mathabatha, talk that they were going to “kill the whites” was 
an important appealing factor in Poqo’s recruitment process.146 The type of violence 
practiced by Poqo responded to the principle that “the last shall be first and the first shall be 
last” and, as Gail Gerhart has argued, performed a “cathartic” function in a Fanonian 
sense.147 Fanon described the oppressed masses as having “an intuition that liberation can 
only be achieved by violence, for violence is the only thing capable of breaking the 
colonisers’ power. Moreover, the oppressed sense that their own emotional health can only 
be restored through violence.”148
The most widely publicised attacks on white civilians occurred in November 1962, 
when a crowd of Poqo men killed two and seriously injured three white residents in Paarl, 
and in February 1963, when five people were murdered near the Bashee River Bridge in the 
Transkei. These acts of violence against the white civilian population were carried out 
without the prior knowledge or sanction of the PAC national structures, and have been 
interpreted by historians as autonomous responses to local problems on the ground.149 
Although the drive for striking against whites initially came from ‘below,’ the PAC leaders 
went along with this practice once they claimed Poqo as their own. That they did so can
145 See Maaba, “The PAC’s war against the state,” 274-278.
146 Mathabatha, “The PAC and POQO in Pretoria,” 311.
147 Gerhart, Black Power, 14.
148 Franz Fanon, quoted in ibid.
149 See Lodge, Black Politics, 244-5, and Maaba, “The PAC’s war against the state,” 285.
177
perhaps find ideological explanation in that the PAC viewed the white group as non- 
indigenous to South Africa -  as opposed to the indigenous black majority.150
Poqo’s insurrectionist impulses from ‘below’ did however come to entwine with the 
PAC’s apocalyptic vision of a general uprising that would be set off by “a few exemplary 
acts of heroism.”151 By the end of 1962, PAC/Poqo cells in South Africa had become 
conscious of a plan of a country-wide uprising which would be directed from above by the 
exiled leadership now in Maseru.152
How did this coordination come about? Immediately after the PAC’s banning in 
April 1960 there followed a period of confusion among those leaders who had escaped 
arrest as to what the future role of the organisation would be. Prior to his release in 
September 1960, the PAC Secretary for Publicity and Information, Z.B. Molete, had been 
appointed Acting President by Sobukwe through the emergency powers accorded to him by 
the Presidential Decree adopted by the last PAC Conference in December 1959. The same 
decree authorised the appointment of Joe Molefi to act as National Treasurer.153 Molete, 
now in charge of leading the organisation, communicated reports to and received 
instructions from the leaders in jail through visits and the smuggling of messages. Despite 
these measures, a high degree of uncertainty still reigned -  not least, it would seem, 
because of Molete’s indecisive style of leadership.154 Both Molete and Molefi participated 
in the December 1960 Orlando Consultative Conference of African leaders and initially
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agreed with the idea of an All-In Conference to be organised by a Continuation Committee 
with representatives from all organisations.155
It was only after some PAC leaders were released on bail around the beginning of 
1961 that the situation started to change. The decision that some PAC leaders should now 
apply for bail -  which some members interpreted as a betrayal of the PAC’s “No bail, no 
defence, no fine!” slogan under which the Positive Action campaign had been launched156 -  
stemmed from the realisation that in prison they had become completely isolated from their 
following outside. Where bail was not allowed, appeals were lodged to the Supreme Court 
(including for Sobukwe, although apparently without his prior knowledge). In any event, 
most of these appeals were turned down.157 However, one member of the PAC executive, 
Matthew Nkoana, was released in early 1961 after paying his fine. Nkoana, who had served 
his sentence with Sobukwe, carried with him specific “instructions to crush moves to 
unity.”158 This was because Sobukwe and other PAC leaders in prison believed that the 
political thinking behind the All-In Conference was of one of “pre-1960 tactics of 
demonstrations,” which the PAC had already surpassed with the launch of its Positive 
Action campaign.159 Thus, it was the release of Nkoana that prompted the withdrawal of the 
PAC representatives from the All-In Conference. Moreover, Nkoana rejected an invitation 
by Mandela to join in the anti-republic protest and was responsible for orchestrating 
opposition to the May 1961 stay-at-home.160 The PAC’s turnabout on its participation in
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the All-In Conference had severe repercussions on endeavours to create a degree of African 
unity in South Africa and, correspondingly, on the union established abroad between the 
ANC and the PAC through the SAUF.
Meanwhile, Mahomo and Molotsi, who had slipped out of South Africa on the eve 
of the anti-pass demonstrations with the task of raising funds for the organisation and of 
mobilising the international community, had been able to set up some rudimentary contact 
points for the PAC in Accra, London and Cairo thanks to the relations they established 
through the SAUF. No coordination, however, was in place between these various centres, 
which operated discretely and not under the direction of a central authority. This lack of 
centralisation remained a chronic problem for the PAC in exile even after the creation of 
more stable external structures -  to the extent that there was sometimes a perception (even 
among its own members) that different PACs existed in different part of the world.161
The PAC in Basutoland
British intelligence reports from the first half of the 1960s provide a detailed account of the 
activities of the PAC in one of Britain’s Protectorates: Basutoland. These sources will be 
linked to the existing literature on the PAC/Poqo underground from 1960 to 1963. What 
emerges is a very clear picture of what the PAC was up to during this period -  something 
which cannot be established with the same accuracy for the ANC (or for that matter for the 
PAC in the second half of the decade). Before turning to the PAC’s activities in 
Basutoland, why and how the organisation arrived to stay in the Protectorate will be 
established.
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As the previous section has argued, Molete, Molefi, Nkoana and a few other leaders 
had provided some initial, limited guidance for the PAC’s reorganisation underground after 
March 1960. In April 1962, the General Secretary of the PAC, P.K. Leballo, emerged from 
prison with several others. A more serious effort to bring together the various parts of the 
organisation into a unitary structure and to link the underground movement with the leaders 
in exile was now initiated under Leballo’s leadership. After his release, Leballo had 
immediately been served with a banning order confining him to a remote area of Natal. 
Having been bom in Basutoland, he successfully appealed to the South African government 
and was granted permission to leave the country. He arrived in Maseru in August 1962, 
where he joined the growing number of PAC refugees who had been arriving in Basutoland 
since the time of the organisation’s banning. The PAC exile community in Basutoland had 
up until this point been loosely organised, little politically active, and their connections 
with the PAC/Poqo militants in South Africa limited.
That a substantial number of South Africa refugees had established themselves in 
Basutoland can be explained by virtue of the long-standing links between Africans in the 
two countries. Basutoland’s economy depended on the massive export of its labour force 
(Halpem provided a figure of some forty-three per cent in 1965) to South Africa, where up 
to six-hundred and fifty-thousand migrant Basotho workers lived at any one time. 
Moreover, it was quite common for the sons of chiefs and of middle-class Basotho to go to 
South Africa to continue their secondary studies, most notably at Fort Hare, the only 
African University College in the whole of southern Africa.164 Therefore, during the 1940s
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and 1950s, many Basotho had become involved in South African politics through the 
activities of the ANC and its Youth League either through their work or education. The 
President of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), Ntsu Mokhehle, had been educated at 
Fort Hare and it was here that he had first come into contact with formal politics. He 
became a member of the ANC Youth League and established personal friendships with 
ANC leaders, including Tambo and Mandela. After returning to Basutoland Mokhehle 
founded the BCP (formerly known as the Basutoland African Congress) in 1952 to rally the 
Basotho for Basutoland’s independence and against its incorporation by South Africa. It 
was with the help of the ANC, which provided initial political guidance as well as a model 
and source of inspiration, that the BCP gradually grew into being the strongest political 
Party in Basutoland.165
As ANC and PAC refugees flocked to Basutoland to escape political prosecution in 
South Africa during the 1960 State of Emergency, they were initially all welcomed by the 
BCP. However, by September 1961, the BCP’s attitude towards ANC refugees in 
Basutoland had changed into one of active hostility. Communism and Pan-Africanism were 
the two main issues of contention between the ANC and the BCP. After attending the 1958 
All African People’s Conference, Mokhehle had become a member of its Steering 
Committee and in the process had come under the powerful influence of Nkrumah’s Pan- 
Africanism. As evidence of the close relations between Ghana and the BCP, in 1960 the 
BCP was invited to set up an office in Accra by the Ghanaian government. The BCP was 
also given another office at Unity House in London.166 Just before the BCP Conference of 
December 1960, Mokhehle expelled fourteen delegates from the Transvaal claiming he had 
discovered a plot to murder him. According to Halpern, these were “mostly veteran BCP-
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ANC members.”167 Mokhehle now accused the ANC, which, like the PAC, he claimed was 
being controlled by the SACP, of trying to take over the B C P.168 He denounced the leaders 
of the ANC in exile as “cowards,” attacked Mandela for “causing a mess” in South Africa 
(referring to the police round up of up to ten thousand Africans in view of the May 1961 
stay-at-home),169 and declared “I hate these so-called freedom fighters who are mostly 
communist inspired and are interested in crippling the nationalist movements by their tricks 
and infiltration.”170 Having already gained a reputation for being anti-white, Mokhehle now 
became a fervent supporter of the PAC, whose leader Sobukwe he praised with 
admiration.171 The reason for the turnaround in BCP-ANC relations was, according to 
Mokhehle, a meeting between the BCP executive and four ANC leaders (Mandela, Sisulu, 
Kotane and Joe Matthews) in January 1961. Mokhehle claimed that the ANC leaders put 
forwards a number of requests at this meeting, including press support of the anti- 
Republican stay-away in May 1961, the setting up a printing press in Basutoland which 
would exclude PAC propaganda, the staging of parallel demonstrations in Basutoland, and 
the demand for immediate self-government. Mokhehle viewed these requests as an attempt 
to interfere in the affairs of the BCP and to undermine his authority within the
172organisation.
The PAC, on the other hand, enjoyed more than friendly relations with the BCP.
Leballo’s Basotho origins and his personal links with the BCP were significant in ensuring
this. Leballo was in fact a founding member and secretary of the Transvaal branch of the
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BCP.173 Until December 1960, when dual membership became forbidden by the BCP, 
many BCP members in South Africa had also been members of the ANC or the PAC. The 
Transvaal BCP membership, under Leballo’s influence, had taken an active part in the 
Africanists’ break from the ANC and the events of March 1960. At the same time, the 
Transvaal branch of the BCP had aided the BCP’s electoral victory in January 1960 through 
their postal votes as well as by making funds available to the BCP in Basutoland. The BCP 
thus found itself in a delicate position in its relations with the PAC. It felt obliged to assist 
the PAC in Basutoland because of the important support it had received from the Transvaal 
branch of the BCP. Moreover, it had to contend with the possibility that future elections in 
Basutoland would continue to include the expatriate Basotho (among them the pro-PAC 
Transvaal BCP members).174
Unlike the PAC, which shared office facilities with the BCP in Maseru, the ANC 
was unable to set up a formal presence in Basutoland. The downside of the help the PAC 
received from the BCP was that this turned out to be instrumental to the PAC’s survival in 
the country, and when the Basutoland National Party (BNP) won the next elections with the 
approval of the British colonial administration in 1965, the PAC was forced to abandon its 
Maseru headquarters. Moreover, as it will emerge, the PAC in Maseru got itself deeply 
involved in the local politics of Basutoland, largely to its own detriment.
The Presidential Council of the PAC and plans for a general uprising
After Leballo’s arrival in Maseru in August 1962 the first external headquarters of the PAC 
were set up in Basutoland, and an office was opened in Bonhomme House under his
173 Lodge, “The Pan-Africanist Congress,” 106.
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command. Leballo allegedly carried with him a letter dated 25 August 1962 which outlined 
new orders from the President (by the powers vested in him by the Presidential Decree) to 
form a Presidential Council from among the NEC members, Chairmen, and Vice Presidents 
who had survived arrest. Although Sobukwe’s letter is mentioned in a statement issued by 
Leballo in 1964, there is no other proof of the existence of such a letter. Leballo took over 
from Molete the post of Acting President, and the latter was now appointed Secretary for 
Publicity and Information. The other office holders of the Presidential Council were John 
Nyathi Pokela (Acting Secretary), Elliot A. Mfaxa (National Organiser), and Zephanaia 
Mothopeng (replacing Molefi as Acting National Treasurer). Other members included P.L. 
Gqobose and Templeton M. Ntantala. In accordance with the same Presidential Decree, the 
Presidential Council now assumed “absolute powers to rule, govern, direct and administer 
the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa during all the time the movement is banned 
and in revolution.”175 These powers in effect meant a suspension of the PAC constitution 
which removed democratic processes and from now on allowed Leballo to run the PAC “on 
a permanent state of emergency.”176
Leballo’s instatement as Acting President, his (mis)use of emergency powers, and 
the appointment of the Presidential Council, were regarded by some PAC members as 
unilateral actions taken by Leballo. On the other hand, Leballo would invoke the 
Presidential Decree mentioned above to defend himself from what he perceived as threats 
to his leadership. In 1966 Matthew Nkoana wrote a long letter to Leballo in which he 
argued, among other things, that the taking on of absolute powers by Leballo was 
unconstitutional because:
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The special absolute powers you [Leballo] refer to [...] were conferred on the 
President [Sobukwe] in anticipation of a particular campaign [i.e. the Positive 
Action campaign]. The [December 1959 PAC] Conference took this extraordinary 
step purely as an emergency measure to enable the President to prosecute that 
campaign. We who were responsible for its passage never intended it as a 
permanent measure [...]. We said in the resolution that the President’s invocation of 
these powers was subject to review at the next Annual National Conference.177
Leballo’s entrenchment at the top of the PAC had far reaching repercussions. From now on, 
it would be impossible to discuss the history of the PAC without making reference to 
Leballo, for Leballo came to symbolise the PAC and the PAC Leballo. As Nkoana put it, 
“you [Leballo] seem to think Leballo is the Party and the Party is Leballo.”178 The 
recognition accorded to Leballo and his faction by the Liberation Committee of the OAU, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, can be held partly responsible for this 
development.
By late 1962, the PAC Presidential Council had firmly established itself in Maseru, 
from where it set out on a vigorous publicity campaign to regroup and build up the PAC in 
South Africa. Around this time PAC/Poqo branches in South Africa began receiving 
written orders from Maseru. Communication with cells in South Africa was maintained 
through the use of secret couriers. Branch leaders were also summoned to Maseru in 
December 1962 and again in February and March 1963. They were told to step up 
recruitment, with each branch having to enlist a target number of 1,000 new members. 
Furthermore, instructions were given out to stockpile weapons, collect materials for the 
making of rudimentary bombs, and wait for further commands when the start date of a 
nation-wide uprising would be revealed.179 Finally, it was promised that military support
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from outside, especially from African states, would arrive on the day of the uprising. 
According to the plan, on the given day PAC cells and branches throughout the country 
would start their own revolt by simultaneously attacking strategic points such as police 
stations and power plants, thus making it impossible for the police and army to assert their 
control over a wide area. The insurgents were then to turn their attention to the white 
population and kill indiscriminately for the next four hours. Those whites who had survived 
would be allowed to stay if they were willing to pledge their loyalty to the new government 
that was going to be created. The date for the uprising was set for the weekend of 7-8 April 
1963, “thereby fulfilling the earlier PAC prophecy o f ‘independence’ by 1963.”180
None of this, however, was to happen, and by the time the insurrection was to take 
place the South African police had arrested over 3,000 PAC/Poqo suspects. Several factors 
are responsible for the mass arrests. The first was the Paarl uprising of 22 November 1962, 
which, as Lodge has argued, “represents the occasion which came closest to the apocalyptic 
ideal of Poqo and many other movements before them: a black insurrection in the heart of 
the white cities of South Africa.”181 The Paarl uprising prompted the government to set up a 
Commission of Inquiry under Judge Snyman, known as the Snyman Commission. The 
Commission’s interim findings, published on the third anniversary of Sharpeville on 21 
March 1963, concluded that the PAC and Poqo were one and the same, and urged the 
government to take severe measures against what was believed to be part of a Poqo’s 
country-wide conspiracy.182 The Paarl insurrection had not, however, been sanctioned by 
the PAC leadership in Maseru, and Leballo claimed afterwards that both the Paarl and
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Bashee River killings had been “premature actions” carried out by Poqo members who had 
“jumped the gun.”183
By March 1963 the South African police was closing down on the Poqo network,
many of whose branches and cells had been infiltrated. Several men travelling from Cape
Town to the Transkei on a mission to assassinate Matanzima had been arrested in the
previous months. Some of the branch leaders returning from the Maseru meeting were also
seized by the police in March. In late March, secret couriers had been sent out from Maseru
carrying letters to be taken across the border and then posted to PAC/Poqo branches from
Bloemfontein. The letters contained coded instructions announcing the start date of the
insurrection. Thanks to a tip off from the Basutoland police to the South African Security
police, two women messengers were arrested in South Africa on 29 March.184 They were
carrying about seventy letters which supllied the police with the addresses of many local
activists, who were subsequently arrested. Leballo delivered a further blow to the
organisation when at a press conference in Maseru on 24 March 1963 he claimed that the
PAC had over 150,000 active members in South Africa who were ready for action and
waiting for his signal to stage the final revolt. Leballo also confirmed that the PAC and
Poqo were the same organisation.
The Maseru press conference has been widely commented on. According to
Sobukwe’s biographer, Benjamin Pogrund, Leballo called the press conference “for no
apparent reason except conceit.”185 Poground’s view is supported by Lodge, who has
186written that “Leballo could not resist informing a startled press conference of his plans,” 
and by Karis and Gerhart, who have accounted for the event in terms of Leballo’s inability
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to “control an urge to boast about his grandiose plans.”187 These interpretations are also in 
line with Joel Bolnick’s characterisation of Leballo “as a mesmerising orator who lived to 
dramatise” and as “an intelligent fabricator of information.”188 In PAC circles (as well as 
outside), many saw Leballo’s erratic political conduct as an open provocation on the 
government so that it would take tough measures against Sobukwe and that Leballo could 
remain in charge of the organisation.189 In fact, Leballo’s Maseru claims came shortly 
before Sobukwe’s three-year-sentence was due to end, and they may well have influenced 
the government to rush through parliament the General Law Amendment Act (better known 
as the ‘Sabotage Act’) which included the ‘Sobukwe Clause.’ This clause provided for any 
person who had been convicted for political offences under the Suppression of Communism 
Act to be detained for a further twelve months if suspected that he/she would commit 
further offences under the same act. The procedure could be renewed each year for an 
indefinite number of times by a resolution of parliament. Sobukwe was the first and only 
person to be detained under this law. On 1 May 1963, just two days before his sentence 
should have expired, the new law came into effect, thus making it possible for then 
Minister of Justice Vorster to announce that Sobukwe would remain locked up in gaol 
“until this side of eternity.” This was not far from the reality. Sobukwe spent another six 
years on Robben Island, where he lived alone in a separate quarter in complete isolation 
from all other prisoners. When he was finally released in 1969 his political quarantine 
continued as he was restricted to the Kimberley magisterial district until his death in 1978. 
In May 1963, Vorster described Sobukwe in parliament as a man of “considerable
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organising ability, a magnetic personality and a divine sense of mission.”190 After his arrest 
on 21 March 1960, the South African government had effectively silenced forever the voice 
of one of South Africa’s most charismatic leaders.
According to journalist Jack Halpem, Leballo was responsible for causing a 
“furore” in South Africa and Britain. Although no official protests were made by the South 
African to the British government, the National Party Press “urged that South Africa should 
prevent such a situation on its borders ‘even at a very high price,’ and that South Africa 
could not be expected to tolerate the apparent impotence of the Basutoland authorities to 
‘obstruct Leballo in his devilish work’.”191 Bernard Leeman, on the other hand, has 
downplayed the importance of the Maseru press conference in spurring the South African 
government into action to crush the PAC and Poqo. In his account, Leeman reported that 
the event was in actual fact a meeting between Leballo, Molete and one single journalist at 
the PAC’s Maseru office.192 That Leeman would take a stand defensive of Leballo comes 
as no surprise, for he became one of his close aides after the latter was finally ousted by an 
internal coup in 1979 and the PAC split into two opposing factions.
Whatever Leballo’s motivations, it is undisputable that his statements had disastrous 
repercussions. First and foremost, they coincided with the police clamp down on the 
clandestine activities of the PAC/Poqo both in South Africa and in Basutoland. Secondly, 
they marked the beginning of a process of estrangement for many in the PAC, as well as 
generally damaging Leballo’s public reputation and, by association, the PAC’s standing 
too. The ANC made use of the Maseru press conference to discredit Leballo -  and the PAC 
-  on the international political scene (especially in front of the OAU) by linking the event
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to the police swoop that took place in South Africa shortly afterwards.193 Within the PAC 
itself, the conference was evoked by Leballo’s critics as evidence of his betrayal of the 
‘South African Revolution.’ To PAC dissidents such as J.D. Nyaose “Mr Leballo ceased in 
March 1963 to be an accredited Leader [...] of the PAC.”194 Nkoana also blamed Leballo 
for the police round up of thousands of PAC activists in the following months, which meant 
that “three years of preparatory work for a general uprising in South Africa were thus 
completely wrecked by Leballo’s indiscretions.”195
The most immediate consequence of Leballo’s hasty claims was a raid carried out 
by the Basutoland Mounted Police on the office of the PAC and two private houses in 
Maseru (of which one was Leballo’s) on 1 April 1963. A number of important documents 
were confiscated, which pointed to the existence of 119 branches or cells with 11,399 
members inside the Republic. Two PAC branches were also active in Basutoland, one in 
Maseru (with 20 members), and one at Roma University (with 40 members), where 
experiments and training in the use of explosives were being undertaken. The documents 
confirmed that the PAC had been directing activities from Maseru since late 1962, from 
where large scale operations were being planned to take place in the Republic in April. 
Reports of visits of PAC members from South Africa to Maseru to attend secret nocturnal 
meetings so that they would receive instructions in sabotage and other organisational 
matters were also confirmed. Although no arms or ammunitions or proof of their presence 
in Basutoland were found during the police search, sketch maps showing the location of
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arms caches in South Africa were captured.196 Finally, Molete, Elias Ntloedibe and Mfaxa 
were arrested.197
There were widespread suspicions that the information obtained from the 
documents seized by the British colonial police in Basutoland, among them the list of PAC 
members in South Africa, was passed onto the South African authorities. John Poleka, on 
behalf of the PAC Presidential Council, wrote to the Colonial Secretary in London to 
express concern over the issue.198 Proof of collaboration between the British and the South 
Africans can be found in intelligence reports of the time199 -  despite the official denial by 
both the British authorities in Basutoland and the British government in London at the 
time.200 Plain-clothes police from South Africa were also believed to have taken part in the 
raid. It was in fact common for South African police to ‘come and go’ from the 
Protectorates as they pleased -  the kidnappings of Anderson Ganyile from Basutoland in 
1961 and of Dr Kenneth Abrahams from Bechuanaland in 1964201 were clear evidence of 
this. Mass arrests followed in South Africa, with over 3,000 PAC/Poqo suspects held in 
detention by June. Despite claims by a group of unidentified PAC members in an interview 
with Die Burger in May that the movement was far from broken,202 the Basutoland 
Mounted Police raid on the PAC in Maseru delivered the organisation a serious blow from 
which it never recovered. The impact of the raid in Maseru on the PAC can be compared to 
that of the Rivonia raid on the ANC and MK a few months later, as both organisations’
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influence inside South Africa started to wane rapidly thereafter. In Kingwilliamstown and 
East London attempts were made to enact the uprising plan, but overall this had been 
averted by the arrests. Scattered Poqo groups continued to operate on a local initiative for 
the next few years, with the last instance of Poqo activity reported in Welkom in December 
1968.203 “But despite the activities of these residual clusters of PAC followers the back of 
the movement had been broken with the mass arrests of April-June 1963.”204
Directly linked to the raid on the PAC in Maseru in April 1963 was the 
promulgation of the Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation Act by the British High 
Commissioner Sir Hugh Stephenson “in order to give an anticipated measure of control 
over such activities in Basutoland” with immediate effect from 26 July 1963. The act 
made it illegal for a person or an organisation to plot or incite violence against South Africa 
from any of the High Commission Territories. In other words, it made it impossible -  or at 
least extremely difficult -  for the PAC to continue to coordinate underground operations in 
South Africa from Maseru.
At the time of the Maseru raid, a warrant for Leballo’s arrest had been issued by the 
Basutoland police on a charge of incitement to public violence. However, Leballo somehow 
managed to disappear and to go into hiding. Leballo’s escape may have not been known to 
his colleagues, as several sources indicate that he was believed to be in the hands of the 
police.206 According to British intelligence sources, a second police search at the PAC 
Maseru office in May the following year led to the discovery of Leballo’s diary. It revealed
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that Leballo had spent “a great deal of his time in hiding in various places in the Republic,
including the PAC regional headquarters in the Orange Free State, Johannesburg and Cape
Town.”207 Leballo’s disappearance in April 1963 was later attributed to a warning he
allegedly received about the impending raid from Hans Lombard, a South African spy
claiming to be a journalist who had arrived in Maseru in 1962.208 “Within weeks,” Leballo
had let Lombard -  “a total stranger” -  into the party’s “innermost secrets.”209 Many years
later, Gordon Winter, another South African spy, claimed that through Leballo, Lombard
was able to obtain a list of about 4,000 PAC underground activists who were then arrested
in South Africa.210 Although it is not possible to verify the extent to which Lombard was
able to penetrate the PAC, Leballo’s dubious friendship with him further tarnished his name
in the eyes of many PAC members. After the Maseru raid, for which Leballo was widely
blamed, his legitimacy as the leader of the PAC was never properly restored.
On 12 September 1963, Leballo “made a dramatic appearance” in the spectators’
gallery of the Basutoland National Assembly in Maseru. Although not generally known at
the time, the warrant for his arrest had been withdrawn the previous month.211 The
withdrawal may have been prompted by a “stinging motion of no confidence in the
Basutoland Government which had been moved a little earlier” by Mokhehle’s BCP -
which had alerted the British government to the BCP’s dissatisfaction with the way the
British authorities had handled relations with South Africa to curtail the activities of the 
010PAC in Basutoland. On his return, Leballo ignored the threat of the Prevention of
207 PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, 11 May 1964.
208 See Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 9-10.
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Violence Abroad Proclamation Act and began reviving the activities of the PAC in 
Basutoland. He addressed a series of BCP meetings, where he made “virulent anti-white” 
speeches. Despite severe financial difficulties, the PAC was able to reoccupy its Maseru 
offices in Bonhomme House on 1 October 1963. This was made possible by limited 
funding received through Anthony Steel, a British solicitor based in London who acted on 
behalf of the PAC, and former Liberal Party spokesman-tumed-PAC-supporter Patrick 
Duncan.213 Financial aid was also received from the American Federation of Labor -  
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), which donated 5,000 U.S. dollars after 
receiving a memorandum from Nana Mahomo, who had begun a two months tour of the 
United States with Patrick Duncan in June 1963. The PAC used its anti-communism to 
encourage the AFL-CIO to give money and thus help “make the PAC in Basutoland a 
bastion of democracy against Communism and apartheid.”214
Since Patrick Duncan was the first and only white person to acquire PAC 
membership in the 1960s, a brief digression on how he came to join the PAC seems 
appropriate. Moreover, since the involvement of white radicals (communists in particular) 
in African politics had been one of the reasons for the Africanists’ secession from the ANC, 
Duncan’s membership raises the question of whether this indicated a degree of 
transformation or change in the PAC’s ideology.
Patrick Duncan had been a white member of the Liberal Party of South Africa and 
editor of Contact (the Liberal Party’s mouthpiece) who had become close to the PAC
213 PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, October-November 1963.
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during the time of Sharpeville.215 After Sharpeville, some individual radical Liberals,
• 91 f tamong them Duncan, became disillusioned with non-violent methods of resistance. 
Duncan escaped to Basutoland in May 1962 after being served with his second banning 
order. Like Leballo (whom Duncan helped out of South Africa and into Basutoland after 
his release) and the PAC, he was close to the BCP and was a friend of Mokhehle -  but also 
of Leabua Jonathan of the BNP, both of whom he had known since the early 1950s when he 
had worked as Registrar of the Diocese of Basutoland for the Anglican Church. In mid- 
1962 Duncan opened two trading stores in Quthing (Basutoland) which he ran with the help 
of PAC men Joe Nkatlo and Ebrahim Abrahams (who had been one of Duncan’s Contact 
assistants in Cape Town), to accommodate South African refugees and later to serve as 
military training grounds for PAC recruits.217
In March 1963 Duncan resigned from the Liberal Party as he was no longer able to 
reconcile himself with the Party’s policy of non-violence. A month later he signed a 
“Declaration of membership of the PAC.” The declaration stated that he had been accepted 
into the PAC as an African, “one who owes his only allegiance to Africa and is prepared to 
accept the democratic rule of the African majority.”218 That Duncan was allowed to join the 
PAC, however, appears to have been another one of Leballo’s personal rulings, and not 
something reached in consultation with fellow PAC leaders, who felt the matter was “too
215 For an account o f  the relations between the PAC and Liberal Party see Randolph Vigne, Liberals Against 
Apartheid: A History o f  the Liberal Party o f  South Africa, 1953-68 (Basingstoke, 1997), Ngubane, An African 
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serious [for such a decision] to be made simply at the top.”219 Duncan’s membership may 
not have contradicted in theory the PAC’s vision of a future non-racial society in which 
non-Africans would be absorbed in a new African government and society. But it did seem
to run contrary to the principle that it was for the African people themselves -  in fact, it was
000their “inalienable right” -  “to determine and shape their own destiny.” Or, in Sobukwe’s 
words, “[t]he future of Africa will be what Africans make it.”221 Moreover, although the 
Africanists were non-racialists in the sense that they refused to acknowledge the existence 
of racial or ethnic groups, they did make a distinction between indigenous and non- 
indigenous people in South Africa. In the end, Leballo’s decision to bestow PAC 
membership on Duncan appears to have been essentially opportunistic in nature, and not 
the outcome of a collective ideological effort. Because of this, it can be viewed as evidence 
of ideological dwindling and more generally of a deterioration of the PAC’s theoretical 
strength after 1960.
Thanks to his “unrivalled range of friendships and connections within the British 
and American political establishments,”222 as well as African statesmen and nationalist 
politicians, Duncan was uniquely positioned to act as one of the PAC’s international 
ambassadors. Moreover, he was fluent in both Sesotho and French. In June 1963 Duncan 
was declared a prohibited immigrant in the High Commission Territories and left to tour the 
United States with Mahomo, after which he was in Europe, primarily in London, for some 
months. Being the PAC’s only French speaker, Duncan was appointed by Leballo as PAC
219 Ibid., 224.
220 Manifesto o f  the Africanist Movement, Inaugural Convention o f  the PAC, 4-6 April 1959, document 39b 
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representative in Algeria in March 1964, where he was able to secure military training for 
PAC members. In July 1965, however, he was dismissed from his post and succeeded by 
Elias Ntloedibe. The reason given for Duncan’s dismissal by Leballo was that he had
O O ' X“engaged in a one-man crusade against the People’s Republic of China.” By this time, 
the PAC had established close relations with China, which will be analysed in greater detail 
in the next chapter. According to Driver, Duncan’s biographer, the true reason for his 
dismissal was actually a letter of congratulations Duncan wrote to Leabua on occasion of 
his electoral victory in Basutoland.224 In ANC circles, on the other hand, rumour had it that 
“the baas [Duncan] has been expelled because he treats Africans on the basis of master and 
servant.”225
Final curtailment of PAC activities in Basutoland
The Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation Act of 1963 did not immediately deter 
the PAC from its resolve to maintain headquarters in Basutoland. Given the country’s 
“unique strategic position” and its essential role as a “forward position” the PAC felt that it 
was from this base that “real and effective opposition to apartheid” could be waged.226 The 
Presidential Council of the PAC in Maseru now concentrated its efforts on organising a 
second uprising in the Transkei, which would begin with the assassination of Chief 
Matanzima at the opening of the Transkeian Parliament on 4 May 1964. The blueprint 
operation was moulded on previous insurrectionist plans. Elias Ntloedibe, the PAC
223 Quoted in Driver, Patrick Duncan, 250.
224 Ibid. 251.
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representative in Ghana, described the new plot in a letter to headquarters dated 10 April 
1964:
When you launch and attack Matanzima and Parliament, our forces must do it. 
Thereafter we must carefully plan mass slaughter of whites all over the country and 
whites in factories and mines must be mercilessly killed. After the attack [...] our 
forces must distribute leaflets to say POQO heats [s/c] out again. [...] Forces must 
also purchase Police Uniforms so that when they attack certain areas like jails, they 
must be dressed as Police. Stations are armed and they should be the last to 
attack.227
On 5 April and the weekend of the 25-26 April 1964 two meetings of the Presidential 
Council took place in Maseru. The first meeting discussed the organisation’s finances, 
whereas the focus of the second one, which was attended by ten PAC representatives from 
the Republic, was the planned uprising in the Transkei. The PAC’s violent infighting, 
and its active participation in local politics through its affiliation to the BCP, however, were 
responsible for drawing much unwanted police attention to these events.
In November 1963 Joe Molefi had been expelled from the PAC by Leballo,229 
probably as a result of Molefi’s criticism of the latter. The dispute culminated with Molete 
being attacked at his home in Maseru by three other PAC men with a home-made panga 
and nearly losing his hand in April 1964. Molefi was found guilty of causing Molete 
Grievous Bodily Harm and was sentenced to six months in prison. In an attempt to re-assert 
his control over the organisation, Leballo also expelled Ellen Molapo and issued “by 
telegram a continuous stream of orders and directives” to PAC representatives abroad 
“couched in peremptory terms.” He warned against the “communistic tendencies” of some 
PAC representatives, including Mahomo, Molotsi, Ntoledibe, Tsohlana, Nkoana, Leabile,
227 CULLEN HSTPAP, A2675, III, 594, Elias Ntloedibe, Accra, letter to Maseru, 10 April 1964.
228 PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, April 1964.
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Ngcobo and Ndziba. Moreover, fearing possible attacks on his person, Leballo employed
two men, Kwenzile Hlabisa and Zibho Tshabalala, as his bodyguards.
The bickering did not confine itself to the PAC in Maseru but spread out to other
countries where PAC members were based. Until 1962, Mahomo and Molotsi had been the
only PAC leading representatives abroad. Given the lack of contact with the rest of the
PAC leadership (the majority of whom were in prison), the two men had been free to
conduct the external affairs of the PAC virtually unchecked. The establishment of formal
headquarters under Leballo in Maseru in 1962 soon led to the development of frictions with
Mahomo and Molotsi over the handling of funds. In 1964 Mahomo and Molotsi, who had
proved unwilling to relinquish their freedom of action, were both suspended on allegations
1
of misappropriating PAC funds.
Meanwhile, both the South African and Basutoland police were keeping a close 
watch on the PAC in Maseru, as they expected further violence to erupt between warring 
PAC factions. They also had become aware of the plot to kill Matanzima. The South 
African government now asked Britain to take action against the PAC in Basutoland and
9^ 9threatened to close the border between Basutoland and the Republic to all African traffic. 
Moreover, the British embassy in Pretoria had learned from their American colleagues of 
preparations for a South African joint police-army operation which would be put into effect
9 ^
if Britain failed to act against the PAC in Maseru. South Africa’s blackmailing strategy 
succeeded in pushing the British colonial administration into action. On 4 May 1964 the
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Basutoland police enforced a forty-eight hours roadblock on strategic roads to the north and
9T 4to the south “with instructions to search for arms and hold anyone on slightest pretext.”
A Bloemfontein-plated car was stopped by the Basutoland police cordon near the Tsupane 
border. The car had four whites in it believed to have been waiting for Leballo. Whatever 
the case, the Basutoland police action succeeded in forestalling any sort of movement by 
PAC.
At 2.20 on the morning of 6 May 1963 Leballo’s Land Rover blew up outside his 
Maseru home. Although Leballo himself escaped uninjured, his two bodyguards were 
wounded. Despite police investigations, the exact cause of the explosion remained 
unknown. The general opinion at the time was that the car was blown up by a PAC faction 
opposed to Leballo.236 Several houses as well as the PAC office were searched by the 
police two days later. Two men were arrested, including Hlabisa, Leballo’s bodyguard, on 
charges of unlawful possession of firearms, threatening language and obstruction of the 
police. No evidence however was discovered of the alleged plan in the Transkei, suggesting 
that the mainspring of the action forecast by the South African police perhaps was not the 
PAC in Maseru but PAC/Poqo cells still active inside the Republic. No registers, account 
books or other documents which the police expected to come across in the office of a 
politically active organisation were found either, and nor was any evidence of caches of 
arms uncovered.237 The car explosion incident prompted Sir A.F. Giles, the resident High 
Commissioner, to send a telegram to the Colonial Office in London requesting that a Public
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Order Proclamation Act be promulgated by the Secretary of State to the Colonies “as a 
matter of urgency.”238 The Act would allow the Resident Commissioner to proscribe the 
PAC in the country. Although no action was ultimately taken to ban the PAC in 
Basutoland, that such request was made request suggests that the organisation’s presence in 
the country was perceived as a security threat both by the British in Basutoland and by the 
South Africans.
On 11 May 1964 a cyclostyled pamphlet entitled “Special release by the 
Presidential Council of the PAC” was distributed in Maseru. It blamed the events of the 
preceding days on the British and South African governments. Fingers were also pointed at 
“the Communists.”239 Relations between the PAC and the ANC/communist elements in 
Basutoland, which had been tense already, now deteriorated rapidly. The Communist Party 
of Lesotho (CPL) had been founded in October 1961. Although the membership of the CPL 
was secret, Joe Matthews, an ANC/SACP member who had escaped to Basutoland after 
being detained during the Sharpeville Emergency, had become closely associated with it. 
Mokhehle and the BCP were deeply wary of both the CPL and Matthews by way of their 
association with the SACP and the ANC. Moreover, Matthews’s involvement in the local 
politics of Basutoland did not go down well with Mokhehle, who had become convinced 
that Matthews wanted to undermine his leadership.240 Matthews was also believed to have 
been involved in the formation of the Marematlou Freedom Party. This was created in 
January 1963 in opposition of the BCP in view of the 1965 electoral contest.241 In February
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1963, a bomb was found underneath Matthews’s car in Maseru, but police investigations 
were unable to shed any light on the matter.242 Leballo’s bodyguard, Hlabisa, was charged 
with the attempted murder of Joe Matthews later that year, although it is unclear from the 
records whether this was in relation to the bomb found under Matthews’s car or to a 
separate incident. The charge was withdrawn in April 1964 as Matthews failed to attend the 
court hearing after being subpoenaed.243 The CPL retaliated to the PAC’s pamphlet which 
blamed them for the explosion of Leballo’s car by issuing a pamphlet attacking the PAC in 
return.244 PAC/BCP-ANC/CPL relations reached open conflict in June 1964, with the 
PAC/BCP engaging in a sort of political gangsterism to push the ANC/CPL out of the 
political scene in Basutoland. The General Secretary of the CPL, John Motloheloa, was the 
victim of an attempted murder on 2 June, which was followed by the stabbing of another 
leading CPL member, Nako Mefane. Physical assaults were carried out against several 
other communist and trade union leaders. Other violent methods used by the PAC/BCP 
included forced evictions by landlords, and discrimination from BCP-sympathising shop
245assistants.
In June 1964 an attempt was made at restoring unity within the ranks of the PAC in 
exile, which had been suffering from fragmentation and leadership conflicts since 
Sharpeville, through the issuing of a statement on the background to official appointments
242 Ibid., 164.
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and policy.246 This aimed at clarifying how present official positions had come to be 
constituted within the organisation after its banning. The document also represents the 
earliest articulation of the tasks and goals of the PAC in exile to have survived on paper. By 
authority of the Presidential Decree, the Presidential Council was proclaimed the supreme 
organ of the party, responsible for “directing the struggle and administering the PAC.” 
Thus, “ORDERS and COMMANDS should emanate ONLY” from this body from its 
Maseru headquarters. All PAC representatives abroad were subordinate to the Presidential 
Council, to whom they owed absolute loyalty and should report on a regular basis, although 
they enjoyed equal status between themselves. Their duties were “to build the true image of 
our Party to the world, fearlessly putting across our message and justifying our cause; to 
procure money and any other help and assistance required [...]; to arrange scholarships for 
our party members, training for our technicians and revolutionaries or to execute any other 
matter in the interest of the Party or when delegated to do so by the P.C. [Presidential 
Council].”247 Members of the Presidential Council lost their executive powers when away 
from the Maseru headquarters. This was to avoid the creation of multiple bureaucracies “as 
it was in the days of Molotsi and Mahomo.”248 Since Basutoland had no direct air links 
anywhere but South Africa, this meant that PAC representatives were effectively denied 
their executive rights once they left Maseru.
Gn 21 August 1964 Leballo left Basutoland by chartered aircraft for Salisbury, 
where he boarded a second plane to Accra. Leballo travelled through South Africa on a
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single-journey transit permit issued by the South African government.249 Gasson Ndlovu 
(head of the section dealing with military training) and Poleka were left in charge of the 
PAC in Basutoland in Leballo’s absence. Leballo was never to return to Basutoland, where 
the position of the PAC became even more untenable after his departure.
The British colonial authorities in Basutoland were becoming quite alarmed about 
the number of PAC refugees arriving into the territory, who they continued to suspect of 
plotting acts of violence against South Africa. Moreover, the Basutoland police was aware 
that PAC supporters were being channelled into Basutoland where they registered as 
political refugees so that they could be educated in the manufacture and use of explosives, 
arms and ammunition, and then return secretly to South Africa. Between July and 
September 1964 alone a total o f 136 refugees from South Africa (of whom 109 were 
though to be PAC supporters) applied for residence permits to remain in Basutoland.251 In 
October 1964 approximately twenty South African refugees were rounded up by the 
Basutoland police under the pretext that they had not complied with entry and residence 
regulations. Their arrest was followed by a police search of three boarding houses which 
“provided evidence of build up of local PAC strength under a form of discipline and 
indications that military training may be contemplated or taking place in the mountains.” 
As no arms or explosives were discovered, the group of refugees was subsequently 
released.252 One night in November 1964 a PAC official was stopped and searched by the 
police. The man carried a suitcase containing PAC documents which implicated leading 
members of the organisations into conspiracies to commit acts of violence in South Africa
249 See PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, October 1963 and July 1964.
250 PRO: CO 1048/521, Pan-Africanist Congress -  brief early history [marked ‘secret’].
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and the High Commission Territories. The PAC premises in Maseru were searched again, 
and so were the two trading stores which had been purchased by Patrick Duncan in the 
Quthing district. The Basutoland police came into possession of a shotgun, a loaded pistol 
and a number of home-made pangas which had been hidden at a boarding house in Maseru 
where PAC refugees lived. In the Quthing area ingredients for the manufacture of 
explosives and some metal containers were uncovered.253 This latest strike on the PAC in 
Basutoland took place roughly at the same time as an operation carried out by the South 
African security police in the township of Mbekweni, outside Paarl, in November 1964. 
The latter led to the arrest of twenty or more Africans belonging to a resurrected 
PAC/Poqo cell in the Paarl area, and to the discovery of documents linking this group with 
the PAC group operating from Basutoland. Chief of security police Van den Bergh 
remarked to the press that the men arrested were PAC and not Poqo. That such a distinction 
was made is interesting, since both the press and the authorities in South Africa had thus far 
tended to conflate the two. This suggests that some form of contact between the PAC in 
Basutoland and its supporters in South Africa had continued to take place despite the 
endless sequence of knock-backs the organisation had received since March 1963 as a 
result of police action in both countries.254
Following the capture of the suitcase filled with incriminating evidence in 
November 1964, Letlaka and Mfaxa of the Presidential Council and six other PAC 
members (Hlabisa, Rufus Fumanekile, Sipo Sobuza, Nikelo Faku, John Tway Ingana and 
M. Kambula) were arrested and put on trial for conspiracy to commit violence in 
contravention of the Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation Act. A second warrant 
for Leballo’s arrest was issued under the same act. Leballo, who was at this time in Britain,
253 PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, November 1964.
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had in the meantime made another application for a transit permit to the South African 
authorities as he planned to return to Basutoland in January 1965. It was also reported that 
the PAC was now looking for an alternative base outside Basutoland.255 The trial of the 
eight PAC men, which started in December 1964, was a lengthy one. Two of the men were 
discharged and the remaining six convicted on 12 July 1965 with sentences ranging from 
one to three years. They appealed against their conviction and succeeded, the appeal being 
upheld by the Chief Justice on 2 September 1965.256 Meanwhile, a separate trial against 
Poleka and Qhobose was also initiated on similar charges.257
The PAC was now struggling to retain its Bonhomme House operational 
headquarters. The organisation was desperately short of funds, and depended entirely on the 
remittances it received from the BCP.258 Reuben Rigala, F. Ntozini and R. Xokolelo were 
put in charge of the day-to-day running of PAC affairs locally. Despite the enormous 
difficulties that the PAC faced as a result of the arrest and trial of many of its leaders, the 
Basutoland police suspected that the organisation was still involved in clandestine activity 
in the Protectorate. These suspicions were confirmed when another group of ten PAC 
members was detained in January 1965. When the police stopped them in the Mapoteng 
area -  dressed in blue boiler suits, velskoens, matching greatcoats and blankets -  they had 
been undergoing some sort of physical training under the leadership of Gasson Ndlovu. The 
latter was remanded in custody to join the other eight PAC men (Letlaka et al.) already on 
trial and was later released on appeal.259
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In February 1965, the Basutoland police uncovered yet more incriminating 
evidence. Seventy pounds of dynamite, forty pounds of gelignite and a quantity of 
detonators were recovered in the Quthing area. Moreover, PAC military training activities 
appeared to have now extended to the Youth League of the BCP, with a view of combining 
forces to intimidate non-BCP voters on election day in April or to take unconstitutional 
action after the election should they not agree with the electoral results. Relations 
between the PAC and the BCP however were beginning to show signs of strain. There had 
been allegations by Mfaxa of the Presidential Council that the BCP had been 
misappropriating OAU funds destined to the PAC, which was now anxious to leave 
Basutoland. Moreover, the split in the PAC in pro and anti-Leballo factions was reported to 
continue.261
Several letters of appeal were sent to the British Colonial Office by the PAC, 
African governments and the British AAM regarding the treatment of PAC refugees in 
Basutoland by the British colonial authorities. In November 1964 the PAC in Maseru 
complained of the constant victimisation of its members in Basutoland. A letter was sent to 
the Colonial Office to appeal against the arrest of a group of PAC men who had been 
released from Robben Island on 1 August 1964 and entered Basutoland seeking asylum. 
The men had been arrested and charged with three months imprisonment. Their appeal to 
the High Court had been dismissed on the grounds that they had entered the country 
unlawfully.262 In February 1965, Matthew Nkoana in London wrote to the Colonial Office 
asking for a meeting with Mrs Eirene White in view of her visit to the High Commission 
Territories to discuss the status and treatment of South African refugees, but his request
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was turned down.263 In July 1965, James Ndawo, another PAC representative in Maseru, 
again appealed to the Colonial Office that the British government define the status of 
refugees in the High Commission Territories, with specific reference to the practice by the 
Basutoland Mounted Police of arresting political refugees without travelling documents 
under the Entry and Residence Proclamation Act.264 Representations and appeals were also 
lodged by the governments of Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania for the release of 
Letlaka and the other PAC men at the start of their trial under the Prevention of Violence 
Abroad Proclamation Act in December 1965.265 After the conviction of six of the PAC men 
in July 1965 the AAM warned the Secretary of State to the Colonies, Anthony Greenwood, 
that the conviction of the PAC men under such an act “seriously undermines the whole 
principle of political asylum and renders the future of South African political refugees in 
the British High Commission Territories uncertain.”266 Although an AAM delegation 
(consisting of David Ennals, Vella Pillay, Joe Matthews and Abdul Minty) was granted a 
meeting to discuss the matter of South African refugees with the Colonial Office on 18 
October, this did not seem to have had any impact on British policy towards the issue.
Far from it, the resident High Commissioner, Sir A. F. Giles, speaking on behalf of 
the Basutoland Commissioner of Police and Head of Special Branch, advised the Colonial 
Office that Britain “must continue by one means or another my earlier policy of leaning 
heavily on these gentlemen and making them feel that they cannot operate safely in
263 PRO: CO 1048/521, Matthew Nkoana, 73 Roseberry Gardens, London N4, to Mrs Eirene White, Colonial 
Office, 21 February 1965, and reply from the Colonial Office to Nkoana, 24 February 1965.
264 PRO: CO 1048/521, Letter from James Ndawo, PAC Maseru Office to the Colonial Office, 9 July 1965.
265 See PRO: CO 1048/552.
266 PRO: CO 1048/521, Letter from the Anti-Apartheid Movement (signed by S. Abdul [Abdul Minty]) to 
Anthony Greenwood, Secretary o f  State to the Colonies, 22 July 1965.
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Basutoland.”267 In September 1965, the Basutoland Mounted Police again suggested to the 
Colonial Office that the PAC in Basutoland should be banned while more permanent legal 
measures against the threat posed by the subversive activities of the PAC could be laid 
down 268 The Colonial Office however decided not to ban the PAC “for the time being,” as 
not a strong enough case could be made for the identification between the PAC and a threat 
to law and order in Basutoland. Moreover, the Colonial Office was aware that the banning 
of the PAC would be viewed in the UK as evidence of the collusion between the British 
authorities, the BNP (which had won a majority of seats in the April 1965 elections) and 
South Africa. Moreover, it was thought that the banning was likely to be ineffective 
because of the wide distribution of PAC members throughout the country and because the
' J f . Q
PAC was likely to continue to operate underground.
That the British authorities should think that the PAC no longer represented too big
a security threat to Basutoland was largely due to the continuous harassment by the police
of PAC refugees as well as to the April 1965 electoral results, which saw the BCP lose to
the conservative BNP. The failure of the BCP at the elections came as a shock to the BCP
and the PAC, who had both been confident the BCP would achieve an overwhelming
victory. The PAC did not hesitate to show its opposition to the newly elected BNP
government. A statement was issued by the PAC from Dar es Salaam which denounced the
recent elections in all three Protectorates as being:
[Fjraught with fraud and manoeuvres cooked up to prop puppet regimes of 
reactionary chieftainships to support Verwoerd apartheid regime against the African 
liberatory movements, thus turning the protectorates into allies against the liberation 
of Southern Africa and a realisation of a Union Government of all Africa.270
267 PRO: CO 1048/521, Extract o f  a Letter from Sir A. F. Giles to the Colonial Office, 23 September 1965.
268 PRO: CO 1048/521, Basutoland Intelligence Report, 17 September 1965.
269 PRO: CO 1048/521, Letter from A. Campbell to Mr Mamham, 25 October 1965.
270 PRO: CO 1048/521, PAC Statement, quoted in Basutoland Intelligence Report, July 1965.
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On the other hand, the new BNP Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan made clear that he 
would not allow Basutoland to be used as a base for subversive actions against South 
Africa by PAC refugees who had been given asylum. With the BNP, which “had made no 
secret of its hostility to the aspirations of the PAC in Basutoland,”271 now in power, a 
chapter was closed in the history of the PAC in exile.
As the activities of the PAC in Basutoland were finally being constrained, its 
leadership had started to disperse to other countries. By late 1965, PAC offices, 
representatives abroad, or small clusters of PAC exiles were present in the following 
places: Dar es Salaam (where Leballo, Molete, Nyaose, and Ngcobo established new 
headquarters), Cairo, Accra, Addis Ababa, Lusaka, Algiers, Khartoum, Manzini, 
Francistown, London, and West Germany.272
Conclusion
When the ANC set up its external mission in 1962, the decision was taken that it should 
represent an “African image” and this was endorsed by other member organisations of the 
Congress Alliance as well as the SACP. Such decision was in tune with the strong Pan- 
African sentiments sweeping over the African continent, where Nkrumah’s Ghana had 
emerged as the champion of African independence and unity and where the PAC’s Pan- 
Africanism found more resonance than the Congress Alliance’s multi-racialism. The ANC 
was in desperate need of support from independent African states, and the “African image” 
was a tactical response meant to establish the ANC’s African nationalist character and to
271 Ibid.
272 PRO: CO 1048/521, Pan-Africanist Congress -  brief early history [marked ‘secret’].
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clear the widespread idea that the ANC was controlled by the Communist Party and the 
Indian Congress.
The imprisonment of the PAC leadership in March 1960 had led to a period of 
confusion in the PAC. From 1962, however, PAC leaders regrouped in Basutoland. From 
here, they succeeded in establishing a good degree of co-ordination with the clandestine 
Poqo movement that had developed after Sharpeville somewhat independently of the 
leadership. Basutoland offered a unique base from which the PAC could carry out its 
insurrectionist plan, which it came very close to enacting. However, the Poqo movement in 
South Africa was by and large broken by the police between April and June 1963. From 
April 1963, the activities of the PAC in Basutoland were gradually brought into check too 
through close police surveillance and legislative measures aimed at curtailing the PAC’s 
freedom of action in the Protectorate. Despite the great tenacity with which the PAC tried 
to hold on to its Maseru base, in 1965, the PAC was in the end uprooted from Basutoland 
for good. By this time, a series of internal problems had emerged, most notably endemic 
conflict amongst its leaders, which persisted after the PAC moved out of Basutoland and 
established new headquarters in Tanzania, as the next chapter will show.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Internal debates, c. 1965-1967
In the first half of the 1960s the ANC set up its first external structures according to the 
guiding principle of the “African image.” Although this principle seemed to serve the 
purpose of presenting an image that was both acceptable and appealing to the ANC’s 
potential supporters on the continent, by the mid-1960s this policy started to come under 
criticism, as the various parts of the former Congress Alliance in exile found themselves 
isolated from each other -  and at times in conflict. This change was the result o f several 
interlinked factors. Firstly, there were events in South Africa and the implications of 
Rivonia for the movement underground and abroad. Secondly, there were developments on 
the rest of the African continent and at the international level. And, finally, this chapter will 
argue that it was the conditions of exile in London which made the upholding of the policy 
of the “African image” increasingly problematic.
This chapter will analyse the case of Barney Desai’s dispute with the ANC external 
mission and his ultimate defection to the PAC. The controversy once again brings to the 
fore the question of the liberation movements’ multi/non-racialism. The PAC’s attempt at 
internal reconstruction in the period following the CPC merger will also be documented. In 
particular, the Moshi executive meeting of 1967 will be analysed to provide a comparison 
with the ANC’s first Consultative Conference held in Morogoro in 1969, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. Although Desai’s break with the ANC did not represent a 
significant threat to the ANC, the problems of representation that he raised were 
fundamental in the sense that they continued to be the subject of debate within the
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movement in exile. In the second half of the decade, London emerged as the key centre in a 
process of discussions, which have also been referred to as the ‘London Debates.’1
Criticism of the “African image”
By 1965 the ANC felt it was finally on the ascendancy in the battle for legitimacy against 
the PAC as the vanguard party in the struggle for national liberation in South Africa. This 
achievement may have had more to do with the PAC’s self-disintegration described in the 
previous chapter than with the successful projection of the “African image” by the ANC. 
Nevertheless, some of the ANC’s supporters in exile now felt that the “African image” had 
been too effective. According to this group, the external mission only reflected “the 
majority, and not the minorities who are subject to oppression in South Africa.” Secondly, 
the notion of the “African image” entailed, according to its critics, an implicit “danger that 
in deference of the views of certain reactionary states in Africa [...] the present machinery 
might make concessions on matters of principle on the question of non-racial democracy.” 
Thirdly, they complained that the current external setting did not accord room at the policy­
making and decision-making levels to “certain persons who are very important in their 
political organisations at home,” as well as inhibiting full use of all available manpower 
resources outside the country. This was particularly true of London, where the bulk of 
South African exiles worked on the fringes of the ANC office, mainly through British 
solidarity organisations such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement or the World Campaign for 
the Release of South African Political Prisoners (started in November 1963) as seen in
1 See Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread, 99.
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Chapter One. Finally, the funds collected were exclusively for the ANC while the other 
organisations at home still nominally legal apparently did not benefit.
The ANC Executive internally acknowledged the existence of these problems and 
the need to solve them, while undertaking to “improve or even alter any practice which is 
proved to be harmful to our cause.” At the same time, however, the ANC warned its critics 
about making serious and disruptive allegations against its officials, and called for 
“complete confidence in the integrity and political honesty of colleagues,”3 given the 
dangerous and delicate nature of their work. However, it was going to be another four years 
before the problems which were highlighted in 1965 were fully taken on board through a 
formal reorganisation of the movement at Morogoro in 1969.
Barney Desai’s clash with the ANC external mission
The case of Barney Desai and a few other CPC members’ defection to the PAC in 1966 is 
an example, although extreme in its final outcome, of the seriousness of the discontent 
within the ranks of the exiled Congress community. Problems of representation (or rather, 
what was perceived as lack of representation) in connection with the structure of the 
Congress Alliance at the international level (as a result of the adoption of the “African 
image” policy) had started to emerge as early as 1963, during a meeting between the CPC 
President Barney Desai and representatives of the ANC external mission in Dar es Salaam 
on August 8.
Desai had been co-opted to the Executive of the CPC in the mid-1950s and had 
become its President on George Peake’s resignation in 1961. During the anti-republican
2 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Survey o f  the External Mission o f  the African National Congress o f  
South Africa, February 1965.
3 Ibid.
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demonstrations of May 1961 he had been arrested and served with a five-year banning 
order. In 1962 he was elected to the Cape Town City Council but could not take office due 
to his banning. He arrived in Dar es Salaam around June 1963 “unannounced and 
unexpected,” having left South Africa by boat from Durban “in spite of the decision of his 
Executive [...] that he should go into hiding,” as “no immediate urgency attended on his 
departure.”4
On his arrival, Desai placed before the meeting with the ANC in Dar es Salaam a 
letter from the CPC executive dealing with what his future work would be. The letter 
invested Desai with power to “speak as the exiled representative of the organisation [CPC] 
and subject to the decisions of the executive,” and to “discussion with members of their 
sister organisation [ANC] nearest to him.”5 The letter also reported on the state of activities 
in South Africa, where the CPC was tackling local issues and, despite financial strains, was 
again pamphleteering, as well as producing a fortnightly newsletter, and hoping to produce 
a theoretical quarterly. Finally, the CPC requested financial help in order to facilitate 
internal work.6
To these points, Desai verbally added “that the ANC was neglecting to mention the 
position and role of minority groups in South Africa; that in its general propaganda the 
ANC did not always mention the fight and contribution of the minority groups.”7 Desai’s 
suspicions were confirmed after he arrived in London in 1964, where he was disappointed
4 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Memorandum: Rissik Hiribai (Barney) Desai, A Political Biography, 
London, 18 September 1966. Desai’s decision to leave the country in defiance o f  a resolution o f  the CPC 
executive, that he should go underground was only made public after his expulsion from the CPC described 
below. See also UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, CPC letter to Reggie and Hetty September, and Frank 
and Olive Landman, Cape Town, December 1965.
5 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Memo on Coloured People Congress External Representation [n.d.].
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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by the “appalling lack of information about the position of the coloured people and their 
role in the liberation movement.”8 Members of the ANC, CPC and SAIC in exile should, 
Desai proposed, travel to those independent African states whose leaders had been 
outspoken against apartheid and ask them “to make statements calling upon the non-white 
minority groups in South Africa to throw their lot with the struggle of the African people.”9 
In its response to Desai’s suggestions, the ANC external mission acknowledged in 
an undated memorandum the need to “approach the problems raised with sympathy and 
understanding,” but firmly rejected Desai’s views as “a retrogressive political step [...] 
contrary to the decision of the organisations at home.” The ANC appealed to the decisions 
of a joint meeting of the executives of the Congress Movement in 1962, according to which 
“as far as Africa and the outside world was concerned, the liberation movement in South 
Africa would be represented by the African National Congress.” Furthermore, it strongly 
maintained that:
This is very clear decision which could not be said to have been misunderstood by 
any of those who passed or endorsed it. All the other four congresses of the Alliance 
discussed it and endorsed it with clear understanding of its political and 
organisational implications and structure. Naturally as the organisation of the 
oppressed African majority, the ANC has put it in the forefront and dramatised the 
case of the African people; the Congress has however, never confined its 
representations to the Africans. It has always acted and is acting as the mouthpiece 
of the whole 13 million oppressed non-white people of South Africa.10
The mandate given to the ANC by the organisations in South Africa to represent the 
Congress Movement internationally could thus be revoked, the ANC claimed, only by the 
ANC at home, or by the joint meeting of the Executives of the five Congresses. Lastly, the 
CPC’s request for financial support was turned down on the grounds that the ANC had very
8 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai, letter to Reg September, 20 August 1964.
9 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Memo on Coloured People Congress External Representation [n.d.].
10 Ibid.
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heavy financial commitments (especially military), and that the CPC was not in any worse 
position than the rest of the organisations in the Alliance -  the activities that the CPC was 
able to carry out proved that “if anything, it is much better off financially.”11 At the same 
time, the ANC hoped that the CPC could be persuaded to abandon the intentions expressed 
by its President during the August 1963 meeting. To this purpose, it pledged to involve 
Desai in its external work in a greater way.
Relations between the ANC and Desai, however, continued to sour. In Dar es 
Salaam, Desai had started to work on the ANC’s news digest Spotlight on South Africa but 
was later put in charge of an ANC overseas mission which he, according to the ANC, 
deserted. It seems that the mission in question was a military training course in Moscow, 
and that Desai, as the most senior person, was put in charge of a small group of people sent 
to the Soviet Union for this purpose.12 In Moscow, however, he requested permission to 
leave the mission to go to London and meet his wife and children who had also gone into 
exile. The ANC later complained that Desai’s urgency to move to London had been 
unfounded as his wife only arrived in the UK in late 1964. Back in Dar es Salaam, the ANC 
provided Desai with a ticket to London and Tanzanian travelling documents. As he faced 
problems entering the UK with the Tanzanian documents, Desai was subsequently able to 
produce an Indian document.13 The episode caused the ANC “acute embarrassment” with
11 Ibid.
12 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
13 Desai had studied in India in the late 1940s and had been Secretary o f  the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress 
and later an executive member o f  the Transvaal Indian Congress in the early 1950s. UWC, Mayibuye 
Archives, MCH70, Memorandum: Rissik Hiribai (Barney) Desai, A Political Biography, London, 18 
September 1966.
218
the Tanzanian government and a serious reprimand from its Home Office, on whose 
benevolence the organisation very much depended.14
In June 1964, Desai was joined in London by fellow executive member and CPC 
Acting Chairman Cardiff Mamey.15 Desai and Mamey then called a meeting of Coloured 
South Africans in an attempt to organise them in London, despite instructions from the 
ANC London office that “there is no separate group that can act on its own here, except if it 
participates within the already existing structures.”16 The South African exile population in 
the UK had been growing steadily after Rivonia, and Desai and Mamey were concerned 
that Coloured exiles in the UK were being left out of the work of the movement as a 
consequence of the ANC’s “African image” strategy. A London Committee of the CPC was 
thus formed, “the idea being to get the many Coloureds who have migrated to do some 
useful work.”17 As well as Desai and Mamey, Frank and Olive Landman, Cosmo Peterse, 
Sonny Ramsdale, and James Phillips were part of the Committee.
In response to the ANC memorandum, Desai and Mamey produced another 
document, which allegedly reflected the decisions taken by the CPC executive in Cape 
Town, and which Mamey had communicated to Desai on his arrival in the UK. The new 
memorandum, regarded by the ANC as “insolent”18 and “provocative to the extreme”19 
pushed forward a separatist line, but also honestly pointed to some very concrete unsolved
14 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, unaddressed letter, London , 2 July 1965.
15 Cardiff Mamey came from the Western Cape. He was close to Kenny Jordaan, a member o f  the Non- 
European Unity Movement. Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
16 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, File 99, Raymond Kunene, letter to the ANC 
representatives in Dar es Salaam, London, 15 July 1964.
17 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai, letter to Reg September, London, 20 August 1964.
18 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, File 99, Raymond Kunene, letter to the ANC 
representatives in Dar es Salaam, London, 15 July 1964.
19 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, letter to Barney Desai, Dar es Salaam, 23 October 
1964.
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problems of representation. The CPC, Desai and Mamey argued in their memo, had no
recollection of the mandate referred to by the ANC that they should be the sole
representatives of the Congress Movement internationally. Should this have been the case,
and had the CPC in fact taken part in the decision, both the internal and external conditions
of the liberation struggle had since changed to such an extent that they called for revision.
In accordance with the CPC policy to pursue the ideal of a non-racial democracy the CPC
had been prepared to “sink its identity in the ANC and disappear as a separate
organisation,” an overture which the ANC rejected. The fact that the ANC at the same time
discouraged the independent existence of the CPC, that it claimed to represent the CPC but
was not making any representations on its behalf, and that it refused the CPC financial
assistance was, “to say the least, inconsistent.” Desai and Mamey went on to argue:
It is clear that the structure of the movement in the country is not monolithic and it 
would be false to represent it internationally as being so. The organisational 
structure of the Congress Movement [...] and the other organisations regarded as 
being within the broad framework of the liberatory movement of course makes this 
plain. No distorted picture can therefore arise internationally nor can the differences 
and separate organisations within the broad framework of the movement be a mark 
of incompetence. These are the products of the history of South Africa and of the 
ideas of the intelligentsia of the country.
The leadership will reveal its stature only by achieving unity in spite of differences 
and not by hiding them.20
Finally, the memorandum complained of the “most cavalier fashion” of Desai’s treatment 
by the ANC, the proposals which were to enable him “to make a great contribution to the 
struggle” not having come to fruition, thus arousing the fear “that no member of CPC for 
that matter, no Coloured person will be enabled to play his proper role or make the 
contribution of which he is capable outside the country.” Still, “a burning desire to establish 
a proper working relationship” between the ANC and the CPC in exile was expressed in the
20 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai and Cardiff Mamey, Memorandum to the External 
Mission o f  the African National Congress -  External Representation, London, 18 June 1964.
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conclusion although, at this stage, it was also felt that the responsibility to achieve unity 
rested more heavily upon the ANC than the CPC.21
The ANC internally commented on the document in a letter from Raymond Kunene, 
the ANC chief representative in London at the time, to the ANC representatives in Dar es 
Salaam in July 1964. The ANC was alarmed by the “hysterical and almost immature 
statements” made in the memorandum, which from the ANC’s point of view, conveyed the 
impression that Desai and Mamey’s battle for their separate identity was more important 
than the freedom struggle as a whole. Personal relations did not help, as Kunene pointed 
out that the situation in London had “radically changed” after Cardiff Mamey’s arrival, 
whose attitude towards the ANC London office was described as one of arrogance. The 
letter concluded that Desai and Mamey were pursuing a unilateral line, as the feeling of 
exclusion did not seem to be the worry of the Indian Congress, nor was it felt that they were 
shared by other CPC leaders such as Alex La Guma.22 James Hadebe, the chief 
representative in Dar es Salaam, concurred with Kunene that since the dissolution of the 
SAUF, the SAIC had always adopted what the ANC considered “a correct stand in matters 
affecting the mode of presenting our case to the outside world.”23
No formal reply, however, was issued by the ANC, nor was a meeting called, 
adding to Desai and Mamey’s disappointment and frustration.24 In August, Desai and 
Mamey held informal talks with Tambo during one of his visits to London (where the 
Tambo family had established a home), and the latter promised a formal reply from the
21 Ibid.
22 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, File 99, Raymond Kunene, letter to the ANC 
representatives in Dar es Salaam, London, 15 July 1964.
23 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, File 99, James Hadebe, letter to Raymond 
Kunene, Dar es Salaam, 1 November 1964.
24 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai letters to Reg September, 20 August 1964, 7 
November 1964, 13 December 1964.
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ANC “within weeks”25 from his return to headquarters. A further letter was then written to 
the ANC in Dar es Salaam, “which was not even acknowledged.”26 Three months later, 
Desai was complaining to fellow CPC member Reg September (in Dar es Salaam) that the 
June memorandum had still received no reply.
Matters got worse as Reg September got involved in the dispute. September was the 
CPC General Secretary, as well as being a member of the SACP. Before leaving South
onAfrica in 1964, he had been in hiding “in pursuance with his executive’s decision.” 
September and Desai had earlier stood trial together after they had been caught breaching 
their banning orders at a CPC meeting in Cape Town. After the preliminary hearing in 
which they were defended by Albie Sachs, a COD (and SACP) member, the CPC had 
decided that they should not stand trial. Bail was paid and separate arrangements were 
made for the two leaders to go to safe houses. After spending about five months in hiding, 
the CPC then decided that September should leave. The decision that he should go into 
exile stemmed from the realisation that he was not serving any useful purpose inside the 
country. The ANC, which had never been very strong in the Western Cape, was at a 
particularly low point in the years after Sharpeville28 and even more so after Rivonia. The 
CPC, on the other hand, never was a mass organisation and was able to offer only few 
facilities for people to continue to operate underground. According to September, Desai had 
already left the country by this time. September was initially meant to leave South Africa 
by boat via Durban, but following Desai’s escape through this route, that passage had
25 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai, letter to Reg September, London, 7 November 1964.
26 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai, letter to Reg September, London, 13 December 1964.
27 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Memorandum: Rissik Hiribai (Barney) Desai, A Political Biography, 
London, 18 September 1966.
28 See Lodge, Black Politics, 214.
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become known and thus blocked.29 September was then taken to Swaziland, but this escape
route also failed following the abduction of Rosemary Wentzel by the South African police.
In the end, September had to go back into South Africa from where he was finally able to
cross into Bechuanaland.30 From Francistown he then proceeded to the ANC headquarters
in Dar es Salaam, where he was appointed to work on the publications side under Themba
1
Mqota (aka Alfred Kgokong).
By late 1965 the Tanzanian government had been growing concerned with the 
presence of increasing numbers of freedom fighters in the country’s capital, where many 
liberation movements’ headquarters were stationed. As a result, Tanzania decided to allow 
only four representatives of each national liberation movement to maintain an office in the 
capital. The ANC was thus forced to reduce its staff in the Dar es Salaam office and 
transfer its provisional headquarters to Morogoro in December 1965.32 Reg September 
recalls how the ANC external mission now started “spreading,” as people were relocated to
29 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
30 See Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 425.
31 September experienced some difficulties during his stay in Dar es Salaam, as Alfred Kgokong (who became 
a member o f the Group o f  Eight in the 1970s) “complained bitterly” o f  not having a senior enough position 
and o f  the fact that September, a Coloured person, was the working directly under him. Interview with Reg 
September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
32 The transfer o f  headquarters in compliance with the Tanzanian government’s order prompted a reshuffling 
o f  official posts. The new provisional headquarters in Morogoro were manned by the following officials: O.R. 
Tambo (Deputy President), Duma Nokwe (Secretary-General), Moses Kotane (Treasurer-General), J.B. 
Marks (Director o f Transport and Communications), Alfred Kgokong (Director o f  Publicity and Information), 
Ruth Mompati (Chief Liaison Officer for the Women’s Section) and James Hadebe (Director o f  Youth and 
Students and Head o f  the Welfare Department). Hadebe had until then been the ANC chief representative in 
Tanzania. Mzwai Piliso was recalled for health reasons from Cairo, where he had been chief representative, 
and appointed to head the Dar es Salaam office as chief representative, the other members being Mandy 
Msimang (administrative Secretary), Z. Ngalo and B. Leinaeng. Hadebe’s reallocation to Morogoro from Dar 
eventually caused him to resign from the external mission o f  the ANC in December 1967. See UCT, 
Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P8, Summary o f  the events in connection with Mr James Hadebe and his 
resignation from the external mission o f  the African National Congress o f South Africa.
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Morogoro, Lusaka, and London. September was assigned to London, where he arrived on 
20 March 1965.33
September and Desai, who had “worked closely for years,” although “not always
easily,” had been in touch by correspondence prior to September’s arrival in the UK. When
he learned of the June 1964 Memorandum by Desai and Mamey while still in Dar es
Salaam, September had expressed concern about his CPC colleagues’ views, which he felt
were “certainly not a reflection of the relationship [between the ANC and the CPC] back
home.” Although September agreed that the issues raised by Desai and Mamey called for
thorough discussion, he insisted that the CPC’s communication with the ANC must be
polite and dignified at all times, and stressed the importance of unity at this especially
difficult moment in time:
We need each other’s assistance and Comradeship, now more than ever before. This 
is not the time for sectionalism and division of ranks, for duplication of work. We 
need one publicity agency, we cannot but have one unit to handle traffic through 
and around South Africa. In spite of the difficulties, [...] a machinery is now there 
and it is working. It needs fullest assistance and it is for us to play our part.34
September believed that the secret of the ANC, which unlike the PAC had so far been able 
to escape factionalism, was that it was guided by a cohesive group of people and therefore 
represented “an anchor” which the CPC needed.35
Desai and Mamey were far from impressed by September’s comments, which they 
received as “very near a studied insult of myself [Desai], Cardiff [Mamey], and CPC.” 
They also resented the decision that once in London September would be working in the
33 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
34 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, Letter to Barney Desai, Dar es Salaam, 23 October 
1964. Original emphasis.
35 Ibid.
36 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Barney Desai, letter to Reg September, London, 13 December 1964.
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ANC office as Organiser of the Coloured Affairs Department, which they felt should have 
been discussed with them first.37 The ANC’s attitude to their memoranda, on the other 
hand, had confirmed Desai and Mamey’s “worst fears as to how things stood outside the 
country.”38 In particular they were concerned about the ANC’s “African image,” in which 
they could not see the CPC represented. On the other hand, they argued that the PAC, 
although once composed of “extreme nationalists,” had now realised “that non-Africans 
have an important role in South Africa and its liberatory struggle.”39
Relations continued to deteriorate after September’s move to London. A meeting of 
the CPC London Committee was held a week after the arrival of September who, however, 
was not invited to attend. Instead, Desai and Mamey had a private talk with September, 
who “very nearly walked out” because of the “cold and unfriendly” atmosphere of the 
meeting, during which Desai indicated “that he was hoping to spearhead a unifying 
movement of all the political elements of South Africans in London.”40 Although the three 
men agreed to meet again, no further talks were in fact arranged, nor were further meetings 
of the CPC London Committee held. The CPC in London now appeared to have divided 
into two sections both claiming to speak on behalf of the organisation. The first one, 
extremely critical of the ANC (and now leaning towards the PAC), was represented by 
Desai and Mamey and included Benny Bunsee (CPC Information Officer), Ebrahim Desai, 
as well as non-member Kenny Jordaan. The other one, pro-ANC, was represented by Reg 
September and included Kenny Parker, Joyce Moodley, Hetty September, Maud and James 
Phillips, and Frank and Olive Landman.
37 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, unaddressed letter, London, 2 July 1965.
38 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Cardiff Mamey, Letter to Reg September, London, 18 December
1964.
39 Ibid.
40 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, unaddressed letter, London , 2 July 1965.
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Communication with home, where “the forces of resistance [were said to be] at their 
lowest” and the political situation “both specifically and in general” was described as 
“bleak,” had become increasingly difficult. In a letter to Reg September, Achmat Osman, a 
CPC colleague, reported from Cape Town that “all communication has broken down. By 
the time I get any news, it is so filtered, so distorted, so coloured that is almost 
unacceptable as a basis for reasoning or belief.”41 The breakdown in communication was 
partly responsible for allowing the dispute to go on unchecked until it was too late and for 
the ensuing confusion as to which CPC grouping (i.e. Desai’s or September’s) was the 
legitimate representative of the organisation at home.
The breaking point came in the summer of 1965 as a result of two actions carried 
out by the Desai group. First, on 1 July, the British AAM received a memorandum signed 
jointly by Matthew Nkoana as PAC European representative and Barney Desai as President 
of the CPC which, amongst other things, accused the AAM of favouritism towards the 
ANC 42 The memorandum was presented without prior consultation with the CPC London 
Committee or with September, who dissociated themselves from it shortly afterwards with 
the approval of the CPC executive at home.43
By this time, a letter signed by the members of the CPC executive still active in 
South Africa had been sent to Desai and Mamey in London. The letter confirmed 
September’s line of action and raised no objection to his working for the ANC external 
mission. It also stated that although the executive sympathised with Desai and Mamey’s
41 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Achmat Osman, letter to Reg September, Cape Town, 17 May 1966.
42 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Joint Memorandum o f  the Pan-Africanist Congress o f  South 
Africa and the South African Coloured People’s Congress to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, United Kingdom, 
June 1965. The Memorandum also complained that the AAM did not actively support the armed struggle in 
South Africa.
43 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Letter to the AAM from the London Committee o f the CPC, 11 July
1965.
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fight against “the alleged black chauvinism of the ANC abroad” and thought it was 
“healthy to have discussions with the PAC and other organisations,” they could not see how 
their difficulties could be reconciled by siding with the PAC which, as far as the CPC was 
concerned, remained “the same racialistic organisation that it was in 1960 and before.” The 
courageous stand taken by the ANC leadership in the recent trials, on the other hand, had 
“filled the people with admiration”, making the ANC “the only organisation for which the 
‘coloured people’ [...] have any respect.” The CPC was still part of the Congress 
movement, and its allegiance unequivocally stood with the ANC, with whom relations in 
the Western Province were described as being “extremely cordial and healthy.”44 In an 
unaddressed letter (probably meant as internal communication between ANC offices) 
reporting on all of Desai and Barney’s activities, September was now in the position to 
warn his colleagues that “the continued right of Messrs. Desai and Marney to represent the 
CPC abroad is putting the movement in grave jeopardy.”45
Second were the statements about an impending civil war in South Africa which 
Desai made during a visit to Stockholm on 10 August 1965. These were reported in the 
South African press, thus bringing the internal CPC split into the open for the first time, 
and were later criticised by the ANC in an editorial of Spotlight on South Africa as “half- 
baked amateurish attempts at political drama.”46 Desai had been invited to Stockholm by 
the Swedish South African Committee. His statement included the claim that whites in 
South Africa no longer had a monopoly of arms, and that Coloured People organisations in 
South Africa were preparing for a full-scale civil war, which would not necessarily be a 
lengthy one. Desai’s “opportunistic and wholly erroneous speech” in Stockholm was
44 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Letter from the CPC executive in South Africa to B Desai and C 
Mamey, 1 July 1965.
45 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, unaddressed letter, London, 2 July 1965.
46 Spotlight on South Africa, Dar es Salaam, African National Congress, 13 August 1965.
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blamed as the prime reason for the arrest of eight executive members and four other 
members of the CPC in South Africa.47 In London, the CPC group headed by September 
dissociated itself from Desai’s actions in a press release, which unequivocally repudiated 
his statements “for their provocativeness, irresponsibility and inaccuracy,” and which
A Q  #
revoked Desai’s right to speak on behalf of the organisation. September was now acting 
as the accredited CPC representative abroad in accordance with the decisions of the 
surviving CPC executive in South Africa.49 Desai, on the other hand, defended his 
Stockholm speech and called for an apology for the “insupportable and morally 
reprehensible allegations” which had been made against him by the ANC.50 A last attempt 
to restore unity within the ranks of the CPC in exile was made by calling a meeting of the 
CPC London Committee. This took place on 9 October 1965, but Desai walked out with his 
supporters before full and proper discussion could take place, thus leading to a vote of no 
confidence from both the London Committee and the CPC executive51 and eventually to 
their expulsion from the party, announced in a circular to organisations dated 20 October 
1965.52
Despite their expulsion, Desai’s faction continued to make statements on behalf of 
the CPC while pursuing a separate agenda. In September 1965, the Johannesburg Sunday
47 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, CPC letter to Reginald and Hetty September and Frank and Olive 
Landman, Cape Town, December 1965.
48 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Press release, signed by R. September on behalf o f  the London 
Committee o f  the CPC, 18 August 1965.
49 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, CPC letter to Reginald and Hetty September and Frank and Olive 
Landman, Cape Town, December 1965.
50 Wits, Historical Papers, A2675, III, 688, Barney Desai, “On civil war in South Africa,” reply to an editorial 
in Spotlight on South Africa, 13 August 1965.
51 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Report on October 9, 1965, meeting o f  the London Committee o f  
the CPC, and Circular to Organisations, signed by Reg September, London, 20 October 1965.
52 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Circular to Organisations, signed by Reg September (CPC General 
Secretary), London, 20 October 1965.
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Times reported of talks between Nkoana and Desai to discuss a possible PAC-CPC 
alliance.53 Talks between Desai and the PAC in London were further publicised in the CPC 
International Bulletin (which Desai’s group controlled), which reproduced a congratulatory 
message from the Botswana Independence Party Secretary General Bishop Macheng to 
Nkoana.54 On occasion of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in November 
1965, Desai released a press statement on behalf of the CPC which expressed the belief that 
“the destiny of the coloureds is indissolubly bound up with the oppressed Africans” and 
that a united organisation representative of all the “enslaved masses” should at long last be 
formed.55 Meanwhile, the CPC International Bulletin attacked the ANC for “consciously 
pursuing racialistic policies.”56 And, finally, The New African57 published an interview with 
Barney Desai which questioned the usefulness of the international boycott as a weapon in 
the struggle against apartheid.58
The Desai clique’s alliance with the PAC was formally announced in March 1966 
and reported in several British newspapers.59 A press statement signed by Benny Bunsee 
(Information Officer) and dated March 19 announced that “the CPC, one of the few militant 
non-white organisations still militant in South Africa, has dissolved,” and that its President 
(Desai) and Chairman (Mamey) had joined the PAC, thus digging “the final nail in the 
coffin of the Congress Alliance,” which “had failed because it led to a sectional and
53 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 12 September 1965.
54 CPC International Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3, London, 16 October 1965.
55 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Press Release: SACPC statement to the Heads o f State on occasion o f  
the Second Afro-Asian Conference, London 30 October 1965.
56 CPC International Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 5., London, 16 December 1965.
57 Randolph Vigne o f  the South African Liberal Party was The New African’s editor in London.
58 The New African, 11 November 1965.
59 The Sunday Times, London, 20 March 1966, and Daily Worker, 21 March 1966. Whereas The Sunday 
Times described the merger as the “first real attempt to build a unitary, non-racial movement in the country,” 
the Daily Worker article also included the CPC London Committee’s rejection o f  Desai’s claim (see below).
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racialistic approach to South African politics which had played into the hands of Dr 
Verwoerd.” The ANC was blamed for setting “the South African masses against one 
another” and for “selling our country to the highest international bidder.”60 The Indian 
community in South Africa was also called upon to consider following the same path as the 
CPC and dissolve their political organisations to join the PAC “as Africans and equals.”61
What the PAC’s views in regards to Indian participation may have been is difficult 
to establish. In his opening address to the Inaugural Convention of the PAC, Sobukwe thus 
spoke of the Indian minority in South Africa: “this group is an oppressed minority. But 
there are some members of this group, the merchant class in particular, who have become 
tainted with the virus of cultural supremacy and national arrogance. This class identifies 
itself by and large with the oppressor but, significantly, this is the group which provides the 
political leadership of the Indian people in South Africa. And all that the politics of this 
class have meant up to now is preservation and defence of the sectional interests of the 
Indian merchant class.” Moreover, Sobukwe and the PAC grouped the Indian with the 
white minority as “foreign” to South Africa -  as opposed to the “indigenous African 
people.”62 However, in the early 1960s Ahmed Gora Ebrahim and Patrick Duncan had been 
admitted into the PAC in exile as its first Indian and white members. This apparent 
contradiction may be explained by the fact that the PAC’s ideals were in principle non- 
racial. In the non-racial society which the PAC envisaged, all people (including those from 
the white and Indian “foreign” minorities) who recognised and respected the inalienable
60 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, SACPC External Respresentation, Press Release, signed by B Bunsee 
(Information Officer), London, 19 March 1966.
61 CPC International Bulletin, 19 March 1966, London.
62 “Opening address” by R.M. Sobukwe, Inaugural Convention o f  the PAC, 4-6 April 1959, document 39a in 
Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 515.
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right of the African majority to govern “would be Africans and all would be guaranteed 
human rights as individuals.”
Several organisations and individuals in the UK, Europe, and Africa welcomed the 
union between the CPC and the PAC. In London, Johnny James of the Caribbean Workers 
Movement, Barbara Haq, MCF Secretary, and Faris Glubb, a representative of the Omani 
liberation movement and former MCF Secretary, supported the merger as “a wise act of 
statesmanship which will be of great benefit to the struggle o f the oppressed people in 
South Africa.”64 John Chipimbari of ZANU congratulated the PAC for having proved the 
“superiority” of its ideology. Various newspapers and broadcasting stations in Guinea, 
Mali, Congo Brazzaville, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Algeria and Egypt also 
released news about the merger.65
The CPC London Committee, however, disclaimed the merger and reaffirmed that 
the CPC continued to struggle for full democracy in South Africa as enshrined in the 
Freedom Charter “in association with all forces sharing the same object.” Desai’s decision 
to join the PAC was dismissed as “an opportunistic move devoid of real significance as the 
PAC itself has disintegrated as a political force both inside and outside the country.”66 Still, 
the CPC-PAC joint statement was printed in the CPC International Bulletin, copies of 
which made their way into South Africa where they were delivered under the doors of 
several homes. This was an indication that although the majority of the CPC executive in 
South Africa backed Reg September and the CPC London Committee, Desai still enjoyed 
the support of “some kind of committee” functioning on his behalf, and “with certain well-
63 Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 317.
64 Faris Glubb, quoted in Azania News, London [April?] 1966.
65 Azania News, London [April?] 1966.
66 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Press Statement on behalf o f  the London Committee o f  the CPC, 20 
March 1966.
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known CPC elements on it.” CPC members as a whole, however, were reported to be either
“unaware” of the merger, “indifferent or derisive.”67
By June 1966, relations between the ANC and the remaining members of the CPC
in exile had been fully restored, mainly because of Reg September’s intervention in the
dispute and his determination that the CPC must stand by the side of the external mission of
the ANC, in acceptance that the latter should “bear responsibility of representing our whole
movement outside South Africa.”68 The arrival of Alex La Guma, who had been acting as a
link between September and the rest o f the CPC executive at home, in Zambia towards the
end of 1966 further substantiated September’s line of conduct.69 Both September and La
Guma were also members of the SACP. It thus seems that Communist Party membership
was of crucial importance in keeping the non-African exiles united behind the leadership of
ANC during this period. As Lodge has argued:
The defection of the CPC men to the PAC’s ranks was a reflection of the tensions 
which existed between SACP members and other exiles within the Congress 
Movement in London. The PAC offered to non-communist CPC men what the ANC 
did not: full membership and responsibility in an African nationalist organisation
t...].70
The issue of external representation within the movement in exile was not settled, however, 
with Desai’s breakaway, thus suggesting that SACP exiles were also affected by it. The 
difference between the two was that SACP members were, unlike non-communist exiles,
67 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Achmat Osman, letter to Reg September, 17 May 1966.
68 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, Memo on Budget for the SACPC, London, 16 June
1966.
69 During a meeting o f  the joint Congress Executives in Morogoro in November 1966, Alex La Guma, who 
had just left South Africa on an exit permit after his release from prison earlier that year, and who was now 
acting as the main CPC representative abroad, repudiated the alleged affiliation o f  the CPC and the PAC. See 
Nhlanhla Ndebele and Noor Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference: a moment o f  self-reflection,” in 
SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1, 582.
70 Lodge, Black Politics, 310-311.
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bound to the ANC by virtue of the SACP’s overarching commitment to unity with the 
national liberation movement. Even so, as the final section in this chapter will argue, the 
problem of fully incorporating all South Africans living abroad, and in London in 
particular, into the work of the ANC external mission continued to raise its head throughout 
the rest of the decade.
Desai, Mamey and Jordaan were added to the executive of the PAC, which 
described the merger as an illustration of “the PAC viewpoint that multiracialism as 
practised by the so called Congress Alliance cannot -  and never did -  work in South 
Africa,” and as finally destroying any accusations of the PAC being a racialistic 
organisation.71 The PAC had always regarded Coloureds as Africans, and in principle the 
organisation had always accepted them within its ranks. Lionel Morrison, who had been the 
secretary of the Cape Town branch of the CPC in the 1950s and an accused in the Treason 
Trial, had become the PAC chief representative in Indonesia when he left South Africa 
after Sharpeville. Like Desai and the other CPC men after him, Morrison joined the PAC 
because he “alleged that the ANC, by insisting on the multiracial Congress Alliance [...], 
was in fact a racially influenced organisation.”72 Indeed, as Saul Dubow has pointed out, 
“the inter-racial configuration of the Congress movement mirrored the official racial 
categories of the apartheid state in uncomfortable ways.”73 Although the ANC and its allies 
refused to engage in the linguistic coinage of apartheid ideologues, there was a “disquieting 
similarity in the discourse of government and liberation movement around issues like 
‘groups’ and ‘peoples’,” based on the acceptance of the politics of multi-racialism by both
71 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, PAC South Africa, Press Release, signed by Lionel Morrison (PAC 
Representative in Indonesia), London 19 March 1966.
72 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 326.
73 Dubow, “Thoughts on South Africa,” 67.
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sides.74 On the one hand, Desai’s clash with the ANC external mission suggests that the 
ANC continued to uphold a multi-racial -  rather than non-racial -  approach to liberation 
politics. On the other hand, as it has been noted in the previous chapter, the PAC espoused 
in principle a truly non-racial ideal which the inclusion of the CPC men in its ranks 
exemplified. In spite of the theoretical sophistication of the Africanists’ views on race, 
however, the PAC’s rhetoric placed heavy emphasis on a racially-defined black African 
identity as a mobilising factor. This meant that at a rank and file level, PAC membership 
always was almost totally black African. So there seems to have been a dichotomy between 
the leadership and the membership in the PAC, which de jure  was a non-racial 
organisation, although de facto , except for its upper crust, remained essentially composed 
of black South Africans.
The PAC, c. 1965-1967
The new CPC arrivals were initially viewed with suspicion by Leballo and his Africa-based 
associates, as the union between the CPC and the PAC had been achieved by the London 
office of the PAC (led by Nkoana), which was run almost independently of the PAC 
headquarters in Dar es Salaam and was opposed to Leballo’s leadership.75 Leballo, 
however, quickly reversed his attitude and used the merger as an opportunity to strengthen 
his authority in the organisation. It would therefore appear that the newly recruited CPC 
leaders soon found themselves drawn into the power struggles between the various factions 
of the PAC in exile. Hence, as Karis and Gerhart have already noted, although the fusion of
74 Ibid., 68.
75 Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 56.
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the CPC with the PAC might have temporarily boosted the PAC’s propaganda, “whether or
nf\not it added to the organisation’s strength seems doubtful.”
From the start, the history of the PAC in exile had been riddled with problems of 
factionalism, which prevented the creation of “stable structures or a continuity of respected 
leadership.”77 The difficulties and contradictions experienced by the PAC in exile have 
been interpreted by one of its members, Mfanasekaya Gqobose, as “non-antagonistic” in 
nature. What is meant by this is that these contradictions were “not against the enemy 
which PAC had clearly identified, namely the White minority regime, its allies and 
supporters.” Rather, they arose out of the difficulties of waging struggle against such
•7Q
enemy and took the form of internal disputes through periodical occurrences. In other 
words, Gqobose’s statements are a public recognition of the problems affecting the 
organisation internally by which, however, the PAC’s fundamental tenets were never 
corrupted or compromised.
During the period 1962-1964, the first serious internal contradiction had taken place 
as a result of Leballo’s Maseru press conference which has already been analysed in 
chapter three. This had brought about a big controversy among the PAC leadership which 
had relatively remained kept below the surface. In 1966, however, the PAC’s internal 
conflicts sprung into the open after two of its executive members attended a UN Human 
Rights Seminar on Apartheid in Brasilia in August-September. The paper presented at the 
seminar by A.B. Ngcobo, the Treasurer, and Peter Raboroko set out a six-point programme 
inviting armed intervention in South Africa by UN military forces known as the
76 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 47.
77 Ibid.
78 UFH, National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre, PAC Tanzania Mission, Mfanasekaya Gqobose, “The 
internal contradictions in the PAC since its inception.”
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“Declaration of Principled Intervention in South Africa.”79 The proposal led to a power 
struggle in the PAC couched in ideological terms which brought into focus a division 
between ‘rightist’ and ‘leftist’ members. The ‘leftists’ in the PAC criticised the Brasilia 
proposal as a serious deviation from the PAC’s basic principle that the emancipation of the 
African people would only to be achieved by Africans themselves. Apart from the PAC’s 
policy of self-reliance, which was now strongly advocated by the PAC ideologues in the 
camps, the ‘leftists’ objected to UN intervention because they considered it “an imperialist 
dominated body” and “an instrument of imperialism,” which the PAC also sought to 
liquidate.80
These different positions can be viewed as a reflection of developments that had 
been accomplished after 1964 as a result of the consolidation of relations between the PAC 
and China. A number of PAC military trainees, including the PAC’s military commander 
Templeton Ntantala, were sent to China between 1964 and 1967 where they had received 
military as well as political, or ideological, training. According to Gqobose, as socialist 
politics became incorporated into the PAC, its ideological character was qualitatively
O 1
changed. However, Lodge has argued that the PAC’s alliance with China was ultimately 
an expedient one and that despite the “tendency of the protagonists to characterise any 
disagreement in polarised ideological terms,” the conflicts which arose in this period 
“really centred around the question of who controlled the movement and its resources.”82 In 
fact, Raboroko and Ngcobo, who were expelled from the PAC because of the Brasilia
79 See Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 48-49.
80 PAC, Public release: “Repudiation o f  the call for United Nation’s military intervention in Azania,” PAC, 
Report o f  the National Executive Committee Meeting, 36-37.
81 UFH, National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre, PAC Tanzania Mission, Gqobose, “The internal 
contradictions in the PAC since its inception.”
82 Lodge, Black Politics, 310.
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representations, had been part of the first delegation of PAC members to travel to China in 
1964.83 Even so, during its reorganising conference in Moshi in 1967, the PAC outlined a 
programme in which a heavy Chinese influence can be detected, and which in many 
respects marks a significant departure from its previous approach to the armed struggle.
The Moshi Conference
The Brasilia incident was “but a symptom of an organisational mess.” As early as 1963 a 
number of PAC exiles “acutely felt the need to streamline the Party machinery.” Matthew 
Nkoana, then in Bechuanaland, and some twenty-four other PAC members submitted a 
memorandum to Leballo and the executive in Maseru which called for a “Special 
Conference to study developments and draw up plans for the future.”84 Despite promises 
that a conference would be held soon, Leballo had thus far managed to avert this through 
the expulsion and suspension from office of the core of this group in 1965. More calls for a 
PAC conference and a general amnesty of expulsions and suspensions were made in early 
1967 on Raboroko and Ngcobo’s initiative. The Tanzanian government and the African 
Liberation Committee of the OAU also got involved in behind-the-scenes efforts to bring 
together all PAC factions in a round-table conference, but Leballo had been able to resist 
them too.85 The closure of the PAC office in Dar es Salaam by the Liberation Committee 
on 12 August 1967 as a result of an incident which involved an attempt by Raboroko and
83 Ibid., 309.
84 Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 42. See also UCT, Department o f  Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Q 
(1), C.L. Lakaye, “A statement concerning the dispute within the Pan-Africanist Congress (S.A.) to the 
African Liberation Committee,” Dar es Salaam, 17 November 1967.
85 Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 5 1.
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Ngcobo to assume its control finally made a reorganising convention inevitable, as the 
continuation of PAC activities and future assistance had come under serious threat.
On 15 August 1967, after consultation with the PAC leadership and the Tanzanian 
government in Dar es Salaam, the African Liberation Committee issued a communique 
which summoned a meeting of the members of the PAC executive, also to be attended by 
the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee, George Magombe. The meeting’s 
purpose would be “to consolidate the PAC External machinery and streamline 
organisational operations”86 so that “a lasting solution to the problem of disunity within the 
leadership” of the PAC could be found.87 Previous calls for a convention had emphasised 
the need to include not only expelled and suspended members but also to have rank and file 
opinion represented by inviting delegates from groups and military units. Fearful that his 
leadership would come under fire, Leballo successfully manoeuvred against the 
participation of the general membership so that the meeting in the end was restricted to the 
PAC executive. The suspensions of membership of Mahomo, ‘Molotsi and Nyaose were 
lifted in view of the conference, which took place in Moshi between 19 and 22 September 
1967 with the full backing of the Tanzanian government and the Liberation Committee.88
The main document adopted at the Moshi conference was entitled “PAC’s 
revolutionary message to the nation.” In it, the PAC laid down for the first time a written
86 African Liberation Committee, “Communique,” Dar es Salaam, 15 August 1967, in PAC, Report o f  the 
National Executive Committee Meeting, 2.
87 George Magombe, “Opening address, PAC re-organisation conference, Moshi: September 1967,” in PAC, 
Report o f  the National Executive Committee Meeting, 3.
88 The participants to the Moshi conference were: P.K. Leballo, Z.B. Molete, J.D. Nyaose, T.T. Letlaka, P.N. 
Raboroko, T.M. Ntantala, B. Desai, K. Jordan, C. Mamey, N. Mahomo and P. ’Molotsi. The Executive 
Secreatry o f  the African Liberation Committee, George Mgombe, its Assistant Executive Secretary, L.S. 
Oyaka, and the Second Vice-President o f  Tanzania, Rashidi M. Kawawa, also attended the meeting as 
observers.
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strategy of armed struggle through rural-based guerrilla warfare. The new strategic plan, 
which variously quoted Mao Tse-Tung and referred to several examples of socialist rural 
guerrilla struggles, can be viewed as evidence of the influence of socialist thinking on the 
PAC and stands in sharp contrast with the PAC’s previous antipathy to Marxism as a 
“foreign ideology.” Echoing the spontaneity which had been a central element of both the 
PAC and Poqo in the early 1960s (but also Che Guevara’s theory o f foco), the document 
stated that the purpose of the PAC’s guerrillas would be to “spark off the all-embracing 
spirit of revolt that is simmering just below the surface.”89 The starting point of the 
oncoming conflict would be the countryside, where “from the ranks of the peasants in the 
reserves, who starve amidst plenty, and millions of landless labourers in thraldom, 
‘squatting’ on white farms, [...] the guerrilla forces find their most eager support.” It was 
therefore in the countryside that mobile units of trained guerrillas would first integrate 
themselves with the “suffering masses” and gradually lead to the development of an all out 
“people’s war.” The guerrillas would build their organisational capacity by dispersing the 
enemy’s forces over a vast area and by conducting intensive political and military 
education among the peasants and the farm workers who would be given arms and 
organised into bands of guerrillas. Their first targets would be “the unprotected, isolated 
settler farmers,” whose land would be taken over to become the supply centres and safe 
bases for the fighting guerrillas. The rudimentary organs of the new state would also be set 
up in these liberated areas.90 Meanwhile, sabotage of lines of communication and power 
supplies on a country-wide scale would weaken the enemy’s degree of mobility to the 
advantage of the guerrilla forces. A second front would then be opened up in the urban
89 “PAC’s revolutionary message to the nation,” in PAC, Report o f  the National Executive Committee 
Meeting, 9.
90 Ibid., 14.
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areas, where workers would be organised in illegal trade unions to engage in sabotage 
operations, strikes and go-slows, culminating in the capture of factories and government 
institutions. Because of the enemy’s military superiority, the PAC now predicted “a 
prolonged protracted struggle.” This recognition marks a significant departure from the 
earlier immediacy of the PAC and Poqo’s aims. It also implicitly points to the failure of the 
PAC’s initial goal of freedom by 1963. Despite the enemy’s military and economic 
strength, white South Africa was described as a “paper tiger,”91 as the country’s economy 
would not be able to endure a prolonged conflict without collapsing, which in turn would 
lead to the disintegration of the organs of repression.
Three revolutionary principles or objectives were set out as the basis for the
09mobilisation of popular forces in South Africa (now re-named Azania): “the
establishment of a non-racial socialist democracy,” the nationalisation of the country’s 
resources (including mines, land, factories and banks), and the “pursuance of positive 
policies with the world-wide anti-imperialist movement.” By representing aspirations 
which linked up the question of racial oppression with that of class exploitation, these 
objectives formed a basis around which a “broad alliance of patriotic forces” could be 
mobilised.93 Like in its original manifesto the PAC made the point of rejecting the racial 
and ethnic divisions imposed by the apartheid government and spoke about the people’s 
aspirations as human beings. However, the PAC’s original emphasis on African 
nationalism and its Pan-Africanist vision were both lost and were now replaced by 
socialist-oriented jargon and goals rooted in the PAC’s alliance with China.
91 Ibid., 17.
92 See Lodge, Black Politics, 310.
93 “PAC’s revolutionary message to the nation,” in PAC, Report o f  the National Executive Committee 
Meeting, 23.
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Another departure from previous ideological positions was with respect to white 
liberals and leftists. In its early days, the PAC had completely rejected the inclusion of 
whites on the grounds that if they appeared to be sympathetic to the demands of the African 
people, it would only be in so far as to ensure their privileges would not be threatened. 
According to Sobukwe, “if they (the privileged) offer assistance, it is only for the purpose 
of ‘directing’ and ‘controlling’ the struggle of the underprivileged and making sure that it 
does not become ‘dangerous’.”94 In contrast, a place was now accorded to “the white liberal 
who, disgusted with the brutality of the system of apartheid, completely identifies himself 
in word and deed, with the aspirations of our people.”95
In the conference resolutions the PAC announced its conviction that “only an armed 
struggle, anchored firmly in the masses can achieve liberation.” Hence it vowed to give 
priority to military over diplomatic requirements. The Presidential Council was replaced by 
a Revolutionary Command in order to give direction to the armed struggle and provide for 
its exigencies.96 The Brazilia papers, which advocated UN military intervention in South 
Africa, were repudiated and the principle of “revolutionary self-reliance”97 was proclaimed 
as the precondition for all outside military and financial assistance. Finally, the merger of 
the CPC was ratified at Moshi and, upon the insistence of the African Liberation
94 “Future o f  the Africanist movement.” Questions and answers by R.M. Sobukwe, in The Africanist, January 
1959, document 38 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 508.
95 “PAC’s revolutionary message to the nation,” in PAC, Report o f  the National Executive Committee 
Meeting, 25.
96 Resolutions, in PAC, Report o f  the National Executive Committee Meeting, 39-42.
97 “Revolutionary self-reliance in a protracted revolutionary war means two things: to capture weapons from 
the enemy in order to promote partisan warfare; and to manufacture weapons, where none are available, for 
the purpose o f  building up the people’s armed strength.” “PAC’s revolutionary message to the nation,” in 
PAC, Report o f  the National Executive Committee Meeting, 27-28.
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Committee, the idea of creating a united front with other liberation movements in South 
Africa was also accepted in principle.98
Despite what the stated intentions of this executive meeting had been, the Moshi 
conference only temporarily resolved the PAC’s internal problems. Although the 
conference resolutions had called for a review of all suspensions and expulsions, A.B. 
Ngcobo’s suspension was confirmed and a commission of enquiry set up to investigate his 
past activities as Treasurer General. Moreover, although it was claimed that Moshi 
represented a moment of “rigorous but healthy self-criticism” in which “all causes of 
misunderstandings were thoroughly examined,” because of the exclusion of the rank and 
file, “the conference mainly served to endorse the actions and behaviour of the PAC 
leadership.”99 Not even two months after the Moshi executive meeting, Charles Lakaje,100 
who had been a PAC representative in Dar es Salaam, wrote a memorandum to the African 
Liberation Committee explaining why the Moshi conference was fundamentally flawed. He 
argued that “the non-participation of the general members in the Moshi conference, 
members in particular who had tabled grievances before the leadership, has caused great 
anxiety and uncertainty in the ranks of the Pan-Africanist Congress.” Therefore, a meeting 
of the general members was still -  if not even more -  needed in order to remedy the 
situation.101 Absent from the Moshi meeting was also the wish of the leadership to seek a 
fresh mandate from the general membership, which resulted in a widening of the gap
98 This resulted in the half-hearted effort by the PAC to try to hold unity talks with the ANC which has been 
mentioned in Chapter Two.
99 Lodge, Black Politics, 311.
100 Lakaje had arrived in Tanzania in July 1965 and was dismissed by Leballo in May 1966 over financial 
matters.
101 UCT, Department o f  Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Q (1), C.L. Lakaye, “A statement concerning 
the dispute within the Pan-Africanist Congress (S.A.) to the African Liberation Committee,” Dar es Salaam, 
17 November 1967.
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between the lead and the led, instead of narrowing the rift between the two. Because of the 
exclusion of rank-and-file opinion, the Moshi conference in effect “mainly served to 
endorse the actions and behaviour of the PAC leadership” under Leballo’s personal 
authority. As Lodge has observed, “the Moshi Conference presents an interesting contrast 
to the ANC’s own efforts at internal reform at Morogoro two years later,” which will be
1 O ')discussed in the next chapter.
Despite the adoption of a new strategic plan of a protracted rural-based guerrilla war 
by the PAC, the Moshi conference did little to address the problems experienced by its 
soldiers on the ground. Gross neglect of those guerrillas who had completed their military 
training and disenchantment with the leadership had led to a scattering of PAC military 
cadres throughout Africa. In November 1967, Lakaje notified the OAU that the PAC could 
not “boast of more than forty trained chaps under the control of the party,” while more than 
two-hundred members were strewn all over the world -  with about thirty members in 
Nairobi, twenty in Addis Ababa, thirty in Botswana and another fifteen scattered around a 
few more African countries. Over one hundred members lived in the US and about twenty 
in Europe.103 Although the accuracy of these figures cannot be verified, they are supported 
by Nkoana, according to whom in the Moshi aftermath, “80 per cent of the PAC’s 
militarily-trained cadres are disaffected, and are now scattered around the world.”104 After 
completing their training in military camps in Africa, these PAC members had been driven 
away by the upheavals of the leadership in exile -  although they voiced their preparedness 
to return once the party’s machinery had been streamlined. Moreover, from 1967 the
102 Lodge, Black Politics, 311.
103 UCT, Department o f  Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Q (1), C.L. Lakaye, “A statement concerning 
the dispute within the Pan-Africanist Congress (S.A.) to the African Liberation Committee,” Dar es Salaam, 
17 November 1967.
104 Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 60.
243
African Liberation Committee of the OAU made it a requirement of financial assistance to 
liberation armies in exile that they provide proof of new recruits. Because of the shortage of 
recruits, PAC cadres were allegedly being sent twice to the same training camp to give the 
impression that the PAC had more men to train -  thus adding to the frustration of PAC 
guerrillas.105
In August 1965 the ill treatment of PAC military cadres in the camps had resulted in 
a suicide by a man in Mbeya. After this death, the man’s wife in Lusaka twice attempted to 
commit suicide. Still nothing had been done to find out the causes of these suicide attempts. 
In 1966 the dissatisfaction of the rank and file at PAC camps in Tanzania reached another 
low. The cadres at a camp in Mbeya requested a meeting with the leaders in Dar es Salaam 
through Ntantala, who was in charge of the men. However, only Leballo went to Mbeya, 
with no explanation given for the absence o f the other leaders. A meeting was scheduled 
with the cadres which Leballo went on to address without observing the meeting 
procedures in use in the camp and without even inquiring about the cause that had 
necessitated the calling of the meeting in the first place. As a result, most of the cadres 
present left the meeting. Shortly afterwards, three PAC members were declared prohibited 
immigrants in Tanziania because, it was suspected, the PAC leadership must have made 
such a recommendation to the authorities. Some PAC cadres then notified the Area 
Commissioner in Mbeya of their determination to join a group of their colleagues in 
Tunduma, near the Zambian border, expressly to draw the attention of the Tanzanian 
government to “the illtreatment to which members are subjected by the leadership.” 
Representatives from the African Liberation Committee and Tanzanian Home Affairs met
105 UCT, Department o f  Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Q (1), C.L. Lakaye, “A statement concerning 
the dispute within the Pan-Africanist Congress (S.A.) to the African Liberation Committee,” Dar es Salaam, 
17 November 1967.
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the PAC men in Tunduma, where their grievances were disclosed. In particular they 
complained about the preferential treatment accorded to certain cadres by the leadership, 
including the cover up of petty crimes by some members, better medical treatment, the 
giving of monies on the sly, and the appointment to positions of trust. ‘Tribalism’ was 
perceived to be at the root of the problem with special treatment given to a group if cadres 
from the Cape (who, incidentally, came from the same area as those regional heads Leballo 
had appointed to the Presidential Council) to the detriment of cadres from the Transvaal, 
the Orange Free State and Natal.106
Far from bringing an end to it, the internal feuding in the PAC became intensified 
after Moshi. In December 1967 the PAC’s headquarters were moved from Tanzania to 
Zambia in order to carry out infiltration attempts from this base. The Liberation Committee 
had in fact threatened to suspend financial assistance if the PAC did not demonstrate some 
military operational effectiveness. After the aborted 1963 uprising, no military action had in 
fact been planned or staged by the PAC. In April 1968 a small unit of guerrillas of the 
newly designated Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) accompanied by Coremo 
forces went into Mozambique with the purpose of crossing into South Africa. They were 
however intercepted by the Portuguese and most of the PAC men were either killed or 
captured.107
Gqobose has argued that divergences within the PAC grew wider after Moshi 
because the majority of the APLA cadres in Zambia had become influenced by leftist 
politics after receiving Chinese training. They became so critical of the leadership based in 
Tanzania that this eventually “affected the relations between the PAC and the Zambian 
government to such an extent that the government threw the entire PAC membership out of
106 Ibid.
107 Lodge, Black Politics, 312.
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its country back into Tanzania.”108 Lodge, however, has argued that the PAC’s expulsion 
from Zambia was the outcome of the increasing disaffection of the rank and file with the 
leadership as a result of the failure of the Mozambique expedition. Moreover, the Zambian 
government claimed that the PAC had been involved in plotting against President Kaunda. 
The PAC’s expulsion from Zambia also resulted in the loss of OAU recognition as a 
liberation movement for a year. 109 In 1970, Leballo managed to once again secure the 
backing of the Tanzanian government after he appeared as state witness in the trial against 
Oscar Kambona and training of APLA men was resumed at a camp in Chunya (north of 
Mbeya) later that year. “From then onwards, Leballo could depend on the Tanzanian 
government’s support in suppressing any resistance to his authority.”110
The ‘London Debates’
Some steps towards strengthening liaison between the ANC external mission and the other 
organisations in the Congress Alliance were initiated around September 1965. On Oliver 
Tambo’s initiative, a series of meetings of supporters of the Congress Movement were held 
in London. Following these meetings, Tambo appointed an informal committee (composed 
of Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Slovo and Joe Matthews) to draft proposals for submission to the 
ANC external mission’s headquarters.
In November 1965 this informal committee produced a memorandum identifying a 
twofold problem. First was the problem of maintaining a close liaison between the 
leadership of all organisations in the Alliance, namely the SAIC, the SACPC, SACTU and
108 UFH, National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre, PAC Tanzania Mission, Gqobose, “The internal 
contradictions in the PAC since its inception.”
109 Lodge, Black Politics, 312.
110 Ibid., 314.
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former COD members. The committee proposed that a Special Liaison Group or 
Committee be immediately set up with the purpose of maintaining direct contact with the 
ANC headquarters and replace “the present unofficial and personal and often ragged links.” 
Such a Committee would consist of top-ranking members from the above mentioned 
organisations, as well as from the ANC, and function as a consultative body in a 
confidential manner (meaning that no formal offices or public image would be established). 
It was recognised that the solution was not “ideal,” but that it was nevertheless a start to fill 
some of the existing gaps in the external machinery of the ANC.111
Second, there was the issue of mobilisation at all levels of the large number of 
South Africans now residing in Britain (and London in particular) and in other European 
and North American countries. From around 1965 the ANC external mission, through its 
London office, had turned its attention to the problem of getting all ANC members and 
supporters engaged in one aspect or another of the work of the office. Several committees 
were established to deal with special issues such as ‘women’, ‘youth and students’, 
‘publicity’, ‘information and research’ and ‘films’, the aim being “to enable all 
Congressites and well-wishers to find some field in which they can make an effective 
contribution to the common cause.”112 Despite these efforts, it was reported that “a genuine 
problem” persisted:
For these supporters it is not enough to call on them to work in the various solidarity 
movements abroad. They also feel the need to work actively in the building of 
support for the organisations of which they are members at home.113
111 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Proposals for strengthening liaison between the External Mission o f  
the ANC and other organisations in the Congress Alliance, November 1965.
112 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC London Papers, Box 5, File 34, ANC Newsletter published by the ANC 
Office, 3 Collingham Gardens, London SW5 [1965].
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The question of mobilisation was distinguished from that of support for the ANC external 
mission. The belief that there must be only an ANC external mission backed by the whole 
of the Congress Movement, in which, however, all members would be active participants, 
was reaffirmed. Effective methods of participation thus needed to be agreed on for 
specifically mobilising members of all organisations in the Congress Alliance.114
The set of proposals, however, met no response from headquarters.115 In May 1966 
Reg September wrote to Tambo that “London needs to be put on a proper foundation 
organisationally.”116 September warned of a “new and dangerous development” which was 
beginning to show itself in London: the emergence of numerous Congress groups (an ANC, 
a CPC and a SAIC group), which he thought had to be questioned. He pointed out to 
Tambo that although small such units were necessary for maintaining contact with home, 
the present set up seemed “rudderless in the main.”117 For example, the SAIC and the CPC, 
although theoretically in the same Congress Movement, occupied separate offices in 
different parts of town,118 to the effect that “one office does not know what the other one is 
doing.”119 He suggested that the ANC should take proper control of affairs in London by 
setting up a Committee, headed by a senior figure such as Yusuf Dadoo, to handle 
Congress matters. In place of the present loose Congress committee, which had no formal 
relations with the ANC office and did not act under the direction of the ANC headquarters,
114 Ibid.
115 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 6, File 53, Problems o f  the Congress Movement 
[1966].
116 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, London, to O.R. Tambo, Morogoro, 5 May 1966.
117 Ibid.
118 The SAIC had a small office at the India League at 1 John Adams Street, while the CPC London 
Committee was initially based at 22 Pattison Road. After Barney Desai’s unilateral decision to dissolve the 
CPC and join the PAC, the remaining CPC supporters operated from the ANC London Office at 49 Rathbone 
Street.
119 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Reg September, London, to O.R. Tambo, Morogoro, 5 May 1966.
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new arrangements had be made so that all Congress elements could be readily marshalled at 
once whenever necessary, and not on a separate basis.
On the ANC’s request,120 a new memorandum was sent to Dar es Salaam by the 
Congress Committee in London which included an analysis of the present situation in 
South Africa and internationally and the proposal of a meeting. At the international level, 
the Committee pointed out that the liberation movement had suffered some major setbacks 
since the early 1960s, as Africa had revealed to be “an unstable factor as an aid and 
assistance to our struggle.”121 This was because, as Joe Slovo explained in later years, “the 
OAU had to accommodate itself to a unity which incorporated disparate levels of 
commitment to the anti-imperialist struggle,” which translated in practice in “less assistance 
and facilities than the amount [MK] needed.”122 Slovo also admitted that the degree of 
support for the struggle from African countries had been overestimated when he wrote: 
“We had a rather euphoric expectation of what the African states would be prepared to do 
for us. We thought they could even provide aeroplanes to drop our personnel. We were a 
little naive.”123 Shubin has claimed that by 1965, 85 per cent of ANC funds came from the 
Soviet Union and the socialist countries,124 rather than from African countries. The question 
of African support is an important point which has to be emphasised, given that in the early 
1960s the ANC had worked hard to make itself acceptable to independent African states so 
that it could become a beneficiary of their aid. The whole “African image” policy had been
120 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Duma Nokwe, Dar es Salaam, to Yusuf Dadoo, London, 24 May 
1966.
121 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 6, File 53, Problems o f  the Congress Movement 
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122 Joe Slovo, “South Africa -  No Middle Road,” in Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and Anthony R. Wilkinson, 
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centred around this issue. Early expectations that South Africa would be politically isolated
by the world community of nations had also gone unfulfilled. UN assistance had in fact
proved to be indecisive as a result of the undermining carried out by the major Western
powers, notably Britain, the United States and France.
On the home front, on the other hand, the London Committee spoke of the
liberation forces as engaged in a struggle for power by revolutionary means against the
apartheid forces in all fields: political, economic, social and military.125 Such was the
emergency situation that:
A nation at war requires a Council of War. [...] The leaders outside the country 
have to do what can no longer be done at home -  to formulate policy and take 
practical steps to give leadership to our respective communities and the South 
African people as a whole. It is in the spirit and tradition of our movement that all 
the various groups and organisations that constitute the forces of revolution in our 
country must do this work together and not in isolation from one another.126
The proposal of a Council of War (which can be viewed as a forerunner of the 
Revolutionary Council which was established at the Morogoro Conference in 1969) 
implied the recognition by the London group that armed activity was the most important 
strategy by which the struggle could now be advanced. Howard Barrell has argued that 
armed struggle emerged as the central feature of MK’s operational strategy at a very early 
stage, and that in fact the sabotage campaign was intended as a transitional phase towards
125 Such an assessment was very idealistic. Although MK fighters became engaged into battle against South 
African forces during the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns (discussed in Chapter Five), and one attempt after 
another was made to find a way back into South Africa, not a single shot was fired on South Africa’s soil until 
the collapse o f  the Portuguese colonial empire cracked South Africa’s strategic invulnerability open. The 
ANC, however, spoke o f  its forces as if  they were already at war with the enemy.
126 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 6, File 53, Problems o f  the Congress Movement 
[1966].
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• 127“the development of an armed force eventually mounting a broad revolutionary assault.” 
This view is supported by Shubin, according to whom “by the beginning of 1963 the 
Umkhonto High Command was not merely planning isolated acts of sabotage, but was 
working on strategies and tactics for a revolutionary war, an armed uprising in reply to 
armed repression by the government. The overthrow of the government by armed struggle 
[in other words, armed revolution] was the stated goal.”128 Whether this understanding was 
being given expression at the organisational level, is what was being questioned by the 
London Committee.
Moreover, following the arrest of the first and second NHC, MK’s leadership had in 
effect passed on to the ANC external mission, which had inherited part of MK’s leadership. 
An ANC committee known as the Planning Council was set up under Tambo’s overall 
leadership to replace the old NHC to give direction to MK and its operations. However, in 
exile, non-African communist leaders such as Joe Slovo who had played a prominent role 
in MK’s formation and initial sabotage plans now found themselves cut off from the
management of MK. And lastly, the military and political aspects of the struggle continued
to be kept as separate units in the ANC which still operated, in some respects,
independently from one another.
The machinery of the Congress Alliance as it existed in South Africa (which had in 
any case ceased to exist as a formal structure after the banning of the ANC) was 
acknowledged to be inadequate for the present tasks facing the movement. Since the 
Congress Alliance had fulfilled its historic role, the London Committee argued, new, 
appropriate organisational forms of alliance ought to be created. In the present conditions of
127 Howard Barrell, “Conscripts To Their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976-1986,” 
D.Phil thesis, St Anthony’s College, University o f Oxford, 1993, http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/librarv- 
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illegality or semi-legality where no formal delegates could be elected or given mandate to a 
conference, “constitutional niceties” could no longer be adhered to. The bulk of the ANC 
executive had been elected in 1959 in conditions of legality and under a general policy of 
non-violence. The liberation struggle had undergone a radical transformation since then 
(i.e. from non-violent tactics to armed struggle); despite this, the same leadership continued 
to function. The London Congress Committee urged that a top level meeting consisting of 
“a top level selection of leaders [...] whose authority and standing is such that it is not 
likely to be challenged” be convened by the ANC. Its purpose would be to work on the 
establishment of a body, a Council of War or Council of National Liberation, “enjoying the 
support of all constituents of the Congress Alliance,” “to plan and direct the overall strategy
1 OQof our movement.”
An ANC Sub-Committee, consisting of Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, and Duma 
Nokwe as convenor, met in Dar on the 24 August 1966 to respond to the suggestions made 
by the London Committee.130 The Sub-Committee asked the London comrades to spell out 
more clearly the idea of a Council of War, and drew attention to the fact that not all 
organisations formerly associated with the Congress Alliance (namely the SAIC and CPC) 
had officially adopted sabotage, and later armed struggle, as a new method of fighting the 
enemy. This they considered an important difference to be borne in mind “in considering 
the form and machinery of the different organisations,” which meant that:
The proposal to form a Congress Alliance machinery which will be a sort of
Council of War to direct, plan, and prosecute the armed struggle at home is
129 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 6, File 53, Problems o f  the Congress Movement 
[1966].
130 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 6, File 53, Report o f  the Sub-Committee on 
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incorrect as it ignores the decided policies of the various constituent organisations 
of the Congress Alliance.131
Instead, it was suggested that cooperation of the constituent organisations be found “in 
these fields where we have common tasks and can agree on common methods.” This could 
be achieved, for instance, by expanding the present Planning Council, by setting up sub­
committees, by involving Congress members in political international activities (such as 
delegations to conferences, seminars, and missions to other countries), in liaison with 
solidarity organisations and in propaganda and publicity work. As for the armed struggle, 
persons from all organisations would continue to be able to join MK on an individual basis.
Finally, the Sub-Committee expressed the view that “many of the problems could be easily
1 ^resolved if the leadership of the ANC was fully accepted by members of the alliance.”
The SACP in exile
Both the London Committee and the ANC Sub-Committee in Tanzania were composed of 
leading Communist Party members who, however, found themselves divided over the issue 
of external representation. These divisions within the exiled SACP leadership had started to 
show by the mid-1960s. In September 1964 a group of people, including Bram Fischer, had 
been arrested and charged with membership of the Communist Party. Fischer was granted 
bail to handle a case in London and after his return to South Africa in January 1965 he had 
gone into hiding to continue to lead the SACP underground. The internal underground 
apparatus, however, was already on its last legs, and Fischer’s sacrifice could do little to 
resuscitate it in any significant way. With his capture nine months later, the last thread of
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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contact with home was severed. Nevertheless, during his time underground, Fischer had 
been communicating with a group of Central Committee members in London operating
♦ 133from a small office in Goodge Street under the leadership of Yusuf Dadoo and Joe Slovo. 
Following the raid on the SACP’s underground headquarters at Rivonia in July 1963, the 
Goodge Street office also served as the premises for the editorial board of The African 
Communist, the SACP’s mouthpiece.134
In early 1965, the SACP leaders in London started receiving requests that they take 
over the whole leadership of the Party. The SACP group in London accordingly put 
forward to their colleagues135 in Dar es Salaam (referred to as “Hull” in the original 
correspondence) a twofold dilemma. The key questions that needed to be tackled were how 
to reconstruct the Party (both inside and outside) and how to establish a leadership which 
would be able to function. This, the London exiles explained, was because the organisation 
at home had been “so hammered” that it could no longer “provide an effective political and 
organisational leadership and want us outside to take over that responsibility.” 
Uncertainty was also expressed regarding the question of the relationship between the 
SACP and the rest of the liberation movement both inside and outside by asking whether 
the Party had any role to play in the plans of the ANC (called “Jane” in the correspondence) 
-  “whatever they may be.” Then, there was also the problem of cooperation between all the 
Congress Alliance groups. Lastly, the London-based SACP leaders asked clarification as to 
what “the whole future of MK from the point of view of the extent, if any, o f non-African
133 See Kasrils, ‘Armed and Dangerous’, 100.
134 Since the time o f  the publication o f  the third issue o f  the African Communist in September 1960 (in which 
the SACP openly associated itself with its publication for the first time), correspondence and subscriptions 
had been managed via an agent in London whereas its editorial board operated from Johannesburg. See Brian 
Bunting, “The African Communist,” http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/ioumals/African%20Communist.htm.
135 Notably the SACP General Secretary Moses Kotane and its Chairman J.B. Marks.
136 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, “The mission to Hull” [1965?].
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participation” may be. SACP leaders in Dar es Salaam were also asked to attend to the 
writing of articles for The African Communist, as none had been received from them. These 
matters, they argued, were so serious that they could not be properly addressed without 
getting together at once.137
Four months after these problems had first been raised, however, little or no 
progress had been made. As the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate, the 
SACP London group felt they were being “called on to formulate a line of policy and take 
immediate practical steps to implement it.” However, they reported that they had been 
“unable to proceed further” on both the question of policy and organisation because of the 
lack of participation and cooperation of their African comrades.138 In fact, the Central 
Committee members in London indicated that they were not sufficiently informed of 
developments in South Africa as well as of the views and plans of the ANC to be able to 
formulate policy. In terms of organisation, on the other hand, they felt they lacked the 
agreement of their colleagues in African countries on the suggestions they had submitted to 
them. Pending a full exchange of views and discussion, Central Committee members in 
London now claimed for themselves the authority “to go ahead and act as a political and 
organising leadership of the Party.” 139 Although members of the Central Committee in exile 
had met in Prague and then Moscow some time in 1963 and again in 1964,140 according to 
Maloka, it was only in May 1965 that the first important meeting of the SACP Central 
Committee took place. The purpose of the meeting, which was held in Prague, was 
specifically “to deliberate on the reconstruction of the Party in exile.”141 The Secretariat, to
137 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, “Matters which cannot be solved without get together” [1965?].
138 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, “The mission to Hull” [1965?].
139 Ibid.
140 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, London Secretariat, letter to Moses Kotane, 12 April 1965.
141 Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 11.
255
be known as the Central Executive Committee with headquarters in London, was formally 
authorised by this meeting, Dadoo was appointed assistant secretary to Kotane and given 
personal authority to act on behalf of the Secretariat. The Central Committee was also 
reconstituted to consist of those members who had been elected at the SACP’s fifth 
Congress in 1962. “Its responsibilities were to: (a) give political leadership and exercise all
t V ithe powers of a central committee provided for in the constitution adopted at the 5 
Congress; (b) work in liaison and consultation with Party apparatus inside the country; (c) 
draft and circulate to all members, both in and out of the country, general political 
directives from time to time, if necessary; (d) build the Party.”142
In early 1965, allegations of misappropriation of ANC funds on the part of the 
SACP were made by Kotane in his capacity as ANC Treasurer. These can be interpreted as 
further evidence of the internal divide within the SACP in exile and of the lack of effective 
communication both between its various segments and between the Party and the national 
liberation movement. In April 1965 the London Secretariat wrote a letter to Kotane firmly 
refuting his claim that the SACP in South Africa had received the sum of £ 40,000 which 
was destined to the ANC locally and “instead of handing the money to its rightful owners, 
these trustees [i.e. the SACP] expropriated it.” Kotane also maintained that the SACP at 
home had “doled out a portion of it to the ANC whenever it pleased them and insisted that 
they were giving the ANC a loan.”143 Some of these funds had been transferred to South 
Africa directly from London and some through Bechuanaland. However, according to the 
information the London Secretariat possessed at this stage, which was based on reports 
from Bram Fischer and the surviving underground, the SACP in South Africa had only 
received a total amount of £ 19,000 in the 1963-1964 period. Moreover, it was pointed out
142 Ibid.
143 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, London Secretariat, letter to Moses Kotane, 12 April 1965.
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that the Party in South Africa was paying out money to the ANC on a regular basis as well 
as “devoting a part of its resources to organise the escape of witnesses in various trials of 
ANC, MK and Party members and to pay part of the legal costs in certain smaller trials.” In 
the light of the foregoing and pending a reply from home, the London Secretariat concluded 
that “any judgement on the handling of funds by our Party at home would be wholly
i • «144premature at this stage.
In his autobiography, Turok has pointed out that “[tjhere had, for a long time, been 
a subtle division of labour in the movement, with our black comrades giving a higher 
priority to the ANC and a small group of whites giving priority to the [Communist] 
party.”145 The pattern of political exile which had emerged by the mid-1960s, whereby the 
majority of the SACP members in London (where by 1966 both the editorial of the African 
Communist and the Party Secretariat were based) were non-Africans, further deepened the 
divide within the Party, as well as between the ANC and the Party, along racial and 
geographical lines. Furthermore, the Africa-based leadership was perceived to be physically 
closer “to the ‘real’ struggle arena, whereas the London-based cadres were perceived as 
primarily garnering solidarity.”146 Lastly, as Ndebele and Nieftagodien have pointed out, 
“those communists who were based in Africa, such as Robert Resha and Tennyson 
Makiwane, had come under the influence of the very strong Africanist currents sweeping 
through the liberation movements in the 1960s.”147 On leaving Dar es Salaam for London 
in January 1969, Turok wrote to Tambo and the ANC executive to express his concern at 
the failure of the ANC to integrate him into the work of the organisation, which he came to 
interpret in racial terms:
144 Ibid.
145 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 211.
146 Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference,” 585.
147 Ibid., 584.
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During the first nine months of our stay in Dar es Salaam we were in fact treated 
with so much reserve that we got the impression that we were suspected on security 
grounds. Direct offers of total involvement were made to both Comrade Tennyson 
Makiwane in Kazungula and Comrade Tambo in Dar es Salaam but nothing resulted 
from them.
[...] It gradually became clear to us that the reason for the estrangement was our 
whiteness and nothing else. The question arises as to whether the individual leaders 
of the ANC with whom we worked in such harmony at home have changed their 
political outlook or whether they have been influenced in their attitudes by other
14ftconsiderations.
Central to understanding why these differences manifested themselves on the axis of 
geography and race was the SACP’s decision, on Kotane’s insistence, to abstain from 
establishing formal structures in Africa, including among military trainees in the camps.149 
This meant that “by 1966, only London had organised Party formation in exile.”150 Kotane 
in fact believed that the Party should “lie low” in Africa “so as to avoid offending states 
such as Zambia and Tanzania which felt more comfortable with the politics of the PAC 
than the ANC.”151 When Ben Turok arrived in Tanzania and raised the question of the 
absence of the SACP in Africa with Kotane, he was told in a “brief letter” that “there was 
no role for the party in the present circumstances and that any attempt to recreate the party 
would lead to the expulsion of the ANC from the region by governments which were 
hostile to communism.”152 Kotane’s approach on the relationship between the ANC and the 
SACP in exile mirrored and was consistent with the position he had adopted some years 
earlier on the question of the public emergence of the Party in South Africa. This had been 
raised at the SACP’s 1958 Conference and Kotane (and others) had successfully opposed it
148 Ben Turok, Confidential letter to the President and Members o f  the National Executive Committee, ANC, 
January 1969, reproduced in Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 216-217.
149 Lodge, Black Politics, 301.
150 Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 15.
151 Ibid., 17.
152 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 211.
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for fear that a premature announcement of the existence of the SACP may prejudice the 
work of the liberation movement as a whole.153 According to Slovo, Kotane “was driven in 
regard to his activities inside the Party by an endeavour to really assert the African 
personality both inside and outside the Movement” or, in other words, “to drive the Party to 
indigenise itself,” as well as by an “overriding desire to maintain the unity and cohesion of 
the national movement.”154 Moreover, Chris Hani explained that Kotane probably “felt that 
he himself was representing the Party in the ANC and that therefore there was no need for 
the Party itself. In a way he succeeded, he achieved the respect of OR [Tambo] and 
indirectly OR’s recognition of the Party is mirrored in Moses [Kotane].”155 This decision 
was taken not only to antagonise African host countries, but also to avoid creating tensions 
in the camps. Since recruitment in the SACP was at the time still secret (party membership 
was not by application; prospective members had to be co-opted into the party), SACP cells 
in military camps would have had to operate secretly. The SACP leadership understood that 
the conspirational nature of recruitment and work of the Party ran the risk of creating 
suspicions and divisions in MK. Essop Pahad has suggested that in any case the SACP was 
probably not ready for such a move at that stage, as the leadership itself was still working 
on how to function as a collective in exile.156
The SACP’s tactical decision regarding its presence in Africa and in the military 
camps does not seem to have affected the work of MK straight away. But in the long run, it 
is clear that the lack of organised Party activity in Africa, and MK in particular, did become
1 <7a problem and “actually a very big danger to the historical survival of the Party.” During
153 Interview with Brian Bunting, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 22 November 2004.
154 Quoted in Shubin, ANC, 112-113.
155 Quoted in Shubin, ANC, 112.
156 Interview with Essop Pahad, Cape Town, 9 February 2005.
157 Joe Slovo, quoted in Shubin, ANC, 113.
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the first formal meeting between the ANC and the SACP held after the Morogoro 
Conference, Joe Slovo explained that “[especially in the case of our members in Africa, 
both inside and outside, we have lost effective organised contact with them.” The 
decision not to establish SACP groups in the army had in fact made it “difficult as to how 
you mobilised your own Party members who were in the camps, and that was a great 
difficulty because we [the SACP] couldn’t then act as a cohesive image.”159 The question 
of establishing operative contact between the Central Committee of the SACP and the 
members of the Party in the army, as well as between the leaderships of the SACP and the 
ANC will be further analysed in the next chapter.
The first meeting of the Congress Alliance partners in exile
These internal differences within the SACP, and between the ANC in Tanzania and the 
SACP in London, emerged more clearly when a Consultative Conference of the joint 
Congress Executives was finally convened by the ANC in Morogoro on 26-28 November 
1966. This was the first official meeting of the Congress Alliance partners in exile.
The debate at the meeting essentially centred on the nature of the organisational 
structure at home and abroad on the basis of the exchanges of opinion which had taken 
place thus far between London and the ANC in Africa.160 The Africanists within the ANC
158 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Notes on the discussion between a delegation from the CC o f  the 
SACP and the NEC o f  the ANC [n.d.].
159 Interview with Essop Pahad, Cape Town, 9 February 2005.
160 Present at the meeting, which was chaired by Tambo, were: Ray Simons, Moses Kotane, Robert Resha, 
William Manila (aka Flag Boshielo), M.P. Naicker, Joe Slovo, Moses Mabhida, Joe Matlou, Alfred Kgokong, 
J.B. Marks, Johnny Makatini, John Pule, Reg September, Michael Harmel, Joe Matthews, Ruth Mompati, 
Duma Nokwe, Mandy Msimang, James Hadebe, Yusuf Dadoo, and Mzwai Piliso. UFH, Liberation Archives, 
ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 8, File 68, Notes on a meeting o f  the joint Congress Executives, 26-28 
November 1966, Morogoro.
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(and the SACP) attacked the idea of forming a Council of War. Robert Resha and Mzwai 
Piliso questioned the formation of a new body on the grounds that it was the ANC only that 
had taken the decision to embark on armed struggle while the rest of the Congress 
organisations had not. James Hadebe insisted that “the London sub-Committee should 
withdraw their claim to policy making and the formation of the War Council for this 
implies a doubt in the leadership.” Alfred Kgokong similarly complained of a “wavering 
attitude to the ANC leadership of this struggle by some of our colleagues.”161 One of the 
few people expressing sympathy with the London comrades and their problem was Flag 
Boshielo who argued that “we are all refugees and should not stick to the Constitution. We 
should accept members of other groups as we accept members of the ANC.”162
The non-African comrades, on the other hand, emphasised the importance of 
mobilising all racial groups in South Africa in order for the struggle to succeed. According 
to Ray Simons, support by the Indian and Coloured people for the ANC could be traced as 
far back as 1918, when the ANC had protested against South Africa being given the 
administration of South West Africa. Furthermore, the various legal organisations which 
opposed the government at home, such as the Black Sash and the National Council of 
Women, as well as individual progressive whites, constituted ground that needed to be 
attended to in order to help them keep the ANC’s image alive. Joe Slovo proposed a 
compromise solution of a machinery consisting of the three oppressed racial groups under 
the leadership of the ANC.163 Reg September agreed that the ANC should continue to lead 
the external mission as decided by all Congresses in 1962-3, but pointed out, as he had
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
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done before, that people in London, which represented a key area, had to be taken 
command of.164
Yusuf Dadoo showed signs of impatience with his African colleagues’ insistence on 
the Indian people being non-violent, an idea which he wished to rid the ANC of. During the 
time of the Rhodesian campaigns of 1967-1968, SAIC leaflets were distributed in South 
Africa which publicly asked the Indian people to support the armed struggle. Similar 
leaflets were also issued by the CPC calling on the Coloured community to welcome MK 
fighters because, the flyers read, “they are our own.”165 During an interview in 1968, Dadoo 
reconciled the tradition of passive resistance of the SAIC with support for the armed 
struggle by arguing that: “Passive resistance was never the ideology of the organisation [i.e. 
the SAIC], although it had been used as a method of struggle since it was introduced by 
Gandhi in the early part of this century.” It was true that some leaders in the SAIC, for 
example M.P. Naicker and Nana Sita, implicitly believed in the principles of Satyagraha, 
but these were never accepted by the Indian people as an absolute creed. When the ANC 
and the SAIC jointly embarked upon the Defiance Campaign in 1952, it was deliberately 
not called a passive resistance but a ‘defiance’ campaign. Although still non-violent, it 
expressed a more militant outlook, “because most of the leaders had realised that in the 
situation of South Africa, where violence was the normal instrument of Government policy, 
there could arise a situation where no alternative would be left to the people, if they were to 
continue to fight for their freedom, but to resort to violent methods.” Finally, Indians 
readily responded to MK’s call after its formation in 1961, and actively participated in its
164 Ibid.
165 CULLEN HSTPAP, A2675, III, 688, “Forward to Freedom!: we call the coloured community...” Leaflet 
in English and Afrikaans issued by the SACPC [1968].
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activities.166 SAIC members Ahmed Kathrada, Mac Maharaj, George Naicker, Indres and 
Steve Naidoo, Abdullhay Jassat and Laloo Chiba, for instance, had all been early MK 
recruits (although arguably they were brought into MK via their affiliation to the SACP 
rather than the SAIC). Many of them were arrested during the Rivonia period and served 
their sentences on Robben Island alongside ANC prisoners.
According to Dadoo, the ANC now had to decide whether it considered all racial 
groups necessary to the struggle or not, and, if necessary, how best they could be mobilised. 
The stage had been reached for Dadoo where “[t]he leadership which is being given by the 
ANC should be given by all,” as the people at home had been left in a vacuum and were 
looking up to the leadership outside for guidance.167 Joe Matthews came in his support by 
arguing. that full participation of other racial groups was not only necessary but 
indispensable to the struggle. This could only be achieved, not by forming a Council of 
War or similar Committee, or by extending the present Planning Council, but “by the full
1 £ Q
participation of our comrades in the work which the struggle demands of them.”
In the end, the meeting resolved to elect a Steering Committee composed of Yusuf
Dadoo, Michael Harmel and Oliver Tambo, and a Recommendations Committee with
Duma Nokwe, Joe Slovo, Alex La Guma, MP Naicker and Joe Matthews on it. Ndebele
and Nieftagodien have argued that:
The decision did not solve the question of full participation or open membership, 
but it did create avenues of cooperation among alliance leaders and opened the way 
for the [Communist] party to play a more influential role in shaping the politics of 
the alliance, and especially the ANC.169
166 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH05, Y. Dadoo, “The role o f the Indian people in the South African 
revolution,” An interview in 1968.
167 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 8, File 68, Notes on a meeting o f  the joint 
Congress Executives, 26-28 November 1966.
168 Ibid.
169 Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference,” 585.
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Another step forward towards the full mobilisation of all oppressed groups was the 
creation, after the 1966 Morogoro meeting, of the Cooperation and Coordination 
Committee (CCC) “as a mechanism for including minorities in the work of the ANC in
1 7 0exile and co-ordinating work among the Congress Alliance partners.” The CCC was an 
internal, non-public sub-committee of the ANC, whose members were appointed by the 
ANC by virtue of their past and present links with non-African organisations. According to 
Joe Slovo, “[f]or the first time members of the SACP were included officially in such 
apparatus”171 by virtue of their connection to the Party. The CCC worked with the ANC’s 
Planning Council on the military and other sensitive aspects of the ANC’s work. This 
enabled the SACP to throw its talent, resources and energies into the struggle more 
effectively than previously, especially in regard to the important sphere of internal work. 
No agreement, however, was reached on the question of open membership. It took almost 
another three years and the almost total disenchantment of the rank and file with the 
leadership for the ANC to give in to pressure to finally review its strategy and tactics.
Conclusion
As the external mission came to assume the leadership of the entire movement after 
Rivonia, the ‘African image’ proved to be unable to accommodate for the new conditions 
o f struggle. The pattern of political exile which had emerged by the mid-1960s posed a 
challenge to the ‘African image’ as this failed to incorporate the growing number of South
170 Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 16.
171 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Joe Slovo, Thoughts on the Future o f  the Alliance, April 1969. This 
seems to contradict Maloka’s claim that the Party was excluded from the CCC. See Maloka, The South 
African Communist Party, 16.
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Africans political exiles in London. Barney Desai’s dispute with the ANC external mission 
was indicative of the state of the movement in London, where, because of the “African 
image” policy, a large number of people were not being drawn into the work of the ANC 
office.
The inability to find a compromise solution to the problems of representation raised 
by Desai can be ascribed to several factors. First, the ANC continued to insist on the 
constitutional legitimacy of the “African image” policy. With most of the leadership 
imprisoned on Robben Island and Chief Luthuli restricted to his Groutville home in Natal, 
the external mission was wary of taking any bold decisions which it felt could be “effected 
and mandated only by a national conference held within South Africa’s borders.”172 This 
partly accounts for the slowness of the ANC leadership in exile in addressing the problems 
arising in this period. Second, personal relations and jealousies seem to have played a 
factor. Desai had a very charismatic, flamboyant and forceful personality; because of this 
he may have been perceived as a threat by some of the ANC colleagues who held 
leadership positions in the ANC external mission.173 Desai, for his part, probably expected 
to be accorded a more senior position when he entered the exile political scene. Finally, the 
failure to achieve an agreement was partly the result of poor communication within the 
movement -  both between the movement abroad and home, and within the movement in 
exile (i.e. between the London-based and Africa-based movement). The serious breakdown 
of communication with home during the years of ‘the lull’ is central to understanding the 
long and arduous road ahead of the movement, which greatly suffered from “the lack of
172 Ndlovu, “The ANC in Exile,” 446.
173 Interview with Reg September, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 15 February 2005.
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cross-fertilisation between the ideas that emerged from this re-think outside South Africa 
and from the re-evaluation that was taking place inside the country.”174
Underlying the debate around the “African image” was an enduring ideological 
tension between non-racialism and African nationalism within the ANC, which both 
preceded the exile history of the organisation, and was not resolved with the CPC men’s 
defection to the PAC, nor with the opening of membership at Morogoro in 1969, which will 
be analysed in the next chapter. The ‘London Debates’ can be viewed as evidence of a 
transition from the multi-racial approach of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s to the 
creation of a unitary, non-racial liberation front under the leadership of the ANC, a change 
which was further complicated by the “African image” strategy.
The merger with the CPC and an attempt to restore unity within its leadership at 
Moshi only defused the problems of factionalism the PAC had been suffering from since 
1963 and which had sprung into the open in Brasilia in 1966. The non-inclusive nature of 
the Moshi meeting, which “ended without any discussion of the grievances and demands of 
the rank and file,”175 can be viewed as the main reason for this. Because of this fundamental 
shortcoming, the ideological reorientation of the PAC from Lembedeist ideas to a Maoist- 
oriented approach to the armed struggle was of little help in lifting the fortunes of the 
organisation.
174 Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread, 102.
175 Nkoana, Crisis in the Revolution, 61.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Unrest, crisis, and resolution
The problems of representation discussed in the previous chapter signal a slow process of 
ideological as well as structural change within the exiled liberation movement. During the 
first decade of exile, a transformation started to take place from the multi-racial alliance of 
Congress Movement of the 1950s, to the creation of a unitary, non-racial liberation front. 
At the heart o f the debates between the ANC and its allies was the full incorporation of all 
South African exiles previously associated with the Congress Movement into the structures 
of the ANC external mission. Closely related to the question of non-racialism was the 
gradual adjustment of the ANC to the armed struggle, which was made difficult by the 
separation of political from military structures. The development o f the armed struggle 
during the 1960s became of one the very reasons why by the end of the decade the 
movement was faced with the urgent necessity to reconsider and revise its structure, 
strategy, programme and aims.
The turn to armed struggle
Before the opening of ANC membership at Morogoro in 1969, the transition from multi­
racialism to non-racialism had partially been achieved through Umkhonto we Sizwe. MK 
had been launched in December 1961 as a separate organisation from the ANC to carry out 
acts of sabotage. The new organisation relied on the ANC for political guidance and 
leadership (which was ensured by having ANC representatives serving on the NHC) and 
financial support, but carried on its independent recruiting and activities. The creation of a
special body was made necessary by the need to “preserve secrecy over the new forms of
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activity.” Because sabotage did not rely on the participation of the mass of the people but
could be carried out by small groups of trained men and women, MK decided that it need
not “involve the whole ANC organisation and its membership.” Furthermore, the
establishment of sabotage groups by other organisations, the SACP in particular, had made
coordination under a unitary structure necessary.1 Since its birth in December 1961, MK
accepted within its ranks people of all origins and functioned as a single non-racial
organisation.2 As Magubane and others have argued:
Although MK retained its own distinct structure and autonomy in order to protect its 
parent bodies, there was no doubt that a new conceptual and political boundary had 
been crossed in the race/class divide that had characterised the alliance [between the 
ANC and the SACP]. This practice attained full realisation at the Morogoro 
conference, where ANC membership was opened for the first time to members of 
the other congresses.3
MK’s initial programme of action had been a campaign of selective sabotage whose aim 
was “to bring the Government and its supporters to their senses,” before the country would 
spiral into a bloody civil war.4 By targeting government and military installations, power 
plants, telephone lines and transportation routes, MK hoped not only to weaken and hamper 
the enemy’s war effort and fighting potential, but also to “frighten National Party 
supporters, scare away foreign capital, and weaken the economy,” thus forcing the 
government to the negotiating table.5 This cautious approach may in part be attributed to 
the deep impact of the long years of non-violent, extra-parliamentary, constitutional
1 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 14, File 113, Report o f  the Sub-committee on our 
perspective [n.d].
2 In practice, however, “conditions on the grounds forced the [MK] units to operate along racial lines.” 
Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 113.
3 Ibid., 126.
4 “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (Spear o f  the Nation). Flyer “issued by command o f  Umkhonto we Sizwe” and 
appearing on December 16, 1961, document 66 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 716-717.
5 Mandela, Long Walk, 336.
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struggle which persisted even after the ANC was banned and after the decision to resort to 
armed, resistance was taken. It also reflected the fact that the ANC leadership was at this 
stage not united on the issue of violence.6 From a practical point of view, sabotage was 
adopted as the first of several stages towards a people’s war and its aim, Joe Slovo later 
explained, was to help bridge the “gap between the people’s disenchantment with 
exclusively non-violent methods, and their readiness and capacity to storm the citadels of 
the enemy.”7 In other words, sabotage was never envisaged as an end in itself, nor as a 
sufficient form of pressure which could on its own achieve the defeat of the enemy. 
Sabotage was to be employed as an auxiliary to other forms of military action while 
preparations (in the form of the training of an army) were being made for the beginning of 
the armed struggle proper. Although “the process by which this evolution [from sabotage to 
armed struggle] was never very clear,” as Rusty Bernstein wrote in his memoirs, “what was 
clear was that preparations for that next stage should begin even while sabotage was the 
only action on the agenda.”8 The principal purpose of Mandela’s tour the continent in early
6 ANC President Chief Luthuli was one o f  the main opponents o f  violent tactics and “it is unlikely that 
Luthuli ever fully reconciled himself with the decision.” Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 89. 
Although Mandela wrote in his autobiography that he was eventually able to convince the Chief to at least not 
condemn the decision, the timing o f  MK’s launch (six days after Luthuli received his Nobel Prize for Peace in 
Stockholm) must have been, in Mandela’s words, “awkward” at the least for the both Luthuli and the ANC. 
Mandela, Long Walk, 336-7. Tambo, who accompanied Luthuli to Stockholm, must have felt the same way. 
Callinicos claims that Tambo “was neither disturbed nor surprised by the turn o f  events” inside South Africa. 
Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 281. Joe Matthews, however, painted a rather different picture when he said in an 
interview with Peter Delius that: “Tambo was very upset by the decision to embark on armed struggle” to the 
point that “I think he actually wrote a letter... to the leadership inside the country... questioning this 
approach... It’s only when Mandela toured and met Tambo outside the country that... the strategy eventually 
was accepted by Tambo.” Joe Matthews, quoted in Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 90.
7 Slovo, “South Africa -  No Middle Road,” 185.
8 Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 233. Original emphasis.
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1962 had in fact been to secure the provision of military training facilities by independent 
African states.
The quest for outside military support must have started even before Mandela’s trip, 
as the first group of recruits9 sent abroad for military training left South Africa for China on 
31 October 1961, that is, before the actual launch of MK’s sabotage operations on 16 
December 1961.10 These trainees were in fact members of SACP (rather than MK) proto­
military cells, and were incorporated into MK only on their return from China. Magubane 
and others have established that the SACP took a formal decision to embark on new 
methods of struggle long before the ANC did, and that the SACP’s contribution to the 
initial formation of MK structures was very significant. When the state of emergency 
imposed during the post-Sharpeville crisis was finally lifted at the end of August 1960 and 
the thousands of people detained released from prison, the discussion of new methods of 
struggle was already under way within the Party. In August 1960, a paper by Michael 
Harmel entitled “South Africa: What Next” was circulated internally by the SACP’s 
Central Committee.11 The SACP’s formal decision to turn to alternative methods of
1 9struggle can be pinned down to as early as the December 1960 Party Conference. At the 
conference, however, little time was devoted to the question of armed struggle in actual 
discussions, as the event ended up being taken over by external developments in the 
international communist world, notably the coming into the open of Sino-Soviet 
hostilities13 at the November 1960 international meeting of Communist Parties in
9 Raymond Mhlaba, Steve Naidoo, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Joe Gqabi and Patrick Mthembu were 
in this group.
10 Elias Motsoaledi, quoted in Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 84.
11 Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 81.
12 Ibid., 82-83.
13 The split had become public during the June 1960 Congress o f  the Romanian Communist Party.
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Moscow.14 The SACP and the ANC thus initially went on “separate, quasi-armed paths” 
and, although they “were moving in the same direction,” they were “not quite on parallel 
tracks.”15 Once the decision to form MK was taken by a group of the ANC and SACP 
leaders, the embryonic quasi-military units organised by the SACP (which had thus far 
worked within the overall Party cell-structure) were merged into the newly established MK 
regional and national structures.16
It was planned that the armed struggle would initially take the form of guerrilla 
warfare, which would be followed by a general uprising. The plan was outlined in detail in 
a draft document, Operation Mayibuye, which became the most incriminating piece of 
evidence at the Rivonia trial. Operation Mayibuye contained the pragmatic observation that 
“very little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by means 
of mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to 
victory by military means.” As in the Cuban model, the launching of the armed struggle 
would have to be “sparked o ff’ by guerrilla operations (concentrated mainly in the rural 
areas) carried out by small groups of trained men who would be infiltrated back into the 
country. 17 The Cuban revolution provided a fresh and powerful model of a guerrilla 
campaign which had succeeded against all odds. In Africa, Algeria represented another
14 The SACP was represented in Moscow by Yusuf Dadoo, Vella Pillay, Joe Matthews, and Michael Harmel. 
Here the South Africans raised the question o f  armed struggle and possible support among socialist countries 
for the first time. After Moscow, the group proceeded to visit China, where training for the first group o f  
cadres who left in October 1961 was probably secured. Harmel then returned to South Africa just in time to 
attend the SACP Congress at the end o f that year. See Magubane et al., “The turn to armed struggle,” 81, and 
Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 225-226.
15 Ibid, 227.
16 This was achieved not without problems. See Magubane et a l, “The turn to armed struggle,” 90-125, and 
Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 230-1.
17 “Operation Mayibuye,” document found by the police at Rivonia, 11 July 1963, document 73 in Karis and 
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 761.
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• 18important source of inspiration for South African nationalists and communists alike. 
Meanwhile, popular resistance in Pondoland highlighted the potential of rural struggles for 
starting a general insurrection in South Africa itself (arguably, however, the nationalist 
leadership overestimated such potential while underestimating the capacity of the state to 
crush these revolts).
Although the defence at the trial maintained that Operation Mayibuye had not yet 
been approved -  and thus implemented -  the turn to armed struggle was also a turn to 
revolutionary strategy which in many respects involved a rupture from the past and not 
simply a transition or evolution. Whether or not all three bodies (i.e. the ANC, the SACP 
and MK) had formally approved Operation Mayibuye by the time the plan was confiscated 
by the police at Rivonia,19 its main guidelines (i.e. guerrilla warfare) must have at least 
been approved in principle. Some weeks before the Rivonia raid, Joe Slovo and J.B. Marks 
had in fact left South Africa to take the new plan outside the country and discuss its 
contents with Tambo and the ANC external mission, and its needs with African 
governments.20
The decision to embark on guerrilla warfare, whose ultimate aim was the overthrow 
of the South African government by armed revolution, from around mid-1963 made the 
continued separation of political from military structures increasingly problematic. By
18 See Martin Legassick, Armed Struggle and Democracy: The Case o f  South Africa (Uppsala, 2002); and 
“Armed struggle in South Africa: consequences o f  a strategy debate,” Journal o f  Contemporary African 
Studies, 21 (2003), 12-16.
19 According to Bernstein, Sisulu and Kathrada, and contrary to Mbeki and Slovo, Operation Mayibuye had 
only received the approval o f MK’s NHC and the document was met by a great deal o f  criticism from outside 
its ranks. Within the SACP Central Committee, Slovo, Mbeki, Goldreich, and Mhlaba were strong supporters 
o f the plan, whereas Bernstein, Kathrada, and Bram Fischer were against it. See Bernstein, Memory Against 
Forgetting, 250-2.
20 Joe Slovo, “The sabotage campaign,” Dawn, Souvenir Issue, 1 January 1986, 24.
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1965, if not earlier,21 MK had come to be openly regarded as the armed wing of the ANC, 
which had assumed its leadership.22 The ANC/MK leadership in exile understood in 
principle that the dual form of organisation and recruiting which had been employed during 
the sabotage period had become unsuitable for the implementation of the next operational 
stage. Unlike sabotage, guerrilla warfare could not be just the affair of a small group of 
“courageous, selfless and dedicated men.” Being envisaged as “a popular people’s war 
against a people’s enemy,” its success would rely on the extent of the participation of the 
masses. People would therefore have to be prepared politically as well as psychologically 
for the war effort and “the hardship and suffering that accompany such a war.” Most of all, 
they would have to be “made to feel that it is they who have declared war against the 
enemy.” Political work among the masses could only be carried out under the political 
programme of a political organisation, the ANC, which in turn must be involved as a whole 
in the military struggle.23 As a result of this understanding, MK structures had thus become 
subordinate to the overall political leadership of the ANC external mission. Yet, the 
military and political aspects of the struggle continued to be kept in practice as separate 
units, which still operated, in some respects, independently from one another. This meant 
that the ANC had not geared itself as a whole towards revolutionary strategy and tactics -  
the army leadership concerned itself with military work, whereas diplomatic work 
continued to be the main focus of the political leadership.
21 As early as April 1963, the ANC executive at the time still active in South Africa had issued a written 
statement in which Umkhonto was publicly declared to be the “specialised military wing” o f  the “mass 
political wing o f  the struggle, spearheaded by the ANC.” See “The people accept the challenge o f  the 
Nationalists,” statement “issued by the National Executive o f  the ANC,” 6 April 1963, document 69 in Karis 
and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 749.
22 Shubin, ANC, 66.
23 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 14, File 113, Report o f  the Sub-committee on our 
perspective [n.d].
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The separation of the military from the political movement also had a theoretical 
dimension, as the creation of MK in the first half of the 1960s had marked, “a change over 
from legitimate extra-parliamentary struggle to violent revolutionary struggle” which had 
not, however, “been accompanied by a similar qualitative change in our thinking -  in our 
political strategy and objectives.”24 The Freedom Charter had been drawn up during the 
days of legitimate, extra-parliamentary struggle and “drafted with a view to providing the 
broadest possible basis for a meeting point -  a meeting between the White minority and the 
disenfranchised majority.” The document, which had been written “without a revolutionary 
mind,” had nevertheless remained at the basis of the movement’s political objectives even 
after the turn to armed struggle.25 So, although the ANC had by the mid-1960s “adopted a 
truly revolutionary method,” at the same time it had not changed its programmes, “attitude 
and state of mind to correspond to the new phase” of the struggle. In other words, it had 
been “conducting a revolutionary War without a revolutionary theory.”26
As a result of this contradiction, the ANC experienced potentially disintegrative 
internal strains and disputes, which by the late 1960s had reached the point of threatening to 
destroy the organisation, and which can be viewed as the main thrust behind the call for a 
consultative conference in Morogoro in 1969. At a leadership level, these tensions, which 
have been described in Chapter Four, concerned issues of representation and structural 
change and, ultimately, political strategy. At a rank and file level, they were the result of a 
growing frustration in MK camps (which was primarily due to inaction and the inability to 
engage directly with the enemy) and of a crisis of confidence in the leadership in the 
aftermath of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns. The Morogoro Conference of 1969
24 UCT, Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P8, Internal Position [n.d.].
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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marked the culmination of a process of reassessment of the movement’s strategy, tactics 
and organisational structure, and has been interpreted by historians and participants as one
77of the most critical cross-roads in the history of the South African liberation struggle.
The Morogoro conference of April-May 1969 can be viewed as the climax of the 
discussions and exchanges that had been taking place between the political leadership of 
the ANC external mission and members of other Congress organisations in London 
throughout the second half of the 1960s. The demands of the supporters of the former 
Congress Alliance for participation in the ANC were in fact fulfilled at Morogoro with the 
opening of membership to all exiles regardless of race and the creation of a new non-racial 
body, the Revolutionary Council. The ultimate catalyst behind the decision to convene a 
consultative conference, however, did not originate in London, but from within the ANC 
itself, and more specifically within MK, which by the end of the decade had reached a state 
of desperate crisis.
Strategic problems
Once the decision to embark on guerrilla warfare was taken, MK’s leadership identified a 
series of problems which would make the armed struggle a prolonged and difficult one. 
These were outlined in a strategic document which can be dated to about 1964. The first of 
the disadvantages faced by MK was that its enemy had at disposal of the “most powerful 
modem army in the Continent” with 250,000 armed men and women ready for action at a 
moment’s notice.28 On top of this, they possessed a highly developed intelligence
27 Maloka, for instance, has argued that the conference was “a watershed in the history o f  the liberation 
movement in exile.” Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 21.
28 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 14, File 113, Report o f  the Sub-committee on our 
perspective [n.d].
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machinery, they enjoyed the support (overt or tacit) of the major Western powers, and 
received training in counter-guerrilla tactics which the U.S.A. provided to all friendly 
countries, South Africa included. On the other hand, in the period between the arrest of the 
first NHC at Rivonia and of the second NHC just over a year later, MK could still count on 
a force of approximately 300 men and women outside South Africa who had been trained
• • • 29in varying degrees for guerrilla warfare, and on 1,000 people inside trained for sabotage. 
The number of people recruited for military training outside increased in the next few 
years, and it has been suggested by Shubin that by the mid-1960s Umkhonto “had about 
500 well-trained fighters at its disposal.”30 This was partly to the detriment of MK’s 
internal structures, as the cadres that were sent out for training could no longer play the 
roles they had been assigned to inside the country.31 Membership inside was further 
decimated by a second series o f mass arrests starting in July 1964 which led to the 
apprehension and conviction of the second NHC in the ‘little Rivonia’ trial. Moreover, the 
overwhelming majority o f the oppressed people in South Africa were both unarmed and 
untrained in modem warfare. Finally, MK’s own intelligence system had at this stage yet to 
be developed.32
From the point of view of logistics, most of South Africa’s terrain consisted of “flat 
and barren land except for isolated areas.” Despite the presence of some mountains, and a 
few dense forests, these were not sufficient to provide the guerrillas with ideal cover or 
potential bases to be set up by the guerrillas. Secondly, water being “a basic requirement 
for a guerrilla unit,” a water problem was identified in the country. Drought was a common
29 Ibid.
30 Shubin, ANC, 65. This number presumably refers to MK members outside South Africa.
31 Houston, “The post-Rivonia ANC/SACP underground,” 613.
32 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 14, File 113, Report o f  the Sub-committee on our 
perspective [n.d].
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phenomenon throughout South Africa, where the rivers were few and not navigable, as they 
tended to flood in the rainy season and had little or no water in the dry season.
But possibly the greatest military problem faced by the ANC throughout the 1960s 
(a problem which persisted well into the next decade and beyond) was a geographical or 
physical one: the lack of friendly border countries in which MK could establish rear bases. 
Until the mid-1970s, when Frelimo and the MPLA freed Mozambique and Angola from 
Portuguese colonial rule, South Africa remained protected by a cordon sanitaire of colonial 
territories and friendly states. In the 1960s, South West Africa (today independent Namibia) 
was under illegal South African occupation, while Angola and Mozambique were still 
Portuguese colonies. Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared independence 
(UDI) from Britain on 11 November 1965, and its racist white minority regime headed by 
Ian Smith became allied to its South African counter-part.
Given these internal and external constraining factors, there had been an early 
recognition that the idea of sending a task force invading from outside was unrealistic. 
However, trained MK cadres would still have to return to South Africa to organise, train, 
and arm the people for guerrilla warfare.34 The problem of infiltrating trained guerrillas into 
South Africa had been made more even more difficult by the arrest of the second NHC, 
followed by that of Bram Fischer in 1965, which marked the final blow to the fragile 
internal underground apparatus. Meanwhile, after completing their military training in 
African and socialist countries, MK recruits were being sent back to the camps in Tanzania 
and Zambia, where they were sitting around “sweltering in the hot sun of tropical Africa”35 
and growing more and more impatient.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Shubin, ANC, 126.
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With its forced withdrawal from the Commonwealth in May 1961, South Africa had 
forfeited any dim chance it may still have held that the British Protectorates of 
Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland would one day be brought under its ‘wing.’ 
Four principles came to govern South Africa’s policy of what Verwoerd’s successor, John 
Vorster, called “good neighbourly relations” with the former High Commission Territories. 
First, not to interfere with one’s neighbour; second, to avoid aid which violated the 
receiver’s “self-respect;” third, to always put South Africa’s interests first; and, finally,
37there was the notion that different nations developed at different rates of progress. These 
principles were translated into Vorster’s pragmatic policy of detente with independent 
black states in the region, the first example of which was his meeting with future Prime
3RMinister Chief Leabua Jonathan of the BNP on the eve of Lesotho’s independence.
Although Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were all independent by the end of
1968,39 they “were nevertheless too economically reliant on South Africa to provide secure
bases for exile South African organisations.”40 As South Africa’s Minister of Information
C.P. Mulder bluntly put it during a parliamentary debate on 21 September 1966:
Economically we are so powerful that these countries cannot afford to become 
involved in a struggle with us. [...] We will not try to compete with any other 
country to buy the favour of these states. We believe unambiguously, because of the 
graphic and strategic situation of those states in relations to South Africa and South
36 In 1963, Verwoerd had again put forward the idea o f  incorporating the High Commission Territories, and 
the “offer” was renewed once again by Vorster in 1966. The British government, however, never treated these 
invitations as serious declarations o f  intent. See PRO: DO 212/4.
37 PRO: DO 212/4, Republic o f  South Africa, House o f  Assembly Debates, First Session, Third Parliament, 
19-23 September 1966, 2554-2557.
38 See Terry Bell in collaboration with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid 
and Truth (Cape Town, 2001), 55.
39 Botswana was the first Protectorate to become independent on 30 September 1966, followed by Lesotho on 
4 October o f  the same year, and Swaziland on 6 September 1968.
40 Lodge, Black Politics, 295.
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Africa’s situation in relation to them, that there will always be from their side as 
well as from our side a permanent desire for friendly relations.41
As described in Chapter Three, the British High Commission government had actively and 
repeatedly obstructed the PAC in its efforts to establish headquarters in Basutoland between 
1963 and 1965. The possibility of using Botswana as a route for infiltration was also tested 
without success. Two two-member MK units, as well as a few ZAPU guerrillas, crossed the 
border into Botswana in August and September 1966 but were all intercepted and arrested 
by the local police. Following their deportation to Zambia, the Botswana government made 
clear that it would not tolerate its territory being used, be it for overt or covert military 
operations against South Africa.42 The victory of the South Africa-friendly BNP, the rival 
organisation to the PAC-allied BCP, in the April 1965 elections, coupled with the threat of 
retaliation by the powerful apartheid state, terminated any residual hopes the South African 
liberation movements may still have held of establishing safe rear bases in independent 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.
This meant that the South African liberation movements had no contingent borders 
from which they could operate, nor were there any established routes through which their 
armies could be infiltrated in significant numbers, which rendered the external military 
threat posed by their armies almost negligible for a long time to come. Despite the objective
41 PRO: DO 212/4, Republic o f South Africa, House o f  Assembly Debates, First Session, Third Parliament, 
19-23 September 1966, 2565-2567. Although Mulder was referring to diplomatic relations with the 
Protectorates in this speech, the quote nevertheless seems apt here.
42 Rendani M. Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston, and Bernard Magubane, “The Wankie and 
Sipolilo Campaigns,” in SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol., 1, 484-486.
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difficulties it faced, the ANC continued to insist that armed struggle in the form of guerrilla 
warfare was the correct and only viable tactic to adopt.43
Discontent in MK camps
In mid-1964 the government of Tanzania granted the ANC a tract of land on which to 
establish a military camp near the town of Kongwa, in the Dodoma region of central 
Tanzania. ZAPU, Frelimo, SWAPO and the MPLA’s armies also established their own 
camps in this region shortly after. Archie Sibeko (aka Zola Zembe), who was deputy camp 
commander (and later camp commander)44 of the first group of MK freedom fighters to 
arrive at Kongwa, described the facilities, which had been part of the British colonial 
government’s post-war ground nut scheme, as consisting of “two deserted buildings. Inside 
was a kitchen, toilets and showers, all in need of cleaning and repair.”45 For the first few 
months the recruits worked on getting the camp up and running with the equipment and 
provisions donated by African and socialist countries and supplied through the OAU. Land 
was cleared for the cultivation of agricultural produce, an aqueduct system was developed 
to supply the camp with clean water, and a health clinic was established for the medical 
care of the camp inhabitants and in later years catering for the local population as well. 
Cultural and leisure activities proliferated at Kongwa (such as study and discussion classes,
43 For an in-depth analysis o f  this tactical decision see Barrell “Conscripts to their Age,” 
http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/sources/barrel thesis/CHAPTl.htm; MK: The A N C ’s Armed Struggle 
(Johannesburg, 1990).
44 Ambrose Makiwane was Kongwa’s first camp commander, Joseph Jack deputy commander (alongside 
Archie Sibeko), Chris Hani camp commissar, Mjojo chief o f  staff, Isaac Makopo chief o f  logistics, Walter 
Mavuso chief o f  communication, and Albert Moloi chief o f  intelligence. Makiwane was replaced for a short 
period by Joseph Jack. When the latter was recalled to Morogoro, Archie Sibeko took over the post. See 
Archie Sibeko with Joyce Leeson, Freedom in Our Lifetime (Durban, 1996), 81, 84.
45 Ibid., 81.
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football matches, music, conceits and singing) in which other liberation movements in the 
area also participated. Great emphasis was placed by the ANC, through its department of 
public relations (established in 1967 and based in Morogoro), on the need to promote and 
foster friendly relations and mutual understanding with both the local community and the 
Tanzanian government and its civil servants.46
Despite these achievements, Kongwa was far from being a ‘garden of Eden.’ The 
limited evidence that is available suggests that by 1966 the ANC “faced tremendous 
resentment from people in the camps”47 resulting in a series of rebellions, desertions or 
what could be interpreted as small mutinies, knowledge of which has since been buried by 
the ANC. These incidents are only mentioned in brief by commentators and their exact date 
and number remains uncertain. According to Sibeko one occurred in 1966, shortly before 
he left for Cuba to represent the ANC at the May Day celebrations in Havana that year. 
Journalist Terry Bell has dated another mutiny to 1964 and has included Amien Cajee 
among the mutineers.49 As Kongwa was only established in mid-1964, it is unlikely that a 
defection would have happened at such an early stage. Moreover, Amien Cajee was part of 
a group of deserters who escaped from Kongwa after the Wankie campaign and found 
asylum in Kenya, where they made their grievances public in 1969.50 Lodge has also 
spoken about a group of defectors who fled to Kenya in 1968.51 These different accounts 
suggest that the mutiny Cajee was involved in, which Bell has also referred to, is likely to
46 See Ibid., 81-84, and Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 463-466.
47 Interview with Terry Bell, Muizenberg, Cape Town, 19 February 2005.
48 Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 85. This incident is also described in Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and 
Sipolilo Campaigns.” 483.
49 Bell, Unfinished Business, 228-229.
50 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
51 Lodge, Black Politics, 300.
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have happened in 1967-1968. By early 1969 the number of MK refugees in Kenya could 
have been as high as eighty.
After being given conventional training in guerrilla warfare in various African 
countries,53 about forty MK recruits “selected on the basis of their having, as much as 
possible, passed metric [sic], or who really could write, read and understand instructions”54 
were sent for further training to the Soviet Union in mid-1963. There had in fact been “a 
realisation that there was a need to train people in urban guerrilla warfare,” because the 
training offered by African states, Egypt in particular, only imparted skills in conventional 
combat. Mark Shope, Chris Hani, Lambert Moloi, Archie Sibeko, and Mavuso Msimang 
were among the MK activists who were trained in Moscow for six months.55 Another small 
group of seven MK men went to Czechoslovakia in 1963-4. Among them were Joe Modise, 
Raymond Mhlaba56 and, according to Bell, Amien Cajee.57 Like the Moscow group, they 
were also taught in “fighting from the kitchen sink” by old Czech partisans who had fought 
in the urban resistance against the Nazis during the Second World War.58 These various 
cohorts of MK recruits, who were the first to have received training in the Soviet Union and 
eastern Europe, converged as they were all assigned to Kongwa. Once back in Tanzania, 
disagreements started to develop as they became aware that orthodox combat skills (which
52 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 27 January 1969.
53 Mandela and Tambo’s visit to African countries in 1962 had secured training facilities from Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
54 Mavuso Msimang, quoted in Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 481.
55 Ibid. See also Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 458-9, and Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 79-81.
56 Shubin, ANC, 65.
57 Interview with Terry Bell, Muizenberg, Cape Town, 19 February 2005.
58 Bell, Unfinished Business, 228.
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was the type of training the majority of MK recruits were imparted at this stage) were “of 
no use in an urban underground environment.”59
Disputes also arose out of the different type of training MK recruits had received 
depending on whether they had been trained in the Soviet Union or China, and “reflecting 
the current political position of their trainers.”60 The impact of the Sino-Soviet split on MK 
may have been more divisive than it is conventionally acknowledged. Although the ANC, 
unlike the SACP, tried to steer clear of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it nevertheless found itself 
entangled in it by way of its connection with the SACP and its unequivocal pro-Moscow 
sympathies. In 1967 the Central Committee of the SACP issued a resolution rejecting the 
“departure of the Mao Tse-Tung leadership from the principles of scientific socialism” and 
criticising China for undermining the unity and impeding the progress of the anti­
imperialist front through factional and disruptive activities in the trade union, national 
liberation, peace and other international organisations. In terms of the South African 
freedom struggle, China was accused of “opportunism and lack of principle” for its backing 
of the PAC and other smaller groups which were “known to all, including the Chinese 
government, for their racialism, anti-communism and disruption of the liberation 
struggle.”61 By the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the ANC had 
also come to openly side with the Soviet Union within the international communist 
movement. A cooling of relations between the ANC and China had started to show 
towards the end of 1963, and according to Shubin all assistance from China ceased by
59 Ibid.
60 Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 82.
61 UCT, Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, 08 .5 , South African Communist Party, Central Committee 
resolution on the international communist movement, 1967.
62 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC London papers, Box 2, file 11, Statement by the ANC (SA) on the 
situation in Czechoslovakia, signed by Secretary General DumaNokwe, 19 September 1968,
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1965.63 In MK, those fighters who had received early training in China were now “looked 
upon with scorn and mistrust” by fellow guerrillas, while anyone who dared criticise the 
Soviet Union was “branded as a deviate Maoist and revisionist, or alternatively, an 
imperialist and branded a fifth columnist who was against the liberation of South Africa.”64 
The leadership attempted to settle the ideological conflict between those MK members who 
took a Soviet and those who took a Chinese position by sending Kotane to Kongwa to 
remind the guerrillas “that the camp was an ANC rather than a SACP one.”65 The incident 
is likely to have had some influence in convincing Kotane that the SACP should not 
establish its own independent presence in MK. Moreover, from now on, all Marxist 
literature and discussion classes were banished in MK camps.66
The atmosphere at Kongwa was becoming one of growing discontent, as MK 
trained guerrillas now found themselves stranded and without any foreseeable prospect of 
going back to South Africa to fight the enemy. By 1965, between four and five hundred 
people had come to be indefinitely stationed at Kongwa, which had only been intended as a 
transit camp for people en-route to South Africa.67 As it gradually became clear that they 
“were in for a long wait” before they could return ‘home,’ the guerrillas’ morale started to 
sag. According to Sibeko, these difficulties “in every aspect were made worse because we
63 Shubin, ANC, 68.
64 Statement by Amien Cajee, Omar Bamjee, Hoosain Jacobs, and Maurice Mthombeni, quoted in Sunday 
Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
65 Thula Simpson, “The People’s War o f  Umkhonto we Sizwe, 1961-1990,” Ph.D thesis, Birkbeck College, 
University o f  London (2007).
66 Ibid. According to Stephen Ellis, however, the ban in MK camps was only on Maoist (and not Marxist in 
general) literature. He has also claimed that MK trainees were withdrawn by the ANC from Chinese military 
academies around 1964. This, he has argued, was the work o f  the SACP, which led the ANC to side and form 
alliances with other pro-Soviet liberation movements, such as ZAPU, the MPLA and Frelimo, in the region. 
Stephen Ellis, “The ANC in exilq,” African Affairs, 90 (1991), 442.
67 Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 82.
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[the leadership] did not adjust our tactics sufficiently to changing circumstances,” the most 
obvious being “that there were likely to be delays infiltrating people into South Africa.”68 
Although every effort was made to run the camp on a permanent alert so that the guerrillas 
would stay out of trouble, loitering inevitably created problems. Among these were 
boredom and financial difficulties experienced by individuals, which in turn led to breaches 
of security and discipline, alcohol and cannabis abuse and theft. Although relations with the 
Tanzanian locals have been remembered as good and “generally amicable, there were 
cadres who acted irresponsibly and committed petty crimes,” with a few cases of assault 
against the local community occurring.69 Sexual relationships with local women also 
created problems, as “MK cadres smuggled women into the camp whenever an opportunity 
presented itself’ where they would then make use of the water supply because of its 
scarcity in the area.70 Lastly, ethnic or tribal differences sometimes developed into enmity 
between different groups, with cadres of Zulu-Sotho origins feeling they were being 
discriminated against by the predominantly Xhosa leadership.71
Although transcending ethic or tribal factional differences had been one of the main 
aims of the ANC since its founding, its stereotyping as a Xhosa-dominated organisation has 
been a common instrument of criticism against the organisation throughout its history. The 
ANC leadership has persistently rejected such allegations and has always been careful in 
having other ethnic groups represented at a senior level (for instance through Chief 
Luthuli’s election as ANC President). But it was true that the large majority o f the ANC’s 
high-ranking officers had historically come from a Xhosa background. The question 
therefore arises as to why, during certain times of crisis, the way in which problems would
68 Ibid., 84.
69 Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 466, 468.
70 Ibid., 468.
71 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
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be experienced and explained by some of the non-Xhosa ANC members was along the lines 
of ethnicity.
The transfer of headquarters from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro in 1965 had caused a 
prolonged series of difficulties between James Hadebe and the remaining executive of the 
ANC which ultimately resulted in Hadebe’s resignation in December 1967. Hadebe had 
been removed from the post of chief representative in Dar es Salaam and relocated to 
Morogoro as Director of Youth and Students and Head of the Welfare Department, 
something he had resented as “a subtle transfer amounting to me being deposed without 
being told.” In a letter to a Commission of Enquiry set up by the ANC in order to 
investigate his problems and recommend an appropriate solution, Hadebe, who was of Zulu 
origins, complained of “favouritism closely bordering on tribalism,” particularly Xhosa vs. 
Zulu, in the Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and London offices.72
A power-rivalry with ethnic undertones had also developed between Ambrose 
Makiwane and Joe Modise. Modise, whose origins were Sotho, had been appointed Army 
Commander in 1965 following the arrest of Wilton Mkwayi (the last o f MK’s commanders 
to operate internally) -  a decision Makiwane was unhappy with. Makiwane’s arbitrary 
dispensation of corporal punishment has been quoted as the issue over which the two 
eventually had a fall-out. The dispute between Makiwane and Modise was only resolved 
through the intervention of Tambo, JB Marks and Kotane and with Makiwane’s removal 
from the army and his transfer to Cairo as ANC chief representative in Egypt.
The complaint that the ANC was dominated by Xhosa-speakers was, like some 
other debates which emerged during the exile period, repeated on Robben Island. The
72 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 15, File 122, James Hadebe, Issues influencing my 
thinking at present, Dar es Salaam, 21 February 1967.
73 See Ndlovu, “The ANC in exile,” 466-467 and footnote 183, and Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 83.
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ethnic composition of the High Organ was the source of some controversy among political 
prisoners on the Island as all four of its permanent members (Nelson Mandela, Walter 
Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba) were of Xhosa background. According to 
Mandela:
This was a matter of coincidence rather than design; the senior ANC leadership on 
the island, the only four to have served on the National Executive Committee, 
happened to be Xhosa. It would not have been proper to take a less senior comrade 
and put him on the High Organ simply because he was not a Xhosa. But the fact that 
the High Organ was Xhosa-dominated disturbed me because it seemed to reinforce 
the mistaken perception that we were a Xhosa organization.74
In order to remedy such perception the decision was eventually taken to have a fifth,
rotating member on the High Organ. This would usually be a non-Xhosa person.75
Problems of discipline were by no means confined to the rank and file. In 1969 the
corruption and inefficiency of the ANC leadership at training camps was revealed publicly
through several reports circulated by the South African police which appeared in the
Johannesburg Sunday Times. They talked about “a widening rift in the ANC between rank
and file and the leaders” caused by the latter’s luxurious living.77 One article, based on
extracts from a statement by Amien Cajee, Maurice Mthombeni, Omar Bamjee and
Hoosain Jacobs (who had deserted MK and were now based in Kenya) described life at
Kongwa as “farcical.” The guerrillas were said to be enduring shortages of food, cigarettes
and medical supplies and to be going about in “rags” because, it was discovered, “the
leaders were doing a thriving business in the People’s Bazaar, a shop in Dar es Salaam,
with clothes and provisions” which had been sent from foreign countries and which should
74 Mandela, Long Walk, 526.
75 Ibid. See Also, Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 195.
76 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 27 January, 2 February, 6 July 1969
77 Brigadier P.J. Venter, quoted in in Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 2 February 1969.
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have been destined to the men in the camps.78 Ambrose Makiwane, Kongwa’s first camp 
commander, is variously remembered for being drunk on duty, as a result of which he 
would give unfair orders and gratuitously administer harsh treatment to his soldiers, 
including corporal punishment in the form of beatings and lashings.79 Female recruits had 
started to arrive in small groups to join the men at Kongwa. Following their arrival, a 
woman soldier was allegedly raped by a visiting member of the executive, and the cover up 
of the abuse fuelled the guerrillas’ bitterness towards their leaders.
Some of these problems were not unique to MK but troubled other national 
liberation armies as well. In her account of the mutinies surrounding the assassination of 
ZANU’s National Chairman Herbert Chipeto in 1975, Luise White has spoken about 
shortages of essential commodities (such as food and clothing) and war material in the 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Other complaints by ZANLA’s 
rebel groups included the neglect of guerrillas on the front by the leadership, corruption, 
tribalism, preferential treatment and unjust punishment.81
In February 1966 the ANC Executive had made a first attempt at dealing internally 
with some of the difficulties of exile. On 27 February 1966, a meeting of the Executive 
Committee was held at headquarters “to rid the organisation of certain weaknesses and 
tendencies,” and to rectify the present state of “looseness and laxity” which was corroding
78 Mthombeni’s statement, quoted in Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
79 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969. The allegations against Makiwane are also confirmed by Archie 
Sibeko. See Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 83.
80 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 321.
81 Luise White, The Assassination o f  Herbert Chipeto: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Bloomington, 2003), 
20 .
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the organisation.82 A list of problems was identified, beginning with an alarming freedom 
of action, with members undertaking missions on their own initiative and moving from 
their allocated area without reference to the executive. This had been possible because 
individual members of the ANC external mission had so far been able to work with little 
supervision and control. Callinicos has argued that Deputy President Oliver “Tambo, in 
fact, was not at that time necessarily regarded as the top leader. He was one among equals 
in a culture of collective leadership.”84 Nor were Tambo’s personality and approach 
towards his colleagues ever authoritarian in style -  and the downside of this was that 
indiscipline tended to be punished sparingly. An attempt was henceforth made to reassert 
Tambo’s authority as “Commander, director and controller of the organisation.”85 Chief 
Luthuli’s death later in the year, however, was to reopen the question of succession, and 
rather than “the natural heir” of Luthuli, Tambo continued to be seen as “the diplomatic 
representative, chief of the [external] Mission.”86 Secondly, the image of the ANC was 
being damaged by the “unhealthy behaviour” of some of its leading members, in the form 
of drunkenness and “destructive gossip and rumour-mongering.”87 Finally, the leadership’s 
attitude to funds had to be corrected. Given the severe conditions under which the struggle 
was now being conducted internally, a resolution was passed to ensure adequate financial 
provision for the struggle at home. Moreover, it would from now on be “the duty of all
82 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 16, File 134, Resolutions Adopted by the 
Executive o f  the African National Congress (SA) [1966]. This meeting is also discussed in Ndlovu, “The 
ANC in exile,” 448-450.
83 Ibid.
84 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 325.
85 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 16, File 134, Resolutions Adopted by the 
Executive o f  the African National Congress (SA) [1966].
86 Ben Turok, quoted in Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 325.
87 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 16, File 134, Resolutions Adopted by the 
Executive o f  the African National Congress (SA) [1966].
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members [of the external mission] to strictly conserve the funds of the organisation and to 
spend with thrift.”88 The problems here identified, and which the ANC executive attempted 
so resolve (although not very effectively) in February 1966, were however limited to the 
political leadership, and did not include an analysis of the state of affairs in the army, which 
was deteriorating rapidly.
Frustration over returning ‘home’ led a small group of MK recruits from Natal to 
steal some trucks and drive off from Kongwa in early 1966. Whether their intention had 
been “to make their own way home,”89 or “to discuss their grievances with the leadership” 
in Morogoro,90 they were nevertheless intercepted by the Tanzanian authorities within 
eighty kilometres of Kongwa and taken back to the camp.91 Joe Modise set up a formal 
commission of enquiry with charges of desertion and theft. Moses Mabhida, MK’s national 
commissar, disagreed with Modise, arguing that since they were trying to go back to South 
Africa, the cadres were not deserters.92 During his career in MK, Modise gained a 
reputation for his militarism, which some attributed to his tsotsi past as a youth in 
Sophiatown.93 In the end “nothing happened about the incident,” and after being 
reprimanded by the leadership, the rebel men were relocated to Zambia.94 This may have 
very well been in view of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns.
88 Ibid.
89 Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 85.
90 Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 483.
91 Ibid., and Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 85.
92 Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 85.
93 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 345. See also Ellis, “The ANC in exile,” 443.
94 ‘Gizenga’ Mpanza, quoted in Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 483.
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The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns
Despite its hopelessness, the truck incident was symptomatic of the degree of ferment in 
MK camps, and may have been a factor in the ANC’s decision to form an alliance with 
Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1967.95 One of the 1966 
truck incident survivors later noted: “the leadership became conscious that something had 
to be done regarding our eagerness to go home and fight.”96 After Rhodesia’s UDI, ZAPU 
had also taken up the armed struggle and set up an armed wing, which, like MK, had a base 
in the Kongwa area. In 1967-8, MK-ZAPU combined forces embarked on a series of
• 0 7  •military incursions by crossing the Zambesi River from Zambia into Rhodesia. Prior to 
this, a small MK unit linked with Frelimo had been sent into Mozambique from Tanzania 
in May 1967 to explore the possibility of infiltrating South Africa through its north-eastern 
comer. Although Frelimo had liberated some parts of Mozambique in the north, there were, 
however, no liberated areas in the south of the country. The plan of reaching South Africa 
through this route was soon abandoned,98 thus leaving Southern Rhodesia as the only 
practical option still open.
The 1967-8 Rhodesian campaigns were launched in a climate of pressures from the 
OAU Liberation Committee and the governments of Zambia and Tanzania, who were 
demanding the liberation movements action, and of increasing discontent in MK camps.
95 Talks about establishing a military alliance between the ANC and ZAPU had started in 1966 and a group o f  
MK and ZAPU activists was given the task o f  undertaking reconnaissance work into Rhodesia. See Ralinala 
et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 486; Nicole Van Driel, “The ANC’s first military operation: the 
Luthuli detatchment and the Wankie campaign,” MA thesis, UWC, 2003, 
http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/librarv-resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/chapter-two.htm.
96 ‘Gizenga’ Mpanza, quoted in Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 483.
97 For a full account o f  these campaigns see Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” Nicole 
Van Driel, “The ANC’s first military operation,” http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/librarv- 
resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/menu-index.htm: and Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 87-93.
98 Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 487.
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The first incursion, which lasted from August to September 1967, and is generally referred 
to as the Wankie campaign, was announced on 19 August 1967 in a joint statement signed 
by Oliver Tambo and JRD Chikerema, ZAPU’s Vice-President. “Furious fighting” was 
reported in the Wankie Reserve area after MK and ZAPU freedom fighters had “marched 
into the country [Southern Rhodesia] as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound 
to its destination.”99 A second MK-ZAPU incursion took place between December 1967 
and June 1968, and a third one in July 1968. These attempts became known as the Eastern 
Front, or Sipolilo campaigns. The ANC’s aim was a double one. The first was to establish a 
secure base in Rhodesia for future transit; the second was to create a route, “a Ho Chi Minh 
train to South Africa,”100 through which MK cadres could be infiltrated back in the future. 
The idea was that the MK-ZAPU detachment would split into two, with a small unit of MK 
members heading for South Africa, where each of them would have to reach a specific 
region he had been assigned to in order to help with the political mobilisation of the people 
inside.101 It was also hoped that if South Africa became involved in counter attacks actions, 
Britain could no longer refrain from directly intervening in the Rhodesia, whose external 
relations she was responsible for. The British government did register a formal protest with 
Pretoria arguing that it should have sought Britain’s consent before entering Rhodesia, but
107no further action was taken.
Although the intention had been to avoid contact with civilians and most of all 
confrontation with Rhodesian forces, the guerrillas’ presence in Rhodesia was soon
99 ANC-ZAPU Alliance, Declaration by Oliver Tambo, Deputy President o f  the African National Congress, 
and JRD Chikerema, Vice-President o f  the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 19 August 1967, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/or/or67-6.html.
100 Chris Hani, “The Wankie campaign,” in Dawn, souvenir issue, 1986, 35.
101 Van Driel, “The ANC’s first military operation,” http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/librarv- 
resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm.
102 PRO: FCO 25/512.
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detected by the authorities and several armed clashes ensued. By mid-August 1967 the 
South African Security Police had also become involved in the anti-insurgency operations. 
On 8 September, Vorster admitted in a public speech that South Africa had decided to send 
police units to Rhodesia with the approval of the Salisbury government, and that South 
Africa would “act in any country where we are asked to act by the Government of that 
country.”103 According to British government sources, South Africa had sent eighty 
members of its police force to the Wankie Reserve area as well as equipment -  three police 
helicopters and three or four Saracen armoured cars -  to assist the Rhodesian authorities. 
There were also some fears that, should guerrilla activity continue and intensify, Salisbury 
might retaliate against Zambia for providing a base for guerrilla operations, for instance 
through an air strike or some other form of military action, possibly with South African 
help.104
The campaigns, which produced MK’s first heroes and martyrs to have fallen in 
battle, came to occupy a powerful symbolic place in MK’s popular history. The Wankie 
and Sipolilo fighters were “pioneers,” as they attempted to open a corridor leading into 
South Africa for the first tim e.105 They laid the “foundation stone”106 of MK’s “perennial” 
preoccupation, i.e. to send trained cadres back to South Africa to reconstruct the political 
underground and resuscitate the struggle inside the country.107 Wankie also marked the 
beginning of the armed struggle proper, as, for the first time in the history of MK, and 
indeed for the first time since the crushing of the Bambata rebellion of 1906, black South
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 See Dawn, souvenir issue, 1986; and Van Driel, “The ANC’s first military operation,” 
http://ww\y.sahistorv.org.za/pages/library-resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/chapter-five.htm.
106 Hani, “The Wankie campaign,” in Dawn, souvenir issue, 1986, 35.
107 Shubin, ANC, 101.
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Africans engaged in armed combat against their white rulers. To MK veteran James April,
who took part in campaign, “the bravery of the Wankie guerrillas meant that oppressed
108people around the world could once again hold their heads high.” As MK leader Joe 
Slovo admitted years later, “Umkhonto never had possessed the fire power to win a full 
scale war: its purpose was to show Africans that they didn’t have to be victims but could 
contest and fight.”109 In this sense, Wankie and Sipolilo performed an important 
psychological role in the minds o f black South Africans (both in MK and among the 
country’s population at large) against the might of the South African state.
But the immediate effects of the Rhodesian campaigns were disastrous. These 
attempts at getting back via Rhodesia failed in both their missions, and resulted in several 
casualties and the imprisonment of many guerrillas, some of whom had retreated to 
Botswana and ended up being sentenced from three to six years in prison. Among them was 
Chris Hani, the political commissar of the Luthuli detachment (named in honour of the 
ANC President who had died on 21 July 1967 just before the Wankie invasion was staged), 
who spent almost two years in Gaborone’s maximum security prison. The Wankie and 
Sipolilo military debacles led to further demoralisation, not only within MK, but also in the 
movement as a whole.110 Archie Sibeko captured the mood of the time when he wrote that, 
in the period following Wankie, “the armed struggle seemed to be in a lull, trained MK 
people were being neglected and a gulf seemed to have developed between most of the 
leadership and the rank and file. Even Kaunda noticed something was wrong and referred
108 Quoted in Van Driel, “The ANC’s first military operation,” http://www.sahistorv.org.za/pages/librarv- 
resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/introduction.htm.
109 Gillian Slovo, Every Secret Thing: My Family, My Country (London, 1997), 154.
110 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 214.
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publicly to ANC leaders, who were usually seen in hotel restaurants, as ‘chicken-in-the- 
basket freedom fighters’.”111
Terry Bell has interpreted Wankie as “a suicidal venture,” and claimed that many of 
those who fought in the campaign, including Chris Hani, became “convinced that they [the
119leadership] had basically deserted them, that they had sent them there to get killed.” A 
number of desertions occurred during the period of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns as 
several MK guerrillas abandoned the camps when they learned that their names were on the 
list for Rhodesia.113 Among them was Gerlad Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu’s 
nephew, who claimed that operation in Rhodesia “was never properly explained to us [i.e. 
MK fighters]. We just got everything through the grapevine. We were told that all the guys 
who were fighting there had been wiped out.” For this reason Sisulu decided he “wanted no 
part” in the plan and went AWOL in Dar es Salaam were he was picked up by the police 
and ja iled .114 Stephen Ellis has also argued that some of the Wankie survivors who “were 
highly critical of the leaders who had sent them into Wankie badly prepared and supported” 
were detained by the ANC in Tanzania.115 Among those who managed to flee to Kenya 
(where ANC activities were restricted by the government) were Cajee, Mthombeni, Bamjee 
and Jacobs, who in 1969 issued a statement (consisting of one joint and four individual 
statements) which was sent to several Western organisations (including the British AAM,
111 Archie Sibeko, Freedom in Our Lifetime, 95.
112 Interview with Terry Bell, Muizenberg, Cape Town, 19 February 2005.
113 This contradicts the generally accepted view that those MK soldiers who took part in the Wankie and 
Sipolilo campaigns were all volunteers. See Ralinala et al., “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns,” 492. 
Stories o f  coercion also appeared in the Johannesburg Sunday Times in January 1969. The extent to which 
these articles can be regarded as a reliable source is o f  course questionable as the South African Police was 
involved in circulating the information. See Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 27 January 1969.
114 Quoted in Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 221.
115 Stephen Ellis, “Mbokodo: security in ANC camps, 1961-1990 ,n African Affairs, 93 (1994), 286.
295
the Dutch Committee on Africa, the World Council of Churches, and the UN Committee
for Relief of Political Refugees).116 In the document the four men criticised Wankie as an
operation staged “to get rid of unwanted dissenters,” and especially those critical of the
“Tambo, Kotane, Nokwe, Modise clique,” who they accused of treating “the lives of
freedom fighters as a cheap commodity.” The Rhodesian campaigns, they claimed, were
nothing more than a ploy in which dedicated men were deliberately sent down for the
ANC’s “own prestige and material benefit.”117 Twenty years on, however, Hani defended
the Wankie campaign as the correct thing for the movement to do at the time from those
118who criticised it as “an exercise in adventurism and a glaring example of desperation.” It 
could therefore be argued that rather than the Rhodesian campaigns per se, it was the 
failure of the leadership to deal with their aftermath which became the subject of bitter 
criticism from MK’s rank and file.119 According to Joe Matthews, when those who survived 
the campaigns went back to Zambia and Tanzania, “there were no medals; there was no
official ceremony for the returning heroes. They just returned and the same routine of the
110camps carried on, with no acknowledgement of their role.”
116 Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
117 Statement by Amien Cajee, Omar Bamjee, Hoosain Jacobs, and Maurice Mthombeni quoted in Sunday 
Times, Johannesburg, 6 July 1969.
118 Hani, “The Wankie campaign,” Dawn, souvenir issue, 1986, 37.
119 See Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference,” 586-590.
120 Joe Matthews, quoted in Ibid., 587.
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The Hani memorandum
On their return to Zambia in late 1968, Hani and six other MK commissars and
191commanders who had been involved in the operations in Rhodesia found that “there was 
a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction in the movement and that there was an urgent desire
199 • •for radical changes in organisation, policy and strategy.” Acting “with the sole intention 
of invigorating the movement with a new spirit,” and driven by an “immediate concern to 
return to our country in order to confront the enemy” and “to create a feeling of urgency 
that would lead to a renewal of the offensive against the enemy,” they voiced their 
criticism to the leadership. They first put together a list of critical points of discussion, 
which was presented by a delegation of three of their members to the ANC General 
Secretary, Duma Nokwe. Although Nokwe “took up a hostile attitude” and dismissed the 
points raised as “trivial,” an interview was granted with the executive in Lusaka. At this 
meeting, which was attended by six members of the executive, Hani and his comrades were 
asked to type up the draft statement they had prepared and to provide all members of the 
executive with copies.123
121 Hani and a second man had taken part in the Wankie invasion as political commissar and section 
commander respectively, and were among those who were served with terms o f  imprisonment in Botswana. 
Another member o f  the group was a deputy leader o f  communication in Lusaka. A fourth had been in charge 
o f medical supplies and taken part in medical missions during the fighting in Rhodesia. And a fifth man who 
worked for the Commissariat also went into Rhodesia on several occasions. See UCT Manuscripts and 
Archives, BC 1081, P7, Grounds o f  appeal and addendum thereto in the matter o f  expulsion from the African 
National Congress o f  Jeqa Buthelezi, Wilmot Hempe, Alfred Khombisa, Wilson Mbali, Jackson Mlenze, 
Chris Nkosana [pseudonym o f  Chris Hani], Bruce Pitso, March 1969 (hereafter ‘Grounds o f  appeal and 
addendum’).
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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Hani and his comrades then drew up a memorandum,124 known as the Hani 
memorandum, which “made serious allegations about the way the struggle had become 
stalled and about deficiencies in the leadership,” and called “for the creation of a new 
leadership, which would be younger and bolder in planning return home.”125 The document 
fiercely criticised the leadership for neglecting those guerrillas who had taken part in the 
Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns and for its failure in giving information about “the fate of 
our most dedicated comrades in Zimbabwe.”126 This was attributed to the fact that MK was 
“being run independently of the political organisation,” to the point that the political 
leadership was said to be “[un]aware of activities and the plans of MK.”127 As Callinicos 
has argued, the memorandum “had hit out at the gross contrast between the political and 
military wings of the organisation.”128 Its authors rejected “the careerism of the ANC 
abroad, who have, in every sense, become professional politicians rather than professional 
revolutionaries.”129 The weaknesses complained of in the memorandum were attributed 
specifically “to wrong policies and to personal failures of some of the leaders.”130 Joe 
Modise and Duma Nokwe were accused of living luxuriously in exile in sharp contrast with
124 The memorandum is variously referred to in the secondary literature (Lodge, Black politics, Karis and 
Gerhart, Nadir and resurgence, Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, Turok, Nothing but the truth, Ndebele and 
Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference: A moment o f  self-reflection”). Only Shubin, however, quotes 
directly from the memorandum.
125 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 214.
126 Chris Hani’s memorandum, 1969, quoted in Shubin, ANC, 86.
127 Ibid. Shubin has argued that this was an unjust accusation. However, the relationship between the military 
and the political counter part, and the question o f  creating a central leadership were among the central issues 
discussed during the Morogoro Conference.
128 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 324.
129 Chris Hani’s memorandum, 1969, quoted in Shubin, ANC, 85-6.
130 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P7, Grounds o f appeal and addendum.
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the harsh conditions of life in MK camps; Moses Kotane was also singled out for “giving
1^1
priority to exile over ‘home’.”
The Hani memorandum can be viewed as expression of the dissatisfaction which 
had been growing for some time within the ANC in exile; the grievances it raised “went 
much further than the outburst of the seven rebels emerging from Botswana’s prisons. 
Underlying the anger was the deep unease that the struggle, after almost a decade in exile, 
had failed.”132 It was supported by another memorandum submitted to the ANC by Ben 
Turok.133 Turok had got first hand experience of the crisis that was affecting the movement 
since his arrival in Tanzania in 1966. On initial contact with the formal structures of the 
movement in exile, he found that the ANC office in Dar es Salaam was in a state of 
“disarray” and that generally “the organisation was not in good shape.”134 Turok gradually 
came to the conclusion that the ANC’s reluctance in getting him involved in the work of the 
external mission was to some extent “due to an unwillingness to reveal to us just how deep 
the malaise was.”135 He also observed “that one of the problems was the looseness of ANC 
structures and the lack of political coherence,” which he partly attributed to the lack of 
Communist Party structures in the region.136 Just before leaving Dar es Salaam for London 
in January 1969, Turok finally voiced his criticism in a “blistering” memorandum which, 
together with the Hani memorandum, “convey[s] the complex interplay of material,
131 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 34. See also Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro 
Conference,” 587-588.
132 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 322.
133 See Ben Turok, “What Is Wrong?” A discussion on the present situation in the South African liberation 
movement, reproduced in Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 287-301.
134 Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 198.
135 Ibid., 210.
136 Ibid., 211.
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1 “X Idiplomatic, political and psychological problems facing the ANC in exile”. Turok
complained of maladministration, authoritarianism, and drunkenness on the part of ANC
officials. But it was the rise of elitism and the attitude displayed towards MK soldiers
which angered him the most:
Perhaps the most deplorable aspect of the work of the movement in Dar es Salaam 
is the treatment meted out to our military comrades. A number of officials working 
at political posts have openly shown the most appalling contempt for the army men, 
failing to exercise common courtesy let alone according them the honour they 
deserve.138
Joe Matthews has claimed that the ANC leadership did not officially discuss the Hani 
memorandum, and that rather than responding specifically to the document, Tambo 
proposed that a consultative conference be convened instead.139 This, however, does not 
seem to be entirely accurate. The immediate response of the ANC to the criticism of Hani 
and fellow signatories was in fact quite severe. At the next meeting between the seven 
disaffected men and the executive, members of the military headquarters were also present 
without prior knowledge of the former, on the grounds that the memorandum had been 
distributed to other MK members without permission from the leadership. After this 
meeting, orders were given out for the arrest of Hani and his comrades, which was halted 
by Tambo’s intervention, and a military tribunal (composed of three members of the 
military and two members of the NEC) was set up instead. The charges against the 
signatories of the memorandum were that they had drafted and circulated a document 
without prior permission, and that they had communicated military or classified 
information to unauthorised persons.140
137 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 35.
138 Turok, “What Is Wrong?”, in Nothing but the Truth, 293.
139 Joe Matthews, quoted in Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 34.
140 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P7, Grounds o f appeal and addendum.
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Hani observed in retrospect that “people generally were not used to being 
criticised,”141 and this may have been why the memorandum was met with such offence by 
the leadership. The seven authors of the memorandum were expelled from the ANC by the 
military tribunal in Lusaka on 25 March 1969, and the decision was ratified by 
headquarters in Morogoro on 28 March.142 For some within the leadership (among them 
Joe Modise), infuriated by the criticism levelled against certain individuals, and especially 
Kotane who had recently suffered a stroke and was still under medical care in Moscow, the 
men’s actions amounted to treason. Accordingly, they demanded that the authors of the 
memorandum be executed.143 It was only thanks to what Hani later described as Tambo’s 
“intelligent leadership”144 and inclusive approach that this was avoided in the end.
Following their expulsion by the tribunal, the men appealed to the forthcoming 
national conference to be held in Morogoro, asking for their convictions and sentences to 
be overruled. In their defence, they claimed that the events leading to their expulsion “arose 
out of differences of opinion concerning policy and out of criticism of various ANC 
leaders.” Because the complaints voiced in their memorandum were of a “political nature” 
they should have been dealt with, the seven men claimed, “in a comradely manner as a 
political issue.” Instead, the leadership had “transformed the issue into a matter of military 
discipline, and thereby obscured and diverted attention from the political questions 
involved.” They further argued that the proceedings in the trial had been unfair. Various 
senior comrades, among them Joe Modise145 and Duma Nokwe, were said to have been
141 Quoted in Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 325.
142 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P7, Grounds o f appeal and addendum.
143 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 326.
144 Quoted in Ibid., 325.
145 An ethnic or tribal divide had emerged between the supporters o f  Chris Hani and Joe Modise. Hani’s group 
came to be known as the “Cape men;” its followers were Xhosa speakers, and it included most o f  the ANC
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hostile and to have show “strong prejudice” against them even before the tribunal was 
constituted. The charges had been vague and at no time presented in writing. The 
composition of the tribunal was questioned as biased, as it included members of the very 
executive whose quality of leadership was under challenge; the proceedings of the trial, 
where they accused were summoned to appear individually and not collectively, and where 
the witnesses testifying against appeared in the absence of the accused, were rejected as 
irregular and “contrary to the principle of justice.” Finally, the men pledged their 
unwavering loyalty to the ANC, and argued that political differences ought to be resolved 
“not by punitive action but by a frank exchange of views for the purpose of arriving at a 
correct revolutionary strategy.”146
Shubin has acknowledged that despite the “excessively dramatic language” of the 
Hani memorandum, “the problem raised in it had hampered ANC activity and threatened 
the very existence of its military wing.” Furthermore, “in the opinion of Hani himself, it 
was due mainly to this memorandum that the ANC conference, convened in April 1969, 
included the participation of not only leaders and high-ranking commanders but rank and 
file from the camps as well.”147 Probably, it was also as a result of the memorandum that 
Hani gained the reputation of being “impatient with exile politics, submission to problems 
and inactivity.”148 The signatories of the Hani memorandum, however, did not take part in 
the conference because of their expulsion, so “the leadership’s claim that it had convened a
leadership and Tambo himself. On the other hand, Modise, who was renamed “Commander o f  the Sothos” by 
his opponents, attracted the support o f  urban Transvaalers who felt discriminated against as a result o f  the 
leadership’s bias in favour o f  fellow Xhosa-speakers. See Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 345-346.
146 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, P7, Grounds o f appeal and addendum.
147 Shubin, ANC, 88.
148 “Chris Hani, a drawing by a close political activist,” Dawn, souvenir issue, 1 January 1986, 39.
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fully representative forum was somewhat undermined.”149 After Morogoro, all of the men 
were fully reinstated in their positions and their expulsion cancelled.
Morogoro preparations
The effect of the Hani memorandum was to finally wake the leadership of the ANC 
external mission up to the dangerous crisis that was developing within the ranks of the 
organisation, and to the fact that urgent action was needed to rectify the situation. Whereas 
until this moment the leadership in exile had argued that the external mission had no 
mandate to hold new elections, Tambo now realised that “a consultative, decision-making 
event was not only vital but overdue.”150 The leaders on Robben Island were asked by 
secret word to give their approval to a reorganising of the ANC, to which they replied 
affirmatively.151 In February 1969, following a plenary session of the executive, the ANC 
issued directives concerning preparations for a conference, which was envisaged to be “the 
climax of a campaign of discussion, criticism and proposals covering all aspects of our 
work.”152 A Preparatory Committee, or secretariat, was established in Morogoro and Joe 
Matthews appointed Secretary. Everyone who wished to was invited to prepare a 
submission to the Preparatory Committee expressing views and criticism. In other words, 
the conference represented an important exercise in democratic participation within the 
ANC and between the ANC and its supporters, the idea being of “bringing into the 
discussion process the political and military movement, including external offices,
149 Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference,” 590.
150 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 330.
151 Ibid.
152 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, Duma Nokwe, Directive concerning preparation for Conference, 
Morogoro, 18 February 1969.
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members and supporters of the ANC and the Congress Alliance in South Africa and in
1exile, publicity and research sections, MK units, and individual experts.” Among the 
central issues to be discussed were “the consolidation of the various national groups and 
progressive organisations in the revolution,” “the structure of our movement,” and “the 
relationship between the political movement and the national liberation army -  Umkhonto 
We Sizwe.”154
Amongst the “veritable torrent’ of replies received by the Preparatory Committee
was the report o f a Commission of Enquiry on the Congress Alliance, which had been
appointed by the Recommendations Committee set up by the November 1966 meeting of
the Congress Alliance (see Chapter Four).156 The Commission’s findings strongly reminded
of the criticism already raised by the memoranda by Hani and Turok, and pointed to a
serious crisis of confidence in the leadership:
In recent years the leadership of the struggle both in the making and execution of 
policy has passed to the ANC Executive and it cannot be disputed that this 
executive has lost the confidence of a substantial layer of our cadres. This is not 
only an anomalous but also a most dangerous state of affairs.
A leadership so divorced from the led cannot be effective and may destroy the 
organisation. Imposition of decisions, harsh disciplinary measures, unwillingness to 
encourage discussion cannot be substitute for dedicated and inspiring leadership.157
The present situation was ascribed to four factors. First, the leadership had been elected ten 
years earlier under radically different conditions: the ANC was then still legal and 
committed to non-violent struggle. The executive had recently come in for severe criticism, 
both individually and as a whole, and yet the same leadership remained in office. Second,
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Joe Matthews, quoted in Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 35.
156 Ndebele and Nieftagodien, “The Morogoro Conference,” 586.
157 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Commission on the Congress Alliance, Report o f  the meeting 
held on the 23rd March 1969.
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the leadership was accused of “an incorrect appraisal of our struggle,” meaning that it had 
failed to recognise the armed struggle as the central core of the struggle. Third, many 
comrades from other sections of the Congress Alliance who had made many sacrifices and 
valuable contributions in the past and were “now ready to play their full role” had found 
themselves cut off from the struggle. Ben Turok’s experience was an example of this. 
Finally there were weaknesses in the present set up of the executive, where a small 
hierarchy seemed to have taken over, with the rest of the leadership being kept in the dark 
about matters.158
In assessing the organisational needs of the movement, the Commission proposed 
that a new organisation or body composed of “all dedicated and genuine Revolutionaries 
irrespective of their national origins” be set up, and that a new executive be elected by the 
forthcoming conference. Secondly, the establishment of various committees was proposed 
so as to “leave the executive as free as possible to apply itself to the major tasks before us.” 
Finally, that the dichotomy between the military and the political movement be terminated 
through the creation of a single umbrella leadership under a Revolutionary Committee. A 
separate role was reserved to SACTU, which as a trade union (and not a strictly political 
organisation) had “a vital role in arousing the workers.”159
Other submissions to the Morogoro Conference Preparatory Committee included 
the memorandum by Ben Turok, discussed earlier, and contributions from Joe Slovo, the 
London Committee of the CPC, and the South African exile community living in Ireland. 
Once again, “most o f the concerns echoed the contents of ‘Chris’s [Hani]
158 Ibid.
159 UCT Manuscripts and Archives, BC 1081, Commission on the Congress Alliance, Report o f  the meeting 
held on the 23rd March 1969.
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Memorandum,” 160 and proposed as a solution to these problems the integration of all racial 
groups into the liberation struggle -  either through the opening of ANC membership to 
non-Africans, or through the creation of a new political body which would be open to all. 
The CPC London Committee, for instance, proposed that the ANC should assume the role 
of a National Liberation Committee of South Africa in exile by assuming the functions of 
the leader of the whole revolutionary movement and not merely of the continued activities 
of the ANC abroad.161 Since London, where a cross-section of supporters lived, was 
identified as the main centre of activities and support for the ANC abroad and outside of 
Africa, it was proposed that “an organisation on a unitary membership basis should be 
established” while existing committees of the CPC and other Congress groups in London 
should be abolished and taken over by the proposed organisation.162
South African exiles living in Ireland163 urged similar structural changes. 
Historically, they claimed, the objective conditions in South Africa had made it necessary 
to mobilise people on the basis of national groups, as it had been in the Congress 
Movement. However, the development of the armed struggle, the effective mobilisation of 
the people, the protection of the South African revolution against sectarianism, ‘tribalism,’ 
and discord between different national groups, and the need to present to the world a united 
people under a single organisation, called for the following change:
160 Shubin, ANC, 89.
161 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH70, London Committee o f  the CPC, Resolution, London, March 1969.
162 Ibid.
163 A small community o f  South African exiles established itself in Ireland in the 1960s. Among them were 
Kader and Louise Asmal, who, after playing an important role in the birth o f  the British AAM in 1960, moved 
to Ireland in 1964 where they founded the Irish AAM.
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That the Congress Movement outside South Africa with the exception of the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions, be merged into one single organisation, namely 
the African National Congress of South Africa.164
In order to remedy the atmosphere of crisis prevailing in the movement, Turok also 
proposed “that comrades of all races be admitted to full membership of the ANC outside 
South Africa, on the condition that the African comrades predominate and are seen to 
predominate on all committees and in the general work of the organisation.”165 In a detailed 
response to his memorandum, Joe Matthews welcomed the proposal for integration of all 
personnel in the ANC external mission as “a tremendous step forward which could 
galvanise the whole movement,” and predicted that “something along these lines will 
emerge from our conference.”166
In a document entitled “Thoughts on the future of the [Congress] Alliance,” Joe 
Slovo argued that, in the post-Rivonia situation, “[t]he Congress Alliance in the form in 
which it was moulded in the fifties [had] ceased to exist.” Between the time of Rivonia and 
1966 the only two organisations which had continued to operate collectively, although 
independently from one another, were the ANC and the SACP, whereas the CPC, the 
SAIC, and SACTU, although still formally legal, had stopped functioning “either inside or 
outside the country in the sense of a defined and functioning national leadership with the 
organised allegiance of the rank and file.”167 Nevertheless, Slovo believed that Indian and 
Coloured people had an integral role to play in the fight against white supremacy, which 
called for united action. The November 1966 Morogoro consultative meeting of the
164 UFH, Liberation Archives, ANC London Papers, Box 35, File 116, Memorandum submitted by South 
Africans in Dublin, Ireland [1969].
165 Turok, “What Is Wrong?”, in Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 299.
166 Joe Matthews, Reply to document entitled “What is Wrong?” by comrade Ben Turok, reproduced in 
Turok, Nothing but the Truth, 311.
167 UWC Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Joe Slovo, Thoughts on the future o f  the Alliance, April 1969.
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Congress Alliance and its resolutions had been a first move towards achieving such unity.
In order to advance from this point, Slovo believed that:
The apparatus which is created and the other steps which are taken must once again 
begin to give public expression to the true character of the revolutionary front in 
South Africa and to the non-racial content of our struggle. It must in the first place 
not detract from the leading role of the majority group in our struggle and partly for 
this reason it should not revert to the NCC [National Consultative Council, the head 
of the former Congress Alliance] type of alliance with a multi-racial image and 
representation from the various bodies on the basis of parity. But in the second place 
it must publicly give expression to top level full acceptance and participation in our 
revolutionary struggle of the other groups and of non-African revolutionaries at 
policy making and leadership levels. 8
This could be achieved, Slovo suggested, through the selected integration of non-Africans, 
both inside and outside the country, into full ANC membership, which implied the 
repetition of “the pattern which has partly established itself in MK,” and would avoid 
drawing “an unwarranted division between armed and non-armed revolutionaries.” It was 
also important that a formal working relationship be established between the Communist 
Party and the ANC to achieve “the closest possible collaboration on the whole conduct of 
the revolution.”169 This was to become finalised during a meeting between the ANC and 
the SACP immediately after Morogoro. Finally, “[t]here must above all be no rigidity,” 
because only “[flexibility and continuous review” of existing structures as demanded by 
the political reality of the time would ensure the mobilisation of the maximum number of 
forces, both now and in the future.170
168 Ibid. Original emphasis.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
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Morogoro resolutions
Slovo’s “Thoughts on the future of the Alliance” formed the basis of “Strategy and 
Tactics,” arguably the most important document adopted by the Morogoro Consultative 
Conference, which took place between 25 April and 1 May 1969, and was attended by 
“over 70 delegates representing regions and training camps [...], including 11 invited 
representatives from allied organisations -  five Indians, three whites, and three 
Coloureds.”171 In “Strategy and Tactics,” which was “drafted by Slovo with some 
amendments by [Joe] Matthews and Duma Nokwe,”172 the ANC reiterated the ‘national’ 
character of the liberation struggle within the new “international context of transition to the 
Socialist system, [and] of the breakdown of the colonial system.” This kind of nationalism, 
which was proclaimed to go hand in hand with the principle of internationalism, was 
carefully distinguished from the “chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch,” 
understood as “the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain 
ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass.”173
In the document, the ANC declared that revolutionary armed struggle was now “the 
only method left open” for the winning of freedom in South Africa. It also spoke of the 
“overthrow of White supremacy” and of the development of “conditions for the future all- 
out war which will eventually lead to the conquest o f  power .”174 Therefore, it was only at 
Morogoro that the ANC external mission fully committed itself -  at least in theory -  to a 
revolutionary path. This marks a radical departure from the integrationist approach of the 
ANC’s history up to 1961, which had been implicit in the non-violent tactics of the 1950s,
171 Karis and Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 35.
172 Ibid.
173 “Strategy and Tactics,” adopted by the Morogoro Conference o f  the ANC, meeting at Morogoro, Tanzania, 
25 April - 1 May 1969, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/stratact.html.
174 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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and whose aim had been to win rights for the African people by trying to bring the 
government into constitutional dialogue. The “tactical circumspection” and pragmatic 
restraint displayed by ANC leaders including Mandela during the 1950s -  as opposed to 
more militant currents, including that of the Africanist movement -  was rooted in an 
inherent belief that racial conciliation in South Africa was possible. This ‘moderate’ 
attitude had continued to have an influence on the ANC even after the embrace of 
organised violence in 1961. In its manifesto, MK had left the door still open for talking and 
negotiating, while the tactical choice of selective sabotage reflected the hope that outright 
military confrontation could be avoided “even at this late hour.”176 The legacy of the new 
revolutionary strategy gradually developed by the ANC and its allies during the course of 
the 1960s and finally sanctioned by the Morogoro Conference in 1969 was long lasting. 
The armed struggle continued to be regarded as an indispensable condition for liberation 
until the end o f the 1970s. It was only in the 1980s that the ANC widened its strategic focus 
and returned to be closer to the image of a “broad church” which had characterised the 
organisation up until 1961 -  and which no doubt had remained a current within the 
organisation despite the momentous decision to take up arms.
The unique system of oppression in South Africa was described in “Strategy and 
tactics” as a double one, i.e. both racial and economic. Political emancipation was said to 
be inextricably linked to economic emancipation, for “to allow the existing economic 
forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not 
represent even the shadow of liberation.”177 In “Strategy and tactics” the ANC addressed 
for the first time the class content of the national struggle by according a special role to the
175 See Lodge, Madela, 61-63.
176 See “Manifesto o f  Umkhonto we Sizwe,” Leaflet issued by the Command o f  Umkhonto we Sizwe, 16th 
December 1961, document 66 in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 716-717.
177 Ibid.
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working class because of what was now recognised as its exceptional militancy and 
revolutionary character. In Chris Hani’s view, the fact that “the ANC began to say the 
working class is the backbone of the struggle -  of course, working with other classes and
178 •strata,” was the most important achievement of the Morogoro Conference. Through its 
analysis of the South African situation in terms of a double system of exploitation, and of 
the working class as the most dynamic force in the struggle for national liberation, the ANC 
implicitly adopted the ‘colonialism of a special type’ formula which the SACP had 
developed. The implications of this were far-reaching. ‘Colonialism of a special type’ 
provided the ANC with the theoretical instruments for the development of a theory of 
national liberation specifically within the South African context.179 The SACP had already 
come to this theoretical conclusion in its 1962 programme, which translated in practice into 
“the party’s commitment to help build a powerful ANC as head of the entire national 
democratic struggle.”180 By formally accepting the notion of ‘colonialism of a special type’ 
at Morogoro, the ANC put the final seal to its alliance with the SACP. Evidence of this is 
the fact that the first official meeting ever to take place between the ANC and the SACP 
was held soon after Morogoro in order to chart the way forward in regards to the 
relationship between the two organisations.181
The ANC’s commitment on non-racialism was also re-affirmed in “Strategy and 
tactics,” which stated that:
178 Chris Hani, quoted in Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 361.
179 Dirk Kotze, “The role o f  the SACP in the struggle for liberation,” in Liebenberg et al. (eds.), The Long
March, 49.
180 Joe Slovo, “Beyond the stereotype,” in Liebenberg et al. (eds.), The Long March, 37.
181 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Notes on the discussion between a delegation from the CC o f  the
SACP and the NEC o f  the ANC [n.d.].
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Our policy must continually stress in the future (as it has in the past) that there is 
room in South Africa for all who live in it but only on the basis of absolute
1 87democracy.
The document also called for unity in action between all three oppressed groups, which 
needed to be given structural expression through the full integration of “those belonging to 
the other oppressed groups and those few White revolutionaries who show themselves 
ready to make common cause with our aspiration.”183 Non-racialism represents the second 
most important theoretical contribution the SACP brought to the ANC. Once again, this had 
important consequences in terms of revolutionary practice. Communists in South Africa 
had undoubtedly been “the undisputed pioneers of a genuine non-racial political 
organisation.”184 The formation of MK had marked the next step in the formal integration 
of communists in the structures of the national liberation movement. At Morogoro, the 
integration of ANC/SACP membership was completed with the incorporation of non- 
Africans in the ANC on the basis of individual equality.
In practice, then, “Strategy and Tactics” allowed the opening of the ANC to non- 
Africans. The decision, which was approved unanimously at Morogoro, was however 
limited to the ANC external mission, while ANC membership in South Africa continued to 
be confined to Africans on the grounds that scope still existed for the exploitation of semi­
legal opportunities arising from the formal legality of the CPC, the SAIC and SACTU.185 
Furthermore, the composition of the NEC, its membership having resigned en-bloc as a 
result of the criticism which had been levelled against it, remained restricted to Africans 
only. As Shubin has noted, “these limitations to the ANC external structure were obviously
182 “Strategy and Tactics,” adopted by the Morogoro Conference o f  the ANC, meeting at Morogoro, Tanzania, 
25 April - 1 May 1969, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/historv/stratact.html.
183 Ibid.
184 Slovo, “Beyond the stereotype,” 37.
185 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Joe Slovo, Thoughts on the future o f  the Alliance, April 1969.
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aimed at satisfying those who thought that the most important decisions should be taken 
inside the country.”186 Callinicos has remarked that “interestingly, on Robben Island, the 
decision had [already] been taken to operate only one organisation, one alliance to which 
all Congress Alliance and SACP prisoners belonged, and that was the ANC.”187 Moreover, 
the leadership on the Island was in some respects ahead of the leadership in exile in that the 
composition of their executive body, the High Organ, was non-racial.
A new, leaner NEC, reduced from eighteen to nine members, was elected at the 
conference.188 Oliver Tambo, who had also resigned during the conference proceedings, 
was confirmed in his position of Acting President, which he had taken up on Chief 
Luthuli’s death in 1966, but which had never received official sanction. The position MK’s 
commander in chief was abolished and replaced by that of chief of operations, to which 
Modise was transferred, thus retaining his place in the military despite the criticism he had 
been the target of. This decision may have had to do with Tambo’s desire not to upset 
“ethnic susceptibilities”189 and to avert accusations that the ANC was Xhosa-dominated. 
Finally, a new body of twenty members, the Revolutionary Council, was also created at 
Morogoro; “its responsibility was to integrate political and military strategy for the struggle 
within South Africa.”190 The Revolutionary Council, which answered directly to the NEC, 
was chaired by Tambo with Joe Matthews as Secretary and, unlike the NEC, was multi­
racial in composition and included non-Africans Yusuf Dadoo, who acted as Vice- 
Chairman, Joe Slovo, Aziz Pahad, and Reg September. Its purpose was to bring non- 
Africans into ANC/MK structures in a more organised manner.
186 Shubin, ANC, 335.
187 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 336.
188 For the composition o f  the old and new National Executive Committee see ibid., 91-92.
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Eligibility to the NEC of the ANC only became accessible to non-Africans at the 
next ANC National Consultative Conference held in Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. Although 
the Kabwe Conference is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to note that the 
debate at Kabwe resembled in many ways the controversy over the status of non-Africans 
in the ANC in the debates that had preceded Morogoro. The main question at Kabwe was 
what the impact of the decision to open the NEC to non-Africans would be on the 
movement in South Africa itself. Once again, SACP members found themselves at 
opposing ends of the debate (Brian Bunting, for instance, voted against it, while Joe Slovo 
was strongly in favour).191 In the end the conference resolved that since “by and large the 
leadership of the Movement devolves on our shoulders” and “despite the fact that the 
majority of our members are inside the country, the National Consultative Conference can 
take decisions on the question and explain to the rest how we came to such conclusions. In 
Morogoro we could not take a decision, but now think we should open membership to all.” 
The matter was put to the vote with an overwhelming majority (225) voting in favour, and 
only two votes against and three abstentions.192 The post-1976 generation who had swelled 
the ranks of MK after the Soweto uprising was a major force in pushing the ANC to open 
its leadership to all races. The Soweto generation who came out of the Black 
Consciousness Movement in fact made no distinction between Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians, who were all regarded as ‘black’ and as a single category of oppressed people.193 
Joe Slovo, the first white person to be elected on the NEC of the ANC, was carried on the
191 Interview with Brian Bunting, Rondebosch, Cape Town, 22 November 2004.
192 “Main decisions and recommendations,” ANC Second National Consultative Conference, meeting at 
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shoulders of his MK cadres up onto the platform at Kabwe,194 which seems to suggest that
the Kabwe resolutions were supported by the rank and file of the ANC.
The opening of ANC membership at Morogoro was facilitated by some political
developments on the African continent. By 1966, inter-state disputes, disagreements within
the OAU, and the instability of African governments (of which the February 1966 coup in
Ghana is an example) had shown Africa to be an unstable factor as an aid and assistance to
the struggle, thus easing some of the pressure off the ANC of having to prove its African-
ness. The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, had become the ANC’s principal source of
support, accounting for 85 percent of the funding in 1965.195 Finally, by the late 1960s, the
PAC no longer represented a serious threat to the ANC’s international standing.
The transformation of the ANC into a non-racial organisation was viewed by some
as evidence of its successful hijacking by the Communist Party and of a dilution of the
ANC’s “African image.” In fact the resolutions (notably the opening of membership and
the creation of the Revolutionary Council) and the reshuffling of the NEC at Morogoro
became the source of resentment for a small group of people, gravitating around Robert
Resha, Tennyson and Ambrose Makiwane, Joe Matlou and Alfred Kgokong, calling
»
themselves “African Nationalists,” and who became better known as the “Group” or “Gang 
of Eight.” The discord between this group and the rest of the leadership of the ANC (and of 
the SACP196) erupted in public in a speech made by Tennyson Makiwane at the unveiling 
of Resha’s tombstone in London in 1975,197 after which the “conspirational group of
194 Slovo, Every Secret Thing, 206.
195 Shubin, ANC, 68.
196 Makiwane and Resha had also been SACP members.
197 See Speech by Ambrose Makiwane at the unveiling o f Robert Resha’s tombstone, London 19 July 1975, 
and Statement by eight expelled members o f  the ANC, 27 December 1975, documents 18 and 20 in Karis and 
Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 400-402, 403-406.
315
dissidents” was expelled by the NEC.198 The resentment felt by the “Eight” clique was to 
due to some extent to personal grudges -  most of them were ex-NEC members who had not 
been re-elected at Morogoro. But, at the same time, they were the same group who had 
opposed any change to the structures of the ANC external missions during the debates that 
had taken place in the years prior to the conference, as they displayed the same Africanist 
stance (now also openly anti-communist, or rather anti-SACP) that they had displayed then 
in defence of the “African image.” The “Group of Eight” represented the last potentially 
disruptive expression of a narrow African nationalism, always a subliminal trend within the 
ANC which would periodically find articulation.
The ANC-SACP alliance
After the Morogoro conference, a historic meeting took place between a delegation from 
the NEC of the ANC and from the Central Committee of the SACP, at whose last plenary 
session a decision had been taken to initiate discussions with the ANC. Although the two 
organisations had “walked with hands clasped together for many years,”199 this was the first 
formal meeting ever to have taken place between the ANC and the SACP. The meeting was 
chaired by JB Marks and attended by eight others, including Tambo, Dadoo, Slovo, Harmel 
and Matthews. It is perhaps significant that Kotane, probably still hospitalised then, did not 
take part in this meeting. Joe Slovo, speaking on behalf of the Central Committee of the 
SACP, put forward to the ANC two key proposals. The first was that of the setting up of
198 See “Expulsion o f  a conspirational clique,” statement by the National Executive o f  the ANC, Morogoro, 
11 December 1975 (abridged), and “The enemy hidden under the same colour,” statement by the Central 
committee o f  the SACP on the “Group o f  Eight,” 1976 (abridged), documents 19 and 22 in Karis and Gerhart, 
Nadir and Resurgence, 402-403, 411-413.
199 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Notes on the discussion between a delegation from the CC o f  the 
SACP and the NEC o f the ANC [n.d.].
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non-public, regular contact between the leaderships of the two organisations “on common 
problems and policy and the utilisation of all our resources, both inside and outside the 
country.” The second proposal concerned the careful establishment of organised contact 
between the SACP leadership and its individual members in MK. The reorganisation of the 
SACP in exile had in fact led to the “almost complete isolation o f individual members from 
the Party collective.” The lack of organised touch had weakened, according to the SACP 
leadership, not only the SACP (because of the absence of a proper collective life) but also 
the movement as a whole (because the isolation of individual SACP members had led to the 
creation of unorthodox attitudes and political postures in conflict with the Party’s ideology 
and standards of conduct).200
In his speech, Tambo stated that there was “no doubt that the two leading pillars of 
our struggle are the ANC and the SACP.” This unique situation had been made possible by 
the special character or the SACP, which had “shown the sort of flexibility which one does 
not always see in other organisations claiming to be communist.” Tambo declared to be 
unaware of the gap which the SACP felt existed between the two organisations. He 
explained that: “We [in the ANC] have not always felt the need for joint discussions of this 
character because we thought that the Party was a collective and operates as a collective. 
This seemed to meet all the requirements of contact mainly through some of its leading 
members in the ANC,”201 most notably Kotane, Marks and Duma Nokwe. In reply to the 
SACP’s two proposals, Tambo warned against providing “the evidence which our enemies 
so badly want, to show (what of course is quite untrue) that the SACP runs the ANC.” 
Which meant that it was “good politics and good tactics” for the ANC and the SACP to 
continue to keep their separate identities, even if in practice the two organisations worked
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
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“intimately and closely together.” The ANC Acting President also cautioned against the 
method through which contact between the leadership collective o f the SACP and its 
membership in MK camps in Africa should be achieved, although he agreed with the 
question of contact in principle. The implicit danger in this case was that of setting up two, 
possibly competing, levels of discipline within MK which may in the end undermine the 
overall authority of the ANC, to which all MK members were ultimately subject to.202
The ANC-SACP meeting unanimously agreed that the leaderships of the two 
organisations should maintain “regular, non-public contact on common problems and major 
policy questions” and on the “maximum utilisation of all resources for the struggle both 
inside and outside the country.” A leading member of the ANC would be appointed by the 
Central Committee of the SACP as liaison man between the latter and the ANC’s Acting 
President. On the question of effective contact within the SACP, no separate SACP units 
were to be created in the army. It was however accepted that the Central Committee 
privately appoint two or three members in each major centre to maintain discreet contact 
with the Central Committee. These appointees were in turn allowed to establish individual 
contact with other SACP members or, where necessary, appoint one or more other 
members under them. The ANC-SACP liaison person would also be responsible for 
keeping in touch with these SACP appointees to ensure that the possible complications 
arising out of the method of implementation of contact would be avoided. SACP members 
outside of the army centres were also given authorisation to meet from time to time 203
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
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Conclusion
By the late 1960s, the problems of representation that had emerged in London came to 
converge with pressures from the camps, where MK cadres were growing increasingly 
disaffected with the ANC leadership. The state of disillusionment in MK pointed to a 
widening gap between the political and military wings of the ANC. This had been made 
possible by their continuing separation even after the ANC external mission had taken over 
the whole leadership of the struggle. It seems that by the time the Morogoro Conference 
was called, the leadership of the ANC was lagging behind in creative ideas, and vitally 
needed to put itself back in pace with its non-African comrades and, most importantly, with 
its rank and file. The Morogoro Conference was an important act of intervention by the 
leadership of the ANC that sought to address as well as redress this situation of crisis and to 
rebuild the confidence of the people in the organisation.
Stephen Ellis, like the “Group of Eight” before him, has interpreted Morogoro as an 
opportunity which the SACP used “to advance its own cause by persuading the ANC to 
adopt a more explicit socialist line and by opening the ranks of the External Mission to 
non-black members.”204 Although the influence of the SACP thinking on “Strategy and 
tactics” is undeniable, the conclusions o f the Morogoro conference were an independent 
achievement which the ANC reached as a collective as a result of the development of the 
armed struggle during the 1960s. In fact, in the period leading up to the conference, there 
had been no official SACP line, and individual SACP leaders adopted divergent views on 
the issue of incorporation of non-Africans into ANC structures. The resolutions of the 
Morogoro conference, on the other hand, provided the ideological foundation for the
204 Ellis, “The ANC in exile,” 444.
319
development o f a more coherent working relationship between the two organisations over 
the decades to come.
The Congress Alliance as it had been conceived in the 1950s had ceased to have 
meaning in exile. In the words of Albie Sachs, outside of the South African context: “It 
made less and less sense. You can’t have four organisations underground. [...] In London 
we had an ANC office. Imagine if you are telling the English people, here is the ANC, there 
is the Coloured People’s Congress, there is the Indian Congress, there is the Congress of 
Democrats. And you are [all] fighting apartheid. You just couldn’t.”205 Although the ANC 
had been slow in recognising this, it finally did so at Morogoro by opening its membership 
to non-Africans so that in the international setting all South African exiles would be 
members of the same non-racial organisation. After Morogoro, the term the “Alliance” no 
longer referred to the partnership between the ANC, SAIC, CPC, COD and SACTU but to 
the one between the ANC, SACTU and the SACP.206 The alliance between the ANC and 
the SACP was formally reviewed at a meeting between representatives of the leading 
organs of the two organisations after Morogoro, when a more official and institutionalised 
form of collaboration was agreed on.
205 Quoted in Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 335.
206 Maloka, The South African Communist Party, 21-22.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has outlined the development of the ANC and the PAC during their first decade 
in exile. It is an attempt to restore this part of their past to a history in all of its complexity 
and ambiguity. The notion that the 1960s was a ‘decade of quietude’ not only conveys the 
erroneous impression that ‘nothing happened,’ but also fails to accurately illustrate the 
dramatic nature of some of the changes which took place during this often difficult period.
The year 1960 was a turning point in the history of both South Africa and the 
African continent as a whole. However, whereas by 1960 most of Africa was on a pace of 
rolling independence, the date marked a serious setback in the struggle against white 
minority rule in South Africa. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, a 
handpicked number of leaders of the resistance movement secretly left South Africa so that 
they could mount international support for the liberation struggle. Thus, 1960 saw the 
establishment of an official external presence by both the ANC and the PAC at the time that 
they were outlawed in South Africa. But this thesis has argued that since the end of the 
Second World War there had been an increase of diplomatic and international work by the 
South African liberation movements. In the aftermath of the war, Britain, which had always 
been one of the key focal points of black South Africans’ protest because of its colonial 
legacy and responsibility for the creation of the Union of South Africa as a white Dominion 
in the British Empire, became the centre of an intensified anti-colonial and Pan-African 
activity. It was within this broader context of the movement against colonialism that anti­
apartheid campaigning also took root in Britain during this period. Moreover, because of 
the deep-rooted historic and economic links that tied South Africa to Britain, and with no 
African countries yet independent, it was through the UK that the South African liberation
movements’ international contacts initially passed. From the late 1940s and throughout the 
1950s, Britain also became home to a small but nonetheless significant number of South 
African radical students and leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition and trade union 
movement. This first generation of exiles left South Africa because of a mixture of personal 
and political reasons, but with no formal mandate for international representation from the 
organisations they had been members of back home. Nonetheless, they were driven by a 
strong political commitment and profound sense of allegiance to the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa. Thus they organised themselves politically in the UK by 
becoming active within the network of British organisations supporting the struggles for 
independence of colonial peoples, African students organisations represented in London, 
and other political groups on the left of British politics, especially the British Communist 
Party, by way of its connection with the SACP.
Inspired by the ANC’s decision to launch a boycott of products associated with the
National Party and apartheid, in June 1959 they launched a parallel consumer boycott with
the help of their supporters in Britain. Less than a year later, this limited campaign had
transformed itself into a permanent organisation. The AAM grew over the next decades into
one of the most formidable solidarity movements by offering its broad support for the
freedom struggle in South Africa without, however, trying to control its direction. The birth
of the AAM, this study has suggested, was significant for a number of other considerations.
Not only do the origins of the AAM bear strong similarities with the Congress Movement
in South Africa, but also the AAM performed a similar role to the one of the Congress
Alliance in the 1950s as it provided a broad public front through which anti-apartheid
protest could be articulated by a wide range of individuals and groups. After 1960, the
AAM was able to incorporate successive waves of South African political exiles that
arrived in the UK so that they could put their resources and energies to use in support of the
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national liberation movement. This was especially true of the 1960s, when non-African 
exiles, the majority of whom came to stay in Britain, were excluded from membership of 
the ANC external mission.
The networks established by South African exiles during the course of the 1950s 
played a crucial role in welcoming the leadership of the liberation movements as they were 
driven into exile when Sharpeville took place. These black South African leaders were also 
highly conscious of the importance o f African support for the furtherance of their cause, as 
one African country after another won its independence from colonial rule. Encouraged by 
the newly-independent African states, and Ghana especially, to unite in a common front, 
the first international ambassadors of the ANC and the PAC, as well as representatives 
from the SAIC, SWANU and SWAPO, joined forces in the SAUF. Although the leaders of 
the SAUF were able to set common goals and work together towards their achievement 
with a modicum of success, the union was ultimately shortlived. As the internal opposition 
movement gradually reactivated after the State of Emergency imposed following 
Sharpeville was lifted, the political differences which had led the PAC to break away from 
its mother body in the first place again came forcefully to the fore. The active opposition to 
unity displayed by the PAC in South Africa with regards to the anti-republican 
demonstrations at the end of May 1961 put a heavy strain on the tentative union which had 
been achieved abroad. Eventually, early in 1962, the union collapsed. The delay in breaking 
up the SAUF can be explained by the liberation movements’ unwillingness to upset the 
views of independent African states, who believed that different liberation movements in 
Africa’s unliberated territories should unite to defeat their common enemy. Moreover, 
ANC leaders like Tambo and Mandela had been distressed to discover that the ANC’s 
multi-racial strategy of cooperation with other groups was out of step with the dominant
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Pan-African sentiments in the rest of the continent, where the PAC appeared to be the 
preferred movement.
This discovery led to the formulation of the little known policy of the “African 
image” by the ANC. It was according to this principle that the ANC began to set up offices 
or external missions in various countries, mainly in African cities, following the demise of 
the SAUF in 1962. The other organisations in the Congress Alliance, as well as the recently 
‘emerged’ SACP, agreed that only the ANC should set up offices abroad as the most senior 
member in the alliance and as the representative of the African majority of the population 
in South Africa. The aim of the “African image” policy was to assert African leadership so 
as to avoid an unnecessary dispersion of energies and most importantly to correct the notion 
that the ANC was controlled by Indians and white communists. The coolness of relations 
between the ANC and Ghana was a glaring example of the suspicion with which the ANC 
was viewed by many African states because of its policy of multi-racial cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the failure of the anti-republican stay-away of May 1961 had brought about a 
dramatic re-thinking of the liberation movements’ non-violent tactics which in turn led to 
the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe by the ANC and SACP leadership and of the PAC- 
inspired Poqo movement. Although for a brief period of time MK was able to carry out a 
number of sabotage operations under the direction of a leadership secretly functioning 
inside South Africa, by 1964 this underground machinery had almost completely been 
destroyed by the South African government thanks to the Rivonia raid and trial.
From mid-1962, the PAC, whose leadership had been momentarily paralysed by
mass the arrests and prison sentencing after the March 1960 anti-pass protest, also started to
regroup in exile with its centre in Maseru, where it enjoyed the full backing of the locally
popular BCP. Thanks to its physical proximity to South Africa, the PAC leaders in
Basutoland, under Leballo’s command, were able to synchronise operations with the
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internal Poqo movement, which had started off as the result of spontaneous initiatives by 
PAC members in various localities. Despite the great strategic potential offered by the 
Basutoland headquarters and the popular support it enjoyed, the underground PAC/Poqo 
network was infiltrated and smashed by the South African police in 1963 before the PAC’s 
ambitious plan of a country-wide general uprising could be staged, while the PAC 
leadership was forced out of Basutoland shortly afterwards. Leballo’s careless statements at 
a press conference in Maseru in March 1963 are partly to blame for the police crackdown 
on Poqo. In the long term, Leballo’s Maseru claims had severe repercussions as they 
irretrievably undermined his legitimacy as the leader of the PAC in the eyes of many of its 
members. Despite Leballo’s attempts at centralising control of the organisation in his own 
hands, internecine strife, which centred around who should hold positions of power within 
the movement, became an endemic feature of PAC politics in exile. Fighting did not 
confine itself to the internal affairs of the PAC but also spilled over to the Basutoland 
political context, often violently, with the effect of pushing the British colonial authorities 
in that country to do everything in their powers to make the PAC’s continued existence 
there as difficult as possible (short of its banning). Continuous harassment of PAC 
members by the Basutoland police coupled with the 1965 BNP electoral victory eventually 
had the desired effect of thwarting PAC activities in the country.
Whereas by 1964 the internal underground machineries of both the ANC and the
PAC had almost completely been destroyed by the apartheid state, their respective external
movements grew simultaneously. After Rivonia, the external mission of the ANC, the only
representative of the Congress Alliance with formal external representation, assumed the
leadership of the whole of the ANC as well as of its armed wing, MK. For the ANC and its
partners in what had been the Congress Alliance, the transformation into an exile
movement entailed a complex and re-negotiation of the relations which had existed
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between them in South Africa. This rearrangement was a highly contested process and not a 
straightforward progression from the multi-racial structure established in the form of the 
Congress Alliance in the 1950s to the creation of a non-racial, unitary organisation. By the 
mid-1960s, the “African image” policy, which in fact excluded the non-African leadership 
in exile from policy and decision making positions, increasingly came to the fore as a 
stumbling block to the full participation of all exiles into the structure and workings of the 
ANC external mission. This problem applied especially to the London context, where the 
majority of the white, Indian and Coloured exiles had come to live, and Barney Desai’s 
clash with the leadership of the ANC in exile on this matter represents a clear manifestation 
of it. Desai’s impatience with the ANC, which appeared unwilling to compromise, led to 
his defection to the PAC with a small group of CPC leaders in 1966. Despite Desai’s break 
from the ANC, the question of external representation continued to be an issue of 
contention between the Africa-based leaders of the ANC and their non-African supporters 
in London. These debates, which essentially centred on the ANC membership policy, also 
seemed to divide the SACP along racial lines. However, the very SACP membership of the 
London milieu was what differentiated the ‘London debates’ from the dispute between the 
ANC and Barney Desai. Unlike Desai, SACP exiles in London were bound by SACP 
policy to the absolute principle of unity with the ANC.
At the time that the CPC men joined the PAC, this organisation was on the verge of
being tom apart by its in-fighting, which had emerged quite forcefully since its Basutoland
days. Only after the intervention of the OAU and the Tanzanian government, where the
PAC’s headquarters had been moved, was an attempt made to bring an end to the factional
struggles within the PAC in exile through a leadership meeting at Moshi in 1967. The
Moshi conference, however, only put off the problems that it intended to resolve. The
failure to contain the problems of factionalism can be ascribed to the exclusive character of
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the Moshi Conference -  where rank and file members were not represented -  and the 
scapegoating tactics used by Leballo and his supporters to deflect criticism from his person. 
Lastly, the Moshi Conference is evidence of a process of ideological reorientation that the 
PAC in exile underwent as a result of the relations that it established with the People’s 
Republic of China. How profound this change was and whether it was essentially one of 
convenience remains open to question.
Unlike the Moshi meeting, the resolutions adopted by the Morogoro Conference 
were more successful in smoothing the tensions between the ANC and its supporters in 
exile. By opening membership, a more inclusive framework was established on the basis of 
which future relations could be built. This proved to be especially important for the 
development of a working relationship between the ANC and the SACP. The clarion call 
that a consultative meeting was not just desirable but also vital to the ANC’s continued 
survival, however, did not come from the London exiles but from within the ANC itself, 
and more specifically from its armed wing.
Despite the ANC’s plan to launch a campaign of guerrilla warfare inside South
Africa, by 1965 it had become clear that there was a serious physical problem of how to
return trained MK cadres to South Africa. As MK guerrillas found themselves indefinitely
stationed in military camps such as Kongwa, discontent started to brew. As well as
loitering, there seem to have been other reasons for the malaise in the camps. These
included neglect by the leadership, accusations of corruption, and perceptions of
preferential treatment/unjust punishment often meted out on the basis of ethnicity. Further,
perhaps less acknowledged sources of discontent seem to have been related to the different
type of training MK recruits received (e.g. Chinese or Soviet) and to issues of strategy and
tactics (e.g. rural-based vs urban guerrilla warfare). The ANC’s response to this state of
unrest in MK was to form an alliance with ZAPU and to embark on a series of military
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incursions in Rhodesia which started in August 1967 and continued throughout most of 
1968. Despite the symbolic value that they may have come to acquire in official and 
popular histories of MK -  thus helping sustain the myth of the armed struggle (which in 
actual fact never came anywhere near a full-scale war) over the years -  from a military 
point of view the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns ended in disaster and threw MK -  and the 
ANC -  into an even deeper crisis. The criticism waged against the ANC leadership by 
Chris Hani and his comrades pointed to fundamental problems of strategy and tactics which 
arose out of the ANC’s inability to adjust to the changing context.
Therefore, by the time the Morogoro Conference was called, the ANC had reached 
an impasse which could only be overcome through the working out of new strategies, 
objectives and structures. The importance of this process of self-renewal and change was 
that the ANC and its allies were able to survive by working out effective and acceptable 
strategies and structures thanks to the commitment to unity of all the dominant strands in 
the Congress Alliance. In spite of the disagreements, the issues and arguments which 
emerged in this period were not about whether, but how, unity could best be achieved. 
Given the huge rifts in South African society, this was quite a remarkable achievement.
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